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This thesis examines the nature and development of Islamism in Indonesia between 
1998 and 2002. The New Order regime (1966-1998) suppressed ideologically driven 
Islam. Islamic political aspirations for most of this period were channelled mainly 
through the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP). In 
1998, many new Islamist parties were established. The most important were Partai 
Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) and Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', 
PBB). The main support base ofPK was Islamic study groups from state universities. 
PBB intended to revive the ideals of Masyumi, the country's largest Islamist party of 
the 1950s. A large part of this study focuses on the political behaviour of PPP, PK 
and PBB. 
Much of the scholarly literature on Islamic politics undervalues Islamism's 
constitutionalism and reformist credentials. At the same time, it is rarely sensitive to 
the contradictions in Islamist politics and the causes of this. Many scholars approach 
the subject from a Western liberal point of view. This thesis critiques this literature 
and advances a more nuanced approach by examining Islamist politics on its own 
terms. 
The study gives particular attention to the dynamic between ideological idealism and 
political pragmatism. It will demonstrate that, for the most part, pragmatism 
prevailed in Islamist politics. It does not discount ideologically driven motives but 
holds that these were often subordinate to practical electoral considerations, in 
particular the need to appear pluralist and reform oriented. It will also point to 
political strategy as the crucial factor behind Islamism's manifold ambiguities. The 
thesis also discusses ideological and strategic aspects in the re-formation process of 
Islamist parties and the downplaying of shari 'ah (Islamic law) issues in order to 
maximise electoral support and the share of power politic. 
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GLOSSARY and ABBREVIATIONS 
adat: local traditions and customs 
ad-din: (Islamic) belief 
ADZKIA: PK-close foundation containing educational institutions and 
consultations, centred in West-Sumatra 
ahl al-kitab (Arab: ahlu 'l-kitab or ahl al-kitab), lit. 'People of the Book', denoting 
the scripture-based religions of the Jewish and Christian communities (based 
on the Gospels and the torah), both acknowledged and, according to Islam, 
completed by the final revelation, the Qur' an 
ahlu sunnah waljamaah (Arab: ahlu 'l-sunna wa 'l-jama 'a): adherents of the 
Prophetic tradition and the community; i.e. Sunnis 
akhidah: (Islamic) ethics and morals; creed 
al-bara: disobedience, 'to free oneself (from un-Islamic rule), Islamist stipulation 
al-Ghifari: Islamic student circle at the Horticultural Institute in Bandung (IPB) 
al-Haraih: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close 
al-Haramain: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close 
al-Hikmah: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close 
al-Irsyad: modernist, puritan foundation of the early 20th century, led by Indonesians 
ofYemenite descend 
al-Manar: Jakarta-based foundation, PK-close 
al-wala: loyalty, obedience (toward a ruler/government implementing Islamic 
teachings), opposite of al-bara 
amar rna 'ruf nahy munkar (Arab: amr bi al-ma 'ru 1 wa nahy 'an al-munkar): lit. 'to 
enjoin good and prohibit evil', Quran'ic stipulation, sometimes used as 
justification for pragmatic behaviour 
asas tunggal: 'sole ideological foundation', government program ofthe mid-1980s 
enforcing the state ideology Pancasila on all political parties and socio-
religious organisations 
As-Syafiyyah: small modernist Islamic organisation 
aurat: those parts of the female body which should be covered in public 
BAKOMUBIN: Badan Koordinasi Mubaligh se-Indonesia ('Indonesian Co 
-ordinating Body of Muslim Preachers') 
bay 'ah: oath of loyalty toward a Muslim leader who in tum is obliged to implement 
Islam 
bayanat: 'official explanation' (of a policy to constituencies by an Islamist party) 
BKAM: Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin ('Aiding Muslim Coordinating Body') 
BKPM: Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal ('Association for the Coordination of 
Modal Investment') 
BKSPPI: Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia ('Indonesian Pondok 
Pesantren Cooperation Body') 
BKUI: Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam ('Coordinating Body of the Muslim 
Community'), modernist-dominated body designed to establish a single 
Islamist party in 1998 
BPUPBN: Badan Pimpinan Umum Perusahaan Bangunan Negara ('Management 
Board of the State Construction Enterprise') 
BPUPKI: Badan Penelitian Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia ('Investigatory 
Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence') 
vm 
Bulog: Badan Urusan Logistik ('Logistic Affairs Agency') 
bupati: regent of a district 
cadar: an Arab-style veil for women covering the whole body 
Cides: ICMI-affiliated think tank 
CSIS: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, government-close think-tank of 
the New Order years 
CYFIS: Centre for Youth, Future and International Studies, PK-close think-tank 
da 'i: preacher 
dakwah (Arab: da 'wa): activities to propagate Islam (i.e. proselytisation, preaching) 
dar-a! Islam: 'House oflslam' (Islamic realm, i.e. House of Peace) 
dar-a! harb: 'House of War' (i.e. realm not ruled by Islam) 
DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Propagation 
Council'), main custodian of the Masyumi legacy 
DI: Darul Islam ('Realm oflslam'), rebellious movement in Java and Sulawesi, 
1948-62 
DPA: Dewan Pertimbangan Agung ('Supreme Advisory Council') 
DPP: Dewan Pimpinan Pusat ('Central Leadership Board'), i.e. party executive 
DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat ('People's Representative Council', i.e. the 
Indonesian parliament) 
FAPI: Forum Aliansi Partai Partai Islam ('Alliance Forum oflslamic Parties'), first 
of two umbrella organisations of smaller Islamist parties 
fatwa: legal ruling (on Islamic law) 
FID: Forum Indonesia Damai ('Forum for a Peaceful Indonesia'), organisation 
comprising leaders from Christian and Muslim organisations, including Partai 
Keadilan 
fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence 
FKGMI: Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Islam ('Communication Forum of the 
Islamic Youth'), small activist group 
FPI: Front Pembela Islam ('Front ofthe Defenders of Islam') 
FSAPI: Forum Silaturrahmi Antar Partai-Partai Islam ('Islamic Goodwill Forum'), 
umbrella group comprising smaller Islamist parties, including Partai Keadilan 
FSUHTM: Forum Silaturrahmi Ulama Habaib dan Tokoh Masyarakat ('Goodwill 
Forum ofHabaib Ulama and Community Leaders') 
FUI: Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah ('Islamic Brotherhood Forum'), modernist 
-dominated Bulan Bintang group sustaining the Masyumi spirit, established 
in 1989 
ghazwul fikri (Arab: [a!- ]ghazwu '1-jikri or [a!- ]ghazw al-jikri): lit. 'invasion of 
ideas'; term depicting an eternal struggle between Islam and any other 
ideology with the goal to return each Muslim to Islam and establish Islamic 
world domination 
GMNI: Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia ('National Indonesian Student 
Movement') 
Golkar: Golongan Karya, political vehicle of the state during the New Order years 
GPI: Gerakan Pemuda Islam ('Islamic Youth Movement') 
GPMI: Gerakan Persaudaraan Muslim Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood 
Movement') 
hadis, hadith (Arab: IJ,adTth): Traditions of the sayings and deeds of the Prophet 
Mohammad 
hajj: pilgrimage to Mecca 
lX 
Hanbalism: strictest and most puritan of the four Islamic legal traditions, rejecting 
reason and philosophy to distil a body oflaws from the Islamic texts though 
claiming to adhere to independent reasoning (ijtihad) and analogy (qiyas) 
haram: prohibited by Islamic law 
hijra: Muhammad's 'emigration' from Mecca to Medina to foster unity among the 
Arab tribes in 622. 
Hizbollah/Sabillilah: Islamic armed units fighting the Dutch colonial troops during 
revolution (1945 to 1949) 
Hizbul Wathan: small modernist dominated Islamic group 
HMI: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam ('Islamic Students' Association'), main modernist 
student organisation 
HMI MPO: Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Majelis Penyelemat Organisasi ('Council 
For Safeguarding HMI'), HMI splinter group, established in 1983 
hubbu 'l-watan mina 'l-iman: 'love of the homeland is part of faith', famous maxim 
for Muslims to stress nationalist devotion, awarded to Rashid Rida 
hudud: (lit. taboo, limit), Qur'anic regulations seen as unequivocal and 
unalterable; today more broadly referring to deeds for which the Qur' an 
demands particular legal penalties/punishments (for example theft and 
adultery) 
hukum: (lit. to rule, to regulate, to judge), i.e. law 
ibadah: (lit. 'service to God'), originally: implementing God's will on earth, now 
usually associated with the pillars of Islam, especially the five daily prayers 
ICDR: Islamic International Council for Da'wa and Relief 
ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia ('Association oflndonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals'), regime-close modernist organisation established in 
1990 
IIFSO: International Islamic Federation Student Organisation 
ijma: 'consensus', originally referring to practise oflslamic authorities 
clarifying matters of Islamic law, today interpreted as Qur' anic consent to 
democratic procedures 
ijtihad (Arab: ijtihad): reasoning, individual interpretation of Islamic teachings and 
law, a central feature oflslamic modernism 
imam: leader in Shiite theology, perceived as infallible (mas 'hum) 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IMM: Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah ('Union ofMuhammadiyah Students') 
IPB: Institut Pertanian Bogor ('Bogor Agricultural Institute') 
IPM: Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah ('Association ofMuhammadiyah Students') 
IPNU: Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama ('Association ofNU Students') 
IPS: Institute of Policy Studies, think tank involving several former PBB leaders 
ITB: Technological Institute ofBandung 
ishlah: Islamic stipulation of 'reconciliation' (between Muslims) 
izzul Islam wa 'l Muslimin: lit. the 'glory oflslam and the Muslim Community', 
proclaimed dictum of both the Masyumi and Partai Bulan Bintang 
jahiliyah: lit. '(period of) ignorance', originally denoting paganism in Saudi 
-Arabia before the advent of Islam, today standing for the submission of 
Muslims to all life-styles and ideologies other than Islam, made popular by 
Sayyid Qutb 
jama 'ah: community (of Muslims) 
Jamaat-i-Islami (Arab: al-Jama 'atu 'l-Islamiyya), Indian-Pakistani Islamist 
X 
movement; inspired by the ideas of Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi 
jihad (Arab: jihad): literally 'to strive' or 'to endeavour' to cultivate Islam, in a more 
specific sense to enlarge the scope of and defend the Islamic realm; this can 
both mean a spiritual, non-violent effort and armed force and physical war, 
jihad does not mean the forced acceptance of the Islamic religion by non-
Muslims 
jilbab: headscarf for Muslim women 
jinayah: penal law 
kaffah: "complete" Muslims, i.e. seen as living fully in accordance with Islamic 
teachings 
kafir (Arab: kafir): infidel (unbeliever), heathen (i.e. all non-Muslims) 
KAMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia ('United Action Front oflndonesian 
Students') 
KAMMI: Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia ('United Action Front of 
Indonesian Muslim Students'), leading Islamist student movement in 1998 
KAPPI: Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia ('United Action Front of 
Indonesian Students') 
KAPPU: Komite Aksi Pemenangan Pemilihan Umum ('Action Committee for 
Winning the General Election'), campaign-coordinating body ofPartai Bulan 
Bin tang 
KASI: Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia ('United Action Front oflndonesian 
Scientists') 
keadilan, adil (Arab: 'ad[): 'justice', self-proclaimed guiding principle for Partai 
Keadilan based on a central Qur' anic imperative 
Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang: 'Greater Bulan Bintang Family' or 'keluarga', 
originally naming Masyumi supporter organisations, today comprising 
various modernist parties, organisations and individuals of diverse doctrinal 
orientations 
kepercayaan: mystic and syncretic creeds and faiths, adherents comprise many 
nominal Muslims 
K.H.: abbreviation for Kiai Haji 
kharijites: major Islamic secession movement of the 8th century 
khilafiyah: difference in opinion over a matter of Islamic jurisprudence 
kiai: Islamic teacher and scholar 
KISA: Komite Indonesia Solidaritas Afghanistan, ('Indonesian Committee for 
Solidarity with Afghanistan'), PK-close foundation 
KISDI: Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee for 
Solidarity of the Islamic World'), doctrinaire Islamist organisation, 
established in 1987 and a sign for increasing orientation of Masyumi legatees 
toward international Islamic issues 
(F)KKI: Fraksi Kesatuan Kebangsaan Indonesia ('United Indonesian Nation 
Faction'), Christian-dominated parliamentary faction 
KNIP: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat ('Central Indonesian National Committee') 
KNPI: Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia ('National Committee of Indonesian 
Youth') 
Komando Jihad: 'Holy War Command', clandestine Darul Islam-derived group of 
the late 1970s and early 80s cultivated by New Order intelligence 
Komisi A: 'Commission A', Constitutional Body (1998-2002) debating the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
Xl 
Konstituante: ('Constituent Assembly'), popularly elected body formed in November 
1956 with the task to draft a new constitution, dissolved in July 1959 by 
presidential decree 
Korps Muballigh Indonesia: 'Indonesian Islamic Preachers' Corps' 
Korps Muballigh Jakarta: 'Jakarta Preachers' Corps' 
Kostrad: Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat ('Army's Strategic 
Command') 
KPKPN: Komite Pemeriksaan Kekayaan Penyelengga Negara ('Commission to 
Examine the Wealth of State Officials') 
KUI: Kongres Umat Islam ('Congress of the Muslim Community') 
Lajnah Syuro 'Ulama 'il Ka'bah: 'Consultation Committee ofKa'bah Ulama', ulama 
-headed organisation of PPP subordinated to the central board, founded in 
June 2000 
lakum dinukum wa liya dini: 'your religion for you, my religion for me', Qur'an: 
(1 09:6), popular reference for portraying Islam as tolerant and pro-pluralist 
LDK: Lembaga Dakwah Kampus ('Institution for Campus Proselytisation'), 
umbrella organisation of student activist groups 
LIPPM: Lembaga Islam untuk Penelitian dan Perkembangan Masyarakat ('Islamic 
Institution for Research and the Progress of Society'), DDII-affiliated 
research and dakwah institution, founded in Kuala Lumpur 
LMD: Lembaga Mujtahidin Dakwah ('Institution for Islamic Propagation Fighters'), 
pioneering Islamist study group at the Technological Institute in Bandung 
Majelis Pakar: 'Expert Council', PPP advisory board 
maklumat: 'announcement' (usually by a Muslim organisation) 
manhaj: 'concept' (derived from Islamic law) 
mas 'hum: 'infallibility/infallible', Shiite concept of Islamic leadership 
maslahat, maslahah (Arab: mas/aha): literally 'utility' or 'benefit', concept in 
Islamic law endorsing the pursuit of public interest 
Masyumi: Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia ('Consultative Council oflndonesian 
Muslims'), from 1943 to 1945, henceforth 'Masyumi' as the proper name for 
the Islamist political party ( 1945-1960) 
Masyumi legatees: contemporary Islamist parties or individual Islamists who base 
their political beliefs and ideals on that of the Masyumi (i.e. 'Masyumi 
tradition'); particular section of the Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang ('Greater 
Bulan Bintang Family' or keluarga) 
mazhab (Arab: madhhab): (medieval) school oflslamic law 
MI: Muslimin Indonesia, name for Parmusi after 1973 
MIAI: Majlisul Islamil a'la Indonesia ('Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council'), 
federation of Islamic organisations, established in 193 7 
modernism: Islamic reform movement spreading in the late 19th century from Egypt 
to Southeast Asia endorsing the purification of Islam and freedom in the 
interpretation of its sources in adjustment to modem science and technology 
mosi integral: 'integral motion', commended political verdict in 1950 to abolish the 
federal system and returning Indonesia to a unitary republic, particularly 
awarded to Mohamad Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara of the Masyumi 
MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat ('People's Consultative Assembly'), 
supreme decision-making body in Indonesia 
MTI: Movement de la Tendence Islamique ('Movement of the Islamic Tendency'), 
Tunisian Islamist movement, led by Rashid Ghannoushi 
Xll 
mua 'malah (Arab: mu 'amala): issues in Islamic law dealing with social relations as 
opposed to man's dealings with God 
Muhammadiyah: largest modernist Indonesian Islamic organisation 
MUI: Majelis Ulama Indonesia ('Indonesian Ulama Council') 
Mukernas: Musyawarah Kerja National ('National Working Consultation') 
Muktamar: 'National Congress', highest gremium for Islamic parties and 
organisations, deciding over policy guidelines 
Muktamar Luar Biasa: 'Extraordinary National Congress' 
munafik: hypocrisy, i.e. Muslims dealing opportunistically with unbelievers 
murobbi: Religious instructor, e.g. in Islamist study circles at universities and 
mosques 
Muslim Brotherhood (Arab: al-Ichwanul al-Musliminun): most influential Islamist 
movement with branches in various Middle Eastern countries 
Muslim League: Indian organisation representing Muslim interests, led mostly by 
Western-educated elites including the pragmatist Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
musyawarah: 'consultation', traditional ideal in Indonesian politics to overcome 
disagreement 
Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah: 'Great Consultation ofthe Dewan Dakwah' 
New Order: name taken by the Soeharto regime (1966 to 1998) 
NGO: Non-governmental organisation 
NIF: National Islamic Front, Sudanese Islamist movement 
NU: Nahdlatul Ulama (lit. 'the Revival of Religious Scholars'), largest traditionalist 
Indonesian Islamic organisation, established in 1926 
Ormas: organisasi masyarakat ('societal organisations'), sometimes also denoting 
mass organisations 
P AH: Panitia Ad Hoc ('Ad Hoc Committee') in the MPR. 
PAN: Partai Amanah Nasional ('National Mandate Party'), de-confessionalised party 
of the post-New Order era, comprising a pragmatic Islamist section 
Pancasila: the five guiding principles of the Indonesian state: the belief in The One 
All-Powerful God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social 
justice 
Parmusi: Partai Muslimin Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Party'), largest modernist 
section ofPPP, formerly MI 
Parmusi (II): Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia ('Brotherhood of Indonesian 
Muslims'), PPP-associated modernist social organisation founded in late 
1999 
PBB: Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party'), self-proclaimed Masyumi 
-successor party of the post-New Order era 
PDII: Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia ('Democratic Indonesian Islamic Party'), 
short-lived party project of the late 1960s 
PDI-P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan ('Indonesian Democratic Party 
- Struggle') 
PDRI: Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia ('Emergency Government of the 
Indonesian Republic') 
PDTI: Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam ('Islamic Dakwah Highschool') 
(F)PDU: Fraksi Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah ('United Faction of Muslim 
Sovereignty'), comprising PNU, PSII, PKU, Partai Daulat Rakyat ('People's 
Fortune Party', PDR) and PPII Masyumi 
Persis: Persatuan Islam ('Islamic Association'), modernist puritan 
X111 
organisation founded in 1924 
Perti: Persatuan Tarbiyah Indonesia ('Islamic Education Association'), smaller 
Sumatra-based traditionalist organisation, affiliated with PPP 
pesantren: traditionalist Islamic boarding school under leadership of a kiai 
Pia gam Jakarta: 'Jakarta Charter', preamble to the 1945 constitution and/or 
supplement to paragraph 29 of the constitution on 'religion', equalling a 
formal recognition of shari 'ah as a source oflaw 
Piagam Medinah: 'Medina Charter', pre-constitutional indenture between Muslims, 
Jews and Christians in foundational Islam under the Prophet's leadership, 
permitting the 'People of the Book'-Jews and Christians-to carry out their 
religion against the recompense of a tax (jizyah) 
PII: Pelajar Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Students' Association', secondary 
school) 
PK: Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party'), political arm of campus Islamism of 
the post-1998 era 
PKB: Partai Kebangkitan Nasional ('National Awakening Party'), NU-affiliated 
pluralist political party 
PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia ('Indonesian Communist Party'), banned since 
the New Order years 
PKU: Partai Kebangkitan Umat ('Party of the Awakening of the Muslim 
Community'), small traditionalist-dominated party 
PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia ('Movement oflndonesian Muslim 
Students'), NU-affiliated student group 
PNI: Partai Nasional Indonesia ('Indonesian Nationalist Party') 
PNU: Partai Nahdlatul Ulama ('Nahdlatul Ulama Party'), small traditionalist 
dominated party 
Poros Tengah: 'Middle Axis', loose alliance of various Islamist parties (PPP, PBB, 
PK) and PAN that succeeded in installing Abdurrahman Wahid as president 
in the 1999 session of the MPR 
PPI: Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia ('Indonesian Students' Union'), Saudi Arabia-based 
Indonesian student organisation 
PPII Masyumi: Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi ('Indonesian Islamic 
Political Masyumi Party'), small Masyumi legatee party 
PPMI: Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Workers 
Brotherhood') 
PPP: Partai Persatuan Pembangungan ('United Development Party'), largest Islamist 
party in Indonesia, founded in 1973 and comprising both traditionalist and 
modernist organisations 
PPP Reformasi: 'PPP Reform', PPP splinter group formed in January 2002, later 
changed its name to Partai Bintang Reformasi ('Reform Star Party', PBR) 
PRD: Partai Rakyat Demokrat ('Peoples' Democratic Party') 
pribumi: Indonesian Muslims 
PRRI: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia ('Revolutionary Government of 
the Indonesian Republic'). The regional government established in 1957 in 
West Sumatra in opposition to the central government 
PSII: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Union Party') 
PSII 1905: Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Union Party 1905'), 
small PSII splinter party of the reformasi era 
PUDI: Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia ('United Indonesian Democratic Party') 
xiv 
PUI: Partai Umat Islam ('Muslim Community Party') 
PUI (II): Persatuan Umat Islam ('Union of the Islamic Community') 
PUll: Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia ('Union of the Indonesian Islamic 
Community') 
PWI: Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia ('Union oflndonesian Journalists') 
P 4: Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila ('Guideline for the 
Comprehension and Implementation ofPancasila'), course for civil servants 
and students as part of the New Order's Pancasila Education Program ofthe 
1970s and 1980s 
qadaf personal accusations on religious grounds 
qiyas: 'analogy' (practise in Islamic jurisprudence) 
qoti, qaty: regulations in Islamic law which are considered definitive and unalterable 
Rakornas: Rapat Koordinasi Nasional ('National Coordinating Meeting') 
Rapimnas: Rapat Pimpinan Nasional ('National Leadership Meeting') 
reformasi: 'reform', dictum of the 1998 student-led movement with its pillars 
'democratisation' and anti-corruption, policy-maxim for all parties in the 
immediate post-New Order era, particularly for the June 1999 elections 
reformism (Islamic): seminal Muslim movement of the late 19th century with the 
central goal to purify Islam; reformism is now associated with Islamic 
modernism 
Salman: pioneering mosque movement at Bandung's Technological Institute (ITB) 
named after the campus's main mosque 
shari'ah, shar'iat (Arab: sharT'a): can both mean the body of rules distilled from the 
Islamic canon together with educational and learning institutions and the 
jurisdictional expertise necessary to exercise and implement those rules and, 
more strictly, Islam-derived laws within national law. The latter can either 
refer to specific and detailed codes of conduct or general values and norms. 
shura: Islamic advisory council, often interpreted as Qur' anic approval of 
democracy, originally only referring to elaborations of shari 'ah law 
SI: Sarekat Islam ('Islamic Union'), founded in 1912 
SIDIK: Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer ('Study and Information of 
the Contemporary Islamic World'), PK-close foundation, publisher of the 
Jurnal Umat Islam 
SPSI: Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia ('All-Indonesian Workers' Union') 
sunnah: Precedents by the Prophet Muhammad, recorded in the hadith 
Syuro: Religious Council, formally highest body in Islamic parties, usually headed 
byulama 
tarbiyah: lit: 'education', depicting Islamist activism on campuses and mosques 
resting on Middle Eastern ideological sources and with a strong didactic 
component 
tauhid (Arab: tawh T d): the Oneness and Unity of God, fundamental Islamic 
theological principle 
tawaduh: 'humility', Islamic ethical ideal 
teori resepsi: Dutch colonial policy determining that Islamic regulations and laws 
had to be compatible with local customs and beliefs (adat) in order to be 
legitimate 
TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia, ('Indonesian Armed Forces') 
tokoh: community leader 
ukhuwah: Muslim brotherhood and unity ofthe Muslim community, fundamental 
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Islamic ideal 
ulama (Arab: 'ulama'): Muslim jurists and scholars 
umat (Arab: umma): Muslim global community, originally referring to the unity of 
all humankind. As the last Prophet, Muhammad's mission was to restore the 
unity of the global umma 
umroh: a less formal pilgrimage to Mecca at no particular time of the year 
unsur: lit. 'element', i.e. political faction in Islamic parties based on socio-religious 
and geographical distinction, especially important in PPP 
usroh, usrah: 'cells', small units of cadres for training and mentoring purposes, 
characteristic element of Islamist activist groups in universities and mosques 
Wafd Party: non-Islamist Egyptian political party, accommodating members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood 
Wahabism: Hanbalite puritan movement of the late 18th century, named after its 
founder al-Wahab 
YIB: Yayasan Indonesia Baru ('New Indonesia Foundation'), close to PPP's 
dissident group 
YISC al-Azhar: Islamic study and activist circle at Jakarta's al-Azhar mosque 
YLBHI: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia ('Indonesian Legal Aid 
Institute') 
zakat: alms, one of the five pillars in Islam 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesian politics was redefined between 1998 and 2002. On 21 May 1998, 
President Soeharto resigned. It was the end of the New Order (1966-1998) and the 
beginning of what became popularly known as the reformasi ('reform') era. 
Reformasi brought an end to authoritarianism and introduced democracy. There were 
high hopes that the new era would bring political stability, restore economic growth 
and halt social and ethnic conflict, issues which had characterised Indonesia since the 
mid- to late 1990s. 
This study is about the beliefs and the behaviour of Islamist political parties in the 
dynamic and often unstable first four years of reformasi. The initial period from 
Soeharto's resignation to the parliamentary elections on 7 June 1999 was dominated 
by the proliferation of political parties and the endeavours of those parties to ensure 
electoral survival. Rivalry over the succession to interim President Prof. B. J. 
Habibie characterised the months between the elections and the first post-election 
meeting of the country's supreme decision-making body, the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat ('People's Consultative Assembly', MPR) in October 
1999. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President on 21 October, but escalating 
tension and eventually deadlock between him and the parliament dominated the 
ensuing 21 months and led to his dismissal from office in July 2001. He was replaced 
by Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri. 
Several scholars and observers have commented on the role of Islamist parties during 
this period. Much of this scholarly work, however, was based on a western-secular 
predisposition and a liberal bias. It described Islam as a pluralism-friendly religion 
and as receptive to new thinking and interpretations. By contrast, it held Islamism to 
be doctrinally misguided. This work also did little justice to Islamist agendas when 
describing and analysing them. The following section argues in favour of a scholarly 
approach that attempts to understand and evaluate the varied features of Islamism on 
its own terms. 
1 
Liberal Bias and Binary Conceptions in Indonesian Islamic Scholarship 
The scholarly discourse dismissive of Islamist politics in Indonesia became dominant 
in the mid- to late 1990s. By 1998 it had become the conventional approach. Its main 
advocates were western scholars and Indonesian intellectuals and academics, many 
of whom themselves were of a liberal disposition. The discourses in western and 
Indonesian scholarship were often similar in tone and mutually affirming. Western 
observers praised liberal Muslim leaders and intellectuals and they in tum reflected 
Western, secular ideas of what the role of Islam should be in Indonesian politics. 
The mainstream of Western scholars regularly paid tribute to those Muslims stressing 
cultural and intellectual means of accomplishing Islamic aspirations rather than 
through politics and ideological struggle. Islamic political commitment, they argued, 
should be channelled through multi-religious parties. The popular name for this 
movement became 'liberal Islam' .1 Western writers not only became very familiar 
with liberal ideas on Islamic theology and political thought but also established close 
personal links with leading liberal thinkers. Not surprisingly, their treatises revealed 
the sympathies of their authors. Many scholars of Indonesian Islam identified 
Muslim agents of democracy and civil society and acquired a number of favourites 
among its intelligentsia. Liberal Muslim views gave hope to the concern of these 
scholars that Indonesia could replace authoritarianism with democracy and lessen 
religious and ethnic tensions. The thesis was that Islamism was detrimental to civil 
political advancement. 
This pro-liberal stance echoed the pattern in 1980s and 1990s American scholarship 
on Islam in the Middle East. Stirred by Edward Said's controversial assault on the 
purportedly latent racism of European and American Islamic scholarship 
("Orientalism") many academics began to see political Islam as having anti-
1 The most comprehensive treatises on liberal Islam are Robert Hefner, Civil Islam-Muslims and 
Democratisation in Indonesia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New York, 2000, especially pp. 
113-66 and Greg Barton, The Emergence ofNeo-Modernism: a Progressive, Liberal Movement of 
Islamic Thought in Indonesia: A Textual Study of Examining the writings ofNurcholish Madjid, 
Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Abdurrahman Wahid, 1968-1980, PhD thesis, Department of 
Asian Languages and Studies, Monash University, 17 August 1996. Initially, liberal Islam was known 
under the name of pembaruan ('renewal') movement. It emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
and was initiated by Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and 
Dawam Rahardjo. 
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authoritarian and democratising potentia1.2 Efforts were made in both Middle Eastern 
and Indonesian studies to provide the more liberal and plural facets of Islamic groups· 
and thinkers with historical depth and theological weight. In Middle Eastern 
scholarship, the promotion of Muslim democrats involved questionable assessments 
of a broad range of thinkers and led to a confusing plethora of typologies of Islamic 
politics.3 
In Indonesia, liberal Muslims obtained greater influence than in the Middle East. 
They attained a steadier public role and, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s, took 
root among the elites of major Muslim organisations in Indonesia such as 
Muhammadiyah (established 1912) and Nahdlatul Ulama (1926). The well-
established position of liberal Islam in Indonesia perhaps inclined western scholars 
sympathising with its qualities to neglect or dismiss Islamism, including Islamist 
parties of the early post-New Order years. 
Liberal Islam in Indonesia emerged out of modernist Islam but many traditionalist 
Muslims have become attracted to its positions as well. Modernist Islam is a wide-
ranging label. It categorises those Muslims seeking to return Islamic practice and law 
to the "uncorrupted" originality of the primary texts, the Qur' an and the example of 
the Prophet Muhammad, as encapsulated in the hadis (Arab: IJadTth) in order to 
purify faith of pre- and non-Islamic beliefs and practices.4 At the same time, 
' 
modernist Islam is associated with the adaptation of western technological and 
scientific achievements and a number of western political models. Theologically, 
therefore, modernist Islam promotes greater individuality and freedom in the reading 
and interpretation of the Islam canon (ijtihad, Arab: ijtihad). Modernists were critical 
of traditionalist Islam which in matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) drew on the legal 
2 Important studies with this central thesis are, for example, John Esposito and John 0. Voll, Islam 
and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996 and Dale F. Eickelman and James 
Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1996. 
3 The range of thought broadly classified as "liberal" in Charles Kurzman, Liberal Islam: A 
Sourcebook, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, includes the great Egyptian reformer 
Mohammad Abduh, YusufQaradhawi, a chieflslamist ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and Mohamad Natsir, a crucial figure in Indonesian Islamism (his role and influence will 
be discussed in chapter two and three). 
4 This stream of Islam originally was known as Islamic reformism, the seminal Muslim movement of 
the late 191h century with the central goal to purify Islam. The term is nowadays associated with 
Islamic modernism. The classic study about Indonesian modernist Islam is Deliar Noer, The 
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, O.U.P, Kuala Lumpur, 1973. 
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precedents of the great medieval Muslim jurists, a practice modernists view as 
outmoded and detrimental to the progress of Islam. 5 
Liberal Islam downplayed the purifying of Islam while stressing the freedom of the 
faithful to interpret and apply the Islamic sources. It is important that many of the 
most important liberal intellectuals had a strong western element in their education or 
personal history and some obtained university degrees in political or religious studies 
from US universities. As a result, liberal Islam adapted a number of theological and 
political traits that made it appealing to westerners, most importantly support for 
liberal democracy and religious pluralism. Its advocates sometimes argue that 
adherents of the scripture-based monotheist religions (Islam, Judaism and 
Christianity) were of matching value and held the same status before God. 
Many scholars on Indonesian Islam approved of such western-style liberalism and 
highlighted its prominence in Indonesia. They argued that the predilection for liberal 
thought made Indonesian Islam the champion of a 'civil' Islamic model, which 
Robert Hefner described as 'the world's largest movement for a democratic and 
pluralist Islam' .6 Liberals were also depicted as genuine Indonesian patriots. They 
'appreciated the uniqueness of Indonesian history, civilization, and nationalism' and 
were 'particularly proud of the Indonesian heritage of ethnoreligious pluralism'. 7 
Moreover, liberals were described as constitutionalists who were 'broadly committed 
to the ideas of civil society, constitutional democracy and the rule of law' and 
committed to 'negotiate their differences with others' which was a 'basic 
requirement of a functioning democracy'. 8 
Several arguments of this scholarly discourse are questionable. To begin with, it held 
to a liberal-secular view of Islamic political thought and modernity. Greg Barton, for 
example, referred to Indonesian Islamists as 'an anti-modem force' that was 
'threatening progress and clashing with the liberal democratic ideals that it was 
5 In traditionalist Islam, at the same time, local customs and folk practices tend to be accepted 
appendages to Islam. Ibid, pp. 302-3. 
6 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 6. 
7 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam and Statist Politics: Some Comparative Reflections on Democracy's 
Possibility, unpublished paper for the conference "Islam in Indonesia: Intellectualization and Social 
Transformation", Jakarta, 23-24 November 2000, p. 8. 
8 Hefner, Statist Politics; R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, The Islamic Challenge to Democratic 
Consolidation in Indonesia, (unpublished paper), 2002, p. 40 (second quote). 
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hoped would take root in the post-Soeharto era. ' 9 This predisposition tended to 
correspond with the trope of US Middle Eastern Studies in the 1980s and early 90s. 
Martin Kramer, one of its chief critics, held this literature as 'present[ing] Islam in 
Western categories', only prepared to acknowledge an Islamic brand personally 
favoured by western scholars. 10 The approach also hinted that Muslims had to live up 
to Western expectations to be tolerable. 11 
Some Indonesian scholars flatly dismissed the doctrinal grounds on which Islamists 
argue their case. The discourse depicted Islamist views as misperceptions and 
contrary to true and virtuous religious spirit. It rejected that there were historical and 
doctrinal reasons for seeking Islamic governance or committing the government to 
implement Islamic law, aims these scholars often equalled with an Islamic stateY 
The liberal bias was particularly evident in its understanding of "Islamic values" 
such as "justice" and "freedom". Many Western scholars argued that the 
ambivalence of the Islamist view on pluralism simply misconstrued fundamental 
Islamic teachings. Hefner gave a clear expression of the liberal bias of much of 
Indonesian scholarship, writing: 
Without any centralized coordination, a great movement for a civil Muslim politics 
was emerging among both "traditionalists" and "modernists". Its intention was not 
the establishment of a monopoly-creating and diversity-denying "Islamic" state, 
but of a Muslim civil society dedicated to the Islamic values of justice, freedom 
and civility in difference. 13 
Strongly related to the Islamic state issue was the charge against Islamists of being 
'statist'. This sprang from the Islamist view that Islam demanded the government and 
its institutions to play an active part in the implementation of shari 'ah (i.e. Islamic 
law). Islamists, therefore, were criticised for their fixation to 'capturing the state' .14 
9 Greg Barton, "The Prospect of Islam", in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith, Indonesia Today: 
Challenges of History, ISEAS, Singapore, 2001, pp. 244-55 (quote p. 245). 
10 Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, 2001, p. 52. 
11 The liberal bias in Western scholarship, Tibawi argued, was in fact little more than yet 'another 
attempt to change the Muslim view of Islam ... '. A.L. Tibawi, "Second Critique of English-Speaking 
Orientalists and their Approach to Islam and the Arabs", Islamic Quarterly 23, No. 1, January-March 
1979, p. 6, quoted in Kramer, Ivory Towers, p. 59. 
12 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12. 
13 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 9 (italic in original). 
14 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 7-9. 
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Hefner challenged this by arguing that the Islamic canon would, theologically and 
historically, not know and not demand its own form of governance. He wrote: 
The Qur' an of course knows no such concept of an "Islamic" state, least of all one 
with coercive powers of a modem leviathan. 15 
Islam, therefore, would not demand a top-down enforcement of its teachings. 'The 
Qur'an', Hefner asserted, 'abhors compulsion in religion' .16 Instead, Western writers 
tended to support the view of liberal Muslim leaders and scholars that 'to fuse 
religious leadership with the state is itself the most profane of secularisations', 
leading to an abuse of Islam's ethical virtues and ideals for political and personal 
ends. 17 'For believers', Hefner asserted, 'the biggest problem with this arrangement 
is that it ends by degrading religion itself .18 Islamists, therefore, mistakenly 
promoted a 'statist Islam that, in the name of implementing Allah's commands, 
concentrates authority for religious affairs and morality in the hands of state 
officials' .19 Yet the 'high ideals' of Islam only prevailed where they were 
disconnected from any state responsibility to become involved in religious affairs. 
Hefner contrasted the Islamist view with civil Islam, recording: 
... civil Islam rejects the mirage of the "Islamic" state, recognizing that this formula 
for fusing religious and state authority ignores the lessons of Muslim history itself. 
Worse yet, without checks and balances in state and society, the "Islamic" state 
subordinates Muslim ideals to the dark intrigues of party bosses and religious 
thugs.20 
The negative stand of these scholars seemed nurtured by experience in the remaining 
Muslim world. Once in power, Islamists seemed inclined to curb the independence of 
15 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12. 
16 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12. Hefner obviously referred to the Qur'an, verse al-Baqarah (2:256) which 
holds: 'Let there be no compulsion in religion ... '. Translation by Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Meaning of 
the Holy Qur'an, amana publications, Beltsville, Maryland, 2002, p. 106. Another, less "liberal", 
reading of the verse is that it permits non-Muslims to decide whether to formally submit to Islam in a 
society that is based on Islam and ruled by Muslims. It does not necessarily refute the obligation of 
Muslims to live according to Islam and the Islamic aspiration for expanding its boundaries and 
spreading its teachings. 
17 Robert Hefner, Cooptation, Enmitization, and Democracy: The Modernist Muslim Dilemma in 
Indonesia, unpublished paper for the conference "Consolidating Indonesian Democracy'', Ohio State 
University, 11-13 May 2001, p. 5 (quote); Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 20. 
18 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 12. 
19 Hefner, Statist Islam, pp. 2-3 
20 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 20. 
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the judiciary and wind back democracy. The dwindling support by their Muslim 
populations required oppressive means to protect the systems erected in the name of 
Islam as in the Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan (to late 2001)?1 Common was an 
autocracy that maintained some democratic institutions and the fayade of popular 
support. This literature cited Islamists declaring that democracy was a 'corrupt and 
corrupting form of government'. Democracy was 'at best, an avenue to power, but an 
avenue that runs one way only' suggesting there was an 'Islamic free-elections 
trap' ?2 Daniel Pipes wrote: 
Like other non-democrats out of power ... Islamists like democracy ... 
Yes, Islamists do sometimes talk like democrats, but there is no reason to believe 
that these fine words are a true guide to their intentions, as opposed to a way to gain 
legitimacy and enhance their chances to get into office. Ballots are fine so long as 
Islamists are on the outside ... If by democracy one means an occasional election, 
with a limited choice of candidates who cannot speak freely, and no voting for the 
most powerful position-then sure, Islamism has no problems with democracy. But 
if the term refers to a system in which citizens have those rights (freedom of speech, 
the rule of law, minority rights, an independent judiciary) needed to make free and 
intelligent decisions, that they have a real choice of candidates, and that they can 
vote for the top leader-then no, Islamism is resoundingly not democratic. Islamists 
believe in divine sovereignty and express a frank and deep disdain for popular 
sovereignty, which happens to be the key idea behind democracy. 23 
The common view in Indonesian Islamic scholarship shared the disapproval of 
leading US experts on Middle Eastern Islamism. Its scholarly focus, however, was on 
liberal Islam; its conclusions on Islamism were based on a remarkably small quantity 
of research. Most Western scholars on liberal Islam in Indonesia have shown little 
interest in careful and exact descriptions of Islamist politics and parties, their various 
doctrines and policies. This reflected the discourse' liberal bias. It examined 
Islamism through the prism of modernisation and development rooted in the 
historical awareness and the liberal ideals of the US and Europe. 
21 These examples, Martin Kramer observed, have refuted the belief in the moderating impact of 
power on Islamists. See his "The Mismeasure of Political Islam", in Martin Kramer (ed.), The 
Islamism Debate, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv, 1997, pp. 
161-73. 
22 Bernard Lewis, "A Historical Overview: Islam and Liberal Democracy'', Journal of Democracy, 
7.2., 1996, pp. 52-63 (first two quotes). Third quote by Alfred Stepan, "Religion, Democracy and the 
'Twin Tolerations"', Journal of Democracy, 11.4, 2000, pp. 37-57 (quote p. 47). 
23 Daniel Pipes, "Are Islamic Movements Compatible with Democracy?", Insight, 14 August 2000. 
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In the first decade of the 21st century, the US represents the first de facto global 
power displaying a firm confidence in the supremacy of its own political and 
doctrinal models. Against this claim, the struggle of other peoples and nations for 
defending and sustaining religious and cultural identities-often involved in the 
uncompleted process of former colonies developing into stable nation-states-is a 
most profound concern. In the diverse cultures of modem nations, Islamists have 
forcefully claimed a right to present a different perspective of modernity and thereby 
have revived the contests over local and national identities in a global context.24 This 
happens in various ways and with differing emphases, according to the different 
histories and characteristics of Islamist groups and movements. 
Many western observers, however, wrote in general terms about Islamist 
characteristics. The superficiality of the analysis appeared to be prompted by the 
view that Islamist politics was a 'Pandora's box' and essentially illegitimate.25 
Irrationality and obstinacy were also cited as features of Islamist politics. By 
contrast, liberals and their sympathisers were described as 'level-headed' and 
'decent' .26 Hefner therefore proposed: 
[T]he survival and consolidation of a civil-democratic Muslim politics will require 
that responsibility for political Islam be taken out of the hands of those who would 
abuse Islamic ideals for narrow personal interests and restored to those committed to 
pluralist, democratic, civil ideals.27 
The disapproval and shallow approach toward Islamism generated a description of 
Islamic politics in Indonesia through binary categorisations. One recurrent charge 
was that Islamists were political and religious 'conservatives'. Other descriptions 
were 'militant', 'radical' and 'hardline'. Suggesting a strict dichotomy between 
Islamists and other Muslims, western writers with sympathies for liberal Islam often 
suggested that the two sides held commitments that were mutually exclusive 
24 Akbar S. Ahmad, "Postmodemist Perceptions oflslam: Observing the Observer", Asian Survey, 
Vol. 31, No.3, March 1991, pp. 213-31. 
25 Quote from Greg Barton, "Islamic Liberalism and the Prospects for Democracy in Indonesia", in 
Michele Schmiegelow (ed.), Democracy in Asia, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt, New York, 1997, pp. 
427-53 (quote p. 441). 
26 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 9. 
27 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 16. The author uses the Indonesian term madani for civil. 
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throughout. Commenting on the rise of liberal Islam over the last five decades, 
Hefuer held: 
Whereas, in the 1950s, the great majority of practicing Muslims supported parties 
committed to the establishing of an Islamic state, today the great majority have 
indicated that they see their great religion as thoroughly consistent with democracy 
and constitutionalism. 28 
Likewise, R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani observed a 'great religious divide' 
between non-Muslims, nominal Muslims, liberal modernist and traditionalist 
Muslims and 'conservative modernist Muslims' .29 There thus was, they proclaimed, 
'[an] Islamic challenge to democratic consolidation in Indonesia' .30 Greg Barton 
observed an 'Islamic drama' taking place between pro- and anti-reform forces. In 
commenting on the quarrels between Islamist parties and President Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 2000 and 2001, the President, Barton held, 'suffered the indignity of being 
sacked by a parliament controlled by seasoned operators desperate to reign in 
reform ... an opposition, that drew heavily on Islamist imaginary and rhetoric to 
undermine his authority'. 31 Hefner similarly accused 'conservative modernists' of 
'backstage deals' and 'parapolitical intrigue' .32 He commented on the dispute over 
East Timor's independence as follows: 
When, in early 1999, interim President Habibie shocked the nation by announcing 
plans for a plebiscite in East Timor, conservative Muslims ... joined with old-regime 
hardliners to use the East Timor issue as a club with which to beat back the 
democracy movement. 33 
Liddle and Mujani contrasted democratic commitment and respect for the rule oflaw 
with the Islamist aspiration to apply shari 'ah, arguing: 
... there is today quite a sharp distinction, at least among modernist intellectuals, 
between political liberals, who are fully committed to the democratic institutions of 
28 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 14. 
29 Liddle and Mujani, Islamic Challenge; also Robert Hefner, "Public Islam and the problem of 
democratization", Sociology of Religion, Vol. 4, winter 2001, pp. 491-514. 
30 This was the title of the 2002 paper by the authors. 
31 Greg Barton, "Islam, Politics, and Regime Change in Wahid's Indonesia", in Julian Weiss (ed.), 
Tiger's Roar: Asia's Recovery and its Impact, East Gate Book, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and New York, 
2001, pp. 312-17 (both quotes p. 313). 
32 Hefner, Muslim Dilemma. 
33 Hefner, Public Islam. 
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elected governments and the rule of laws passed by those governments, and 
conservatives, who want to oblige Muslims to follow the syariat.34 
Further claims held that Islamist politics was a danger to political stability and social 
peace. Liddle and Mujani observed a 'commitment to an Islamic State' in 
Indonesia's largest Islamist party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United 
Development Party', PPP) and advised the party to end advocating shari 'ah in order 
to aid fostering democracy and harmony between religious constituencies. 35 They 
argued: 
[More democracy] will eventually convince mainstream Indonesians of all religious 
persuasions that Indonesia will not become an Islamic State. PPP leaders could help 
this process along by giving up their quixotic but dangerous-because frightening to 
others-pursuit of a society governed by syariat.36 
Frequently, the religious conservatism of Islamists was related to a rigid attitude 
toward the interpretation of Islam and formulating its teachings into laws. Liddle and 
Mujani recorded that '[L]iberals read[ing] the Qur'an in a more open, metaphoric, or 
presentist way ... '. By contrast, ' [ o ]ther modernists have become conservatives, even 
fundamentalists. Conservatives read the Qur'an and other texts literally ... '. 37 And 
further: 'Islamists assert [that] [t]he Qur'an and other texts are clear and need little 
interpretation today'. 38 
A charge against Indonesian Islamism coupled to that of being undemocratic and 
conservative was to be 'regimist'. 'Regimist' denoted those Islamists who supported 
the New Order regime and former President Soeharto. The 'rivalry seen here in 
Indonesia', Hefuer argued, was 'between a civil Islam and an anti-democratic 
regimist Islam'. This was a dichotomy 'illustrative of a line of contestation 
widespread in today's Muslim world'.39 He wrote about party politics in the early 
reformasi era: 
34 Liddle and Mujani, Islamic Challenge, p. 12. 
35 Ibid, p. 31. 
36 Ibid, p. 39. 
37 Ibid, p. 7. 
38 R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, New Patterns oflslamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia, 
(unpublished paper), 2002, p. 4. 
39 Hefner, Muslim Dilemma, p. 8. 
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[T]he prodemocracy wing of the modernist Muslim community has for the moment 
lost the momentum it had so proudly developed in the fmal years of the Suharto 
regime. As long as this wing of the modernist community continues to be trumped 
by its antidemocratic rivals, the consolidation of Indonesia's fragile 
democracy ... will remain a distant dream indeed.40 
Hefuer then concluded that it was the strength of 'the reform-minded wing of the 
modernist community' which was critical for 'the ability of Indonesia to get the 
democratic transition back on track' .41 Islamists, rejecting reform and democracy, 
'seemed determined ... to steal the sweet dream of a civil society and replace it with a 
civil society-denying statist Islam' .42 
This scholarly literature thus depicted Islamism through a mixture of broad 
characteristics, almost all of which were negative. It freely allocated accusations of 
conservatism and a lacking commitment to democracy and constitutionalism. Rarely 
did it put compelling arguments or evidence behind its judgments. The same 
woolliness went into the treatment of the Islamic state issue which often seemed to 
be a synonym for the inclusion of shari 'ah terms into the constitution. 
The Idealist-Pragmatic Tension: Thesis Objectives 
This thesis examines the ideologies of Islamist parties m Indonesia in order to 
illuminate their political strategies and behaviour during the years 1998 to 2002. It 
seeks to describe and analyse the variety in Islamist agendas and their underlying 
motives in the context of national and global identities. It will point out that major 
Islamist parties defend a number of Islamist agendas without endorsing a 
comprehensive and solid set of beliefs that warrants classification as Islamist 
ideology. These beliefs will be defined as quasi-ideological. 
The analysis focuses on the relationship between religious and political factors. It 
gives special consideration to the shifting dynamics between ideology and behaviour 
and thus between idealism and pragmatism. The idealist-pragmatist tension has led to 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, p. 7 (first quote), p. 3 (second quote). 
42 Hefner, Statist Politics, p. 12 (italic in original). The author uses the Indonesian term masyarakat 
madani, meaning 'civil society'. 
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a debate among observers and scholars. It is, Rhys H. Williams suggested, 'the 
interactions among ideology, organization, and environment that are most interesting 
[in plural politics]' .43 Gary Alan Fine and Kent Sandstrom similarly see 'the 
compelling issue' as 'when and how [ideologies] are announced and acted upon'.44 
This puts the relation between 'ideology's internal processes' and 'external 
dimensions of strategy' at the heart of constitutional Islamist politics.45 A focal point 
to analyse the application of ideology in the empirical world therefore is the 
dynamics between the desire to remain faithful to an ideological ideal and political 
exigencies. The thesis also considers various factors impacting on party performance 
and strategy such as internal power structures and organisational models. 
A central argument of the thesis is that Islamist parties in Indonesia's early reformasi 
era channelled their aspirations through representative institutions of the democratic 
system and showed a high willingness to cooperate and compromise with non-
Islamist forces. It argues that in a plural political setting, Islamists succumb to the 
more practical ways of doing politics. Hence, Islamism was basically 
constitutionalist and basically pragmatic. 
The thesis, at the same time, will show that many Islamists have sustained an 
ideological vision with anti-pluralist traits. It will elucidate the resulting dilemmas in 
policy and strategy through the contrast between public statements on one hand and 
personal conviction, internal documents and training material of Islamist parties on 
the other hand. 
The thesis thus supports the view that 'there eventually comes the point when the 
interest in the promotion of power takes priority over the ideology' .46 In pluralist 
politics, Islamists time and again give way to the necessities of particular situations. 
43 Rhys H. Williams, "Movement Dynamics and Social Change: Transforming Fundamentalist 
Ideology and Organizations", in Scott R. Appleby and Martin E. Marty (eds.), Accountingfor 
Fundamentalisms: the dynamic character of movements, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, 
pp. 785-833 (quote p. 787, italic in original). 
44 Gary Alan Fine and Kent Sandstrom, "Ideology in Action: A Pragmatic Approach to a Contested 
Concept", Sociological Theory, 11, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 21-38 (quote p. 31). 
45 Williams, Movement Dynamics, p. 788. Gudrun Kramer and Daniel Bromberg are two scholars who 
have given particular attention to this dynamic. Both have written widely on Middle Eastern Islamism. 
46 Arthur Schweitzer, "Ideological Strategy", The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, March 
1962, pp. 46-66. See chapters two, five and six. 
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They promote and apply their principles according to the demands of particular 
situations and in hindsight to the strength and policies of their political contenders 
and preferences of their audiences. 47 This is because, like others, Islamist politics 
'are the product of interaction with government and society, ofhistorical experience, 
trial and error and reactive rather than active' .48 Political participation requires 
consensus to negotiate; it rests on the will to compromise and to accept the 
possibility of defeat. Ideologies thus lose the self-sufficiency they had in a more 
closed environment. 
An outcome of practical necessities has been the Islamist proneness toward 
ambivalence and, at times, dual agendas. Wary to present a program likely to 
overwhelm and confront political rivals, the internal Islamist discourse tends to 
diverge from the external discourse. Islamists, therefore, sometimes sound 
ideologically temperate in a non-Islamist and determined in an Islamist environment. 
Islamist parties, like others, seek power through electoral success. They must 
consider the broader concerns of society and therefore are often more concerned with 
'the humanly practical and strictly temporal' .49 People care for parties only if they 
transport messages relevant for how they organise and, possibly, intend to improve 
their lives. Hence, Islamists use images and terminology that reflect and touch on the 
worldview and, concretely, the concerns of particular communities.50 The public 
sphere is nearly everywhere culturally plural. The resulting proclivity for moderation 
has, in some cases, also facilitated political alliances between Islamists and 
47 James Piscatori, "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms", in Appleby and Marty, Accounting for 
Fundamentalisms, pp. 361-74 (esp. p. 366). For example, in the mid-1970s the Muslim Brotherhood 
discarded its goal to re-establish the caliphate by recognising the Egyptian government under 
President Sadat, in turn hoping to obtain permission to found a political party. See Abdel Azim 
Ramadan, "Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Takfir Groups", in Scott R. Appleby and Martin E. Marty (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State: 
remaking polities, economies and militance, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, pp. 152-84, 
(esp. p. 166). 
48 Gudrun Kramer, "Cross-Links and Double Talk? Islamist Movements in the Political Process", in 
Laura Guazzone ( ed. ), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the 
Contemporary Arab World, Ithaca Press, Reading, Berkshire, 1995, pp. 39-67 (quote: p. 47). 
49 Barry M. Hooker, "Muhammadan Law and Islamic Law", in Barry M. Hooker, Islam in Southeast 
Asia, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1983, pp. 160-182 (quote: p. 160). Also John H. Garvey, '"Introduction: 
Fundamentalism and Politics", in Appleby and Marty (eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 13-
27 (esp. p. 24). 
5° Compare with Fine and Sandstrom, Ideology in Action, pp. 28 and 35. 
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secularists. 51 These were important issues in the immediate post-New Order years, 
especially during the run-up to the first elections held in June 1999.52 
The flexible and pragmatic Islamist imperative, therefore, often appears as a variable 
disparate from personal conviction. Islamist flexibility, Gudrun Kramer observed, 
was 'more noticeable in the domain of political organisation ('techniques') than in 
social and religious values.' 53 Factors such as unanimity in Islamist leadership over 
party ideology and political strategy can be crucial whether these incongruities 
become manifest or remain cloaked. 
The need to provide justification arises wherever underlying premises have been 
subordinated to compromises and practical considerations. Islamists 
characteristically seek to justify action of immediate advantage with references to the 
Islamic revelation. The motivation might be either to maintain moral authority in the 
eyes of constituencies or, possibly, to justify these actions in the face of God. 
Anthony Johns recorded: 
Every reform and revival movement seeks justification from it, and over the 
centuries, in Indonesia as elsewhere, no matter what political and social 
circumstances might have been relevant, no matter what ideological stimuli may 
have played their role. It is the Qur' an that is invoked as the ultimate source of 
guidance.54 
51 An example for such an alliance is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's cooperation with the secular 
Wafd Party, enabling Islamist activists' entrance into parliament. See Kramer, Cross-Links and 
Kramer, "The Integration of the Integrists: a comparative study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia", in 
Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy without Democracts?: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim 
World, I.B. Tauris, London, 1994, pp. 200-26. 
52 Indonesian Islamist parties frequently laid bare an ambivalent stance toward non-Muslims. See 
chapter five. 
53 Kramer, Cross-Links, p. 55. Max Weber explained this undercurrent of the idealist-pragmatist 
dynamic in the famous 'switchmen' metaphor: 
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very 
frequently the "world images" that have been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. 
Cited in Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies", American Sociological Review, 
51, 1986, pp. 273-286 (quote p. 274). 
54 Anthony Johns, "Coming to Terms with the Qur'an: A Challenge for Indonesianists", Review of 
Indonesian and Malaysian Studies (RIMA), University of Sydney, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1988, pp. 69-92 
(quote p. 70). 
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The seminal status of the Qur' an as the source of reference prevails in legitimising 
any political stance. Graham Fuller noted the difference to western political 
ideologies: 
When Westerners talk about political ideals, they naturally hark back to the Magna 
Carta, the American Revolution, and the French Revolution. Muslims go back to the 
Koran and the Hadith to derive general principles about good govemance ... and 
concepts of social and economic justice. 55 
Two of the most common justifications for pragmatic Islamist action are to uphold 
national peace and unity and protecting the Muslim community. 56 The most often 
cited Qur'anic stipulations include maslahat (Arab: mas/aha, 'benefit' or the 'public 
good') or amar ma 'ruf nahy munkar (Arab: al'amru bil ma 'ruf wa nahyu 'ani! 
munkar, 'to enjoin good and prohibit evil'). Widely applicable and highly subjective, 
Islamists frequently use these stipulations to render compromise and pragmatic 
behaviour less deviating from the ideological ideal. 
The dynamics between ideology and pragmatism lead to the broader question about 
the compatibility between Islamism and democracy. 'It is not possible', Kramer 
argued, 'to talk about Islam and democracy in general, but only about Muslims living 
and theorising under specific historical circumstances' .57 And Bromberg recorded: 
Those scholars who argue that Islam is intrinsically illiberal, or who define away the 
problem by offering relativist concepts of "Islamic democracy", offer little in the 
way of explanation, and of prediction still less. Yet. .. reduc[ing] Islamism to little 
more than a source of rationalizing ideologies are equally limiting. Islamist 
ideologies ... are shaped by and encapsulated within a multitude of ideal social, 
political, and cultural identities and interests that can contradict as well as 
complement one another. Thus the challenge is not to figure out whether Islamism is 
"essentially" democratic versus autocratic, or liberal versus illiberal. Instead, it is to 
see whether this or that Islamist group is acting within a hegemonic political arena 
... where Islamists, like other players, find themselves pushed to accommodate the 
logic of power-sharing. 58 
55 Graham Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No.2, March!April2002, 
pp. 48-60. Also Guazzone, Islamism and Islamists, p. 19. 
56 Kramer, Cross-Links, p. 48. 
57 Gudrun Kramer, "Islamist Notions of Democracy", Middle East Report, July-August 1993 p. 4. 
58 Daniel Bromberg, "Islamists and the Politics of Consensus", Journal of Democracy, 13.3.2002, pp. 
109-15 (quote: pp. 111-2). 
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The thesis proposes that the answer to the Islamism-democracy question is somewhat 
gratuitous for the Islamist parties PPP and Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star 
Party', PBB). None of these parties has presented a clear idea what an Islamic 
society should look like and how it could come into existence. PPP and PBB did not 
support their calls for shari 'ah with patent conceptions for its implementation and 
they have allowed little insight into how they plan to adapt the scriptures for a 
modem state and administration, except for a few standard issues. 59 Both parties and 
a number of their affiliated organisations rely heavily on the Jakarta Charter model. 
This model arguably sprang from the quixotic idea of finding an ideological middle 
ground between Muslims and non-Muslims in an independent Indonesia. More 
recently, however, it has been condensed to a bare-boned formula with little 
intellectual substance. 60 
The study discerns two tendencies in what it defines as constitutional Islamism in 
Indonesia: 'the Masyumi tradition' and 'imported Islamism'. Both types see a 
broadly defined Islam and Indonesian national culture as forming an integral unity. 
Masyumi legatees, it will point out, tend to be more outspoken in their claim to be 
shaped by and being in step with national or regional cultural traits and to be a 
dominant part of national identity. The two currents have different political strategies 
to cultivate Islam. The strategy of imported Islamism will be described as 
'gradualism'. Imported Islamism's political outlet Partai Keadilan has followed a 
post-democratic political ideal. Overall, there is, apart from several individuals in 
PPP, a rather clear divide between the doctrinal determination of PPP on one side 
and one section of PBB, its associated groups (described in the thesis as the 
"doctrinaire Islamists") and nearly the whole of Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) 
on the other side. 
The thesis describes the concept of jihad as a crucial undercurrent for the political 
struggle of Partai Keadilan. This party, in particular, understands jihad as having a 
vital role in Islamic ideology and history. The thesis adopts the definition of jihad 
59 See chapter four. Conceptual patchiness is a frequent malaise of Islamist parties. Garvey, 
Introduction, in Appleby and Marty, Fundamentalisms and the State, ( esp. p. 25); Kramer , Islamist 
Notions; Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics. 
60 See chapter four. 
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from the subjects of its study, broadly referring to a 'striving' or an 'endeavour' to 
cultivate Islam. In recent decades, this endeavour has more and more rested on the 
aim to defend the Islamic realm against other ideologies. Throughout recent years, 
much of the general public has come to understand the concept of jihad as 
synonymous with terrorism and violence. Jihad is now almost exclusively associated 
with militant Muslims in support of a physical struggle against the West. Those 
Islamists in PK highlighting the status of jihad in Islam see it as referring to both 
peaceful and physical means. This notwithstanding, they pursued a non-violent 
political and constitutional struggle. 
Methodology 
The study draws on documentary evidence and interviews as main sources of 
information. Important material was obtained from the archives of Partai Bulan 
Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia 
('Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council', DDII). Documents of Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP) and Partai Keadilan ('Justice 
Party', PK) were mostly made available through party staff. These included records 
of party Congresses and official statements by party boards. Valuable material was 
also gained from the PBB and PK party journals Buletin Bintang ('Star Bulletin') 
and Suara Keadilan ('Voice of Justice'), the books and pamphlets available at the PK 
headquarters and the DDII bookstore. Additional material comprising newspaper 
reports and articles was gained from the Indonesian press and the web sites of PK. An 
important supplementary source was documentations of constitution assembly 
debates stored at the Hubungan Masyarakat bureau (Humas) of the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) complex in Jakarta. This material comprised 
meetings of the MPR and various commissions and panels. More than one hundred 
interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Jakarta between May to August 1999, 
July 2000 to May 2001, mid October to late November 2001, November 2002, and 
January 2003. The majority of interviewees came from PPP, PK, PBB and DDII. 
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The largest part of the thesis covers the time period between the beginning of 
reformasi in May 1998 to the last round of constitutional amendments in August 
2002. It examines the constitutional debates which took place a year into the 
Megawati Soekarnoputri presidency but pays no attention to other issues in that 
period. An analysis of Islamic politics under her government was premature and 
could not provide ample insight. 
For the most part, the thesis is structured thematically. Chapter one discusses the 
central terms 'ideology' and 'constitutional Islamism'. It introduces the categories 
'Masyumi tradition' and 'imported Islamism' and discusses their roles in Indonesia. 
The topic of chapter two is the re-formation of Islamic politics in 1998 and 1999. It 
illustrates the declining importance of the Masyumi tradition in Islamist politics. 
Chapter three depicts the frustration among the devotees of Masyumi resulting from 
defeats and concessions to non-Muslims since independence, the continuity of this 
discourse in the New Order and its impact on the frame of mind of legatee parties in 
the reformasi era. Chapter four covers the motives and doctrinal approaches of 
contemporary Islamist parties to Islamise state and society and discusses the quality 
of their shari 'ah agenda. Chapter five examines the political strategies of Islamist 
parties. It will describe the oscillation between Islamist concerns and those of 
broader political reform. It will portray the ambivalent Islamist position toward non-
Muslims within the context of political necessities and the impact of Qur' anic 
passages on plural issues on the Islamist mindset. Chapter six surveys the behaviour 
of Islamist parties between ideological goals and political advantage, again depicting 
the tension between idealism and pragmatism as inimical to constitutional Islamist 
politics. It argues that political short-term goals prevailed, explained by the 
constitutionalism of Islamist parties. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISLAMISM IN INDONESIA 
This chapter introduces various terms and problems addressed in the thesis. The first 
section makes a distinction between "ideologies" and "quasi-ideologies". This 
distinction prepares the categorisation of Indonesian Islamist parties in later chapters. 
The first section also outlines two main features of Islamism: the claim to know 
God's will how public and personal lives should be organised and a legalist outlook. 
The first feature will be described as "is and ought"; the latter feature as "shari 'ah-
mindedness". Shari 'ah rule (i.e. rule by Islamic law), it will be pointed out, is 
connected to the Islamist perception of 'justice'. The second part of the chapter 
establishes the main constitutional features of Islamism and the ensuing dilemmas for 
the accomplishment of ideological goals. The third section gives an introductory 
overview of constitutional Islamism in Indonesia, discerning two main streams: "The 
Masyumi tradition" and "imported Islamism". 
Islamism and Ideology 
Ideologies and Quasi-Ideologies 
A succinct definition of Islamism is Islam understood and promoted as an all-
encompassing and cause-oriented political ideology. Ideologies are explicit and 
rather cohesive sets of strongly interrelated and systematised beliefs and ideas, 
shared and endorsed by an internally integrated group, with a strong evaluative 
component and a firm determination on key propositions. The theoretical blueprint of 
ideologies for political action is unequivocal and there is 'consensus demanded of 
those who accept them' .1 Ideologies constitute alternative visions of civilization. 
1 Definitions of ideology tend to be abstract and to overlap with other "difficult" terms. A more 
straightforward treatise is Gary Alan Fine's and Kent Sandstrom's "Ideology in Action: A Pragmatic 
Approach to a Contested Concept", Sociological Theory, 11, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 21-38 (definition 
on p. 24 ). Also Edward Shils, "The Concept and Function of Ideology'', International Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences, No. 7, 1968, pp. 66-76 (quote: p. 66) and Terry Eagleton, Ideology- an 
Introduction, Verso, New York & London, 1991. See also, for example, Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, 
Ideology, and Belief Systems", American Political Science Review 63, 1969, pp. 398-411 and Williard 
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The thesis will describe Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) as such an 'internally 
integrated group' that rested on a 'rather cohesive set of strongly interrelated and 
systematised beliefs and ideas' and performed on an explicit blueprint for political 
action. 
Ideologies 'arise in conditions of crisis and in sectors of society to whom the hitherto 
prevailing outlook has become unacceptable' .2 The exact origins of ideological 
devotion, however, are notoriously diffuse. They are grounded in an intricate blend 
of tradition, religion and what Alan Dundes termed 'folk ideas'-the 'traditional 
notions that a group of people have about the nature of man, of the world and of 
man's life in the world' .3 For the design of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that 
ideology emerges from within a pre-existing socio-religious setting and value 
system. In the words of Shils: 
An ideology cannot come into existence without the prior existence of a general 
pattern of moral and cognitive judgments-an outlook and its subsidiary creeds 
against which it is a reaction and of which it is a variant. It requires, in other words, 
a cultural tradition from which to deviate and from which to draw the elements 
which it intensifies and raises to centrality. An intellectualized religion provides the 
ideal precondition for the emergence of ideology, since the former contains explicit 
propositions about the nature of the sacred and its cultivation, which is what 
ideologies are about.4 
The thesis, at the same time, will argue that a number of Islamist parties and 
organisations defend a number of Islamist agendas without endorsing a coherent and 
comprehensive set of a belief that warrants classification as ideology. These agendas 
constitute a quasi-ideology. By definition, therefore, quasi-ideologies are indefinite 
and loose belief systems. Full and elaborate ideologies exist alongside more freely 
structured beliefs with mere ideological orientations. 5 
Mullins, "On the Concept ofldeology in Political Science", The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 66, No.2, Jun. 1972, pp. 498-510. 
2 Shils, Concept, p. 69. 
3 Alan Dundes, "Folk Ideas as Units of World View'', Journal of American Folklore, No. 84, pp. 93-
103 (quote: p. 95). 
4 Shils, Concept, p. 69. 
5 Shils, Concept. It is difficult to always maintain a rigid differentiation between 'ideologies' and 
'quasi-ideologies'. For example, though ideologies 'are not infinitely flexible', they, too-like quasi-
ideologies-are not entirely closed to change or flexible application. Hamzah Alavi and Fred 
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The common adherent of a quasi-ideology has ideological needs less 'intense, 
comprehensive and persistent' than devotees of fuller ideologies. This adherent 
usually proposes a partial range of ideological goals and shows less zeal to change 
the nature of the society he or she lives in. Devotees of 'quasi-ideologies', however, 
often adamantly defend a certain number of beliefs and policies.6 Quasi-ideologies, 
thus, Shils recorded: 
... become a program of aggressive demands and criticism against the central 
institutional and value system. Programs, like ideologies, are also emergents from 
prevailing outlooks and creeds; they "take seriously" some particular element in the 
outlook and seek to bring it to fulfilment within the existing order. A program 
accepts much of the prevailing institutional and value system, although it fervently 
rejects one sector.7 (Italic in original) 
It will be argued that Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development Party', 
PPP), the largest Islamist party in post-New Order Indonesia defended such a partial 
ideological agenda and sought 'to bring it to fulfilment within the existing order'. 8 
This "program" often is a remnant of what was once a fuller ideology. Its demands 
may acquire a significant status in a party's program. They thus become crucial in 
forming a distinctive party identity. To present a distinctive profile, of course, is 
often in the interest of a political group. This awards the defence of assorted 
ideological policies its practical value. 
Furthermore, ideologies can transform into quasi-ideologies. Ideologies are often 
associated with a dominant individual, in Shils' terms an 'inspiring genius', or a 
specific tradition of thought that has remained of intellectual relevance. 9 Its main 
body of ideas has prevailed, passed on by its initiators to following generations. 
Halliday, State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, Macmillan Education, Basingstoke, 
1988, pp. 6-7 (quote: 7); also Kramer, Cross-Links, pp. 47ff.; Piscatori, Accounting, pp. 366 and 371. 
6 Shils, Concept, pp. 66-9. 
7 Shils, Concept, p. 71. 
8 See the following chapters. 
9 Shils, Concept, pp. 66-9. Leading examples in 201h century Islamic politics are Hassan al-Banna and 
Sayyid Qutb, the prevailing intellectual influences of the Muslim Brotherhood in various countries. 
Also Rashid Ghannoushi of the Tunisian Movement de la Tendence Islamique (MTI), Sayyid Abul 
A'la Mawdudi of the Indian-Pakistani Jama'at-i-Islami and Hasan al-Turabi of the Sudanese 'National 
Islamic Front' (NIF). The influence of these men went beyond their organisations and homelands. 
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Subsequent devotees, however, operate in a different social and political 
environment, both in domestic and global terms. As a result, the ideology's clarity 
might have faded; its key positions might have become distorted or undergone a 
process of modification. 
Where ideologies have turned into quasi-ideologies, their precise body of ideas often 
become a matter of internal contest amongst devotees. These devotees tend to have 
diverse levels of ideological awareness and award different significance to particular 
aspects of an ideology. Internal contest may also happen because key ideological 
concepts were directly founded on the ideas of a particular person or core group. 
Successive disciples conserve and often revere a particular intellectual tradition, but 
its dispositions may have not been further debated and developed or been adequately 
adjusted to a different socio-political environment. It is also possible that disciples 
fail or hesitate to spell out the hierarchical order of an ideology's various components 
and do not clarify what conduct they dictate. These questions are thus left to 
negotiation. 10 
The thesis will portray the Masyumi leader Mohamad Natsir as coming closest to an 
"inspiring genius" in Indonesian Islamism. It will describe the main Masyumi legatee 
party Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB) as illustrating a case in 
which the meaning of a loose ideology and the hierarchical order of its assorted 
values has become further unclear and contested. 
"Is" and "Ought" 
Islamists believe in and, more so than ordinary Muslims, proclaim the existence of a 
Godly order of how to organise life and society. They therefore proclaim a 'link 
between is and ought', which, Fine and Sandstrom pointed out, stands 'at the heart of 
ideology'. 11 As adherents of a belief that claims to defend the truth, Islamists 
typically assert to know what is in the best interest of "the people" or the sections of 
society they claim and wish to represent. John Garvey pointed out: 
10 Shils, Concept, p. 71. 
11 Fine and Sandstrom, Ideology in Action, p. 23. 
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The connection between "is" and "ought" means that it is possible to have objective 
knowledge about how we should behave. That would be a good foundation for 
making laws. People would then agree once they understood the facts, even in a 
pluralist democracy. [Islamists] do not claim that we can reach political agreement 
through the use of reason alone. That belief is actually a form of idolatry because it 
assumes that men and women can get along on their own. . . . [M]ost important from 
a political standpoint is this: he has given us, in writing, the foundation of a legal 
code.12 
Islam, like other salvation religions, offers the incentive that proper execution of 
God's will makes salvation more likely. For the believer there are thus definitive 
paths to follow and goals to struggle for though, in general, a doctrinaire Islamist 
might have a higher awareness about "what should be" than a pragmatic Islamist. 
Shari'ah-Mindedness and Justice 
Related to the "is and ought" feature is Islamism's particular emphasis on Islam's 
political assignment in order to enforce its teachings and laws (i.e. shari 'ah, Arab: 
sharT'a). The notion of shari 'ah has a central position in Islamic theology and 
history. 13 'In its religious usage ... and from the earliest period', Fazlur Rahman 
wrote, shari 'ah 'has meant "the highway of good life", i.e. religious values, 
expressed functionally and in concrete terms to direct man's life' .14 Marshall G. 
Hodgson termed the proclivity in the Islamic tradition to establish a 'programme for 
private and public living centred on the Shari'ah law' as 'shari'ah-mindedness'. 15 
Shari 'ah-mindedness attempts to give the spiritual, ethical and philosophical aspects 
12 Garvey, Introduction, p. 19. 
13 Mark Cammack, "Islam, Nationalism, and the State in Suharto's Indonesia", Wisconsin 
International Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, winter 1999, p. 30. 
14 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 100. The original 
understanding of shari' ah thus went beyond that of strictly being Islamic law or an Islamic legal 
system. Literally, the term 'shari'ah' means 'way toward the spring of water'. Water symbolises the 
essence of life. Understood as such, shari'ah becomes identical with 'belief (ad-din) itself and not 
strictly law-related. This is a common understanding, endorsed, for example, by Partai Bulan Bintang 
('Crescent Star Party, PBB) ideologue Rifyal Ka'bah in his "Syari'at Islam & Amendemen 
Konstitusi", Buletin Dakwah, No. 31, 4 August 2000. 
15 Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of/slam (Book 1), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974, 
p. 238. 
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of faith a definitive outward form and to establish institutions and authority 
structures that ensure their observance. 16 
The inspiring example for the operation of shari 'ah is foundational Islam, a term 
referring to the organisation of society by the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century 
and the subsequent reign of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs. Islamists often assert 
that all central questions in modem Islam could be traced back to the immediate time 
after the death of the Prophet. This comprises the organisation of state and 
community and a basic scheme of governance. The Prophet and his immediate 
successors, the caliphs, were spiritual, political and military leaders. In his life, 
Muhammad established a state with attributes comparable to modem administrations 
though its features were necessarily of lesser complexity. It oversaw the collection of 
taxes, the establishment of laws, and leadership over an army. There was, Bernard 
Lewis wrote, 'from the beginning an interpenetration, almost an identification, of 
cult and power, or religion and the state: Mohammed was not only a prophet, but a 
ruler' .17 
Foundational Islam stands for an exemplary Muslim community heading a plural 
religious society, known as 'Medina Society'. Islamism perceives this social order as 
having applied to broader religiosity. Power rested increasingly with Mohammad.18 
Christians and Jews obtained special recognition because they possessed scriptures 
(the Gospels and the torah), acknowledged by the Qur'an and which made them, like 
Muslims, 'People of the Book' (ahl al-kitab, Arab: ahlu '1-kitab or ahl al-kitab).19 
Islam teaches that religious communities classified as ahl al-kitab share the belief in 
the singularity and unity of God. They, therefore, were permitted religious autonomy 
under a "protected" status?0 Yet Christians and Jews had a lower social and legal 
16 The counterpart to shari'ah-minded-Islam is Sufism, attempting to know God through meditation, 
ascetic or ecstatic practices. 
17 This particularly refers to Muhammad's last years of his lifetime during which he attained 
domineering powers. Lewis, Historical Overview. 
18 Initially, the Prophet's role was to settle disputes among members of the Medina society. But 
eventually, Mohammad became the central religious and political authority. See Montgomery Watt, 
Mohammad at Medina, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956. 
19 As such, the Gospels and the torah anticipate the Qur'an and have to be interpreted with hindsight 
to the word of the latter. 
20 Other 'People of the Book' were permitted to perform their religions under Muslim leadership 
whilst compelled to pay a tax (jizyah). 
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status than Muslims and, though they could carry out their faiths, they were not full 
members of the Medina community. 21 The Islamic tradition aspired a global religious 
community in which Muslims constitute the leading populace. Hodgson compared 
this universal appeal to that of other religious communities: 
... Muslims, unlike the Jews, did not regard their own community as a unique 
and ... hereditary body selected out from a world left otherwise without direct divine 
guidance. The Muslim community was thought of as one among many divinely 
guided communities such as the Jewish or the Christian, all (at their origin) equally 
blessed. Thus far, Islam took explicitly the form that various Christian and Jewish 
bodies had implicitly been assuming under the confessional empires-an 
autonomous social organism with its own law for its own members. The difference 
between Islam and the other communities was that Islam was first to rule over and 
then to supersede all others. Islam was to bring the true and uncorrupted divine 
guidance to all mankind, creating a world-wide society in which the true revelation 
would [be] the everyday norm of all nations. It must not merely guide an 
autonomous community like the Jewish; it must guide the practical policies of a 
cosmopolitan world.22 
A heightened sense for not disconcerting secular Muslims and non-Muslims in 
contemporary plural political systems, however, has caused an increasing number of 
Islamists to either downplay or to step back from Islamism' s appeal to broader 
religiosity by claiming to target the Muslim population only.23 
Classical Sunni political theory stipulated that a ruling authority (i.e. a caliph) was 
under obligation to protect and execute the Islamic canon of laws on Muslims. 
Ruling authority had to be the custodian and implementer of shari 'ah rule. It was 
God's representative on earth whose task was to ensure that the Muslims were able 
to lead pious lives so that they would achieve salvation in the afterlife. A ruler's 
legitimacy was based in the successful execution of this mission: 
The Sunnites tend to look to the state as the organizer of their religious affairs. In 
their traditional theory, the ruler is the implementer of the Word of God; and in this 
21 The religious and material rights of the Jews were inserted in the Constitution of Medina, especially 
in the famous phrase of Paragraph 25: 'to the Jews their religion and to the Muslims their religion'. 
Reprinted in Watt, Mohammad, p. 223. 
22 Hodgson, Venture, p. 317. Present-day Islamist states like Sudan or Saudi Arabia reflect Islam's 
broad religious zeal by prohibiting non-Muslims from drinking alcohol or forcing non-Muslim women 
to wear a headscar£ Daniel Pipes critiqued the Islamist position in his "Islam and Islamism: Faith and 
Ideology'', The National Interest, Washington, Spring 2000, pp. 87-93. 
23 The Jakarta Charter clause illustrates this. It specifically excludes non-Muslims from the obligation 
to follow Islamic law. See later chapters. 
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capacity obedience is due to him from every believer. And that Word of God is 
specifically translated, by the jurists, into law, the shari'a.24 
Shari 'ah-minded Islam thus relies on governmental institutions and on decrees and 
verdicts that cultivate Islam in society. Fazlur Rahman noted: 
Man on earth must discover and implement the will of God. The will of God lies 
enshrined in the Qur' an and is embodied in the Sunna of the Prophet. This will of 
God is the Shari'a. A community, which consciously sets out to implement the 
Shari' a, is a Muslim community. But in order to implement the Shari' a, the Muslim 
society must set up certain institutions, the most important of which is the state. No 
form of the state, therefore, has any inherent sanctity: it possesses sanctity only in so 
far as it is an effective instrument of the Muslim community.25 
The traditional understanding of shari' ah is 'universal in scope'. 26 It covers fields of 
civil law such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, penal law and a number of 
religious laws and obligations.Z7 Classical Sunni doctrine thus postulated a set of 
rules, which is under the supervision of the state and extended into private matters. It 
has been noted that Islam, in its original disposition, was in this regard very much 
unlike Christianity. 28 
Islamists, at the same time, highlight the traditional Sunni stipulation that, being of 
Godly origin, surrendering to shari 'ah rule will bring about a virtuous and happy life 
in a 'just' (adil, Arab: 'ad!) society.29 This logic demands that a just organisation of 
society is only viable by living in fullest accordance possible with the rules of Islam. 
These rules automatically avoid perilous and barren governance and guarantee peace 
and wealth framed by the principle of justice. As Lewis noted, this correlation 
between justice and religious ruling is uniquely Islamic: 
W estemers have become accustomed to think of good and bad governments in terms 
of tyranny versus liberty. In Middle Eastern usage, liberty or freedom was a legal not 
a political term ... For traditional Muslims, the converse of tyranny was not liberty 
24 Nazih N. Ayubi, "State Islam and Communal Plurality", The Annals of the American Academy, 524, 
November 1992, pp. 79-91 (quote p. 83). 
25 Fazlur Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam", in P.M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard 
Lewis ( eds. ), The Cambridge History of Islam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 
632-56 (quote pp. 636-7). 
26 Hodgson, Venture, p. 317. 
27 This might include daily prayer (sa/at), fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj). 
28 Lewis, Historical Overview. 
29 'Justice' is one of the most frequently mentioned key terms in the Qur'an. 
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but justice. [This meant] that the ruler was there by right and not by usurpation, and 
that he governed according to God's law, or at least according to recognisable moral 
and legal principles.30 
The term 'justice' played a central role in the polemics of the Partai Keadilan 
('Justice Party', PK) and the party gave the clearest illustration of the intimate bond 
between 'justice' and shari' ah rule. 31 
Classical Sunni political literature, however, has almost exclusively dealt with 
theological questions and somewhat neglected the technical aspects of how Islam's 
legal codes could be enforced and implemented in a particular environment.32 
Moreover, many instructions of the Islamic canon are worded briefly, have complex 
semantics or are thematically set in a particular historical context. They, therefore, 
are in need of recurrent scrutiny and interpretation. As a result, there is to the present 
day no consensus as to what an Islamic system precisely consists of and how it has to 
be organised and administrated. 33 
A legacy of colonialism was the triumph of national law and inherently secular, 
hierarchical and centralised legal systems. In most present-day Muslim countries, 
therefore, Islamists operate in political and legal models of European origin or 
comprising a strong Western element. The provisos of constitutionalism also 
impacted on the understanding and promotion of shari 'ah regulations. They called 
for a modification of shari 'ah approaches and their means of application. Islamists 
have partly responded to the tensions arising from constitutional ruling by 
reinterpreting the Qur' an through moral and ethical notions and less through literal 
readings decoded into strict laws. As law, the term shari 'ah today stands for a 
detailed and precise set of rules for regulating life and also for a set of general values 
30 Bernard Lewis, What went wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, Orion Books, 
2002, pp. 60-1. 
31 See especially chapter five. 
32 This becomes evident in the writings of the great medieval scholars al-Farabi, al-Marwardi and Ibn 
Khaldun. Bassam Tibi, "Islam and Modem European Ideologies", International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, Feb. 1986, pp. 15-29. Also Laura Guazzone, "Islamism and Islamists in 
the Contemporary Arab World", in Guazzone (ed.) Islamist Dilemma, pp. 3-38 (esp. p. 11). 
33 It is thus uncertain whether there is a historical precedent for the full realisation of a society under 
shari 'ah rule. Nathan J. Brown, "Sharia and State in the Modem Muslim Middle East", International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vo. 29, No.3, August 1997, pp. 359-376. 
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broadly in accord with Islamic temperament. 34 It can both refer to specific Islamic 
regulations and directives and to principles shared by other creeds, most notably 
security, morality, order and prosperity; all of which stand on the basic principle of 
an Islam-sanctioned form of justice. Parallel to the ambiguity of these Islamic-
deemed ideals, the notion of shari 'ah continues to bear a status as panacea for the 
problems of Muslim societies in modem times and its significance as a politically 
potent factor and a means of mobilisation has grown steadily. 
Islamism and Constitutionalism 
Constitutional Islamists are to various degrees confronted with the tension of 
practical and idealist concerns. 35 They often have to modify their political approach, 
and follow practical-pragmatic considerations by accepting the provisos of a non-
Islamic political system and recognising constitutional authority. Constitutional 
Islamists thus often differentiate between immediate and ultimate objectives, in 
accordance with what particular social and political circumstances permit and 
suggest being strategically wise. The dominance of nationalist and secular regimes in 
20th century Muslim countries and the exclusion of Islamists from government, army 
and the high bureaucracy were additional factors necessitating this. 
The idea of framing the body politic with a Constitution entered the Muslim world in 
the course of intensified contact with the West during the 19th century and the 
pressure of European powers on the Ottoman caliphate. The installation of a 
Constitution then became central to finalising the process of decolonialisation and 
establishing self-governing Muslim states. The purpose of a Constitution is to 
'bring[s] stability, predictability and order to the actions of government'. It works as 
'a set of rules that seek to establish the duties, powers and functions of the various 
institutions of government, regulate the relationships between them, and define the 
relationship between the state and the individual.' 36 It has been argued, significantly, 
that the attraction of constitutionalism to Muslims did not rest with the secular 
34 Kramer, lslamist Notions. 
35 Kramer, Integration and Cross-Links. 
36 Andrew Heywood, Key Concepts in Politics, Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 196. 
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origins of constitutionalism but because it promised to lead to order and stability in 
the newly formed states.37 
Respect for the rule of law 1s the least ambivalent attribute of constitutional 
Islamism. Most Islamists who are not active in political parties also operate legally 
yet are often eager, and able, to safeguard some form of autonomy. Islamist 
politicians, too, may preserve some inner detachment from a state and its values but 
willingly decide to embrace a plural political system and to accept the limiting 
provisos of its composition. Constitutional Islamism thus fully and consciously gives 
way in its actions to the qualifications set out by the constitutional framework and 
the government that is based on it. 
Along with the promulgation of Constitutions m vanous states with a Muslim 
majority persisted the desire to apply shari 'ah. The ensuing tension has been 
between those Muslims viewing the Islamic canon as a book of strict laws that limits 
human freedom to locate its rules, and others prepared to install a Constitution that 
gives humans the liberty to compose laws themselves, possibly in violation of the 
Godly rules. Many of the newly formed Muslim states tried to overcome this impasse 
by inserting a stipulation that nothing in the Constitution must go against Islam. 38 
Islamic courts survived European intrusion into domestic legal systems but gradually 
declined in significance. Many colonial powers, including the Dutch in the East 
Indies, controlled and restricted shari 'ah-based jurisdiction rather than abandoning it 
completely. In the course of time, however, Islamic courts fell behind the 
modernising force of the parallel operating civil courts. Institutions that once had 
been central to a successful enforcement of shari 'ah were transformed; educational 
37 Prof. Sohail Hashmi, a leading authority on the relation between Islam and constitutionality, cited in 
the Event Transcript from a conference at Mount Holyoke College, 22 November 2002. 
http://www.eppc.org/conferences/pubiD.l592,eventiD.48/transcript.asp. 
38 There is, however, no guarantee that the inclusion of shari' ah terms into Constitutions fulfils this 
purpose if ruling elites object to the idea. In independent Algeria, for example, Islam was written into 
a Constitution that sanctioned a hard-line socialist ideology and a secular elite. The 1972 Egyptian 
Constitution defmed Islam as state religion and shari' ah as the primary source for legislation. Yet 
despite this, the Constitution was 'substantially secular'. William Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: 
Towards a Typology", Middle East Studies, 19, 1987, pp. 307-36 (quote p. 309). 
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techniques and practices deemed to constitute an essential part of shari 'ah 
disintegrated. 39 
Responding to the challenges of western-defined modernity, 19th and 20th century 
reformers such as Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) 
reopened shari 'ah-mindedness to human reason. The scope of human reason in the 
application of shari 'ah has been a lasting controversy in Islamic political thought.40 
The 9th century Hanbalite legal school (mazhab, Arab: madhhab) and its main 
theorist Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) opposed reason and the use of philosophy in 
distilling a body of laws from the Qur' an. Hanbalism also demanded a literal 
adaptation of shari'ah.41 The school of al-Ash'ari (873-935), the main pre-modem 
theology in Sunni Islam, appropriated legal innovation through means of independent 
reasoning (ijtihad) and analogy (qiyas) by qualified Muslim scholars (ulama, Arab: 
'ulama'). Yet to be eligible, the moral content of any interpretation had to originate 
in the Qur'an and the collected sayings of the Prophet (hadith). 
Modernism further accentuated a rational reading of the sources of Islamic law 
through an individual and layman's interpretation of religious texts. It also moved 
shari 'ah-mindedness from the earlier predilection to adapt Islamic teachings literally. 
Arriving in the Dutch East Indies in the later decades of the 19th century, modernism 
introduced a rational interpretation of Islam; flexible and constantly readjusted to 
meet the needs of a certain time and place, though the reformers still desired that 
several Qur'anic stipulations be applied literally into laws and degrees.42 
Above all, the reformers strove to modify the character of Islamic state models to 
meet the new demands. Reformist ideas had meant a serious blow to classic Islamic 
political conceptions. They undermined the ideal of a global Muslim community 
(umat, Arab: umma) headed by a single ruler. Nationalism endorsed language as the 
39 Brown, Sharia and State. 
40 The school of the Mutazilites was the most radical advocate ofhuman reason. The Sunni majority 
views the Mutazilite School as "heretic". 
41 This is notwithstanding that Hanbalism claimed to adhere to independent reasoning and analogy in 
matters of exegesis. Hanbalism is one oflslam's four major jurisprudential traditions. The main law 
school in Indonesia is the Shafi'i school named after its founder al-Shafi'i (d. 820). 
42 Mark Cammack, "Indonesia's 1989 Religious Judicature Act: Islamisation oflndonesia or 
Indonesianisation oflslam?", Indonesia, No. 63, April1997, pp. 143-68 (esp. p. 167). 
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common denominator, not religion. It 'introduced the secular conception of 
authority' and made the nation the basis of authority. 43 This proved a lasting 
dilemma for Islamic political thought, aspiring to a global religious community in 
which Muslims form the governing peoples.44 Madjid Khadduri pointed to the 
impasses that the triumph of a modem law for plural nation states imposed on 
classical Sunni thought: 
In contrast with the modem law of nations, which presupposes the existence of a 
family of nations composed of states enjoying sovereign rights and equality of 
status, the law of Islam recognizes no other nation than its own ... [T]he law of Islam 
was based on the theory of a universal state. It assumed that mankind constituted one 
community ... govemed ultimately by one ruler. The aim of Islam was the 
proselytization of the whole of mankind. Islam's law for the conduct of the state, 
accordingly, was the law of an imperial state which would recognize no equal status 
for the party (or the parties) with whom it happened to fight or negotiate. It follows 
therefore that the binding force of such a law was not based on mutual consent or 
reciprocity, but on the state's own interpretation of its political and religious 
interests, since Islam regarded its principles of morality and religion as superior to 
others.45 
Islamic reformers laid bare this dilemma by approving nationalist sentiment only if it 
was addressed to a nation that respected Islam. Rashid Rida famously proclaimed 
that 'love of the homeland is part of faith' (Arab: hubbu 'l-watan mina 'l-iman), a 
saying later quoted by numerous Islamists to underscore their claim for nationalist 
credentials. 
Dealing with western models of governance thus inevitably called for the re-
interpretation of Qur' anic directives deemed in line with pluralist politics. An 
important upshot of the diffusion of western political concepts was Islam's esteem of 
civil political authority, a 'definite shift of emphasis away from the person of the 
ruler and the duty of obedience and acquiescence ... to the authority of the community 
and the responsibility of every individual believer' .46 Along with this shift went a 
review of selective Qur' anic concepts. The most cited of these concepts is shura, 
43 The first Muslim state built on these principles came into being in 1908, replacing the Ottoman 
regime. Madjid Khadduri, "Islam and the Modern Law ofNations", The American Journal of 
International Law, Vo. 50, No.2, April1956, pp. 358-72. 
44 Martin Kramer, "Fundamentalist Islam at Large: The Drive for Power", Middle East Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, No.2, June 1996. 
45 Khadduri, Islam and the Modem Law, p. 358. 
46 Kramer, Islamist Notions. 
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commonly defined as the duty of political consultation and participation and tied to 
two sections in which the Qur'an honours those 'who conduct their affairs by mutual 
consultation' and the stipulation 'to consult them in affairs' .47 This was a 
reinterpretation of Sunni doctrine in which shura stood for the practise of a 
"qualified" 'advisory board' with the 'freedom to express views, exercised by the 
opinion leader only insofar as this does not affect any components of the religious 
doctrine ... '. 48 The equally popular notion of ijma has served to give Islamic 
legitimacy to the democratic process of building a consensus. In Sunni doctrine, 
however, ijma justified negotiation over matters not fully clarified by Muslim 
jurisprudence (fiqh). The stipulation to confine authority to Muslims with superior 
intellectual and moral qualities continues to have varied impact on the thought and 
rhetoric of contemporary Islamists.49 
The reformers' efforts to face up to Western-defined modernity also influenced the 
perception of the term shari 'ah and, ultimately, the quality of the shari 'ah 
discourse. 50 In its broader legal sense, shari 'ah covered knowledge about processes 
and practices dealing with the question of distilling legal directives from the religious 
texts and mediating interpretational disputes. The term was linked to and grounded in 
a set of learning institutions that sought to create excellence in the fields of religious 
commentary, exegesis, or understanding of earlier textual interpretations. As such, 
the implications of shari 'ah rule encompassed the existence of institutions that 
enabled its execution and implementation, above all the prevalence of shari 'ah-based 
courts. 51 
Modem legal reform reduced the importance of institutions vital to accomplishing 
shari 'ah. Yet, bereft of the institutions and practices once associated with shari 'ah, 
Islamists often lack proficiency in matters of jurisprudence and thus fall short of 
47 Verses Al-Shura (42:38) and al-Imran (3:159). Translation by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 1257 (first 
quote) and p. 169 (second quote). 
48 The al-Azhar (Cairo)-based sheikh Mahmud Shaltut quoted in Tibi, Ideologies, p. 16. 
49 Traditionally, only so-called 'people of authority' had the right to elect the caliph. Reformers such 
as Rida continued to support the idea that high offices should be limited to those who had proven their 
mastery in theological and juridical hindsight. Majid Fakhry, "The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State 
in Recent Controversies", International Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, Oct. 1954, pp. 450-62. 
50 See, for example, Brown, Sharia and State. 
51 Ibid. 
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explaining how they intend to successfully apply Islamic regulations on a broader 
scale. At the same time, demands to adapt shari 'ah became the trademark of Islamist 
movements in the second half of the 20th century. Ann Elizabeth Mayer recorded: 
In its conversion for use as a political ideology, the Shari'a has inevitably become 
simplified and politicised; its elaborate jurisprudence and the complex and extensive 
rules worked out by the premodern jurists have been slighted. In many areas, what 
reinstating the Shari' a might involve in practice is often left vague by the proponents 
of Islamization when they are seeking popular support. 52 
Parallel to this, the traditionally wide-ranging understanding of the term shari 'ah as 
"the highway of good life" (p. 23) was transformed into a narrower understanding of 
shari 'ah as being law itsel£ Brown observed: 
The degree to which the shariah is seen as prevailing is connected less with the 
institutions and practices formerly associated with it than with the degree to which 
the law in force conforms to shariah norms ... [A] set of identifiable rules, has 
become the most widely accepted indicator of the degree to which a society and 
political system are Islamic. 53 
The shari 'ah discourse in post-colonial states, therefore, took more the form of a 
competition between Islamic- and European-derived laws with the latter prevailing in 
many Muslim countries, including Indonesia. An Islamic order became defined 
through the influence of shari 'ah-sympathetic laws in national legal systems, 
detached from the creation of Islamic political traditions such as the caliphate but 
combined with the endeavour to write shari 'ah words into the Constitution 
supposedly in order to defend its status. 54 
There has never been a formal incorporation of shari 'ah terms in the Indonesian 
Constitution. In 1945, similar to other newly formed states, Indonesian Muslim 
representatives opted for a compromise constitutional proviso which was to ensure 
that Muslims would not act in violation of God's commands. This aspiration 
ultimately was rejected but turned into a durable legacy for subsequent devotees. 
52 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, 
Pakistan, and the Sudan", in Appleby and Marty ( eds. ), Fundamentalisms and the State, pp. 110-51 
(quote: p. 110). 
53 Brown, Sharia and State, pp. 370-1. 
54 Kramer, lslamist Notions. 
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During Guided Democracy (1959-1966) and the New Order (1966-1998) Islamism 
had no political outlet while maintaining a very strong advocacy for 
constitutionalism. In 1998, then, Islamism became part of a democratic multi-party 
system, channelling its aspirations through constitutional means and its 
representative institutions. 
Constitutional Islamism in Indonesia 
Indonesian Islamism emerged as an inbuilt component of a broader Islamic political 
scene in the early decades of the 20th century. 55 Its conception of governance was 
adopted along Islamic modernism. At its programmatic core was the approval of a 
nation state as political entity, the rule of law, the belief in the political authority of 
society as opposed to arbitrary and despotic rule, and, at the same time, the 
reformer's conviction that being Muslim and succumbing to shari 'ah were 
indivisible and that the state was under an obligation to implement shari 'ah for 
adherents of Islam. 
It is a scholarly truism that Indonesian Islam is highly diverse and plural. There is, 
therefore, a wide array of understanding about what it means and requires to be a 
Muslim.56 The position of Islamists toward their home nation, its history and 
cultures, including the specific nature of the Islamic faith, are matters of wide-
ranging importance. In many Muslim countries, different identities compete with 
each other: national, Islamic and regional identities. Islamist groups have various and 
shifting senses ofbelonging to their nation and the global Muslim community. Often, 
they not only claim to be shaped by and to be in step with national or regional 
cultural traits, but also to represent national identity or "Muslims" (the umat Islam) 
in general. 
55 Islamism is a quite recent term to depict the resurgence oflslam as an ideological movement in the 
second half of the 201h century. Indonesian Muslims of the 1920s, 30s and 40s necessarily had a less 
fragmented perception of the Muslim community. 
56 Many authors have emphasized this plurality, most emphatically Clifford Geertz in his Religion of 
Java, The Free Press, Chicago, London, 1960. 
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The height of Turkish and Arab nationalism, both central to Islamic reformism, 
intersected with the parallel revival of pan-Islamic sentiment. Indonesian Islam of the 
1920s up to the 1950s had comparatively few pan-Islamic leanings.57 Rising from 
within the broader political Islamic scene was a self-consciously home-grown 
Islamist current which always claimed to be orientated toward domestic themes and 
indigenous expressions of the Muslim faith. 
These Islamists had traditions that distinguished them from other forms. One 
tradition was educational and intellectual. The vast majority of the first generation of 
Islamists was educated in the Dutch Indies. Many, especially those preoccupied with 
politics, had little formal Islamic education. They had a rather limited command of 
the Arabic language and little expertise in matters of Islamic jurisprudence. 58 Even 
fewer had studied in Middle Eastern countries. Usually, they had received religious 
training from Javanese ulama (Islamic scholars and jurists) coupled with a formal 
Dutch education. 59 
A significant number of organisations that were established approaching the end of 
Dutch colonial rule in the second and third decades of the 20th century were self-
proclaimed Islamic reformers in the tradition of Abduh and Rida. Indonesian 
devotees of reformist Islamic ideas shaped their outlook. Central figures were 
Ahmad Surkati, Ahmad Dahlan (founder of the puritan reformist Muhammadiyah in 
1912), Ahmad Hassan (founder of the Persatuan Islam or 'Islamic Association', 
Persis, of the same doctrinal orientation) and Haji Agus Salim, a moderate Muslim 
intellectual of the less doctrinaire Sarekat Islam ('Islamic Union').60 
57 Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 298. The pan-Islamic ideas of Jamal al-Din at-Afghani, an 
early reformer, were mainly influential in the Sarekat Islam ('Islamic Union', 1912). 
58 Greg Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A History ofNahdlatul Ulama 1952-1967, PhD 
Thesis, Monash University, 1998, p. 82. Sarekat Islam leader Tjokroaminoto, for example, only 
started his Islamic studies after he founded the organisation. Also, he had little knowledge of Arabic 
but sympathised with the work of Dutch socialist writers. Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 298. 
59 The Bandung-based reformer Muhammad Yunus, for example, was the teacher of the Persis 
('Islamic Association') ideologue Alunad Hassan. 
60 The journal al-Manar, adopted from the Egyptian journal of the same name, had a reasonably wide 
circulation. See Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: transmission and responses, 
University ofHawaii Press, Honolulu, 2001; Jutta Bluhm-Warn, "Al-Manar and Alunad Soorkattie", 
in Peter Riddell and Tony Street (eds.), Islam: essays on scripture, thought, and society: afestschrift 
in honour of Anthony H Johns, Brill, Lei den and New York, 1997. 
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As the cradle of Islam and the birthplace of Muhammad, Middle Eastern custom and 
culture has always held an exemplary rank in the Muslim consciousness. 
Nonetheless, Middle Eastern lifestyle and thought had a much larger impact on 
Islamists of the 1990s. Islamic discourse in Indonesia's 1930s or 1940s gave little 
attention to a sultanate or caliphate even though nationalist ideas never permanently 
replaced the foundational Islamic ideal of a global Muslim community. Abolished in 
the wake of Islamic reformism, the caliphate permanently fascinated early Islamists, 
though mostly without any practical relevance.61 These Islamists were preoccupied 
with domestic issues of national sovereignty, the diffusion of power among political 
and religious groups in a post-colonial state and the formal rank of Islam in such a 
state. 
A significant number of present-day Islamists regard the central themes of their 
predecessors as the basis for their own legitimacy. Yet they have come to depict 
historical issues and the difficulties they involved not merely as the inheritance of a 
particular branch of Islam but of Indonesian Islam in general. This echoes Islamism's 
intrinsic position in the broader Islamic political scene of the early and mid-20th 
century. At the same time, it exposes the enduring aspiration of subsequent devotees 
to represent the umat Islam. Accordingly, these present-day Islamists continue to 
defend the claim to profess and defend a brand of Islam embedded in domestic 
beliefs and practises. 
Typical in the Muslim world of the 1950s and 1960s were hybrid concepts such as 
"Islamic democracy".62 When the Dutch East Indies became independent, the vast 
majority of Muslim politicians favoured a democracy grounded in an unspecified 
Islamic temperament, a democracy loosely based in Islamic principles.63 They helped 
to create political institutions based on European-derived concepts. But as adherents 
of hybrid models they nevertheless strove to remain equally faithful to the commands 
61 Compare with Fakhry, Theocratic Idea. 
62 Other such concepts were Islamic- and Arab socialism. 
63 After the Second World War, the globally endorsed political system outside the communist world 
was the democratic. Quite necessarily, "popular sovereignty" became a principle of the independent 
Indonesian state and in the following years, all political camps claimed to endorse democracy as the 
best political system. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1962, p. 44. 
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of their faith. These ideas were still defined by the parameters of classical Sunni 
political theory. 
The Masyumi Tradition 
Islamism's largest representative in Indonesia in the 1940s and 1950s was the 
Masyumi (Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi, 'Indonesian Islamic Political 
Party Masjumi').64 Masyumi took on key modernist influences such as a multiparty 
system, the separation of powers and parliamentary rule. It held that human rights 
and the 'freedom' for other communities 'to adhere and to perform their religions 
and to develop their cultures' had to be ensured if it held govemment.65 Most 
importantly, free speech and a formal opposition in parliament were deemed 
mandatory for a democracy. 66 These were not inherently Islamic issues but denoted 
the impact of modernism on Indonesian political Islam, in which the 'Masyumi 
tradition' came to grow as an innate, undisclosed component. A lasting influence of 
western political ideas on this tradition was the emphasis on public opposition 
against unjust rule and that it was the religious obligation of each Muslim to control 
the actions of government. This emphasis accompanied a strong respect for the rule 
of law regardless of the aspiration that law should be in unequivocal accord with 
shari 'ah. These propositions remained central for Indonesian Muslim organisations 
and parties from the 1920s up until the later years of the 1950s. The Masyumi 
tradition thus built on different thought models than the Islamist movement of the 
1970s and 1980s. The former understood itself as part of the worldwide Muslim 
community, but only later forms rose as part of a self-consciously global Muslim 
movement with its distinct organisational model and political strategy. 
64 Masyumi was ftrst founded in 1943 as Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia ('Consultative Council of 
Indonesian Muslims') by the Japanese colonial administration to aid the mobilisation of Muslims 
against Western allies. It replaced the Madjlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia ('Supreme Indonesian 
Council oflslam', MIAI), a Japanese-initiated federation. Masyumi had strongholds in Sumatra and 
West Java. See Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the 
Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945, W. van Hoeve, The Hague, 1958. 
65 "Kalau Masyumi Pegang Pemerintahan" ('lfMasyumi held power'), Hikmah, 2 April1955, p. 5 
(quote); "Memilih Masyumi berarti...:" ('To vote for Masyumi means ... '), Hikmah, 24 September 
1955, p. 6. 
66 "Konsepsi Presiden bawa ke Konstituante: demokrasi tak mengenal barat dan timur pendapat Moh. 
Natsir", Hikmah, 26 January 1957. In order to ftnd support in Islamic doctrine for these views, 
Masyumi, like most of its Muslim contemporaries, justified an approval of popular sovereignty by 
means of the Qur'anic principle of shura (mutual consultation). 
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Devotees of the Masyumi tradition, at the same time, have taken the offensive 
against the modernisation paradigm and its promotion of liberal democracy as it 
prevailed in 1950s Western academe. They contested suggestions that Islam was 
somewhat faulty if it could not prove congruity to a concept of democracy grounded 
in Western norms and philosophy. Attempts were made to reconcile a variety of 
European political conceptions with the ongoing sway held by doctrinal models over 
Muslim thought. The way Masyumi formulated its aims plainly exposed this 
predicament. It described a modem political system as a 'democratic and 
constitutional state based on Islam' (negara hukum yang demokratis berdasarkan 
Islam). In its 1945 statutes, Masyumi set the primary goals: to 'implement the 
sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic and the Islamic Religion'; to 'carry out 
[melaksanakan] Islamic ideals [cita-cita Islam] in state affairs'; and, in a later 
version, to 'carry out Islamic teachings and law in the life of each individual, society 
and the Indonesian Republic ... ' 67 
This means that, though permeated by modernist rationalism and devoted to 
European political concepts, the Masyumi tradition remained strongly dedicated to 
upholding the purity of the Islamic ethos and, therefore, demanded Islam be the 
ultimate source and the underpinning constraint for all reasoning. 68 The somewhat 
indistinct understanding of a negara Islam ('Islamic state') thus became a 
democratic, popularly elected, constitutional state formally based on Islam and 
framed by Islamic principles with hazy attributes. 69 Once Islamist parties had 
achieved to write shari 'ah terms into the Constitution, not every draft law would be 
67 See Natsir' s speech at the Constituent Assembly, 12 November 1957, reprinted in M. Natsir, Agama 
dan Negara dalam Perspektifislam, Media Dakwah, Jakarta, 2001, pp. 195-230; Anggaran Dasar 
and Program Perdjoangan "Masjoemi" (Partai Politik Oemmat Islam Indonesia), Masjoemi Daerah 
Jogyakarta, Jogyakarta, (1945?), p. 4 and "Anggaran Dasar Masjumi", reprinted in H. Aboebakar 
(Atjeh) (ed.), Sedjarah Hidup K H A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar, Panitya Buku Peringatan 
Aim. K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, Jakarta, 1957, p. 405. Also "Masa depan Indonesia dan Perdjuangan 
Masjumi", Hikmah, 10 November 1956, p. 5 and Hamka "Harapan Konstintuante (sic) dengan dasar 
Islam", Hikmah, August 1956, p. 5. 
68 This is the thesis ofMohamad Natsir in his Islam dan Aka/ Merdeka, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1970. 
There was thus a strong disapproval of the radical rationalism in the tradition of the Mutazilites and 
more recently the Young Turks, especially the most daring secularist of the Islamic-state relationship 
and ideologue ofKemalist Turkey, Sheikh Abd al-Raziq. 
69 Typically, Muslim countries adopted the western label "republic" whilst formally making Islam, in 
various forms, the main source oflaw. In practice, however, this was often ignored as governments 
widely adopted Western codes for their civil and public laws. Fakhry, Theocratic Idea. 
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eligible to parliamentary debate, but only those not predetermined by Qur' anic 
directives. Mohamad Natsir wrote: 
Islam is democratic, in the sense that Islam is ... anti-absolutism, anti-despotism. But 
[this] does not mean that parliament [has to] approve the abolition of lotteries, 
[issues dealing with] 'iniquity' [kecabulan], and it does not have to be negotiated 
whether the abolition of superstition [khurafat] and polytheism [musyrik] and so on 
is required. No! This all does not belong to the consultative right of parliament. 
What perhaps will be discussed, are the ways to carry out those laws... Islam is a 
sense, a concept, a principle for itself, which has at the same time its own features. 
Islam is not 100% democracy. Islam is ... well, Islam.70 
Moreover, devotees of the Masyumi tradition always ardently believed in the state's 
obligation to implement and enforce Islamic teachings among the Muslim 
population. This led to controversy because it suggested that the government was to 
give special treatment to Islam and use its institutions to enforce the teachings of that 
religion. Non-Muslims, nominal and nationalist Muslims insisted that the state had to 
treat all acknowledged religions equally by non-interference. Yet supporters of 
formal status of Islam argued that rejecting their request for upholding shari 'ah 
infringed on an essential facet of Islam; that is, that political authority has a religious 
obligation. The majority of Indonesian citizens were Muslim, hence, it was only 
appropriate that the state ideology and the Constitution reflected this fact and 
enforced Islamic law on Muslims. Hamka, for example, alluded to classical Sunni 
beliefs by holding that 'according to Islam, the state is nothing else than a tool to 
carry out the law of truth and justice on the people. And absolute truth and justice 
comes from Allah.' 71 Significantly, while Masyumi was the driving force, modernists 
and traditionalists both supported these ideals. 72 To institute Islamic political 
authority is a key aspiration of contemporary Islamism; thus until the later 1950s, a 
number of subsequently Islamist goals were part of the general agenda of Muslim 
politics. 
70 Natsir, Islam Demokrasi, reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, pp. 89-90. 
71 Hamka, Agama dan Negara Menurut Islam, Panjirnas, Jakarta, 1970, p. 15. Hamka (d. 1981, short 
for Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah) was a prominent Sumatran exegete and preacher affiliated to 
Masyumi. 
72 NU, at this stage, shared the belief in the state's obligation to implement Islam and endorsed it 
openly. 
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The triumph of the nation-state in the early 20th century meant that the perception of 
Islamic authority became confined to national boundaries. 73 An utter lack of clarity 
surrounded the position of the sacred law in a state that is formally based on Islam or 
featured shari'ah terms in the Constitution. The most difficult question was whether 
the state should legally bind Muslims to adhere to shari 'ah. If this was affirmed, it 
remained undecided which aspects of Islamic law this would comprise and in which 
areas the state needed to become active as an implementer of shari'ah.74 Other 
quandaries such as deciding a theological basis for the exegesis and application of 
shari 'ah, the readiness of institutional and personnel resources for its 
implementation, and the correlation between civil and Islamic courts also remained 
scarcely addressed by the Muslim parties. 75 
The pro-shari 'ah camp claimed to be willing and to be able to maintain a pluralist 
state despite an Islamic state ideology and constitutional recognition of shari 'ah. 
Pluralism could be upheld because Muslims would not interfere in the lives of 
religious minorities. Islamic law would impose an uncertain number of obligations 
on Muslim citizens. Displaying a purportedly indifferent attitude toward non-Muslim 
issues, these shari'ah advocates thus appeared to compromise on Islamism's-and 
arguably Islam's-appeal to broader religiosity. 
The necessary outcome of democratic commitment and religious fervour was tension 
because the state could not take on its responsibility to implement Islam if popular 
support for such a role proved insufficient. Problems were also to be expected if 
subsequent elections brought a secular party to govern which, then, had to adapt its 
policies alongside the Islamic state ideology as written down in the Constitution. 
73 As a result, shari 'ah law today only applies for Muslims of a particular nationality living in a 
certain territory. See, for example, Daniel Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam", in Martin 
Kramer (ed.), The Islamism Debate, Moshe Dayan Centre of Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel 
Aviv, 1997, pp. 11-33 (esp. p. 64). Also Allan Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics", Asian Survey, 
Vo1.8, Issue 12, Dec. 1968, (esp. p. 1003); Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 152. 
74 It was, for example, unclear whether the future government would have to collect zakat (alms) or 
whether it would need to advance its involvement in organising the hajj (pilgrimage). 
75 Despite the common efforts to implement shari'ah, there remained major differences in the Islamic 
bloc, partly grounded in theology. NU adhered to the Syafi'i school oflaw whereas Masyumi 
proclaimed toleration of all major Sunni schools. See Fealy, Ulama and Politics; Herbert Feith and 
Lance Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 1970. 
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In the 1950s, however, Islamic commitment to the idea of nation-state and national 
law was bac.ked by the conviction that it represented large parts of the public's 
aspirations. Prior to independence in 1945, the Islamic camp expected to dominate 
the multiparty system and thus be able to set up the main pillars of the Constitution 
and law. There was, of course, for some years no empirical evidence for this 
assumption. To the contrary, the results of subsequent elections indicated that this 
hope had been unfounded. Nonetheless, until after the end of the New Order in 1998, 
Masyumi legatees maintained their consent to and backing of constitutionalism and 
procedural democracy. At the same time, they dealt with what proved to be the 
Masyumi camp's historical misperception of its own strength in Indonesian society 
and an overestimation of the support of ordinary Muslims for shari 'ah. 
Hence, the self-awareness of the Masyumi camp is coupled to a number of domestic 
historical issues, which strongly impinged on the thinking, rhetoric and behaviour of 
later generations. Proclaiming allegiance to procedural democracy and a modem law 
of nations, Muslims from a wide organisational background also wanted Islam to be 
formally acknowledged in the Constitution and to become the ideological basis of an 
independent Indonesian state. Pivotal for both traditionalists and modernists had been 
the monotheistic (taw hid, Arab: tawh T d) religious identity of the state. They also 
insisted on a number of other pre-concessions such as that the future President had to 
be a Muslim Indonesian. Nominal and nationalist Muslims and non-Muslims desired 
the nation to adopt a de-confessionalised basis. 76 This dispute started in the 1920s 
and 1930s. It peaked between March and August 1945, when final preparations for 
independence were under way. Islamic parties saw the multi-religious state doctrine 
Pancasila as artificial and arid. A human idea, it was necessarily inferior to Islam.77 
But they accepted Pancasila as a compromise if understood as a compressed pluralist 
76 The following sections benefited greatly from Dr. Greg Fealy's contributions. He also suggested the 
term 'de-confessionalised' to me. It was introduced by the Dutch scholar van Nieuwenhuijze. C.A.O. 
van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in post-colonial Indonesia: five essays, W. van Hoeve, The 
Hague, 1958. The term refers to a religiously sanctioned moral and ethical ideology that comprises 
several creeds and promises to give those the same status. 
77 Pancasila is a de-confessionalised doctrine claiming to give equal consideration to Islam, 
Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism. The first principle 'the belief in The One All-
Powerful God', however, discriminates non-monotheistic creeds. The remaining four guiding 
principles are: humanitarianism, nationalism, popular sovereignty, and social justice. 
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version of a broader Islamic temperament. 78 This consent faltered between 1952 and 
1959. In the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), a popularly elected body in 
session between 1956 to mid-1959 with the task of drafting a new Constitution, 
Islamic parties pleaded for Islam as the ideological base of the state. 79 
Nationalists, nominal- and non-Muslims argued that an Islam-based Indonesia would 
jeopardise the formation of a unitary post-colonial state retaining the boundaries of 
the Dutch East Indies. To maintain colonial boundaries had been deeply ingrained in 
the proposition for independence. With the option of living under Islamic authority, 
however, areas in the East and West of the archipelago with large Christian and 
Hindu populations felt discriminated against, and thus were disinclined to join the 
Republic. At the same time, Indonesia's folklore has always proudly asserted its 
inhabitants to be an innately religious people. This made the adaptation of a secular 
state ideology unlikely. The question at stake, therefore, became whether the state 
would be based on Islamic principles expressed in Islamic terminology or make use 
of religiously neutral terms. The parameters of this discourse were prolonged until 
the post-New Order era. By then, however, advocates of foreign Islamist ideology 
purposely sought distance from the dispute at home. They set up an ideological 
alternative to the Masyumi tradition, its established themes and the resulting political 
strategy. 
This exploration of alternative political strategies was induced by the failure of the 
Islamic camp to achieve any of its major goals. In early 1945, the Japanese 
occupying power set up the Badan Penelitian Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia ('Investigatory Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence', 
BPUPKI), deciding on a de-confessionalised ideology as the basis of the Republic, 
78 To reconcile itself with the Pancasila, the Islamic camp held that Pancasila consisted of five 
passages taken from the thousands in Islam. Pancasila was a 'reflection' (afopiegeling) oflslamic 
teachings. The classical treatise is Mohamad Natsir, Apakah PS bertentangan dengan ajaran al-
Quran? ('Is the Pancasila at odds with Qur'anic teachings?'), reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, 
pp. 158-66. 
79 The Konstituante was the result of the 1955 general elections. It had the task offorming a new 
Constitution and gave Islamic parties a legal platform from which to propose their concepts to write 
Islam into the Constitution. It began its work in late 1956, culminating in a deadlock in early 1959 and 
the dissolution of the Assembly on 5 July. Both the secular and the Islamic faction were unable to gain 
the necessary two-thirds majority to realise their proposal. 
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which Soekamo named Pancasila. 80 This prevented the state giving specific attention 
to the Islamic religion. In a renowned address to the BPUPKI, Soekamo declared that 
he wanted Muslims to pursue their ideological aspirations through parliament. This 
was more than a shimmer of hope, as it promised that all Muslims had to do was gain 
a sufficient share of votes in the upcoming elections to fulfil their desire to Islamise 
the legal system. Soekamo said: 
For Muslims, this [i.e. parliament] is the best place to promote religion ... If we 
really are an Islamic people let us then work as hard as we can, to see that the 
greatest number of seats in parliament which we shall form, will be held by Islamic 
representatives. If we take it that parliament has 100 members, then let us work, as 
hard as possible, so that 60, 70, 80, 90 of representatives in parliament will be 
Muslim, Islamic leaders. Then the laws which parliament promulgates will naturally 
be Islamic laws. Yes, I am even convinced that only when something like this 
happens, only then can it be said that Islam really lives in the soul of the people, so 
that 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% of the representatives are Muslims, Islamic leaders, 
Islamic ulamas .... 81 
In 1945, this seemed to be a goal within easy reach. But as it turned out, the Muslim 
elite's confidence that their ideological aspirations were shared by a majority of the 
umat (Muslim community) was misguided. 
Having settled on a de-confessionalised ideology, a subcommittee of nine BPUPKI 
members gathered to find a solution that would reconcile the Islamic camp and pave 
the way for the full acceptance of Pancasila. On 22 June 1945, they hit upon a 
compromise in form of a document called the Piagam Jakarta ('Jakarta Charter'). 
The Charter was to become the Preamble to the Constitution and a 'gentlemen's 
agreement' between Muslims and secular-nationalists. The issue at stake became 
whether it should be implemented. 
The key phrase in the Charter consisted of seven words: dengan kewajiban 
menjalankan Syari 'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya ('with the obligation for 
adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law'). Though the inclusion of this clause 
80 The BPUPKI included President Soekamo and Vice-President Hatta. These men represented the 
nationalists and thus the interests of religious minorities. The Islamic side was represented by both 
traditionalists and modernists, among them the NU leader K.H. W ahid Hasyim, Mohamad Natsir and 
Agus Salim. 
81 Quoted in B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 
1982, pp. 22-3. 
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would give Islam a special place in the Constitution, again it was unclear what 
precisely the implications would be. A central question was whether the wording 
would refer to the obligation of individual Muslims to carry out Islamic law or 
whether it made the state responsible to implement loosely defined shari 'ah 
regulations. 
For the Islamic camp, the Charter was the mmtmum goal.82 But nationalists, 
nominal- and non-Muslims opposed the compromise. They argued that the clause 
would burden the state with the heavy task of coercing all Muslims to adhere to 
shari 'ah law. This echoed a familiar dispute in the Muslim world. It raised the 
question whether it is practicable for a state to enforce Islam on a Muslim population 
which is highly diverse, follows diverse religious customs, has thus different 
religious needs, and is therefore likely to require a varied handling of shari 'ah 
regulations. Parts of this population, of course, might just be plainly unwilling to live 
according to shari' ah though it seemed that, at this stage, the Charter's proponents 
were fully entrenched by the disposition that to be a Muslim meant to submit to 
shari'ah. 
In mid-July 1945 it seemed that Muslims would emerge victorious from the 
debates. 83 The BPUPKI approved a draft of the Constitution that included the 
Charter. It also accepted the stipulation that any future President must be a Muslim.84 
The Muslim politicians' sense of triumph was short-lived, though. The day following 
independence, on 18 August 1945, resistance to the Charter resurfaced. Christian-
populated areas threatened to leave the Republic if concessions to the Islamic camp 
were not eliminated. They demanded the "seven-word" clause be dropped, to 
eradicate specifically Islamic terms in the Constitution and to open the presidency for 
non-Muslims. There also were demands, reportedly from Hindu Bali, to adopt a 
82 At this stage, there were further concessions made to the Islamic bloc. The Charter's introduction 
comprised the words rahmat Allah yang Maha kuasa ('by the Grace of the One All-Powerful God'). 
The mentioning of the Arabic word Allah was a clear victory over the secular nationalists and non-
Muslims who had opted for the neutral Malay term keTuhanan ('Godness'). The initial term for the 
Preamble was the Arabic word 'Mukaddimah'. 
83 Despite remaining reservations, the BPUPKI had accepted the Charter twice (on 11 and 14 July 
1945). This was partly because Soekamo urged members of the committee to proceed and not to 
jeopardize the common ground that was established under great difficulties. 
84 See Boland, Struggle and Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 dan sejarah 
consensus nasional antara nasionalis Is/ami dan nasionalis 'sekular' tentang dasar negara Republik 
Indonesia, 1945, Pustaka, Bandung, 1981. 
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neutral wording of the first pillar of the Pancasila. The phrase rahmat Allah yang 
Maha Kuasa was to be changed into Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa ('belief in the One 
All-Powerful God'). The latter phrase pointed to religious faith in an unspecified 
Supreme Being. It remained monotheistic without implying a primacy of the Islamic 
religion. 
The Islamic camp grudgingly agreed to these changes, thereby marking its historical 
defeat. By giving in, pro-shari 'ah Muslims allowed a quick finalisation of the new 
Constitution whilst securing national unity. They regarded both issues as of more 
pressing importance. 85 Yet significantly, they found some solace that they would 
have a chance to readdress the state ideology issue in parliament and the Constituent 
Assembly once the first national elections were held. 86 These expectations were not 
fulfilled. The first elections in 1955 shattered the expectations of Islamic parties 
about their popularity among the umat. The polls established a 44% share for Islamic 
parties, a result insufficient to insert shari 'ah terms into the Constitution. 
In the Constituent Assembly neither ideological camp commanded the required two-
thirds majority to pass constitutional revisions. Islamic parties, however, had eagerly 
waited for this opportunity as a second chance to make Islam the ideology of the 
state and to raise the status of shari'ah.87 During parliamentary democracy (1950-
57), Masyumi had served in six of its seven cabinets. Three governments were led by 
Masyumi-based ministers.88 These cabinets were coalitions. The subsequent 
necessity for compromise with other parties made it difficult to realise ideological 
goals. 89 
85 I am indebted to Dr. Greg Fealy for pointing out the significance of this. 
86 Despite the overall defeat of the Islamic camp, the new Indonesian state acknowledged religious 
interests. With an overwhelming Muslim majority, these issues automatically were tinged Islamic. 
The most important creation was the Department of Religion, which, in the following decades, 
devoted much attention to the spreading of the Islamic faith. Under its auspices, Islamic boarding 
schools (pesantren) obtained state funds and it played an important role in organising the hajj. The 
ministry inspected school programs and ensured they followed accepted Sunni theology while keeping 
out Islamic interpretations seen as "heretic". It also oversaw the enforcement of various aspects of 
Islamic law. This mostly comprised aspects of family law issues such as marriage, divorce and 
inheritance. The favouritism of the ministry has drawn much criticism from non-Muslims and secular-
nationalists. For them, it breached the de-confessionalised nature of the Pancasila. 
87 It was a two-third majority necessary to make amendments. 
88 The only cabinet from which Masyumi was excluded was the first Ali Sastroamidjoyo cabinet. The 
Masyumi Prime Ministers were Natsir, Sukiman W:itjosanjoyo and Burhanuddin Harahap. 
89 Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy: Between Ideological Idealism and 
Political Exigency", Studia Islamika, Vol. 12, No. l, 2005, pp. 73-101 (p. 79). 
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In the Constituent Assembly, Islamic parties proposed the drafting of a new 
Constitution, which was to be based on Islam.90 The nationalist camp was once again 
opposed. Eventually, the Islamic camp, pressed by Soekamo, agreed to re-install the 
1945 Constitution on the proviso that the Charter be re-inserted. Soekarno, the Army 
and nationalists flatly rejected this. After three votes on the Charter, which failed to 
gain the necessary majority, the Constituent Assembly was deadlocked.91 All Islamic 
parties had previously voted in support for the Charter. Soekamo then, in an 
unconstitutional act, dissolved the Assembly and, on 5 July 1959, issued a decree 
that re-installed the 1945 Constitution. The result was a devastating blow for those 
Muslims who had set their hopes on the Constituent Assembly. Again the Charter 
was rejected and this time it was entirely unclear when the next opportunity would 
come up for re-addressing it. In a final, but in essence merely symbolic, concession 
to the Islamic bloc, Soekarno allowed the Charter to be described as menjiwai 
('providing spirit to') and being dalam rangka kesatuan ('in connecting accord') 
with the 1945 Constitution. Once again, though, the legal implications remained 
unclear. Importantly, there was no mention of the word shari'ah in the Constitution. 
Later Islamists with an allegiance to Masyumi's struggle would relentlessly point to 
the menjiwai-status of the Charter; ultimately, however, shari 'ah had still no legal 
force if it was not mentioned in the Constitution. A further opportunity to force 
through the Charter emerged in 1967 and 1968 after Soeharto and the military had 
taken over government. Now, however, Islamic parties did not address the state 
ideology but merely sought to persuade the regime to reinstate the Charter. The 
generals, profoundly apprehensive of political Islam, dismissed the appea1.92 
Hence, in the immediate post-independence period until the 1955 elections and, to a 
lesser degree, until the Constituent Assembly, Muslim politicians perceived shari 'ah-
mindedness as a natural and vital aspect of doing Islamic politics. This changed 
90 See Fealy, Ulama and Politics. At that stage, Indonesia was based on the 1950 Constitution on 
which the parliamentary-democratic interlude had rested. Soekarno and the military wanted to 
reinstall the 1945 Constitution because it provided the executive with substantially more power than 
the 1950 Constitution. 
91 See Feith, Decline. 
92 See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New 
York, 1978; Steven Drakeley, Islam in Indonesian Politics 1965-1971: The Transition to the New 
Order, PhD Thesis, University ofWestem Sydney, 2001. 
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when the abolition of parliamentary democracy in 1959 brought an end to the 
political participation of shari'ah-minded Muslims. Until 1998, Muslims had to find 
more practical ways of engaging in politics if they were to be tolerated. The New 
Order regime suppressed any ideological debate and insisted on unquestioning 
loyalty to Pancasila. Many authoritarian regimes promoted dominant ideologies as 
inevitable to sustain national unity and harmony.93 The New Order, too, sought to 
profit from exploiting an image of both political Islam and leftist ideologies as 
threats to national unity, security and prosperity. It stepped up the criticism against 
Islamic governance as disruptive and inapt for Indonesia. To underscore this 
assertion, the government started an extensive propaganda campaign that Pancasila 
was the only safe doctrine for Indonesia. 
Over an extended period of time, however, the accomplishments of dominant 
ideologies often proved to be shallow. Despite massive amounts of propaganda, 
delivered by means of school curricula and indoctrination programs, national and 
local beliefs proved resistant to the infiltration of official "state culture" into the 
public domain.94 Nonetheless, the resistance of Masyumi legatees against the New 
Order state touched on a limited range of factors; it did not question the state's 
existence and legitimacy in general. This was partly because Pancasila still claimed a 
reference to religious values with parallels to Islamic principles. Masyumi legatees 
also sustained the historical themes of the Islam-state debate until after the demise of 
the New Order in May 1998. By then, a form of Islamism grounded in foreign 
concepts had risen against the intrusion of the state in religious matters such as 
education yet without displaying its highly political nature. Its key motive was the 
defence of Islam against other ideologies, domestic and foreign, through acquiescent 
means. 
93 See Eagleton, Ideology. Doctrines such as Kemalism (Turkey), Baathism (Iraq, Syria), Nasserism 
(Egypt), Pahlavism (Iran) and Pancasila aimed to foster identification of a population with its nation. 
These doctrines promote that their enforcement served the common good or a higher ideal. 
94 Ibid. Authoritarian regimes such as the New Order, however, tend to rest on less elaborate 
ideologies than totalitarian systems. Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in Fred I. 
Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby ( eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol.3, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, Reading Massachusets, 1975, pp. 175-357, cited in Edward Aspinall, Political 
Opposition and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Case oflndonesia, PhD Dissertation, The 
Australian National University, 2000. 
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Imported Islamism 
From the late 1960s on, decidedly defensive interpretations of the Islamic faith 
emerged in many parts of the Muslim world. This phenomenon was commonly 
termed as Islamic resurgence or revivalism. 95 Its intellectual foundation was the 
highly politicised Islam of the Sunnis Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi (d. 1979) from the 
Indian-Pakistani organisation al-Jama 'atu 'l-Islamiyya (Jamiat-i-Islami), Hassan al-
Banna (d. 1949) and Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) from the Egyptian al-Ichwanul al-
Musliminun ('Muslim Brotherhood'), and from the leader of the Iranian Islamic 
revolution, the Shiite Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989). 
Any ideology, Shils pointed out, 'arises in the midst of an ongoing culture' .96 People 
rarely abandon completely the national or local specifics in which they live.97 As 
such, Islamic revivalism, too, dealt inevitably with preceding norms and customs in 
the countries and regions it emerged and, to various extents, arranged itself with the 
conditions. Based on diverse national and local traditions and histories and their 
social, political and religious features, revivalism took on various forms. 98 Its 
political strategy and accomplishments depended on the types of government and 
political institutions, the social and economic strata of the societies it operated in, and 
the availability of a wide variety of facilities such as communication networks and 
patronage resources.99 
Islamic revivalism is the most recent addition to Islamic political cultures in 
Indonesia. One of its central themes was re-emphasising the foundational Islamic 
ideal of the Qur' an's organisational unit, the global community of believers (umat). 
95 Important studies on revivalism are Ali E. Hilla} Dessouki (ed.), Islamic Resurgence in the Arab 
World, Praeger Press, New York, 1982; Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1994 and Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge 
and Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2002. 
96 Shils, Concept, p. 67. 
97 Some groups have attempted to shield their cadres through isolation. They sought separation from 
influences that they distrust and reject, attempting to create a homogenous society and space for 
ideological commitment. Among Islamist groups fitting into this category are the Indian Jama'ah 
Tabliq, the Malaysian Darul Arqam and its "Islamic villages" and the Indonesian Darul Islam ('Realm 
oflslam'), whose goal in the 1950s and 60s was to establish a secessionist Islamic state within the 
Indonesian Republic. 
98 See, for example, Kepel, Jihad, p. 60. 
99 Compare with Fine and Sandstrom, Ideology in Action. 
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The traditional notion of the umat referred to the unity of all humankind. As the final 
prophet sent by God, Mohammad's task was to restore this unity which his 
predecessors, in the Qur'anic view, had failed to achieve. The Qur'an, verse al-
Baqarah (2:213) holds: 
Mankind was one single nation, and Allah sent Messengers with glad tidings and 
warnings; and with them He sent the Book in truth, to judge between people in 
matters wherein they differed; But the People of the Book, after the clear signs came 
to them, did not differ among themselves, except through selfish contumacy. Allah 
by His grace guided the believers to the truth, concemin~ that wherein they differed. 
For Allah guides whom he will to a path that is straight.1 0 
Revivalist Islam self-consciously took up the ideal to impose an Islamic system onto 
the world by resuming the foundational Islamic call for jihad (Arab: jihad). 101 The 
aim was first the defence and then the extension of the Islamic realm (dar-ul Islam); 
it was not supposed to include the forced conversion of non-Muslims because of the 
Qur'anic prohibition to do so.102 
The defence and cultivation of Islam is to be achieved through means which are 
social, political and educational; it takes peaceful means yet may also warrant armed 
struggle. 103 Revivalism put the credo that Islam was the universal, infallible and final 
creed handed down to all humankind into a political ideology which aims to 
overcome the moral degradation and identity conflicts of contemporary Muslim 
societies in the face of perceived Western cultural infringement and political-
economic subjugation. In 1998, revivalism emerged in Indonesian politics as a 
100 Translation by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 85. 
101 The aspiration for Islamic conquest is, for example, based on the Qur'anic verse al-Anfal (8:39): 
'And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in 
Allah, altogether and everywhere ... '. Translation by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 423. 
102 Qur'an, al-Baqarah (2:256). Islamists have widely quoted this passage to back their claim for 
approving religious pluralism. 
103 See, for example, Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law, p. 359; Hartmut Bobzin, Der Koran-Eine 
Einfii,hrung, C.H. Beck, Miinchen, 1999, pp. 83-5. The Qur'an speaks of al-jihadfi sabil Allah, the 
'endeavour on the way toward God'. Verse al-Tawbah (9:36) demands: 'And fight the pagans (al-
musrikun) all together as they fight you altogether.' Al-Baqarah (2:218) holds: 'Those who believed 
and those who suffered exile and fought (and strove and struggled) in the path of Allah-they have 
the hope of the mercy of Allah'. Translations by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 448 and p. 87. These 
passages underline that the 'endeavour' also denoted war efforts to extend the Islamic realm. Physical 
struggle has played a crucial role in Islamic history. See, for example, Manoucher Parvin and Maurie 
Sommer, "Dar-al Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and its Implications for Conflict 
Resolution in the Middle East", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 
1980, pp. 1-21. 
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movement making use of strictly constitutional means and embracing procedural 
democracy. Its devotees set the aim to defend Islam in the context of acquiescent and 
non-violent governmental take-over by partaking in plural political systems. 
Defensive religious sentiment is often spurred by developments perceived as a 
threat. 104 A frequent domestic factor was the perceived inability of national elites to 
deal with the negative side effects of western-defined modernity on Muslims. 105 The 
intrusion of western culture suggested 'a change (or the threat of a change) in 
national identity' and the expansion of secular state authority. 106 Often 
administrations of such states attempted to increase their influence by interfering in 
areas that previously had been part of the personal and spiritual domain. In this 
process, revivalist Islam emerged as an alternative moral authority for sections of 
society alienated by a ruling order and the values it claimed to represent. 107 In 
Indonesia as in many other Muslim countries, this section was dominated by the 
urban educated youth. 
These young Muslims, active in campuses and mosques, epitomised a key pattern of 
imported Islamism: to bring about better organisational models in order to revitalize 
Islam. 108 Organisational models are vital for the efficiency of a group; its success 
depends on the ability to create strong identification among adherents with central 
doctrinal positions and goals. 109 In a loose network ideologies disintegrate or fade in 
importance but they tend to prosper in stable conditions. Ideologies rely on the 
number of people who have the same ideas and live according to the same rules. 
Strong inter-personal relations therefore provide the best preconditions for 
establishing and sustaining a code of belief. 110 The organisational model of 
revivalism is based on intense cohesion, persuasive guidance and conformity which 
104 Piscatori, Accounting, p. 361. The points in Garvey, Introduction, are similar. 
105 Piscatori, Accounting, p. 361. 
106 Garvey, Introduction, p. 20. 
107 Compare with Shils, Concept; Piscatori, Accounting. 
108 Hasan Mutalib, "Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications", Asian Survey, Vol. 
30, No.9, Sept. 1990, pp. 877-91. 
109 S. V. R. Nasr, "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism", Political Science Quarterly, summer 1995, 
pp. 261-85 (esp. p. 281); Fine and Sandstrom, Ideology in Action. 
110 This, of course, does not only apply to religious groups, as shown in Gary Alan Fine's "Small 
Groups and Culture Creation: The Idioculture of Little League Baseball Teams", American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 44, No.5, Oct. 1979, pp. 733-45. 
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together create unanimity. It consists of small training and mentoring cells (usroh) to 
ensure a tight environment that sets itself apart from highly diverse national cultures. 
These environments have cultivated distinctive beliefs and customs, the sharing of a 
system ofknowledge and education (tarbiyah) and the application of strict behaviour 
codes. Its members tend to be bonded by common experience, allowing better 
protection against outside influences. 111 Small entities such as Islamist cells are thus 
a 'frequent venue of ideological enactment', ensuring that fundamental beliefs 
remain intact. 112 
Revivalism usually emerged more militant in abidingly closed and radically secular 
regimes. 113 Here, state policies directly contravened the religious beliefs and customs 
of large sections of its people. The outcome was permanent open conflict between 
Islamism and the state. 114 The revivalist Islamist movement in New Order Indonesia 
was comparatively small and seclusive. It did not have the broader social backing as 
did similar currents in various Middle Eastern countries. It therefore could not 
confront the state but sought consolidation through Islamic propagation programs 
(dakwah, Arab: da 'wa) and political quietism. 
This imported Islamism also advanced a number of traits that already had formed 
part of the Masyumi tradition. It put extra weight on Islam's egalitarian appraisal for 
the community of believers. This stance is grounded in Islam's emphasis on the 
community of the faithful with the same responsibilities and chances for salvation 
while giving less concern to extraordinary individuals: 'All Muslims were to be 
equal' .115 It stressed that each human being must endeavour to reach salvation and to 
bring about a public life in accordance with Islam. This became the ideological 
111 Fine, Small Groups, p. 734. 
112 Jilian Schwedler, "Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace or Mobilizer?", SAIS Review, Vol. XXI, No.2, 
Summer-Fall2001. 
113 Guazzone, Islamism and Islamists, p. 10. 
114 See, for example, Lisa Anderson, "Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism", in 
John L. Esposito (ed.), Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder, Colo, 1997, pp. 17-31. Examples of such open conflicts are the events following 
Turkey's sweeping secularisation after the 1980 military coup, pre-revolutionary Iran which was 
based on a secular-capitalist modernisation program, and socialist and secular Arab countries such as 
Egypt under Nasser and Sadat or Tunisia under Bourguiba. 
115 Hodgson, Venture, p. 317. This collectivism is very much unlike the individualism endorsed by 
mystical Islam. 
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foundation for an activist temper, social commitment and a critical intellect. 116 
Community leaders had to be reassessed strictly according to their moral and 
religious qualities. 117 
It is an essential part of Islamist folklore that the most flourishing and just 
organisation of human society was achieved in the Arab city of Medina, helped by a 
short document known as the 'Constitution of Medina' .118 This belief and the Medina 
Constitution feature prominently in the mind-set of Masyumi devotees, but they 
never explicitly targeted to build an analogous societal order in modem times. In 
1945, Masyumi endeavoured to build a crossbreed form of democracy derived from 
Western institutional and doctrinal concepts, yet hoped this would become a tool to 
cultivate Islam in their home country. For followers of imported Islamism, by 
contrast, the Prophet's organisation of community remains the model for a modem 
version of social order. 
Various features of the Medina society impacted on the thinking of Islamists 
worldwide. Many present-day descriptions, however, tend to misconstrue the Charter 
underlying it, believing that the core of the treaty was equality rather than in fact 
being tolerance for a restricted number of other faiths. As Montgomery Watt 
recorded: 'In so far as God was mentioned ... and after Muhammad had become the 
strongest man in Arabia, there was no equality' .119 Despite Islamist notions of 
'justice' (adil), Islam remains the final creed with its teachings completing those of 
preceding revelations. 120 Also, the Medina society was a community of limited size 
and complexity and thus quite unlike large modem states, with their greater religious, 
social and cultural diversity. 
116 The Qur'anic endorsement of political and social commitment is often related to verse al-Ra'd 
(13:11). It proclaims: 'Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it 
themselves ... '. Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 589. 
117 Traditionalist Islam, by contrast, centred on the patriarchal rank of the ulama and gave less credit 
to activism and reason, teaching that fate (takdir) alone determined the ways oflife. In practice, of 
course, a radical form of submission to the divine will never existed. See Fealy, Ulama and Politics. 
118 In the year 622, Muhammad moved from Mecca to Medina to foster unity among the Arab tribes. 
This is known as hijrah and points to the actual beginning of the Islamic era. The Constitution of 
Medina represented a federation of several Arab clans and remains a significant symbol for Muslim 
unity. 
119 Pagans, for example, were not tolerated. Watt, Muhammad, p. 246. 
12° Compare, for example, with Khadduri, Islam and the Modem Law. 
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An incident of major historical dimensions was that the covenant with Jewish tribes 
failed because the latter rejected Muhammad's prophethood, challenging his 
leadership and claim that Muslims were the community chosen by God. An 
interpretation of the message in the Qur' anic verse al-Bayyinah (98: 19) is helpful in 
this respect: 
The People of the Book fell from the true, straight, and standard religion, into 
devious ways, and would not come to the true Path until. .. they were convinced by 
the arrival of the promised Prophet. But when the promised Prophet came in the 
person of Muhammad, they rejected him, because they really did not seek for Truth 
but only followed their own fancies and desires.121 
These deviators came to be known as the traitors of the Medina treaty. 122 But, as 
Martin Kramer pointed out, the steady rise of Islamic anti-Semitism over the last two 
to three decades of the 20th century cannot be strictly traced back to the Islamic 
canon as the Qur'an does not depict the Jews of the ih century as 'the embodiment 
of Jews in all times in places'. For most of history, Jewish communities lived 
unperturbed amidst Muslims. Most present-day Islamists, however, respond to Jews 
in the tradition of European anti-Semitism: as an enemy in all places and at all times, 
not only because of the Israel issue but a menace to mankind, indistinctively and 
stereotyped. 123 This loathing is nurtured by the diverse Qur' anic polemics against 
Jews and Christians. 
The bond with Christianity was damaged because, as with the Jews, it failed to 
acknowledge Muhammad as the final prophet in the line announced by their own 
scriptures. With the concept of the trinity, Christians then further deviated from the 
message of God's singularity and thus were seen as "corrupted". 124 The impact of 
colonialism reinvigorated this traditional rivalry with Christendom. By the final 
decades of the 20th century, anti-Semitism had encroached the mainstream Muslim 
121 Yusuf Ali, Meaning, and footnote: 6221 (page 1678). 
122 This resulted in the Jews being driven out ofMedina. Watt, Mohammad, pp. 204-20. 
123 Martin Kramer, "The Salience oflslamic Antisemitism", Institute of Jewish Affairs Reports, 
http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Antisemitism.htm and "The Jihad against the Jews", 
Commentary, reprinted in http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/JihadAgainstJews.htm (quotes 
from "Salience"). In the last edition of his 'Social Justice in Islam', Qutb claimed that there was a 
'Jewish plan to destroy the world'. Cited in William E. Shepard, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A 
Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam, E.J. Brill, Leiden, New York, Cologne, 
1996, p.li. 
124 I am thankful to Prof. Anthony Johns for his comments on this. 
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consciousness. A present-day outcome is the rigid, inflexible line in Islamist foreign 
policy characterised by a reflex antagonism against Israel and its perceived backer, 
the US. 125 The active promotion of Islam's superiority, backed by historical and 
doctrinally certified images of treason and hostility by other creeds, makes for 
extraordinary difficulties in the pluralist world or a certain plural state. 126 
Virtually everywhere in the contemporary Muslim world, the domestic peril ts 
embedded in a sense of global Muslim defeat and suppression coupled with the belief 
in a glorious Islamic past. Hodgson recapped the defining fissure in the history, and 
then in the history writing, of the Muslim peoples, which turned into the lamenting 
credo of Islamists worldwide: 
In the sixteenth century of our era, a visitor from Mars might well have supposed 
that the human world was on the verge of becoming Muslim. He would have based 
his judgment partly on the strategic and political advantages of the Muslims, but 
partly also on the vitality of their general culture ... The subsequent decline has cast 
a shadow over the greatness of the age, which by no means leaps to the eye any 
more; yet it was quite as much Muslim cultural splendor as Muslim political power 
that might have persuaded the Martian visitor that Islam was about to prevail among 
mankind ... 127 
'The trauma of modem Islam', Daniel Pipes wrote, 'came about from this disparity 
between medieval successes and recent troubles'. This had triggered 'a pervasive 
sense of debilitation and encroachment in the Islamic world today'. To revive the 
grandeur of the past, contemporary Islamists act on the presumption 'that Muslims 
lag behind the West because they're not good Muslims' .128 
It is the revivalists who most resolutely aim for a complete protection of their 
"Islamic-ness" to regain their religious purity and political influence. 129 Mawdudi 
125 As many ordinary Muslims have come to share their hostility toward Jews and the US, foreign 
policy issues are oflimited use for analysing Islamist politics. Kramer, Cross-Links. 
126 Originally, Judaism and early Christianity also claimed the superiority of their own creed. The idea 
seemed to have remained more intact among adherents of the former. 
127 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, "The Role oflslam in World History", International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 2, April1970, pp. 99-123 (combined quote ofp. 99 and p. 102). 
128 Pipes, Islam and Islamism. 
129 This search for authenticity inspired the Arabisation of the formal expressions of faith. In 
Indonesia, Arab-derived variants of the women's headscarf(iilbab), the men's beard and the 
popularity of Arabic idioms have been on the rise since the 1980s. An often-cited Qur'anic reference 
to support such appearances is verse al-Imran (3:64), calling on the believer: 'Bear witness that 
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and, later, Qutb postulated an all-round suspicion and rejection of any thought model 
other than Islam and thus inspired this aim. One key characteristic, Garvey observed, 
was making out an 'enemy', a 'force against which they react' .130 Revivalist thought 
postulated a 'need for boundary setting, for affirming approval and disapproval' .131 It 
extended the perception of "enemy" to both domestic and foreign foes, at the same 
time perceiving "liberal" Muslims more strictly as traitors who helped to alienate the 
Muslim community from Islam. 
As such, revivalism has been working on a rudimentary worldview. It asserted that 
adherents of the main scriptural Revelations had deserted their faiths and 
endeavoured to destroy the unity of the Muslim community. In this global struggle 
between the Islamic and Western civilisations, it has become customary to depict the 
Muslim world as trapped in an era of prolonged crisis and spiritual 'ignorance' 
(jahiliyya), both unwitting and wilful. Early expositions of this view can be found in 
the writings of Ibn Taymiyyah, but it was Mawdudi and then Qutb and their 
numerous legatees all over the world who called on Muslims to recapture their 
Islamic identity and challenge Western economic and cultural intrusion. 132 
Jahiliyya initially stood for the pagan beliefs that Arabs adhered to prior to the 
advent oflslam. But modem writers expanded the meaning to an 'un-Islamic' (jahili) 
culture in Muslim societies.133 Modem Muslim societies resembled pre-Islamic 
Arabia, as a majority of Muslims, consciously and unconsciously, followed Western 
thought and behaviour, which brought harm and was heathen (kaflr, Arab: kiijir). 134 
The cultural imperialism of the West has thus created a new jahiliyah in which 
Muslim societies opportunistically took on Western concepts and customs, thereby 
we ... are Muslims'. Interview, Daud Rasyid, Jakarta, 5 November 2001. Translation by Yusuf Ali, 
Meaning, p. 144. Disagreement over which behaviour and garment meets this demand can lead to 
conflict among Islamists. Compare with chapter two, last section on the rifts in PBB. 
130 Not necessarily is the 'enemy' a definite group or class; it might as well be a 'certain way of 
thinking that can affect anyone'. Garvey, Introduction, pp. 21-2. Also Shils, Concept. 
131 Piscatori, Accounting, p. 363. 
132 Qutb's Fi zilal al-Qur'an ('In the Shadow of the Qur'an') was one of the most influential 
commentaries on the Qur' an in the 20th century. 
133 The Qur'an addresses the dangers ofjahiliyyah in verse al-Ma'idah (5:50), al-Zumar (39:64), al-
Fath (48:6), al-Imran (3:154), al-Nisa (4:60), al-Fath (48:26), al-Qasas (28:55), al-Furqan (25:63), al-
Ahzab (33:33), al-Baqarah (2:257) and al-Nur (24:39/40). 
134 The term kafir usually comprises all non-Muslims, sometimes including the 'People of the Book'. 
Verse al-Tawbah (9:73) states: 'Oh Prophet! Strive hard against the Unbelievers and the Hypocrites. 
And be firm against them. Their abode is Hell-an evil refuge indeed'. Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 459. 
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indulging in degenerate lifestyles unfettered by moral restrictions. 135 The resulting 
conflict between Islamic and Western civilisations is inbuilt in the notion of ghazwul 
fikri (Arab: [ al-]ghazwu 'l-fikri or [ al-]ghazw al-fikri, lit. 'the invasion of [ un-Islamic] 
ideas'). Qutb wrote onjahiliyyah: 
'There are only two possibilities for the life of a people, no matter in what time and 
place they live. These are the state of guidance of [sic, probably: or] the state of 
error ... the state of truth or the state of falsehood, whatever may be the varieties of 
falsehood; the state of light or the state of darkness ... the state of obedience to the 
Divine guidance or the state of following whims ... the state of Islam or the state of 
jahiliyyah ... and the state of belief or the state of unbelief. People live either 
according to Islam, following it as a way of life and a socio-political system, or else 
in the state ofunbelief,jahiliyyah, whim, darkness, falsehood, and error.136 
Most contemporary Islamists ignore or downplay that some of the promoters of the 
endeavour to reassert Islam's position deemed violence legitimate if it was 
considered necessary for or helpful to the Islamic cause. The common view became 
that not every Muslim had the duty to defend Islam, especially through force but to 
try to cultivate Islam in his or her immediate surroundings or to help to bring about 
better community standards in accordance with Islamic ideals, for example in 
education and health. This restraint was accompanied by ongoing revision of past 
strategies to foster Islam. It led to a modification of ideological goals according to 
their feasibility. 
In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, there has been mounting awareness among 
revivalist Islamists that taking part in politics promised to be more beneficial than 
135 See the later editions ofQutb's 'Social Justice in Islam' and his 'Milestones'. Qutb, especially in 
his later years, had a more sweeping perception ofjahiliyyah than Mawdudi and al-Banna, comprising 
all Muslim societies except the communities guided by the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. 
See Shahrough Akhavi, "The Dialectic Discourse in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The 
Scripturalist and Modernist Discourse ofSayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi", International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No.3, August 1997, pp. 377-401. 
136 Sayyid Qutb, The Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics, American Trust Publications, Plainfield, 
1991, p. 78. The original title is Khasa'is al-Tasawwur al-Islami wa Muqawwamathhi. His Milestones 
(as Seyyed Qutb), Dar-Ar-Ilm, Damascus, (no year) contains numerous like-minded passages. 
Mawdudi, in similar fashion, attacked the 'legion of ism ... racial and concerned with particular classes 
they eulogise ... [and who] do not look beyond the geographic and national boundaries'. He based his 
plead for Islam on the conviction that ' [ w ]hat humanity needs, and needs pressingly, is a 
system ... based on a true perception of man and all the realities that pertain to him ... based on 
principles that are universal, abiding and eternal-a way of life that may steer forth his course safely 
through all the vicissitudes of the present and the future, resolve the problems originating in them, and 
advance undaunted towards its goal without much ado'. S. Abul AI' A Maududi, The Religion of 
Truth, Islamic Publication Ltd, Lahore, 1978 (1967), pp. 15-6. 
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ongoing isolation and obscurity. 137 By contrast, its first generation, most notably the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami had internal differences over matters of 
political strategy. 138 There were sections insisting on education and mission as the 
only way of raising an Islamic society from below, and others who at the same time 
wanted to participate politically. For the latter, it was an obstacle that major 
ideologues postulated a one-party system consisting of "capable" Muslims with the 
task to establish God's sovereignty. Moreover, Mawdudi and Qutb used 
revolutionary rhetoric and the latter at times approved armed struggle as a way to 
topple an "impious" political order. 139 Later devotees recognised the disadvantages 
of strategic indecision and open enmity and opted for a more practical approach. This 
approach can be described as gradualism. Later chapters will describe Partai 
Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) as a typical representative of gradualism. 
Throughout the 1980s, a number of authoritarian states undertook closely monitored 
political liberalisations. They accommodated Islamic opposition either by tolerating 
them while denying equal legal status, or by allowing them full legal recognition. 140 
But the ruling elites were always careful not to endanger their grip on power. 141 Even 
so, Islamist groups more than ever before were able to organise and promote their 
views. 142 These Islamists, as one scholar noted, 'have not failed to recognize that 
137 Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, The Other Face of the Islamist Movement, Democracy and Rule of 
Law Project, Global Policy Program, Working Paper 33, 2003; Kramer, Integration; and Cross-Links. 
138 Other examples are the Hamas in Palestine and the Hizbullah in Lebanon. Guazzone, Islamism and 
Islamists, p. 16. 
139 See, for example, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: 
The View ofSayyid Qutb", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No.1, Winter 1993, pp. 14-29; 
Kramer, Fundamentalist Islam. 
140 Kramer, Cross-Links, pp. 44-7. 
141 In most cases, the inclusion ofls1amic opposition did not point to a significant shift in regime 
policy. Where openings were endorsed, they were often lengthy and wearisome, involving numerous 
setbacks and negotiation deadlocks. See Daniel Bromberg, "Authoritarian Legacies and Reform 
Strategies in the Arab World", in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds.), Political 
Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo, 
1995-98, pp. 229-59 (esp. p. 233) and Bromberg, "Liberalization Versus Democracy: Understanding 
Arab Political Reform", Working Papers Middle East Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 37, May 2003, p. 3. Tunisia and Egypt, for 
example, set up multi-party systems but only allowed Islamists to run as independent parliamentarians 
whilst upholding the ban on parties using Islam as their symbol and ideology. 
142 In countries such as Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen, Islamist parties participated in 
municipal and national elections. See, for example, Vickie Langohr, "An Exit from Arab Autocracy'', 
Journal of Democracy, 13.3., 2002. 
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pluralism and interdependence are the catchwords of the 1990s'.143 'Democracy', 
Nasr wrote, 'opened the political process for Islamists and provided an avenue for 
them to pursue their agenda' .144 Overall, the warm reception the Indonesian mosque-
and campus-based Islamist movement gave to the demise of authoritarianism in 1998 
entirely followed the global trend of the past one and a half decades. 
Among the well-known self-moderating movements in the contemporary Muslim 
world were the main factions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian 
Movement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI). 145 Both became part of plural political 
systems and renounced rebellion. They became supporters of the main attributes of 
democratising states such as the rule of law, governmental accountability, human 
rights, periodical elections and the abolition of one-party rule, the establishment of 
independent judiciaries and the strengthening of a civil society through an 
independent media, unions and other non-governmental groups. 146 Parallel to this, 
they pursued short-term goals such as dakwah (proselytisation) programs, the 
insertion of Islamic laws into national laws, and endeavours to Islamise school 
curricula. 147 
A voiding the rigidity of a previous generation, the strictly constitutional current of 
revivalism thus, to some extent, adapted to the prevailing apologetic Muslim 
discourse. The compliant rhetoric of leading revivalist ideologues such as the 
Sudanese Hasan al-Turabi or the Tunisian Rashid Ghannoushi worked as a model for 
others. 148 It led to crucial refinements to Islamist political strategy by retaining 
Islamist core values and long-term objectives but adapting their promotion to the 
sensitivities of the 1980s and 1990s. These activists, many prominent critics of 
143 Ali R. Abootalebi, "Islam, lslamists, and Democracy", Middle East Review of International Affairs 
(MER/A), Vol. 3, No. I, March 1999. 
144 Nasr, Democracy. 
145 The Brotherhood began its cooperative stand under the Sadat government and later took part in 
elections under President Mubarak. But the organisation remained internally divided over the pros and 
cons of political participation and it has maintained an ambivalent stance toward a multi-party system. 
146 The promotion of these aims varied, though, and was rarely uniform. Jilian Schwedler, "A Paradox 
ofDemocracy? Islamist Participation in Elections", Middle East Report, winter 1998. 
147 See Kramer, Islamist Notions, Cross-Links and Integration 
148 The latter was leader of the MTI and its predecessor, the Hizb an-Nahda. 
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Islamism such as Martin Kramer argued, did not rewrite the ideological aims of 
Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini but 'repackaged' them. 149 
The question as to whether Indonesian Islamist parties merely adjusted themselves 
opportunistically to the political circumstances in 1998, and as to whether and to 
what extent they sustained an anti-democratic and anti-pluralist agenda, and the 
dilemmas created though participation in a plural political system will be among the 
topics of later chapters. 
Before this, the next chapter depicts the significance of pragmatism in the restoration 
of the Islamic political party scene in Indonesia in 1998. It shows that practical 
considerations prevailed. Islamic politics in its entirety anticipated the re-formation 
process against the backdrop of a state-sanctioned discourse that since the early 
1960s tagged Islamist agendas as harmful for national unity and social peace. This 
38-year interval necessitated remaining devotees of the Masyumi tradition to 
reappropriate their outlook and face new competition from within Islam. In the New 
Order, a partial form of Masyumi's ideology had taken roots in form of the Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP). At the same time, other 
parts of the Muslim elite had come to disbelieve in the electoral potency of 
Masyumi-style Islamism. There were sections shifting their support behind pluralist 
parties while others had taken on the intellectual sources of foreign Islamist models 
instead which led to the formation of Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK). 
149 Kramer, Fundamentalist. See also Daniel Bromberg, "Rhetoric and Strategy: Islamic Movements 
and Democracy in the Middle East " in Martin Kramer ( ed), The Islamism Debate, Moshe Dayan 
Centre ofMiddle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv, 1997, pp. 11-33. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEW ANING INFLUENCE OF THE MASYUMI TRADITION ON 
ISLAMIC POLITICS 
This chapter examines the re-formation process of Islamic politics in the years 1998 
and 1999. It argues that an associative spirit of the Masyumi tradition was sustained 
during the New Order.1 In the reformasi era, however, this spirit did not lead to joint 
political action. The chapter will show that the Islamism represented by Masyumi 
and a number of affiliated organisations has gradually diminished in significance. 
Practical considerations determined the re-formation of Islamist parties after the fall 
of Soeharto in May 1998, which led to small support for the establishment of 
Masyumi legatee parties. Moreover, despite claiming ongoing adherence to the ideals 
of Masyumi, the devotion of main sections of contemporary adherents has turned 
formalistic and symbolic with the underlying ideology becoming increasingly 
hollow. Tensions among parts of today's Masyumi legatees also revealed a lack of 
clarity what behaviour, both politically and morally this dedication has to entail. This 
will be the topic of the chapter's final section. 
The historical focal point of several of the Islamist parties formed in 1998 is the 
Masyumi. From 1949 to 1958 Masyumi was headed by Mohamad Natsir (d. 1993). 
Natsir turned into the most revered and intellectually dominating figure for later 
generations of Masyumi adherents. Among the parties that have carried on the 
Masyumi tradition are Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB), Partai 
Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi ('Indonesian Islamic Political Masyumi Party', 
PPII Masyumi) and, to a lesser extent, Partai Umat Islam ('Party of the Muslim 
Community', PUI) and a number of very small parties. 
Contemporary Muslim organisations which have continued the Masyumi tradition in 
a variety of ways and different emphases are Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia 
('Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council', DDII), Komite Indonesia untuk 
Solidaritas Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World', 
1 Dr. Robert Cribb suggested the term 'associative spirit' to me. 
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KISDI), Persatuan Islam ('Islamic Association', Persis), Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim se-Indonesia ('Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals', ICMI), 
Persatuan Umat Islam ('Union of the Islamic Community', PUI), the student 
organisations Gerakan Pemuda Islam ('Islamic Youth Movement', GPI), Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam ('Islamic Students' Association', HMI), Pelajar Islam Indonesia 
('Indonesian Islamic Students' Association', PII), the foundation al-Irsyad and two 
umbrella organisations, the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah ('Islamic Brotherhood 
Forum', FUI) and Majelis Ulama Indonesia ('Indonesian Ulama Council', MUI). 
Masyumi has also remained a point of historical reference for Parmusi ('Indonesian 
Muslim Party'), the modernist section of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United 
Development Party', PPP), which was the only Islamist party allowed to exist during 
the New Order years. 
Until the mid- to late 1950s, political Islam approached the Islamic canon as a set of 
legal rulings. This approach was clearest among the modernist section of Masyumi, 
which comprised a spectrum of moderate and doctrinaire Islamists.Z The blend of 
Dutch and Islamic upbringing of modernist elites brought about a complex and, at 
times, uneasy amalgam of political views and conceptions. 3 Later generations of 
Islamists would try to improve and purify their faith through studying Islamic 
matters only in Middle Eastern countries. Some of them went to join the Partai 
Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) in 1998. By taking up religious studies in the Middle 
East, these Islamists were consciously avoiding those parts of Western thought and 
culture seen as harmful to sustaining a coherent ideology. 
2 The doctrinaire camp mainly came from the puritan Persis. Its chief ideologues were Isa Anshary 
and Ahmad Hassan. Ahmad was a strict modernist Sunni with sectarian inclinations, regularly 
attacking Islamic sects active in Indonesia such as the Ahmadiyah, Christians and Communists. 
Michael Feener, Developments of Muslim Jurisprudence in 20th Century Indonesia, PhD Thesis, 
Boston, 1999, (esp. pp. 36 ff.). Also Isa Anshary Filsafah Perjuangan Islam, Medan, 1951 and his 
Sebuah Manifesto, Pasifik, Bandung, 1952. 
3 Natsir, for example, was familiar with the religious texts of the pesantren (Javanese boarding 
schools) and later studied the work of the major Egyptian reformers. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Studi 
Islam di Timor dan Barat dan Pengaruhnya terhadap Pemikiran Islam Indonesia", Ulumul Qur'an, No. 
3, Vol. V, 1994, pp. 12-20. Natsir's main domestic teachers were the moderate Haji Agus Salim and 
two puritans, Ahmad Hassan and Akhmad Surkati. 
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For those present-day Muslims devoted to Masyumi and its legacy, the party stands 
as a beacon for how to think and act as politically active Muslims.4 But despite 
sustaining an associative spirit, Masyumi's legacy failed to inspire Muslims to 
undertake joint political action after the fall of the New Order. This was because of 
widespread awareness that elections could no longer be won with the label Masyumi, 
an observation confirmed by the meagre share of votes obtained by its legatee parties 
in the 1999 elections (Appendix 1). To an increasing number of Muslims, the 
shari 'ah agenda of Masyumi now appeared anachronistic. Hence, despite the 
associative spirit, a great number of Muslim leaders decided not to support an 
Islamist party in the elections. 
Despite the original appearance of a strong legitimacy, Masyumi only survived until 
1960. There was a break of almost four decades between the ban on Masyumi and 
the re-formation of Islamist parties in 1998. In this period, changes in education and 
the globalisation of information impacted dramatically on the approach toward 
Islamic politics. Rising educational levels expanded a Muslim middle class. 
Globalised communication brought in new political and ideological concepts. 
Muslims gained much wider access to and understanding of a greater range of 
Islamic thought models and practices than in the 1950s and 1960s. 5 Above all, the 
ideologisation programs of the New Order and the necessities that the regime's 
patronage system had created made many Muslims think over more practical ways of 
doing politics. These factors resulted in the organisational and intellectual 
segmentation of political Islam and turned Masyumi legatee parties into a 
disconnected camp with decreasing popular support. 
Associative Spirit and the Fragmentation of the Masyumi Tradition 
It was a central ideal of Masyumi to unify Muslims politically under its banner. 
Among the most central Muslim virtues are brotherhood and communality 
(ukhuwah). Though this has been a traditional theme in Indonesian Islam, the 
modernist side paid more attention to it than traditionalists. The Kongres Umat Islam 
4 For the main arguments of this discussion, see also Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy. 
5 Ibid, p. 88. 
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('Congress of the Muslim Community', KUI), held in 1945, sanctioned Masyumi's 
wished-for status as sole Islamic party.6 Masyumi, then, comprised both modernists 
and traditionalists. 7 Its political statutes and the conference that launched the party 
stated that it would unite the Muslim community. Its founding Constitution described 
it as the 'one and only Indonesian Islamic political party' and all special members 
had to acknowledge it as the sole vehicle for political struggle. 8 
Masyumi started with a genuine spirit of concord. By the late 1940s, however, 
political unity began to crumble and revealed its somewhat artificial nature. 
Masyumi was openly divided into factions.9 It comprised 'cultural, generational and 
ideological cleavages which largely transected organisational loyalties'. 10 The party 
was loosely managed and did not impose high levels of discipline among its 
constituents. 11 There also was a poor handling of financial matters. 12 It contained 
individual (anggota biasa), organisational and extraordinary members (anggota 
istimewa). 13 These diverse membership criteria, it was hoped, would result in wide 
support from the Muslim community. 14 Corporate membership promised to be a 
practical solution by binding the constituencies of affiliated organisations to the 
party. 15 Members of these organisations, the largest of which were the modernist 
Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), automatically became 
Masyumi members. A large proportion of these cadres, however, only had scant 
6 During this stage, all major Islamic organisations attended the Congress. It was held for the first time 
in 1926 as Kongres Khilafat and then under the auspices ofMadjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia 
('Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council', MIAI). Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Kongres Umat Islam 
Indonesia", Media Dakwah, December 1997. 
7 All member organisations of the 1943 federation re-grouped in the 1945 Masyumi party. 
8 Program Perdjoangan Masjoemi, p. 8 andAnggaran Dasar, in H. Aboebakar (Atjeh) (ed.), Sedjarah 
Hidup. 
9 Feith, Decline, p. 134. 
1° Fealy, Ulama and Politics, pp. 79-80. 
11 Feith, Decline, p. 154; Fealy, Ulama and Politics, p. 79. 
12 Masyumi core members were obliged to pay a monthly fee but they usually failed to do so. Also, 
there was no official list of core members up to the dissolution of the party in 1960. Deliar Noer, 
Partai Islam di Pentas Nasiona/1945-65, Mizan, Jakarta, 1987, p. 56. 
13 The anggota istimewa comprised Muhammadiyah, NU, Persatuan Umat Islam ('Union of the 
Islamic Community', PUI) and Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia ('Union of the Indonesian Islamic 
Community', PUll). 
14 Mahendra, Kongres. 
15 Deliar Noer, Masjumi: Its Organisation, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia, Ithaca, MA 
thesis, New York, 1960, p. 54; Kenneth E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1970, p. 9. 
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knowledge about the party's program and goals. 16 As a result, support and loyalty 
toward Masyumi was uneven. 17 The precise nature of the working relationship with 
its affiliates always remained sketchily defined. Moreover, the degree of autonomy 
was left open to members. 18 These factors hampered the development of party cadres 
with matching degrees of ideological awareness. 19 
Unity, therefore, was fleeting. The segmentation of political Islam began in the 
1930s. The 1937 Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia ('Indonesian Supreme Islamic 
Council', MIAI) which initiated the establishment of Masyumi reunited Islamic 
forces but unity again faltered after 1949.20 Since the late 1940s, modernists 
increasingly dominated Masyumi's outlook, causing resentment in NU.21 The first 
major blow occurred in 1947 when the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian 
Islamic Union Party', PSII) split from Masyumi after it had failed to join the left-
leaning cabinet of Amir Syarifuddin.22 NU departed in 1952, aggravated over 
changes in Masyumi's leadership and organisational operation.23 NU's departure 
severely undermined Masyumi's claim to stand for the Islamic community in its 
entire. Most traditionalist Muslims left Masyumi when NU seceded. Masyumi then 
turned into a party dominated by modernists, initiating its decline?4 
16 Despite holding Masyumi membership, some even supported other parties. Noer, Partai Islam, pp. 
51-7. 
17 Noer, Partai Islam, pp. 51-4. The common, far-stretching and subjective prerequisite to become 
affiliated to Masyumi was to belong to the ahlu Sunnah waljamaah (adherents of the Prophetic 
tradition and the community, a term usually used to distinguish Sunni from Shiite Muslims). Original 
Masyumi members were NU, Muhammadiyah, Perti and PUI. Later followed al-Irsyad, Persis and the 
north-Sumatran organisations al-Jamiyatul Washliyah and al-Ittihadiyah. 
18 This was a matter of regular debate at Masyumi Congresses. Noer, Partai Islam, p. 55. 
19 The party with the most lucid ideology and tightest cadreisation program was arguably the Partai 
Komunis Indonesia ('Indonesian Communist Party', PKI). Unlike Masyumi, PKI professionally 
catalogued its membership. Noer, Partai Islam, p. 57. 
20 See, for example, Ward, Foundation, p. 9. The Sarekat Islam ('Islamic Union'), which temporarily 
united Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU, had since the 1920s declined in importance. 
21 See Fealy, Ulama and Politics, Chapter three; George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1952, p. 306. 
22 The PSII was the successor organisation to the Sarekat Islam. 
23 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 79. There were three main reasons for Masyumi's break-
up: the political sidelining of ulama, socio-economic reasons such as obstructed state patronage, and 
the loss of the Ministry of Religion to the modernists. The Sumatran traditionalist organisation Perti 
had originally refused to join Masyumi and became a rival party. Fealy, Ulama and Politics, pp. 94-
105. 
24 Traditionalist organisations such as al-Jamiatul al-Washliyah, al-Ittihadiyah and Mathlaul Anwar 
remained in Masyumi, but they all were small and locally based. 
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The deadlock of the Konstituante in early 1959 and the New Order regime's refusal 
to lift Soekarno' s ban on Masyumi settled the party's demise. It was the final and 
formal step in the segregation of the Masyumi tradition from political Islam. 
Following the prohibition, it was no longer possible to organise freely and maintain 
an unrestricted formation of cadres. After Masyumi dissolved itself, the correlation 
with its associates further receded. In the early 1960s, Gerakan Pemuda Islam 
('Islamic Youth Movement', GPI) was dissolved. Persis left Masyumi in 1960 
though Natsir and Isa Anshary-both Persis notables-remained active. In 1971, 
Muhammadiyah formally severed its ties to political parties. 25 Overall, the number of 
Islamic groups grew leading to increasing competition between factions of similar 
doctrinal and political orientations. This differed to the 1950s when Masyumi was 
the only modernist party and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam ('Islamic Students' 
Association', HMI) the only tertiary student Islamic organisation.26 Then GPI was 
the only youth organisation and Pelajar Islam Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic 
Students' Association', PII) solely covered the secondary school students.27 
In response, the Masyumi camp split into several currents. The first of these was the 
dakwah (Arab: da 'wa) current, focussing on the propagation of Islam. Most senior 
Islamic leaders committed themselves to making dakwah the pillar of Islamising 
Indonesian society. This resulted from the New Order's restrictions on Islamic 
politics but the disappointing election results of Islamic parties in the past also 
impacted on the view that many Muslims ought to enlarge their commitment toward 
Islam. 
25 Early in the New Order, the support ofMuhammadiyah and other major Islamic organisations for 
Masyumi still had seemed unrelenting as they demanded to rehabilitate the party. Samson, Islam, p. 
1005. 
26 HMI has traditionally the most diverse membership among Islamic organisations. 
27 GPII (later GPI) was founded in 1945, PII in 1946 and HMI in 1947. PII graduates normally 
proceeded through HMI. From the 1960s on, Muhammadiyah and NU increased the number of their 
own student outlets In the 1960s, the NU-affiliated Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia 
('Movement of Indonesian Muslim Students', PMII) emerged, later the Muhammadiyah-affiliated 
lkatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah ('Union ofMuhammadiyah Students', IMM). Both were founded 
by former HMI members. Further splintering occurred through splits within organisations, like in 
HMI, Sarekat Islam and al-Irsyad. 
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The Dakwah Current 
The ensuing Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Propagation 
Council', DDII) always saw itself as the main custodian of the Masyumi spirit. This 
self-awareness stemmed from the fact that most of the senior Masyumi leaders from 
the 1950s had joined and built up the organisation (see Appendix 11).28 By 2001, the 
last of these men had died. Younger devotees of Masyumi based their own 
legitimacy on having served on the staff of Masyumi seniors. Others had obtained 
the permission of Masyumi leaders to assume high office in DDII.29 The doctrinal 
breadth of the dakwah stream covered both moderate and doctrinaire modernists. 30 
As self-proclaimed adherents of the ahlu sunnah wal-jamaah ('adherents of the 
Prophetic tradition and the community'), DDII has been highly committed to stamp 
out "heretic" Islamic organisations and esoterism, such as in Shiite Islam.31 
The desire to sustain the spirit of Masyumi had been apparent throughout the New 
Order. An illustrative example was the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyyah ('Islamic 
Brotherhood Forum', FUI), formed in 1989. FUI was dominated by senior Masyumi, 
Persis and Majelis Ulama Indonesia ('Indonesian Ulama Council', MUI) leaders, 
most of whom had passed 70 or 80 years of age. 32 Most modernists kept their 
distance from FUI because they depended on the government's forbearance and 
28 Among them Natsir, Mohammad Roem, Sjarfruddin Prawiranegara, Dr. Anwar Haryono, Prawoto 
Mangkusamito, Prof. Kasman Singomedjo, Noer Ali, Prof. Rasjidi, Faqih Usman, Burhanuddin 
Harahap, Sholeh Iskandar and Yunan Nasution. 
29 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 82. 
30 See Robert Hefner, "Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian 
Muslims", Indonesia, No. 64, April1997, pp. 77-103. 
31 Doctrinal differences among DDII or Persis notables were often displayed in everyday habits such 
as the toleration of music and smoking or variations of female dress codes. Interview, Lukman 
Hakiem, Jakarta, 27 November 2001. 
32 The founders included Natsir, K.H. Masykur (NU), K.H. LatiefMuchtar (Persis), CH. Ibrahim 
(Sarekat Islam), K.H. Nur Ali, Nurulhulda (from the Perti faction in PPP), K.H. Sholeh Iskandar, 
K.H. Dadun Abdulkhohar (both Badan Keljasama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia, 'Indonesian Pondok 
Pesantren Cooperation Body', BKSPPI), Dr. Ismail Sunny (Muhammadiyah), Nuddin Lubis and K.H. 
Sjaichu (both NU). Younger affiliates included Dr. Amien Rais (Muhammadiyah), the Salman-
mosque co-founder A.M. Luthfi, GPI Chairman Anwar Shaleh, KISDI Chairman Ahmad Sumargono, 
Hussein Umar, K.H. Kholil Ridwan (Chairman BKSPPI), Rusdy Hamka (PPP) and Tamsil Linrung 
(Majelis Penyelemat Organisasi, 'Council for Safeguarding HMI', HMI MPO and DDII), M.S. 
Ka'ban (HMI MPO) and PPP politicians close to DDII such as Faisal Baasir, Hartono Mardjono and 
Mohammad Soleiman. Most initiators like Anwar Haryono, Rasjidi (a leading Islamist intellectual and 
critic ofNurcholish Madjid) and Mohamad Natsir were not affiliated to a political party. Sejarah 
Pergerakan Umat: Visi & Misi Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (no publisher, no place, no date, probably 
1996) and Ramlan Mardjoned, Sejarah Partai Bulan Bintang- Dari MW sampai Deklarasi Partai 
Bulan Bintang, DPP PBB, Jakarta, 2001, p. 59. 
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because they perceived Masyumi seniors as potential competitors. 33 Curbed by the 
narrow limits set out by the regime, through associations like FUI Masyumi leaders 
aimed to anticipate the channelling of Muslim political potential into a single party in 
an unforseen future. 34 The achievement, however, was confined to that of reviving 
the emotional link to Masyumi's legacy and to binding a few younger activists to the 
cause of its renewal. 35 These ties led to strong identification with domestic Islamic 
themes and became crucial for the policies and rhetoric of Masyumi legatee parties 
and individuals in other groups and parties in 1998. 
Other modernist sections dropped Masyumi's agendas or established a modified 
version in reaction to the external circumstances. This continued the erosion of 
earlier ideals and reduced further their ideological rigour. These sections, however, 
maintained an associative spirit among former adherents of the Masyumi camp. This 
spirit was linked to the notion of the Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang ('Greater 
Crescent and Star Family' henceforth also 'keluarga'), a popular reference since the 
1960s. 36 The term Keluarga Besar points to a hierarchical order in which members 
have diffuse degrees of commitment and engagement. It comprises Masyumi's 
former 'special members' and affiliated organisations, which from 1952 to 1959 
formed Masyumi's support base.37 These organisations lacked a formal structural 
link with Masyumi, but the notion of keluarga created a sense of political 
commonality between members and was sustained as a 'symbol of solidarity' among 
Muslims. 38 This spirit also survived among traditionalists with family connections to 
Masyumi. Yet in spite of an ongoing associative spirit, this never led to joint political 
action. 
33 Interview, Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, 25 January 2001. 
34 Anwar Haryono "Simposium Generasi Muda Forum Ukhuwah", Media Dakwah, October 1996, pp. 
6-7. 
35 FUI had no external authority. Its decisions, therefore, had no impact on the policy outlook of 
organisations such as PII, Muhammadiyah or HMI. 
36 The term was inspired by Masyumi's symbol in the 1955 elections. Deliar Noer, Partai Islam, p. 61. 
37 The keluarga included the major socio-religious organisations (Muhammadiyah, Persis, and PUI), 
the major youth organisations such as the tertiary HMI, the secondary school PII, GPI, the al-Irsyad 
foundation and several smaller local groups. 
38 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: the Biography of Mohammad 
Natsir (1908-1993)", Studia Islamika, vol.2, No.1, 1995, p. 145 (footnote 37). 
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Keluarga members praised Masyumi for various reasons. In their "memories", 
Masyumi lives on as a champion of democracy, a resolute guardian of Islam, a 
steadfast opponent of communism and an advocate of political fair play. 39 Masyurni 
leaders, they stress, were hard working, principled and modest, with a gentle 
personality and forbearing attitude. Bulan Bintang leaders often commended what 
they see as Masyumi's devotion to Indonesia's religious and cultural diversity. This 
included maintaining good relationships with political opponents and cooperating 
with Muslims and Christians alike.40 Importantly, they also took pride in the fact that 
Masyumi's tradition demanded a firm constitutionalism (taat hukum). There is 
general agreement that Masyurni leaders sustained these noble features despite 
ongoing hardship. Natsir, in the words of Prof. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the later 
Chairman of the Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB), was described as 
'a well that never dried out although the dry season went on and on' .41 Masyumi's 
goals, above all, the determination to strive for Islam through constitutional means, 
went beyond what a single generation could achieve.42 Another outlook shared by 
keluarga members was the strict anti-leftism of Islamic parties and, particularly, 
Masyumi's unwillingness to cooperate and work together with communists.43 Party 
leaders gave as reasons both that communists were enemies of democracy and that 
they denied the existence of God and thus were kajir (infidels, heathen).44 
Though these "memories" persisted in the Parrnusi current, it only sustained an 
innovated partial Islamist agenda adapted to the particular circumstances of the New 
Order. Parrnusi stood for Partai Muslimin Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Party').45 
39 The DDII-affiliated Media Dakwah, Suara Masjid, Serial Khutbah Jumat and Mimbar Ulama most 
actively cultivated these "memories", in particular since Natsir's death in February 1993. 
40 See, for example, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Pendahuluan", in Tamizi Taher (ed.) Pemikiran dan 
Perjuangan Mohammad Natsir, Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1996, pp. 1-8. 
41 Mahendra, Pendahuluan, p. 1. To highlight the modest character of Masyumi leaders, it was often 
mentioned that Natsir still rode his bicycle to office during his term as Prime-minister. 
42 Mahendra, Pendahuluan, p. 4. 
43 The anti-communist stance has been widely praised, including by leaders of contemporary pluralist 
parties. See for example Amien Rais "Tiga Prestasi Masyumi", Serial Mediah Dakwah, November 
1987, p. 17. 
44 See, for example, "Komunisme Kufur Menurut Hukum Islam" ('Islam holds communism to be 
heathen'), Hikmah, January 1955, pp. 13-4 and Mohammad Natsir, "Membela nikmatjg. diberikan 
demokrasi", Hikmah, 16 March 1957. 
45 When PPP was established, the regime required Parmusi and its three PPP associates to drop any 
reference to their former status as separate parties. Thereafter they were known as unsur ('elements') 
within PPP. Parmusi's unsurname was altered to Muslimin Indonesia (MI). 
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It was Masyumi' s nominal replacement but the new regime banned senior Masyumi 
leaders from joining. Modernist politicians who chose not to support the government 
party Golkar came to perceive Parmusi as the only chance for ongoing formal 
political representation for the Islamic community while trying to remain 
independence from the New Order's corporatist network.46 This proved of limited 
success and the regime's political and security agencies frequently interfered in 
Parmusi's internal matters.47 At the 1971 elections, the party merely won 5.4% of the 
vote by using the symbols and images ofMasyumi. 
PPP's Partial Islamist Agenda 
In the view of DDII and FUI, Parmusi did not carry on Masyumi's ideals and 
program.48 Indeed, as opposition to the government, Parmusi was less dynamic than 
NU and this set an obvious contrast to the legacy continued by DDII.49 In 1973, 
Parmusi was incorporated into Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development 
Party', PPP). In the five post-1973 New Order elections, PPP' s results ranged from a 
high of 29.3% to a low of 15.9%.50 During the following years, the regime stoked 
rivalries between the Parmusi and the NU camp in PPP. It aimed at counterbalancing 
the larger and more outspoken NU made by making sure that Parmusi leaders 
obtained the chairmanship of the party. A smaller number of Parmusi politicians 
maintained active links with Natsir and DDII, for example, Mohammad Soleiman 
and Faisal Baasir.51 
46 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, pp. 82-3. 
47 This was evident in the nomination ofParmusi's Chairman Mohamed Mintaredja who was the 
choice of the government rather than the party. 
48 Yusril Ihza, Activism and Intellectualism, p. 129. 
49 NU leaders, for example, were more sympathetic toward the Petisi 50 ('Petition of 50'), an outer-
parliamentarian opposition group attacking the New Order's repressive policies. The group also 
comprised several senior Masyumi leaders. 17 NU members signed the declaration of the Petition, 
triggering critique from within MI. Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: 
The Political Journey of/slam under Indonesia's New Order (1973-1987), McGill University, 1993, 
p. 74. 
50 PPP's electoral results during the New Order were: 29.3% in 1977; 27% in 1982; 16% in 1987, 17% 
in 1992; and 22% in 1997. 
51 Mohammad Soleiman, "Bukan Politikus Bermuka Dua", Lukman Hakiem, Sultan Mufit and 
Miftahudin ( eds. ), F aisal Baasir: Politik Jalan Lurus, Dharmapena Nusantara, Jakarta, pp. 3 73-79 
(esp. p. 375). 
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Besides barring shari 'ah agendas, the government, above all, appeared keen to 
eradicate formal expressions of political Islam. In 1973, both Islam and Pancasila 
were declared to be founding principles of PPP. In 1979, the status of Islam in the 
party was downgraded as an 'identifying characteristic'. As a next step, PPP had to 
change its party symbol and electoral slogans. 52 PPP was one of the first Islamic 
organisations to accept Pancasila as 'sole ideological foundation' (asas tunggal) and 
in 1986 the kab'ah (Holy Shrine) was replaced by a star symbol.53 PPP, then, 
officially became open for non-Muslims to join although this hardly ever happened. 
In fact, it always remained an exclusively Muslim party and a complete separation 
from its affiliated organisations never occurred. 54 
Moreover, despite these restrictions, there were no substantial changes in PPP's 
campaign material. The party was still able to claim to defend Islam as long as this 
claim was not expressed in shari'ah terms.55 Typically, authoritarian systems such as 
the New Order permit a limited number of "oppositional" issues and thus retain a 
restricted 'space for dissent' .56 Such concessions prevent the complete dissuasion of 
the opposition and a definitive inner break with the regime. The scope for such 
dispute, of course, was never sufficient to question the fundamental ideals on which 
the ruling elites based their authority. Yet restrictions in various Muslim autocracies 
tended to be more sweeping than those of the New Order. The latter controlled the 
political clout of any potential challenger, including Islam, but unlike many similar 
regimes, it strongly invested in the social and cultural aspects of Islam. 57 
52 The party symbol was under fierce debate at PPP's 1984 National Congress (Muktamar). In 1985, 
the regime issued a regulation banning socio-religious organisations from being formally associated 
with political parties. It also banned the use of Arabic scripture and quotes from the Qur'an. During 
Djaelani Naro's leadership, Islamic elements were removed from party regulations. Jean van de Kok, 
"A Survey of Political Developments in Indonesia During the Second Half of 1987: The Impact of the 
Election on Social and Political Developments in the Country", RIMA, Summer 1988. 
53 The pragmatist Naro, nonetheless, preserved the ka 'bah as party symbol for maintaining links to 
PPP's constituency. Hakim, Political Journey, p. 98. 
54 For example, at the 1987 elections, PPP still claimed to represent NU. Syamsuddin Haris, PPP dan 
Politik Orde Baru, Grasindo, Jakarta, 1991, p. 140. 
55 Haris, PPP, pp. 130-1. 
56 Juan Linz has pointed to this 'limited pluralism' of authoritarian regimes, in contrast to totalitarian 
systems. Linz, Regimes, cited in Aspinall, Opposition. 
57 See, for example, Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 101. Demerath and Straight classified the New Order as a 
religious state with a secular political policy; Shepard similarly suggested 'religious secularist'. N. J. 
Demerath and Karen S. Straight, "Religion, Politics and the State: Cross-Cultural Observations", 
paper given at the Institute of Oriental Philosophy, Tokio, 20 May 1996; Shepard, Islam and Ideology. 
Pancasila's spiritual claim appeared quite unlike other state-backed ideologies such as Baathism 
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As a result, PPP came to support several popular Muslim (umat) themes. Islamist-
fuelled opposition concentrated on popular issues of that time such as the 1973 
Marriage Law and the 1978 Kepercayaan Law. In both areas, PPP had some success 
in resisting the regime's attempts to undermine the position of Islam.58 PPP also 
defended Masyumi's primary concern to ensure a strictly religious reading of the 
Pancasila based on the first principle and restated in Paragraph 29, First Article: the 
state is based on 'The One All-Powerful God' (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa).59 But on 
the Jakarta Charter and shari 'ah, the party had to comply with the Pancasila-based 
tenet. 
PPP thus defended a typical quasi-ideological program with a firm position on 
selected key issues. The governmental ban on shari 'ah issues made it at the same 
time necessary to give special vocal attention to the ethical and moral aspects of 
Islam. This was thus, above all, a matter of rhetorical adjustment to ensure the 
party's political survival. It nevertheless remained pivotal for PPP to ensure that a 
number of umat-related themes continued to dictate its agenda in order to sustain 
links to its constituency. 60 
As a 'federation of different orientations', PPP was never able or even willing to 
develop and sustain a coherent and full ideology. The party always centred on efforts 
to balance its independent power camps which necessarily led to doctrinal rifts.61 MI 
(later Parmusi), NU, Sarekat Islam and Perti protected their organisations' interests 
which owed much to European socialist thinking and to secular states such as Turkey where the 
Constitution forbade its citizens to 'even partially found the fundamental, social, economic, political, 
and legal order of the State on religious tenets' (art. 24 of the Turkish Constitution, quoted in Garvey, 
Introduction, p. 15). The scope of secularism in authoritarian states was also wider in pre-
revolutionary Iran, Nasser's Egypt, Bourguiba's Tunisia or Assad's Syria (after 1963). 
58 The term kepercayaan refers to syncretic forms oflslam, attacked by PPP as being in violation of 
Islam's strict monotheism. The bill had proposed to acknowledge kepercayaan as sixth officially 
recognised religion. 
59 During the 1978 MPR session, PPP MPs approved the re-election of President Soeharto but walked 
out after a controversy over the first principle's interpretation. Geoffrey C. Gunn, "Ideology and the 
Concept of Government in the Indonesian New Order",Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No.8, August 1979, p. 
759. 
60 Haris, PPP, 1991, pp. 115, 124 and 130. 
61 Umaidi Radi, Strategi PPP 1973-1982: Suatu Studi tentang Kekuatan Islam Politik Tingkat 
Nasional, Integrita Press, Jakarta, 1984, p. 106. Unti11977, NU, Perti, Sarekat Islam and PSII used 
their own symbols underscoring PPP's internal factionalism. 
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and used to strictly support party candidates along factional lines. A factional 
decision-making process was the key barrier for PPP to achieve unanimity: 'a 
problem comes up and each group first negotiates among itself. 62 PPP thus 
developed into a political alliance but never established a coherent body of ideas 
shared by all its components.63 As the rivalry between Parmusi and NU elites became 
a customary element of PPP' s political life, party Congresses tended to be tightly 
staged and passed up substantive debates on policy issues. 64 
PPP was also fettered by intricate hierarchies. Up to 1984, the party appeared to have 
a double executive, divided into a Central Board and presidency plus two advisory 
boards. One of these advisory boards was the Religious Council (Syuro ). These 
boards often issued conflicting policies and orders and there was an unclear 
allocation of duties and responsibilities. 65 Policy decisions had very limited impact 
on the activities of regional boards and party cadres. After the formal deletion of the 
Syuro Council and the presidency in 1984, PPP's internal structure seemingly 
became clearer. But working mechanisms between the parliamentary faction and the 
Central Board remained obscure and the quality of management a matter of 
concern. 66 Disputes centred on lucrative positions and patronage resources m 
national or regional parliaments and the party bureaucracy. This rancour happened at 
the expense of a coordinated leadership, a clear political strategy and transparent 
policy-making mechanisms. During the 1980s, it was common that a small elite 
62 Radi, Strategi, p. 150. 
63 The main division was between Parmusi and NU, but, in addition, the two camps were often 
entangled in internal rancour. There were tensions over the composition of party boards, which often 
failed to get the unanimous approval from within the party. It was common that complaints were made 
toward the press and thereby compromised proper party mechanisms. The fragile internal stability was 
also due to inconsistent membership regulations. Haris, PPP, p. 133. 
64 The central issue of these Congresses was the election of General Chairman. It was common to pay 
off local branches in return for their votes. The statutes required convening for Congress once every 
four years but only two of those Congresses were held between 1973 and 1991. A third Congress 
followed in 1994, once again strained by conflict between NU and Parmusi with each camp split into 
three competing factions. See Saiful Muzani, "The Devaluation of Aliran Politics: Views from the 
Third Congress of the PPP", Studia Islamika, no. 3, 1994, pp. 177-223 (esp. pp. 184-5); Haris, PPP, p. 
135; Radi, Strategi, p. 105. 
65 Cees van Dijk, Survey of Political Developments in the Second Half of 1984: The National 
Congress of the PPP and the Pancasila Principle", RIMA, winter 1985, p. 179. This was a direct 
consequence of the many interests groups in the party which all had to be accommodated. 
66 Sidney Jones, "The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat" and the Role ofNahdatul Ulama in 
Indonesia", Indonesia, no. 80, October 1984, pp. 1-20 (esp. p. 10). 
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decided unilaterally about policies without consulting the party board. 67 At the same 
time, the regime ensured that PPP lacked strong figures able to create a sense of 
unity.68 Prior to Congresses party activities peaked and the criticism was made that 
PPP's promotion of Islam centred on the lead-up to polls.69 The ongoing feuds and 
apparent concern with power politics alienated PPP from its traditional following and 
diminished sympathies among the Islamic student and mosque movement. Moreover, 
from the late 1980s there were increasing signs of tension between older and younger 
elites. The latter openly detested the way that senior leaders clung to status and 
power. 70 These issues would continue to hamper the party from 1998 on. 
Campus Islamism 
The associative spirit of the keluarga was, to some extent, also evident in the esteem 
of foreign ideological teachings among campus Islam.71 While barred from practical 
politics, Masyumi leaders and their associates in the keluarga had facilitated the 
spreading of a self-protective religious spirit at secular state universities. 72 When, in 
the early 1980s, the New Order sought to shut down the political activities on 
campus, student groups adopted the Muslim Brotherhood organisational methods, 
most importantly the use of cells (usroh) for religious training (tarbiyah).73 These 
cells were led by murobbi (itinerant preachers and instructors) and consisted often to 
twelve cadres. 
Senior Masyumi leaders such as Prof. Rasjidi and Natsir were vital in circulating the 
doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami, translating and publishing 
67 Radi, Strategi, pp. 152-3; Haris, PPP, p. 132. 
68 Jean van de Kok, "Dissension within the PPP", RIMA, winter 1988, p. 171. The result of these rifts 
was PPP's worst performance in an election (1987) since its foundation. 
69 Haris, PPP, p. 134. 
70 Haris, PPP, p. 135. 
71 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy. 
72 An often-quoted statement by Natsir is his call to re-direct the Islamic struggle to mosques, 
campuses and pesantren. The pioneering group was Latihan Mujahidin Dakwah. DDII senior leader 
Dr. Imaddudin Abdulahim initiated it at the Salman mosque of the 'Technological Institute of 
Bandung' in 1974. Many activists see this group as having initiated the Islamist movement at 
campuses and mosques. 
73 Qutb's highly influential commentary on the Qur'an Fi Zilal a/ Qur'an ('In the the Shadows of the 
Quran') had, at least partly, been available in Indonesian translation since 1952. Johns, Coming to 
Terms, p. 71. 
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the works of Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.74 These teachings 
imported a new political culture into Indonesian Islamism. They became the rationale 
for the Islamic student and mosque movement, which consciously sought distance 
from the traditions and themes of the Masyumi camp. 75 Initially, the keluarga was 
disaffected by Shiite revolutionary thought, which had played a role in forming 
campus Islam. DDII and other Sunni groups see Shiism in the "heretic" tradition of 
the kharijites and other dissident streams. 76 Shiite influences, however, never gained 
strong roots among campus based Islamists. After the enthusiasm triggered by the 
success of the first Islamic revolution 1979 in Iran led to a fleeting rise of interest in 
Shiite political theory, the campus movement detected contentious theological 
aspects and abandoned it. 77 
DDII was not the only catalyst in this campus dakwah movement. Yet it played a 
momentous role in popularising foreign ideological approaches. A key Islamist 
activist held: 
What is clear, in concrete terms, is that campus mosques were the monumental 
achievement of Pak Natsir. So it was Pak Natsir who guarded the flourishing of 
campus mosques, beginning with Salman. And Natsir once declared 'one day we 
will see Islamic cadre multiplying on campuses.78 
74 DDII spread the works ofSayyid Qutb, Musthafa Masyhur, Abul A'la Mawdudi, al-Banna, 
Mohammad Qutb, YusufQaradhawi, Said Hawa and Fathy Yakan. Other key DDII figures in thriving 
the circulation of Muslim Brotherhood writings were Abdi Sumaithi (known as Abu Ridho or Ridha) 
and Prof. Rahman Sainuddin, a prolific translator of Brotherhood works for Dewan Dakwah. DDII 
initiated mosque study groups at the University oflndonesia, at Surabaya's Airlangga University, at 
the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta (Shalahuddin), and also at Ujung Pandang and in Padang. 
Interview, Rifyal Ka'bah, Jakarta, 5 January 2001. Several DDII leaders and affiliates played an active 
role in these groups, for example, Amien Rais in the Shalahuddin. 
75 Among the Indonesian students in Arab countries who became closely acquainted with the new 
teachings were several later Partai Keadilan leaders: Dr. Salim Segaf, Dr. Hidayat Nur Wahid, Dr. 
Daud Rasyid, Abu Ridho and Abdul Hasib Hasan. Abu Ridho returned from Saudi Arabia in 1982. He 
co-founded al-Islahy press which translated the works of Muslim Brotherhood ideologues like 
Mustafa Masyhur. Hidayat Nur Wahid established the al-Haramain foundation in February 1993 after 
his return from Saudi Arabia. Salim Segaf founded the al-Haraih foundation, based in Sulawesi. 
Abdul Habib Hasan made al-Hikmah a dakwah center in South Jakarta, setting up study circles at 
various universities in Jakarta like the University of Indonesia. Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai 
Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, Penerbit Teraju, 2001, p. 165 and 
Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 12 April2001. 
76 Interview, Rifyal Ka'bah, Jakarta, 5 February 2001. The Shiite ideologue Ali Syariati became a 
major reference for the Salman movement. Shiite thought was later promoted by the book-publisher 
Mizan, disdained by DDII and other conservative Sunnis as a promoter of"heresy". 
77 Interviews, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 5 April 2001; Mohammad Hafiz, Jakarta, 16 April 2001. 
Shiite-influenced campus groups often adopted an esoteric or mystical approach toward Islamic 
teachings unacceptable for the main currents. 
78 Interview, Fahri Harnzah, Jakarta, 2 April2001. 
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Campus activists readily paid homage to Masyumi but they also openly questioned 
the relevance of the traditional political approach in order to advance Islam. In 
particular, they viewed the open ideological frictions of the 1950s as exasperating. 
Furthermore, throughout the New Order Masyumi and DDII had neglected to bind 
new cadres to its cause. 79 The political struggle for Islam, however, was inefficient 
without the systematic formation of devoted activists and campaigners. Mutammimul 
'Ula, a later Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) leader who had been active in 
DDII, concluded that 'history and political models have changed'. This meant that 
the Masyumi legacy 'was not so important any more'. 80 DDII-based Mashadi, a later 
PK MP, expressed the view among campus activists on the cadreisation issue: 
The old [Masyumi] figures always neglected cadreisation. The most they did was 
public lectures but there was nothing systematic. Natsir never gathered together 
people to win new cadres. Hence, the various 'Masyumi' parties did not get many 
seats. I think that is major reason why Masyumi is only a historical remnant with a 
bigname.81 
Moreover, many younger activists regarded DDII's post-Natsir leadership as quietist 
and docile.82 Natsir, who believed that leaders should rise "naturally" from society, 
left a legacy that was difficult for any successor to meet.83 His successor, Dr. Anwar 
Haryono, had substantive Masyumi credentials and was respected as an astute and 
productive intellectual but he lacked the personal authority and the historical weight 
ofNatsir.84 Anwar's own views were mostly based on Natsir's.85 Hence, 'for DDII', 
Mutammimul summed up, 'there was Anwar Haryono, for Masyumi there was no 
79 Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 Apri12001. 
80 Interview, Mutammimu1 'U1a, Jakarta, 4 September 2000. 
81 Interviews, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000 (quote), Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000. 
Bulan Bintang leaders often argued that Masyumi had been unable to create cadres as the party had to 
dissolve itself. PK leaders held that, equally declared illegal during various periods, both the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Jam'aat-i-Islami successfully had maintained a devoted following. Interview, 
Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April2001. 
82 Interviews, Abdullah Hehamahua, Jakarta, 21 September 2000, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 
2000, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000. 
83 George McTurnan Kahin, "In Memoriam Mohammad Natsir (1907-1993)", Indonesia, No. 56, 
October 1993, pp. 158-66. 
84 Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000. Emphasising Masyumi's role as a beacon, DDII-
affiliated media fostered the somewhat inhibiting view that all younger Muslim leaders lacked the 
noble qualities of Masyumi leaders. "Mengikuti Jejak Sang Pemimpin", "Citra Indah Natsir dan 
Masjkur", "Kiat Menjadi Pemimpin"; Natsir Zubaidi "Natsir-ist Indonesia, Janganlah Pesimis", Suara 
Masjid, April1993; and most of Media Dakwah, March 1993. 
85 Islamists have rarely adopted Anwar's writings as a source on its own terms for their beliefs and 
actions. 
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successor'. 86 But Anwar was 'not progressive' and 'too accommodative toward the 
government'. 87 What is more, the campus activists claimed to act on a deeper 
understanding of Islam. In the words of Mashadi: 
Our associates who studied in the Middle East did not agree with Anwar because 
they held that he did not really understand Islam [kurangfaham Islam]. Anwar was 
more a politician than ada 'i [preacher]' .88 
At the same time, when many senior Masyumi leaders died in the early 1990s, which 
initiated a leadership change in DDII, it weakened the link between Masyumi 
adherents and campus Islam, initiating a 'separation of generations' .89 In this course, 
the campus movement established its own leaders and formed with murobbi a type of 
religious instructor whose mission it was to form an evenly strong-mind assemblage 
of cadres.90 In the course of the mid-1990s, campus Islamism became increasingly 
self-reliant. From 1992 on, it took over student senates and by the mid-90s 
dominated campus politics.91 
Campus Islam's devotion to Muslim communality took on the ideals of foundational 
Islam, including the Prophet's perceived method of instructing disciples.92 Following 
a perception of the Prophet's guidance as unswerving yet compassionate, the 
dominant form of training upheld the possibility for debate and criticism.93 Unlike 
the Shiite perception of imamship as 'infallible' (mas 'hum), the central stream of 
86 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 10 October 2000. 
87 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000. 
88 Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000. 
89 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000. Also Interviews, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 
2000 and Andi Rahmat, Jakarta, 22 January 2001. 
90 By the mid-1990s, many Indonesian students were able to conduct training programs on the basis of 
their own religious expertise, thus becoming less dependent on graduates from the Middle East. 
Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April2001. 
91 The most active campus groups were the Salman mosque at the ITB Bandung, the Arif Rahman 
Hakim mosque at the University of Indonesia, al-Ghifari at the Institut Pertanian ('Agricultural 
Institute') in Bogor, Jama'ah Shalahuddin at the Gadjah Madah University in Yogyakarta and the 
Airlangga University in Surabaya. Andi Rahmat and Mukhammad Nadjib, Gerakan Perlawanan dari 
Mesjid Kampus, Purimedia, 2001; Interview, Mohammad Hafiz, Jakarta, 16 April2001. 
92 The Tradition of the Prophet and the rules of the four first caliphs dismissed, at least in theory, 
social differentiation based on descent or status. Differences could only be measured through 
submission to Islam. Lewis, What went wrong?, p. 91. 
93 Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April2001. This was the dominant type of instruction in the 
Islamic activist groups Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia ('United Action Front of 
Indonesian Muslim Students', KAMMI) and the umbrella organisation Lembaga Dakwah Kampus 
('Institution for Campus Proselytisation', LDK). Both became important cadre sources for PK. 
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campus Islam identified the Prophet as the last 'infallible' human being.94 While 
stressing the need for discipline and rejecting libertarianism, it taught to oppose and 
disobey political repression.95 Abu Ridho, later a central PK ideologue, wrote: 
A leader or a judge is not mas'hum [untarnished from mistakes and sin]. He or she 
[ia] is an ordinary human being who can be right and can be wrong, can be just or be 
cruel. It is an obligation for the Muslim society to constantly set straight leaders who 
have committed mistakes and fraud ... 96 
Hence, campus Islam fostered an alternative vision to the New Order and set up a 
counter-culture. Its central trait was a conscious retreat into an autonomous social 
hierarchy and value system.97 It redirected the traditional focus in the propagation of 
Islam, proclaiming that each Muslim had to endeavour to improve the moral life of 
the community.98 This orientation particularly stressed that the Islamic moral 
imperative was not individualist but communal. As such, Islam put ideological 
fervour into expanding inner resistance and fostered religiously motivated 'civil 
disobedience' (al-bara) against a regime classified as "impious".99 It further sought 
to harness the alienation of younger Islamic elites from the materialist way of life 
promoted by the New Order's pembangunan ('development') programs. In the words 
ofMutammimul 'Ula: 
This society that the bureaucrats say 'is based in Pancasila' is more and more 
mystified in distinguishing between noble and deprived values, between what is 
permitted [halal] and what is prohibited [haram]. This is what the developmentalist 
crowd calls pembangunan. Pembangunan with a set of diffuse values has brought 
94 Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April2001. 
95 A reverse motto of traditionalist thought demanding strict obedience toward authorities is 'Better 
one hundred years of tyranny than a single week of anarchy'. 
96 Abu Ridho, "Pemimpin Bangkrut", Suara Keadilan, 16 January- 15 February 2001. While a 
religious instructor [murobbi] guided his disciples to learn about the fundamental nature of Islamic 
teachings, he lacked the enlightened status accorded to an imam. Such perceptions of traditional 
authority also contrasted with traditionalist doctrine in which the kyai stood at the peak of hierarchy 
with an absolute authority over students often enhanced through alleged supernatural abilities (taqlid: 
absolute obedience). Fealy, Ulama and Politics, pp. 18-9. The term usrah had similarly implied strict 
and uncritical obedience toward a religious authority. With its negative connotation, later dakwah 
organisations such as LDK, KAMMI and also PK deliberately avoided the term. 
97 'Then it was as if we were running away from reality'. Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 17 
October 2001. 
98 Traditionally, missionary activities (for example those ofDDII) centred on secluded regions in the 
archipelago, anticipating the intrusion of Christian missionaries into "Muslim" terrain. Campus 
dakwah movements, by contrast, started with their immediate surrounding, for example, trying to 
engage the anak kafe ('coffee shop kids') in a dialogue about Islam and moral behaviour. Interview, 
Imam Rulyawan, Jakarta, 5 April2001. 
99 Interview, Andi Rahmat, Jakarta, 22 January 2001. The interviewee used the English term. 
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about double standards [ nilai ganda] or a split personality. It has led to a philosophy 
'unity and conformity together with harmony' both between what is true [haq] and 
what is wrong [bath if] .. . If this continues, the highest cost that has to be paid is the 
logical consequence of pembangunan itself [that is] the emergence of hypocrisy 
[ kemunafikan] .100 
Many activists had perceived restrictions such as the 'sole ideological foundation' 
(asas tunggal) as calculated secularisation of national identity. With asas tunggal, 
the regime appeared to exclude Islam from the consensus Pancasila had claimed to 
represent because it portrayed Islam as damaging for national unity. The spiritual 
aridity of state-sanctioned propagation of religion enhanced the spirit to display 
formal Islamic attributes, demonstratively adapted to signal inner resistance and 
underlining the sense of a counter-lifestyle. 101 Arabic was the counter-language to 
the arid bureaucratised terminology of the New Order. 102 
There was no adequate response from established Muslim organisations to the influx 
of foreign Islamist concepts. Up to 1998, HMI struggled against an 'Islam yes, HMI 
no' attitude on campuses. 103 PPP, in particular, never adapted to tarbiyah-type 
instruction and the systematic build-up of a protective outlook against influences 
from outside. The cell structure of campus Islam was very much unlike PPP's 
flexible cadreisation methods and its purpose to create unanimity contrasted PPP's 
internal lack of concord. 104 In reverse, for most activists, PPP no longer represented 
the interests of Islam, lacking both the means and the willpower to establish an 
100 Mutammimul 'Ula, Mencari Akar Sekularisme, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 12. 
101 Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 5 April 2001. It underscores the protest character of the 
movement that many campus activists came from a non-religious family background. 
102 Much of the New Order's ideological terminology was based in Sanskrit or ancient Javanese. 
103 Anas Urbaningrum, "Menegakkan Khittah Petjuangan dan Visi HMI", Republika, 27 September 
1997. Under Soekamo, HMI had been an important oppositional force and the most influential student 
organisation. In the early 1970s, it managed to avoid incorporation into PPP. With the state's 
meddling in campus politics, HMI's influence declined. The 'sole foundation' campaign had further 
negative impact. In 1985, HMI split. By the mid-1980s, HMI Chairmen suffered from severe image-
loss through incorporation into Golkar and the central bureaucracy. Increasingly dependent on the 
government's patronage resources and thus wary to embarrass its seniors in influential positions, HMI 
lost much of its earlier prestige. By the 1990s, HMI was fiercely criticised for its unresponsive stance 
on umat themes such as the government's ban on headscarfs at public schools. See Y. Setio Hadi 
(coordinator tim penulis ), Masjid Kampus untuk Ummat & Bangs a (Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim UI}, 
Lembaga Kajian Budaya Nusantara, 2000, pp. 119-20; Djoko Susilo, "50 Tahun Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI)-Habis Sudah "Lokomotif' Intelektual Itu", Jawa Pos, 5 February 1997. 
104 Interviews, Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, 25 January 2001; Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April200l. 
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ideological alternative to the regime. 105 PPP, in particular, came to be seen as having 
sold out the umat on asas tunggal when accepting the proviso much more quickly 
than NU and Muhammadiyah. 
The Technocratic and the Militant Sub-Streams 
A further proto-Islamist stream contained Muslims of an explicit 'technocratic' 
liking. 106 This camp consisted of former Masyumi members and sympathisers who 
relinquished an Islamist agenda and pursued their careers via Golkar or one of its 
regime-endorsed affiliates such as Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia 
('Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals', ICMI). Many ICMI activists were 
at the same time technocrats. They were attracted to the New Order's 
developmentalist policies which showed some obvious parallels to prominent Islamic 
economic policies in the 1950s.107 With this technocratic outlook, they readily 
suppressed possible Islamist inclinations, especially to advance shari 'ah. Most were 
at ease to adopt Golkar's secular disposition without proviso. A smaller number 
retained an aspiration to gradually Islamise the regime and society. Politicians of this 
current had become an influential force by the early 1980s. They were one of the first 
groups to gain advantage from the regime's guarded siding with Islam almost a 
decade later. 
Power within ICMI rested with public servants, academics and associates of 
Chairman Prof. B.J. Habibie. 108 These were urban, middle-class modernists from the 
105 When, in 1992, Natsir called on Muslims to vote for PPP, many campus activists continued to 
abstain from voting. 
106 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 83. 
107 Since the late 1960s, HMI had produced many central figures of the New Order, among others 
Marie Muhammad, Tarmizi Taber, Adi Sasono (grandson of Masyumi founder Mohammad Roem), 
Abdul Gafur, Yusuf Kalla, Dr. Marwah Daud Ibrahim, Tanri Abeng and Fahmi Idris. Among recent 
Golkar notables with a Bulan Bintang affiliation resulting from HMI leadership were Akbar Tanjung 
(HMI Chairman 1972-1974), Ade Komaruddin (Chairman Ciputat branch 1986, Chairman of the 1988 
Central Board) and Ekky Syahruddin (Chairman Jakarta branch). Many of these people were at the 
same time involved in ICMI. 
108 Edward Aspinall observed that 'government bureaucrats with little apparent previous commitment 
to Islam ... dominated its leadership'. Opposition, p. 89. William Liddle described ICMI as 'an 
organisation with an Islamic name but with minimal Islamic content'. The prevailing view is that 
ICMI was a direct result of Soeharto's estrangement from the Indonesian army and thus a strategic 
attempt to build up an alternative support base. R. William Liddle, "The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A 
Political Explanation", Journal of Asian Studies, Vo. 55, No.3, August 1996, pp. 613-34. 
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non-Islamist current dominant among the Muhammadiyah and HMI elites. 109 
Islamists did not gain key positions; no DDII, Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas 
Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World', KISDI) or 
Persis activists rose into ICMI's higher ranks. 110 The influence of ICMI cadre with 
an Islamist background such as Hussein Umar, Mohammad Soleiman, Yusrillhza 
Mahendra and A.M. Luthfi remained minor and many obtained less important 
positions in its Majelis Pakar ('Expert Council'). 111 
Smaller splinter groups connected to the keluarga spirit surfaced in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. One group consisted of militant elements. These Islamists became 
involved with the clandestine movement Darul Islam ('Realm of Islam', later known 
as Negara Islam Indonesia or Nil) and a number of other militant offshoots. Its direct 
ideological counterpart became the "liberal" movement of which some initiators 
originally had risen from within the keluarga as well. 112 
Those Muslims, most from an urban modernist background, who joined the New 
Order's central bureaucracy and the political apparatus, had wide-ranging ideological 
views, with doctrinaire Islamists at one end of the spectrum and affiliates of "liberal" 
Islam at the other. 113 It was impossible to demarcate these camps clearly, in 
particular since various groups were active in a variety of organisations with equally 
diverse ideological commitments. Apart from a few dozen prominent Islamists who 
had fled Indonesia or been sentenced to jail, in most of these organisations there was 
109 Aspinall, Opposition, p. 61. 
110 Among Masyumi senior leaders only Anwar Haryono and Hasan Basri joined the ICMI board. 
Donald Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, Routledge Curzon, London, New York, 
2002, p. 89. Their influence was further lessened due to the unusual high number of 117 board 
members. 
111 Porter, Managing Politics. Accordingly, the response by campus Islamists to what many saw as the 
government's 'tactical, partial, and artificial' commitment to Islamise politics and national law 
remained reserved. Interview Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000. Also Interview, Andi Rahmat, 
Jakarta, 22 January 2001. ICMI-initiator Imaduddin Abdulahim had strong DDII affiliations but his 
influence in ICMI diminished gradually and, after 1998, he mainly worked as a business consultant. 
112 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 83-4. The designation Natsir muda ('Young Natsir') 
was most often bestowed on Nurcholish Madjid. But in the early 1970s, Nurcholish started to criticise 
Masyumi, especially its shari 'ah-minded agenda. 
113 Aspinall, Opposition, p. 333. 
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an intricate and unstrained intermingling of an Islamist minority and a less 
doctrinaire Muslim majority. 114 
The incorporation of significant sections of the dakwah and the technocratic streams 
of the Masyumi camp throughout the last decade of the old regime meant that, unlike 
many other liberalising Muslim countries, post-New Order Indonesia has not put the 
question of 'Islamist participation' and about ways to socialise Islamism into the new 
political system. 115 There was no comparable 'liberalization as crisis management' or 
'a form of domestic peacemaking between enemies' .116 Islamists, including those 
coming from a campus-tarbiyah background, were free to found new parties, except 
that they had to adopt Pancasila as ideological basis until the law permitted them to 
adopt Islam as party ideology. The legal situation prior to the June 1999 elections 
was that, theoretically, no obstacle remained for Islamists occupying political power 
through electoral success. 
Yet by then the weakening grip of the Masyumi tradition on Islamic politics had 
become a fact. Above all, it reflected the previous conversion of younger Muslim 
cadres to non-Islamist politics. 117 Former Masyumi associates such as HMI, 
Muhammadiyah and PII formally dropped Islamist goals, above all the formalisation 
of shari 'ah in the state. 118 This suggested that neither of these organisations would 
back the re-formation of an Islamist party following Masyumi's example. It was 
particularly unlikely that they would support writing shari 'ah terms into the 
Constitution. However, though non-Islamism became the official policy of these 
organisations, support for shari 'ah goals remained vital among sections of their 
114 This is thus different to the fault line in other authoritarian regimes where the Islamist opposition 
was easier to identify and affiliated with particular groups and organisations. 
115 Other military-backed regimes such as Egypt under Bourguiba and Tunisia under Sadat put 
political Islam under tighter control during incorporation processes. See, for example, Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview" in Rex Brynen, 
Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab 
World, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colo, 1995-98. 
116 Kriimer, Integration, p. 200 (first quote); Bromberg, Rhetoric and Strategy, p. 16 (second quote). 
117 The increased influence of"liberal" thinkers was helped by the 1984 killings in Jakarta's Tanjung 
Priok district, after which hundreds of Islamist activists were jailed or forced to leave the country, 
many to Malaysia. 
118 Nurcholish became the dominating intellectual reference for HMI. In 1969, he drafted HMI's 
'Basic Struggle Values' which remained unaltered throughout the following three decades. Agus 
Mualif, "Pergeseran Orientasi HMI- Antara Pragmatisme Politik dan Cendekiawan", Jawa Pos, 7 
February 1997. 
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cadres. This has resulted in a discrepancy between official policies of the elites and 
the secret symphathies of followers and, at times, between policies and the training 
material for cadresY9 
Fragmentation of the Keluarga 
Organisa Relaticm Ideological Political Ideological Ou~ook 1998 
tion to Outlook 1950s Affiliation 
Masyumj .· during the New 
Order ·.· .. 
Muhamm "special Masyumi-affiliated Golkar, PPP Non-Islamism as official policy 
adiyah member" as part of political 
Islam 
HMI "special Ditto Golkar, PPP Non-Islamism as official policy 
member" 
PII "special Ditto None, PPP, Non-Islamism as official policy 
member" Golkar Ideologically and politically 
highly diverse 
GPI "special Ditto None,PPP Islamist, defensive spirit 
member" 
Persis "special Ditto None, PPP Islamist, de-politicised, low-
member" profile 
Al-Irsyad "special Ditto None, PPP Islamist, de-politicised, low-
member" profile 
Golkar - - - ReligouslyN eutral 
KISDI - - None,PPP Islamist, defensive spirit 
DDII - - None, PPP Islamist, defensive spirit 
As many previous leaders and cadres adopted more pragmatic and practical politics 
the Masyumi tradition lost its political and intellectual force. Nevertheless, remaining 
Masyumi leaders and their followers hoped to revive the support of the keluarga for 
establishing an Islamist party following the Masyumi example. Apart from historical 
and nostalgic reasons, it was, of course, pivotal for a new party to obtain a wide 
breadth of support bases that would ensure its survival at the 1999 elections. 
119 This is particularly the case in PII. PH's cadreisation was comparatively taut in its ideological 
instruction while, at the same time, encouraging intellectual diversity and free political choices. The 
result has been internal diversity. PII was the only Muslim organisation successfully resisting the 
adoption ofPancasila as its ideological base. From 1986 to 1998, it operated as a semi-legal 
movement. Although it eventually adopted Pancasila in 1998, the training ofPII cadres and the 
organisation's statutes remained unaffected. In late 1998, PII formally returned to Islam but this, 
again, had no further impact. Underscoring its ambivalent doctrinal outlook, in 2000 PII supported 
Islamist parties in their bid to implement the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution. Interviews, Djayadi, 
Jakarta, 23 January 2001; Hilla! Tri Anwar, Aye Sudarto and Surahman, Jakarta, 20 March 2001. 
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Expediency in the Re-formation of Islamic Politics after the Fall ofSoeharto 
Though most Muslims, especially modernists, have been paying tribute to the merits 
of Masyumi, in 1998 this appreciation did not translate into widespread practical 
support for the revival of the party. Only a few PPP, Golkar, Muhammadiyah or HMI 
leaders joined one of Masyumi's self-styled successor parties. Particularly 
detrimental was the rejection by Muhammadiyah's elite of a re-formed Masyumi, 
given that it had provided most of Masyumi' s support base in the 1950s.120 
Nevertheless, few keluarga members openly dismissed the idea of an Islamist party 
and most organisations sent delegates to seminars held for preparation purposes. 
Their input, however, was not the same as giving practical support. It created an 
illusionary image of unanimity and concealed that most keluarga affiliates never 
contemplated backing an Islamist party. 
DDII saw itself as custodian of the keluarga and took seriously its self-ascribed role 
of maintaining keluarga unity. This claim already had become evident in 1995 in the 
blend of anger and amusement following the foundation of the misleadingly named 
Masyumi Baru ('The New Masyumi') by the PPP politician Ridwan Saidi. Masyumi 
Baru's connection to the "old" Masyumi was not compelling. 121 In fact, it directly 
countered Islamist interests because Rid wan wanted his party to 'stir up the 
honeymoon' between ICMI and the government in the 1990s.122 Senior Islamist 
leaders were angered by the use of the Masyumi label and symbols and dismissive of 
12° Fealy, Ulama and Politics, p. 79. 
121 Ridwan saw the religiously-neutral Golkar as 'party of the future' and as a possible coalition 
partner. Overall, Masyumi Baru was hardly designed as a serious political alternative. It did not have a 
clear leadership or perception of future constituencies. Former Masyumi official Mawardi Noer had 
planned to join but eventually decided not to do so. Interviews, Ridwan Saidi, Jakarta, 11 and 18 
September 2000. 
122 Interview, Ridwan Saidi, Jakarta, 18 September 2000. This was underscored through the 
partnership with groups such as the social-democratic Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia ('United 
Indonesian Democratic Party', PUDI), the Soekamoist neo-PNI party, the leftist Partai Rakyat 
Demokrat ('Peoples' Democratic Party', PRD), the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) and 
several NGOs that loosely backed PDI (subsequently PDI-Perjuangan) Chairwoman Megawati and 
aimed to counter ICMI's rise. These groups, unlike most Islamists, also opposed Habibie's possible 
rise to the vice-presidency. Porter, Managing Politics, p. 185. 
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Masyumi Bam's leadership, as it would lack an "appropriate" background and had 
'no significance whatsoever'. 123 
Still it was hardly surpnsmg that the opportunity to restore Islamist parties 
challenged the authority of the DDII leadership. 124 In the post-Natsir era, this 
authority centred in Anwar Haryono, Chairman from 1993 to his death in early 1999. 
When Soeharto fell in May 1998, only Anwar, Rasjidi and MUI-based Hasan Basri 
remained of Masyumi's 1950s elite. 125 But the central authority for speaking on 
behalf of Masyumi was the ailing Anwar. 126 This was because when Masyumi was 
dissolved in 1960, Natsir handpicked the young cadre as party spokes-person (juru 
bicara). 
Many in the keluarga, however, questioned the wisdom of re-forming Masyumi and 
were, for various reasons, reluctant to support DDII. DDII held a Musyawarah Besar 
('Great Consultation') in June 1998, shortly after Soeharto's resignation, to foster 
ties among keluarga affiliates. Meanwhile, from April to August 1998, Muslim 
organisations, the vast majority of them modernist, were active in the Badan 
Koordinasi Umat Islam ('Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community', BKUI) 
with the objective of creating a single Islamist party. BKUI adopted Madjlisul Islamil 
a'laa Indonesia (MIAI) which led to the establishment of Masyumi as its mode1.127 
With its prestigious role in 1945 and 1949, the Kongres Umat Islam ('Congress of 
the Muslim Community', KUI) had considerable historical resonance. Accordingly, 
123 Interview, Hussein Umar, Jakarta, September 2000. Masyumi Baru comprised several NGO-
activists who had no Islamist credentials, particularly from HMI. "KH Hasan Basri: Mungkin Rid wan 
Sedang Main-main", Merdeka, 26 November 1995; "Anwar Harjono: Tidak ada Masyumi Baru" 
('There is no Masyumi Baru'), Kompas, 8 November 1995. Instead, DDII leaders asserted that 
Masyumi lived on in the 'Islamic Brotherhood Forum' (FUI), which resembled Masyumi's federal 
form. "Reuni Masyumi", Media Dakwah, December 1995. 
124 In retrospect, some Islamist leaders devoted to reviving Masyumi linked these splits to Anwar 
Haryono's and Hussein Umar's weak grip on DDII. They argued that while it had been legitimate for 
keluarga members to join PPP in the past, the DDII leadership should have shown a stronger hand in 
re-directing cadres to the new Islamist party. Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. 
125 Rasjidi and Hasan Basri (Chairman of the 'Indonesian Ulama Council', MUI) died in 2001. Neither 
played a role in the re-formation process. Hasan had previously been another candidate to succeed 
Natsir. But he had a reputation for having been overly compliant toward the government as MUI had 
been a major pillar in Muslim support for Soeharto. Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000. 
126 In 1996, Anwar suffered a stroke and, from 1998 on, was bound to a wheelchair. 
127 Another example was the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin ('Aiding Muslim Coordinating 
Body', BKAM), active from 1965 to 1967, which hoped to lead Masyumi' s revival. 
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BKUI' s task was to prepare the third Kongres Umat Islam which-then-was to 
launch the Masyumi-successor party. 128 
Contrary to rhetoric, there was wide awareness that their party would fail to get wide 
support from former Masyumi associates. One obvious cause for the dire outlook 
was that, by 1998, most senior leaders had died (Appendix II). The party, Anwar 
Haryono demanded, had to represent 'in total' Muslim aspirations and to 'channel 
the aspirations of the Muslim community'. 129 But the participation of many 
organisational envoys was only a gesture of reverence due to personal links to 
Masyumi's senior leadership and nostalgic ties with its legacy as the sole Muslim 
party. 13° Conflicting leadership ambitions and established patronage networks made 
a united modernist-based Islamist party a lofty goal. Hence, the keluarga, as Anwar 
observed, 'is like a river which was sealed for decades; now as the seal has been 
removed, the water runs everywhere' .131 
The expediency of several Islamist notables was a sign of the requirements of the 
early post-New Order days. Many DDII leaders, among them Hartono Mardjono, 
Mohammad Soleiman, Pro£ Amir Yusuf Faisal, Ramlan Mardjoned and Kholil 
Ridwan, joined Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB), Masyumi's 
official legatee. But a significant minority of DDII notables set up or joined new 
parties. Luthfi, Tamsil Linrung, A.M. Fatwa and Yahya Muhaimin were among the 
inaugural members of Partai Amanah Nasional ('National Mandate Party', PAN). 
They joined PAN despite being, in ideological terms, a religiously neutral party. 
PAN officially abstained from using Islamic symbols, terminology and shari 'ah 
128 A.M. Luthfi, "Kita Berada pada Titik Reformasi Petjalanan Bangsa", in Suharsono and Edi Ryanto 
(compilers), Partai Politik Era Reforrnasi, PT Abadi, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 21-31. The Congress 
eventually took place in November 1998, three months after Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) was 
launched. Fewer organisations took part than in previous years. In contrast to the historic examples 
MIAI and KUI I, the traditionalist camp was only involved individually. Although DDII attended, the 
Congress was seen as staged by Mill-loyalists of the New Order regime and was widely met with 
cynicism. Interviews, Rifyal Ka'bah, Jakarta, 22 September 2000; Abdullah Hehamahua, Jakarta, 15 
September 2000. 
129 Anwar Haryono, "Mengamati Situasi di Era Reformasi", Partai Politik Era Reforrnasi, pp. 11-21 
(This was Anwar's address at DDII's 'Great Consultation'). 
130 BKUI was established by consensus ofleaders from DDII, Persis, SI, FUI, KISDI, BKSPPI, al-
Irsyad, Perti, the Forum Silaturrahmi Ulama Habaib dan Tokoh Masyarakat ('Goodwill Forum of 
Habaib Ulama and Community Leaders', FSUHTM) and ICMI. Haryono, Mengamati; Naskah 
Pendirian dan Para Pendiri BKUI, Jakarta, 28 April1998. 
131 Address (al-Azhar mosque) at the official declaration ofPBB, reprinted under "Deklarasi Partai 
Bulan Bintang" in Mardjoned, Sejarah, pp. 73-80 (quote p. 75). 
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goals, believing to stand for what one of its initiators called a 'clean Golkar' which 
could overcome ideological conflict and be an electoral winner. 132 DDII activists 
with a strong commitment to foreign Islamist thought such as Abu Ridho, Mashadi, 
and Mutammimul 'Ula had similar doubts about the benefits of reviving Masyumi. 
They played a central role in forming the Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK). 
But most crucial was that key keluarga members such as Muhammadiyah, HMI and 
PII did not see support for an Islamist party as useful for their own interests; they 
perceived Masyumi's Islamist approach and themes as anachronistic. 133 With the 
exception of Persis and GPI which both supported PBB, none of the major socio-
religious and student organisations backed an Islamist party and mobilised its 
constituencies for the 1999 elections. 134 HMI and PII had well-established patronage 
links with Golkar and, to a lesser extent, with PPP, which they were unwilling to put 
at risk. These youth organisations have always depended on good links with people 
in high office providing them with patronage. A new Islamist party did not promise 
to fulfil this need. 135 PII, for example, signed as participant in BKUI not as formal 
statement of support but 'only to give evidence of attendance' .136 In 1999, PII's 
leadership did not advise cadres to vote for a particular party. Moreover, keluarga 
members did not see a modernist-based Islamist party as an electoral winner. PII 
Chairman Djayadi (1998-2000) reasoned about what had remained of Masyumi's 
appeal: 
Only old people understand Masyumi's symbols. Those who are active [today] know 
[them] but don't really understand what Masyumi was. Why? Because there was no 
socialisation. An Islamic-political socialisation from the Old to the New Order-
132 Interview, Abdillah Toha, Jakarta, 24 August 2000. 
133 Muhammadiyah attended the preparations because of its historical status as a 'special member' of 
Masyumi. But participation was confined to several leaders close to DDII, such as the preacher and 
long-time activist A.M. Fatwa. 
134 Among the representatives of 11 organisations registered in BKUI, only one, Ahmad Sumargono 
(for KlSDI), became a leading PBB official. Among the representatives were Ahmad Tirtosudiro 
(representing ICMI), Geys Amar (al-Irsyad Chairman) and Shiddiq Amien (Persis Chairman). Kholil 
Ridwan, Chairman ofBKSPPI, left PBB in mid-2000 after dispute. Laporan Sidang II Munas 
(Lanjutan) BKUI-1998, Jakarta, 10 June 1998. 
135 Interview, Hillal Tri Anwar, Aye Sudarto and Surahman, Jakarta, 20 March 2001. Throughout the 
1990s, former PII leaders gained influential positions in Golkar and ICMI and benefited from good 
relations to Habibie, among them Adi Sasono, Dr. Ryaas Rasyid, Dr. Fuad Bawazier, Jimly Assidiquie 
and Dr. Watik Pratiknya. None of these men joined an Islamist party in 1998. 
136 Interview, Djayadi, Jakarta, 23 January 2001. 
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generation did not happen. Therefore it is not possible to use [Masyumi's] symbols 
and obtain many votes.137 
Similarly, prior to the 1955 elections, HMI instructed cadres to vote for an Islamic 
party. By contrast, at the 1999 elections, HMI only called on cadres to vote for a 
party 'aspirational' toward the Muslim community. It did not call to vote for a party 
formally based on Islam or pursuing shari 'ah goals. 138 Without formal political 
affiliation, HMI members dispersed their votes along the whole political spectrum. 
ICMI, despite continuing Masyumi's technocratic orientation, played a trifling role 
in reviving Islamist parties.139 Tellingly, none of its more prominent Islamic activists 
joined an Islamist party. 140 As such, the involvement of the bulk of Islamic activists 
in ICMI's elite in the preparation of an Islamist party through DDII was only 
symbolic. 
Most in the traditionalist camp, unsurprisingly, never seriously considered joining a 
Masyumi successor party. Still, following Masyumi's original conception as party 
for all Muslims, pleas were made to consult with both the Muhammadiyah and NU 
leadership before the party launch. 141 In awareness that NU undertook separate 
preparations, these pleas appear as a mere formality. 142 Eventually, almost all 
137 Interview, Djayadi, Jakarta, 23 January 2001. 
138 Interview, Anas Urbaningrum, Jakarta, 16 March 2001. 
139 Only two ICMI founders attained leadership positions in Islamist parties: the academic Yusuf Amir 
Faisal and PPP Chairman Hartono Mardjono. The two men were among ICMI's signatories in 1990. 
Both became PBB Chairmen. A substantial role of other ICMI members in the preparation process 
was confmed to a few DDII leaders, particularly Anwar Haryono, Luthfi, Hussein Umar and 
Mohammad Soleiman. 
140 ICMI's Islamic activist section comprised Amien Rais, Watik Pratiknya (Muhammadiyah), the 
NGO veterans Dr. Dawam Rahardjo and Adi Sasono, the PPP dissenter Dr. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, 
Dr. Nasir Tamara (also PPP), Imaddudin Abdullahim and Dr. Muslim Nasution (both initiators of the 
Salman movement). 
141 This was later formally decided. In the late 1940s, NU founder Hasyim As'jari was Masyumi 
Chairman and his son W ahid Hasyim Deputy Chairman. 
142 NU's distrust of the modernists had not substantially lessened since it seceded from Masyumi in 
1952. Neither had the suspicion of other traditionalist affiliates ofMasyumi in the 1940s and early 50s 
like Perti, al-Washliyah, al-Ittihadiyah, PUll and Nahdlatul Wathan. Most traditionalists close to the 
Bulan Bintang camp came from Perti and a small dissident section in NU. This camp, led by 
Abdurrahman Wahid's uncle Yusuf Hasyim, had remained ideologically closer to Masyumi and was 
marginalised by the NU patriarch. Despite this, it founded its own traditionalist party offshoot. 
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traditionalists withdrew from supporting a modernist-dominated party after rumours 
that it was to be named Masyumi, described as a 'psychological burden' for NU. 143 
Most in the Parmusi camp in PPP followed a similarly expedient line. PPP, of course, 
was reluctant to accept provisos by political newcomers. 144 With its established 
networks and patronage opportunities, PPP leaders expected newcomers to merge 
with their party. 145 Those PPP leaders more closely affiliated to the keluarga saw it 
as more important to sustain existing political allegiances. As a result, many 
Parmusi-notables with long links to DDII such as Prof. A. M. Saefuddin, Husni 
Thamrin and Faisal Baasir remained in PPP. 
Those determined to set up a new Islamist party had to deal with the dilemma rising 
from an agreement to a drawn-out party establishment process, while realising that a 
quick launch would be more beneficial. To swiftly establish a party meant to stay 
ahead of political competitors in the run-up to the 1999 elections. Several DDII 
notables, most prominently Hussein Umar (Secretary-General), Abdullah 
Hehamahua and Luthfi, dissented over the eventual shortening of the inauguration 
process leading to the launch of PBB as early as July 1998. They criticised that 
colleagues had breached earlier agreements and put their own interests first. 146 
143 Interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000. More important were developments in the 
traditionalist camp, such as the rivalry between PPP and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa ('National 
Awakening Party', PKB). 
144 There were calls to reassess PPP's policies, to adopt a new party symbol and leadership and even to 
dissolve the party due to its New Order image. "Konsep Aliansi dan Koalisi Partai-Partai Islam", 
Profil 48 Ketua Umum Parpol RI, Kerjasama Kreasi Karya Wiguna dan NIAS, Jakarta, 1999; 
Interview, Abdullah Hehamahua, Jakarta, 15 September 2000. 
145 PPP leaders offered Bulan Bintang notables such as Sumargono and Ka'ban to become 
parliamentarians. The latter declined because ofNU's participation. They also argued that the 
'political identity ofPPP wasn't clear'. Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 31 October 2000. 
146 There were charges of 'political egoism' and 'overt pragmatism', as many officials had desired to 
take over leadership positions and rushed to launch the party instead of following the procedures. 
Interviews, A.M. Luthfi, Jakarta, 7 November 2000; Hussein Umar, Jakarta, September 2000. 
Individual members of the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (FUl) separately met with other Muslim 
leaders, thereby ignoring DOll's Congress decision in June 1998 to delegate authority to the Kongres 
Umat Islam to inaugurate a single party. Konsep Aliansi. There also were claims that Anwar Haryono 
had been tricked into approving ofPBB's declaration. Allegedly, he was told to be on his way to a 
press conference when, in fact, it was the official declaration ofPBB. Taken by surprise, he approved 
the launch. Interview, Hussein Umar, Jakarta, September 2000. Other PBB leaders disputed that this 
has happened. 
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An issue under debate was whether and when the use of the name Masyumi and its 
symbol (the crescent and star) should be legalised. There was common agreement 
among keluarga leaders such as Anwar Haryono, Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Prof. 
Deliar Noer that Masyumi was never formally banned. Instead, under the pressure of 
Soekarno's presidential decree (No.200 1960), Masyumi eventually dissolved 
itself.147 Otherwise, the party was in danger of being declared illegal. They also 
argued that Natsir's detention, too, had lacked legal grounds as acts of subversion 
laid against him were never proven. Hence, when Soeharto resigned from office, the 
ban was obsolete and prevailed merely as a political tool. 148 But as the ban was still 
effective, there was hesitation whether to defy it. 149 Eventually, most Bulan Bintang 
leaders agreed that there was no constitutional basis for reviving the label 'Masyumi' 
unless the ban was formally lifted. Explaining this position, Anwar pointed to 
Masyumi's traditional respect for the Constitution.150 In addition, there were 
concerns that the label Masyumi would be a burden for the new party and its 
leaders. 151 
Deliar Noer, a leading political scientist and former HMI Chairman, and Abdullah 
Hehamahua, a DDII affiliate and likewise a former HMI Chairman, were two main 
dissenters among Bulan Bintang leaders. Both insisted on Islam as the ideological 
base of the new party as 'it was not wrong to defy a wrong regulation' .152 They 
fiercely opposed PPP's decision to retain Pancasila as party base until the law 
147 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Neo Masjumi, Neo PNI", Gatra, II November I995; "Dr. Anwar Harjono 
SH. 'Sekarang Mulai Ada Keseimbangan"' (Interview), Ummat, 10 July 1995; Interview, Deliar Noer, 
Jakarta, 9 October 2000. 
148 Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000; Mardjoned, Sejarah, pp. 69 and 74 and "Partai 
Bulan Bintang teruskan cita-cita besar Masyumi", Buletin Bintang, No.2, 1-14 September 1998. 
149 In late June 1998, several DDII leaders (Anwar, Soleiman, Lutfhi and Hartono Mardjono) met with 
President Habibie, calling on him to rehabilitate Masyumi and abolish Soekarno's decree. "Hasil-
Hasil Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia" reprinted in Partai Politik Era 
Reformasi, pp. 8I-97. DDII leaders believed Habibie's refusal was because of concern his supporters 
in Golkar would oppose the permission to revive Masyumi labels. Interview, Hartono Mardjono, 
Jakarta, 25 January 2001. 
150 "Partai Bulan Bintang Teruskan Cita-cita Besar Masyumi" ('Partai Bulan Bintang continues the 
great ideals ofMasyumi'), Bulan Bintang, No.2, 1-14 September 1998, 1998, p. 2; "Ijtihad kita tidak 
salah", Abadi, 5-Il November I998, p. 8. 
151 Interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, I2 October 2000. 
152 Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000. By mid-1998, asas tunggal was still in place. 
Though only dropped in November 1998, it was of little significance for the party preparations. The 
reason was that in mid-I998 it seemed only a matter of time until it would be abolished. Hence, most 
Islamists suggested a compromise solution with Pancasila as doctrinal party base but with a reference 
to 'Islamic faith' (aqidah). Partai Umat Islam (PUI), PPII Masyumi and Partai Keadilan ignored the 
ban. 
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permitted it to do otherwise. 153 Moreover, both entered the re-formation process as 
outsiders because of a very critical stance toward ICMI and its Chairman Habibie. 154 
Both had remained uncompromisingly critical toward the Soeharto regime when it 
had approached modernist Muslims in the early 1990s.155 Deliar Noer demanded a 
radical break by dissolving all New Order parties, together with PPP, because they 
all were 'handicapped by history' .156 Such a stance, of course, obstructed 
relationships both with DDII and PPP as with individual Muslim leaders such as 
Yusril and Amien Rais, who had appeared more willing to colloborate with the 
regime. 157 
Among keluarga senior leaders, however, only Deliar Noer publicly argued that 
reviving Masyumi was anachronistic. 158 He asked: 
Who among the younger people today knows of Masyumi? Ask them whether they 
know of Masyumi or not. They definitely will ask what Masyumi is. This has to be 
taken into account. What remains ofMasyumi are memories. [It] therefore cannot be 
used to grasp the masses in our times. 159 
Sharing this scepticism, Abdullah nevertheless was convinced that Masyumi's name, 
symbols and original program should be revived. 160 Once it became clear that the 
153 The De liar Noer-led Partai Umat Islam ('Muslim Community Party', PUI) approached the Kongres 
Umat Islam, MUI and PPP functionaries and urged them to return to Islam as party base. These 
declined, with PPP arguing that any alteration of the base would require the approval of a National 
Congress. "Deliar Noer: Elite Islam Kurang Bisa Bedakan yang Taktis dan yang Prinsipiil, Detak, 7 
March 2001; Letter of the 'Goodwill Forum oflslamic Parties' (FSPI), an umbrella organisation PUI 
adhered to, addressed to Prof. K.H. Ali Yafie, Chairman ofKUI, 3 November 1998. 
154 Adian Husaini, Soeharto, Habibie dan Islam, Gema Insani Press, Jakarta, 1995, p. 67. 
155 Abdullah was listed as state enemy and fled to Malaysia. Deliar Noer worked as an academic in 
Australia. 
156 Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000. 
157 Deliar Noer chastised Yusril for working in the State Secretary as a speech writer for Soeharto in 
the mid- to late 1990s and Amien Rais for frequently changing his views. A long-time associate of 
Natsir and the old Masyumi elite, though never a party member, Deliar's relations with DDII had 
cooled after Natsir's death. Interviews, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 9 October 2000; Hussein Umar, Jakarta, 
September 2000. 
158 His Partai Umat Islam featured Masyumi exponents (Dr. Mochtar Nairn), HMI activists and 
academics (Prof. Harun al-Rasyid) and, initially, the doctrinaire preacher Dr. Daud Rasyid, a shari 'ah 
graduate from Cairo's Al-Azhar-university and fiery critic ofNurcholish Madjid (Daud Raysid later 
joinedPK). 
159 Deliar Noer quoted in "Anak muda tak ada yang kenai Masyumi" ('Young people do not know of 
Masyumi'), Detak, 2-8 May 2000. 
160 Abdullah's behaviour in the party-building process and his insistence on formal Islamic attributes 
echoed his personal history. He had played a decisive role in HMI's turbulent 1983 Congress in 
Medan that rejected asas tunggal. When HMI yielded he enforced a break-up, which led to the small 
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Kongres Umat Islam would not launch an Islamist party, Abdullah established the 
Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi ('Indonesian Islamic Political Masyumi 
Party', PPII Masyumi). 161 DDII leaders, not surprisingly, dismissed PPII Masyumi as 
a legitimate successor of Masyumi on grounds that the leadership and doctrine had 
flimsy Masyumi credentials. It rather was personal relations with Natsir which 
attested loyalty toward Masyumi's ideology. 162 
A major problem for the ambitions of Masyumi devotees became the dearth of 
popular leaders.163 The newer generation of DDII leaders such as Hussein Umar, 
KISDI Chairman Ahmad Sumargono or Anwar's successor in DDII, Afandi Ridwan, 
did not have the intellectual stature or the personal appeal to draw a mass Muslim 
constituency. Many Muslims and the press either viewed these men as hardliners (as 
Sumargono) or hardly took notice of them (as Afandi). At the same time, many 
modernists in PPP and Golkar either had biographies during the New Order which 
counted against them or preferred to remain in PPP. Another damaging aspect was 
that most aspirants for leadership positions were academics with little mass appeal. 164 
HMI splinter group MPO, based in Yogyakarta. He specifically returned to Indonesia to 'help abolish 
the "sole base'". Ostracised by New Order authorities but endowed with a sure survival instinct, in the 
early 1980s Abdullah moved closer to DDII and became part of an informal forum of Masyumi 
seniors and younger intellectuals. The target of the forum was, according to Abdullah, to revive 
Masyumi and, to this end he was appointed as secretary to Masyumi senior leader Burhanuddin 
Harahap. This original purpose was later 'aborted' by ICML Under the influence of Habibie and his 
associates, ICMI allegedly dropped the forum's original goal. As Burhanuddin's former assistant and 
endowed with the task to rebuilding Masyumi, Abdullah claimed for him authority in the re-formation 
process and therefore questioned Anwar Haryono's mandate. Interviews, Abdullah Hehamahua, 
Jakarta, 15 and 21 September 2000; "Sekali Diberi Kesempatan Mega Malah Menguat", Suara 
Hidayatullah, September 1999. A stickler for incorruptibility and a simple lifestyle, Abdullah 
frequently spent the nights on the floor or on the office desk of his party's plain headquarters. 
161 In Abdullah's view, the decision to hold the Kongres Umat Islam was based on a decision made by 
consultation which Islam prohibited to breach, especially unilaterally. Konsep Aliansi. PPII Masyumi 
adopted the decisions of the previous KUI Congress of7 to 8 November 1949 (Yogyakarta), including 
the exact party name. PBB's emblem showed a yellow crescent and star framed green; PPII Masyumi 
used the same symbol in black and white. On the ballot sheets the parties stood next to each other 
which further enhanced concerns that voters might mix up the parties. In the election campaign, 
Yusril, referring to the black and white emblems of PPII Masyumi, Masyumi Baru and the two 
Sarekat Islam parties (PSII and PSII 1905), described them as 'photocopies' of PBB, the original. 
"Jangan Mencoblos Bayangan Bulan Bintang" ('Do not vote for Bulan Bintang's shadow'), Media 
Indonesia, 4 June 1999. 
162 Interview, Hussein Umar, Jakarta, 24 January 2001. Highlighting the difference, Hussein stressed 
that he had been close to Masyumi leaders since the early 1960s. 
163 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 84. 
164 Many Islamists saw this as a major obstacle to connect to electorates. Interview, Anis Matta, 
Jakarta, 5 October 2000. The comment by Dr. Mochtar Nairn, an inaugural member ofPUI and later a 
PBB MP, on his colleague Deliar Noer and reasons why the Muslim constituency ignored PUI, has 
some general value: 
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DDII recognised this weakness and thus tried to convince Pro£ Amien Rais, the 
Chairman of Muhammadiyah, to take on the chairmanship of an Islamist party.165 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, a high-profile law professor at the University of Indonesia, 
was to become his Secretary-General. At this stage, few considered Yusril, who 
never held a senior position in a Muslim organisation, as a principal Natsir legatee. 
By contrast, Amien had been a member of the DDII board since 1993 and Media 
Dakwah had closely covered his career. 166 By the time of Natsir's death, keluarga 
circles held that Amien continued Natsir's intellectual legacy and, on various 
occasions, Amien had referred to himself and his associates as 'Natsirists' .167 Above 
all, he was the epitome of the 1998 reformasi movement, which automatically made 
him an attractive leader for most parties. 
But Amien Rais was in doubt about the most useful stance for the 1999 elections. 
This hesitation had a deeply negative impact on his reputation in the Islamist camp. 
Previously, Amien had adopted a firm oppositional position against the regime.168 
But he became convinced that both a formal Islamic label and affiliation with 
Masyumi would be unhelpful to gain many votes in the elections and would thus 
harm his presidential ambitions. Amien revealed the reasons behind his decision 
during DDII's June 1998 Consultation when he spoke to an Islamist audience. He 
said: 
The Bulan Bintang Family has to form a party in order to collect its scattered 
potentials [balung pisah]. However, it has to be considered not to return to the 
'It is entirely impossible to recognise with Deliar a skill to ... steer the emotions of the masses . 
... Deliar's ... speeches are flat [getar], ... brain fodder. [They] are insufficient to seize and to move 
the heart and the feelings of the masses ... [T]heir content is ... sophisticated, with orderly and 
academic speech which is good for an educated elite but not. .. appealing to normal people. People 
... enjoy playing with emotions, not to think.' Mochtar Nairn, "De liar Noer dan Pola Kepemimpinan 
Politik: Catatan atas Kegagalan PUI dalam Pemilu 1999", in H.A. Saripurin ( ed. ), Begawan Politik: 
Deliar Noer 75 Tahun, Jakarta, 2001, pp. 248-57 (quote p. 256). 
165 Amien was also professor of international relations at Yogyakarta's Gadjah Mada University. 
166 As early as 1985, Media Dakwah portrayed Amien as a leading example for the 'rising hope' that 
young Islamist intellectuals would emerge from campuses. "Tantangan Semakin Besar", Serial Media 
Dakwah, January 1985, pp. 4-11. 
167 In the early to mid-1990s, this group comprised Watik Pratiknya, Dr. Syafi'i Ma'arif 
(Muhammadiyah), Dr. Kuntowijoyo and Yahya Muhaimin. Djoko Susilo, "Siapakah "Natsir-Natsir 
Muda"?", Jawa Pos, 7 February 1993. None of these men joined an Islamist party in 1998. 
168 Especially after he was ousted from the ICMI board in 1997. 
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paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s. It is no longer the time for this [kind of] thinking. 
We certainly recall the result of the 1955 election. [T]he vote won by Islamic parties, 
that is Masyumi, NU, Sarekat Islam and Perti, was less than 50%. Hence, if we now 
gather this scattered potential.. .it is not guaranteed that we get 25%. [It is] almost 
definitely less than that. Now we have to think: first, it is not necessary to abandon 
idealism, but second, it also has to be based in realism. Third, [we have to] use astute 
political arts [seni berpolitik yang canggih]; the objective remains [the same] but 
[we have to be] flexible in its implementation, in its tactics, in its manoeuvres ... For 
me there is somewhat of a dilemma, which we have to crush. If we form a new 
Islamic political party, with an Islamic character, with Islamic community leaders, 
its image will be more or less closed. For us to seize 20% only would already be 
very good. Because later there will be a NU party, a Syarikat Islam party [and] many 
more which will grab the Islamic masses from each other. Hence, it is us who [will] 
obtain the drawback from [forming] a specific Islamic party. Aside from mobilising 
masses, politics is also to fight to get as much as possible profit. An Islamic party 
will hold ... a fifth of the votes at the utmost. But what can you do with regard to the 
presidential election, for filling ... the executive and legislative, [a fifth is] possibly 
not yet enough. From there emerges the idea how about an open party, in its 
understanding still Islamic, the direction [lokomotifnya] also consisting of our 
friends but there are positions given to non-Muslims ... Possibly this is tolerated 
from a shariah point of view. And second ... after all, we cannot form our own 
people. What shall we do with those [remaining] 80%? They have also 
aspirations ... have wishes that we need to accommodate ... With regard to the 
responsibility of an open party I cannot answer this except if we go back to the 
Qur'an. What is prohibited is that we make Jews and Christians our leaders but if we 
lead them, it does not matter in my view ... Hence, if we hold control [memegang 
kendali], for example in an open party, control is in the hands of people of faith 
[orang beriman]. But in a large party, there are Chairmen of sections ... as an 
outcome of nationhood. Indeed, I think this is the country of many people, so why 
not? This is what I think. 169 
Despite Amien's compromise, up to its launch, the PBB leadership 'very much 
hoped' that Amien eventually would form a team with Yusril. 170 They speculated 
that Ami en could mobilise the bulk of Muhammadiyah' s large following for PBB. 171 
As Amien appeared the only leader capable of drawing many modernist Muslims 
into one body and to attract a considerable support base, PPP, too, was keen for him 
to join. But Amien's belief that an open ideological platform would be more helpful 
for his presidential ambitions prevented this. He changed his stand on several policy 
169 Amien Rais' address at a seminar during DDII's Musyawarah Besar ('Great Consultation'), 17-19 
June 1998, reprinted as "Partai Politik Era Reformasi", in Partai Politik Era Reformasi, pp. 44-9. 
Amien explicitly excluded Masyumi Bam when referring to the 'scattered potential' of the Bulan 
Bintang family. Pointing to the Qur'anic directive to shun non-Muslim leadership, he referred to the 
often-quoted verse (5:51), which holds that those Muslims who approved Christian and Jewish 
leadership had become part of these communities. PAN's inaugural central board later included 
several prominent Christians like Albert Hasibuan and Prof. Frans Magnis Suseno. 
170 Interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000. Even at the party launch, Yusril said the party 
would still wait for Amien to join. "Partai Bulan Bintang Menunggu Amien" ('PBB waits for 
Amien'), Merdeka, 27 July 1998. 
171 Asmawi, PAN-Titian Amien Rais menuju istana, Titian Ilahi Press, Yogyakarta, 1999. 
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issues, which alienated him from both from Bulan Bintang and the PPP leadership. 
He later declared publicly that PBB would be a 'too tight a shirt' for him, a statement 
that was widely quoted and that cost him much sympathy. During his speech at a 
BKUI session, Amien repeated his arguments against an Islamist party. Zubair Bak:ri, 
a PBB MP recalled: 'I felt very offended. For him Islam was too narrow (sempit)'. 172 
Many Bulan Bintang leaders complained about his unreliability. In the words of 
DDII notable Kholil Ridwan: 
Amien Rais has disappointed many people. He has made a promise. Several times 
we waited for him. He did not come. The last time he did not show up, the party 
[PBB] was about to be launched in about two weeks time. Amien did not come, so it 
was Yusri1.173 
Another PBB and DDII official bitterly remarked: 
Amien Rais is a clown when it comes to politics. He's so inconsistent ... and that is 
dishonourable. If Amien had led PBB, it would have been a large party because 
Muhammadiyah people would have supported [it]. Amien's final decision was 
driven by [his search] for popularity. 174 
Significantly, Islamists were convinced that Amien turned them down only because 
of pragmatic reasons. They, therefore, accused Amien of trading his ideological 
conviction for political exigencies. One DOll-affiliated PK leader held: 
In the reformasi era, PAN did not have the courage to use Islam as a label and this 
was a political calculation... Ami en feared that if he uses the label Islam he would 
not be supported.175 
In comparison, PPP's interest in Amien joining was more strictly due to his central 
role in the reformasi movement through which he had emerged as a strong candidate 
172 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. Also Interview Abdurrahman Saleh, Jakarta, 
September 2000. The next speaker was Yusril who reconciled the audience when he countered Amien 
by saying: 'An Islamist party [partai Islam] - why not? Islam is also open ... If there are non-
Muslims who want to join an Islamic party, please do so.' (Yusril cited by Zubair). 
173 Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. PBB leaders were particularly irritated that 
Amien had made statements to the press without talking to them first. 
174 Confidential interview with a DDII leader, Jakarta, September 2000. As conditions for joining the 
Islamists, Amien demanded the Masyumi-related label Bulan Bintang to be dropped in exchange for 
the neutral Partai Amanah Bangsa ('National Mandate Party', P AB; later PAN). He also demanded a 
prerogative to determine several Chairmen and to postpone the launch. "Sikap Amien Rais Tidak 
Moderat" (Interview with Yusril Ihza Mahendra), Tempo Interaktif, 22 July to 1 August 1998. 
175 Confidential interview, Jakarta, 2000. Another PK leader similarly described Amien's position as 
'a matter of win or loose, what matters is to get votes in the elections'. 
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for the presidency. Unlike DDII, there was very little mention ofhis credentials as an 
Islamist leader. Internally, however, the party was divided over the benefits of 
Ami en's leadership. Opposition came particularly from within PPP' s 
Muhammadiyah section. 176 Others were indignant that Amien was to rise through the 
ranks without previously holding a posting. 177 This was because he had demanded 
the chairmanship without having to wait for the formal approval of branches at the 
party's upcoming National Congress (Muktamar) in late 1998. 178 
Hence, approaching the 1999 elections, the keluarga was dispersed across PBB, PPP, 
PAN, PK, Golkar, PPII Masyumi and PUI. But the families of the old Masyumi elite 
only recognised PBB as the single legitimate successor. 179 Indeed, PBB most 
comprehensively adapted its doctrine to Masyumi's core values. 180 Anwar Haryono 
defined the connection as follows: 
The Bulan Bintang [Party] is like one side of the coin with Masyumi on the other. 
So, with the Bulan Bintang Party, we want new blood and new freshness in order to 
continue the great ideals from the past. This Bulan Bintang Party indeed has an 
emotional connection with Masyumi, but nowadays we take a quite rational 
approach. There is a reason for this emotional [link]. 181 (Italic in original) 
176 Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Jakarta, 18 October 2000. 
177 "Terburu-buru, Keputusan Amien batal ke PPP", Suara Merdeka, 16 August 1998. PPP's 
negotiations with Amien were poorly coordinated. Some party officials criticised that PPP MPs 
Aisyah Amini, Bahtiar Chamsyah, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Zarkasih Nur, Yusuf Syakir and Rusjdi 
Hamka had met Amien without the knowledge of their colleagues. "Diprotes, Masuknya Amien Rais 
dalam Majelis Pakar PPP", Pelita, 8 August 1998. Other MPs lamented that Ismail Hasan Metareum 
had recruited Ami en without seeking the advise of the Expert Council. 
178 Interview, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Jakarta, 24 October 2000. In August 1998, Amien had signed 
a statement that he would head PPP's newly established Majelis Pakar ('Expert Council'). Then, 
however, he demanded to become General Chairman. PPP's board declined, pointing out that changes 
in leadership had to be decided by regional branches at the next National Congress (Muktamar), 
scheduled for November 1998. By contrast, PBB was willing to give Amien a proviso chairmanship 
until holding its Congress. 
179 This became clear when Natsir's widow (and one of four initial Deputy Secretary-Generals) Ida M. 
Natsir, handed the patron's golden pin over to Chairman Yusril Ihza Mahendra at PBB's first National 
Working Congress (Mukemas, 25 to 28 February 1999). "Bersama Partai Bulan Bintang menjuju 
Indonesia yang Demokratis dan Bermartabat", Abadi, 20-26 May 1999. There were more signs for 
such a mandate: PBB's headquarters and private homes of officials were decorated with a portrayal of 
an angel-like Natsir surrounded by a flash of light and below him, his inheritors, the current leadership 
of the PBB represented by the Chairman and Secretary-General M.S. Ka'ban. The painting shows 
Yusril receiving the Masyumi symbols crescent and star (personal notes, 2000). 
180 The PBB party bulletin regularly paid homage to Masyumi senior leaders. Devotees of the party 
promote Masyumi together with Jamaat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood as the most significant 
representative of political Islam in the 201h century. However, unlike these organisations, Masyumi 
had little influence on Islamic political thought outside Indonesia. The significance ofNatsir's thought 
was entirely domestic. 
181 Deklarasi in Mardjoned, Sejarah, pp. 73-80. 
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It was, nevertheless, clear that despite the tribute to Masyumi's past there was little 
trust in the popular roots of Bulan Bintang leaders aside from Amien. 182 Because of 
this, Yusril, in particular, appeared keen to forestall an overly close association with 
Masyumi. In an interview shortly after PBB's launching, he said: 
If one considers the number of Masyumi voters in 1955, only a very small number 
[of those voters] are [still alive] today ... and they are now very old. Therefore, this 
new political force [i.e. PBB] has a commitment to Islamic values and its [support] 
is not limited to the descendents of [original] Masyumi supporters ... If the 
grandparents are Masyumi, it's not certain that the grandchildren will be 
Masyumi·t83 
Adian Husaini, a Deputy Secretary-General ofPBB and one of its most forthright 
activists held a similar view: 
Islamic leaders, especially the former Masyumi followers, have to be aware that one 
of the things they sell is a proud past. But the more time passes the more this [pride] 
declines. So, over time, the new generation no longer knows what Masyumi was. 
They don't know whoM. Natsir, Sjafruddin were. But [the] Bulan Bintang [Party] 
still perpetuates Masyumi's idealism ... [But] Masyumi's symbols are, after all, 
fractured. The image of Masyumi is fought over by so many people. PPII Masyumi, 
Masyumi Barn, PPP, parts ofPAN are also Masyumi family. Including Golkar.184 
The use of the symbols of Masyumi was thus first and foremost to underline this 
historical affiliation and to facilitate access to electorates. The symbol of the crescent 
and the star, Yusril argued, were particularly important for the uneducated masses. 185 
Many senior Islamist activists from PII and GPI recognised PBB as future 
representative of their ideals and joined the party's first, appointed, board (Appendix 
182 Compare with "KAPPU, Langkah Awal Partai Bulan Bintang Menangkan Pemilu" ('KAPPU, The 
first step for PBB to win the elections') (Interview with Farid Prawiranegara), Abadi, 28 January to 3 
February 1999. 
183 "Wawancara Yusril Ihza Mahendra: 'Sikap Amien Rais Tidak Moderat'", Tempo Interaktif, 22 
July-1 August 1998. 
184 Interview, Adian Husaini, Jakarta, 30 October 2001. 
185 Address (al-Azhar mosque) at the official declaration of PBB, 26 July 1998, Jakarta reprinted in 
Mardjoned, Sejarah. He earlier wrote in his doctoral thesis that 'leaders of modernist parties' had to 
take into account the support of the 'ordinary people (rakyat awam)'. Those would need 'formal 
attributes' like 'Islamic state' or 'Islamic state base'. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan 
Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai 
Jama'at-I-Islami (Pakistan), Paramadina, Jakarta, 1999, p. 204. 
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IV). 186 After Amien declined, Yusril's eloquency and urbane attitude convinced 
other inaugural members that he could be sold to the public. 187 From then on, Yusril 
was to dominate PBB's public profile much more than the party's doctrinaire 
Islamists such as Sumargono and Abdul Qadir Djaelani (a senior PII leader). 188 
Initially, there appeared to have been general agreement over Masyumi's core values. 
Pragmatic and doctrinaire Islamists characterised Masyumi likewise as 'the 
champion of democracy and anti-communist' .189 At the same time, however, it was 
left open how precisely a new Islamist party would stand in for these values and what 
they meant in concrete political situations. A particular cause for tension became 
what stance toward non-Muslims the Masyumi tradition called for. 190 
Campus Islamist leaders, by contrast, had followed the efforts to restore Masyumi 
with little interest. Restoring Masyumi was seen as an over-ambitious plan and 
founding a new Islamist party on the themes of the past as out of touch with realities. 
In the words ofMutammimul 'Ula: 
PK is comparable to a still innocent child [ibarat bayi yang masih bersih]. [It is] 
very different with PBB. PBB is affiliated to Masyumi and adopts the symbols of the 
186 An elected leadership only took office following the first National Congress in April/May 2000. 
The most prestigious entries were Abdul Qadir Djaelani, an infamously stem and outspoken activist 
and preacher and indefatigable opponent of the Soeharto regime, KISDI Chairman Ahmad 
Sumargono, Hartono Mardjono, an equally outspoken, experienced former PPP Deputy Chairman, 
Eggy Sudjana, head ofPersaudaraan Peketja Muslim Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Workers 
Brotherhood', PPMI), Farid Prawiranegara, a well-to-do businessman and son ofMasyumi senior 
economist Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Lesser known to the public were Kholil Ridwan, Head of 
BKSPPI, Anwar Shaleh, a former GPI Chairman, the TV preacher Anwar Sanusi, M.S. Ka'ban and 
Sahar L. Hassan, two activists of the HMI splinter organisation HMI MPO and relatively 
unexperienced in party politics, Dr. Rifyal Ka'bah, an al-Azhar trained legal expert and Hamdan 
Zoelva, a younger lawyer. Notable entries from PPP were Zubair Bakri and Mohammad Soleiman. 
Among younger Islamic activists and intellectuals, Adian Husaini, a prolific KISDI-based writer, and 
Fadli Zon, an activist with close links to Soeharto son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, were significant. 
187 Casting the position of Secretary-General, Hartono Mardjono let Yusril decide, who chose his HMI 
comrade Ka'ban whom he knew since university. Although Ka'ban had published a few times in DDII 
affiliated media, he had not been well acquainted with PBB' s other leaders. 
188 As ideological party base, PBB initially adopted the compromise established by BKUI: 'with the 
Islamic faith and based on Pancasila' (beraqidah Islam dan berazas Pancasila). This was a formality 
as it was unanimously decided to return to Islam once it became legal. "Sekilas Sejarah Partai Bulan 
Bintang", in Mardjoned, Sejarah. 
189 Abdul Qadir Djaelani "Program Petjuangan Bulan Bintang'', 1999, reprinted in Abdul Qadir 
Djaelani, Sebuah Otobiografi Abdul Qadir Djaelani-Anak Rakyat Jelata Mencoba Berjuang 
Menegakkan Islam, Yayasan Pengkajian Islam Madinah Al-Munawwarah, Jakarta, 2001, p. 201. 
190 See chapter five. 
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past... The past can become a problem. If our head is small but the hat is big, it 
becomes a problem.191 
The aim behind Partai Keadilan was to 'start from nil; a radical beginning' .192 
Whereas PBB was 'Masyumi nostalgia', PK was 'not Masyumi in its thinking' .193 
Campus based Islamists believed that prominent community leaders would be 
detrimental to their ideological goals and their political culture. A charismatic 
reformasi leader could have damaged the party's hierarchical balance.194 As the 
national symbol for reform, however, Amien Rais was an interesting ally, because 
despite their primary drive to defend Islam these Islamists envisaged a gradual 
ideological strategy and thus shared the same short-term political goals as PAN. 195 
Typical for Islamism with an orientation toward tarbiyah (education) and dakwah 
(proselytisation), PK activists emphasised collective strength and egalitarianism 
while at the same time demanding strict submission to an ideological line. Partai 
Keadilan set up prohibitive conditions for recruitment. At the same time, it was, 
according to one of its leaders, 'possibly the most egalitarian party in the world' and 
this was 'very different from [parties such as] PBB'. 196 Necessarily, the progress and 
public image of the party was less dependent on individual figures. 
A preliminary aim was to proceed on a coherent and internally socialised ideology 
and a clear political strategy. A consensus on these matters was considered pivotal 
for the sustainability and the long-term success of the party. It was not of immediate 
relevance to form a united Islamist party and there were only few campus activists 
involved in the preparations of the keluarga. 197 Reversely, there was little influx 
from HMI's and PH's central streams into PK's leadership (Appendix V). 198 The 
191 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000. 
192 Interviews, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 4 September and 10 October 2000. 
193 Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, November 2000. 
194 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 12 April2001. 
195 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000. 
196 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 5 October 2000. 
197 Only two subsequent PK officials, Abu Ridho and Mashadi, were directly involved in FUI and 
BKUI. Abu Ridho was a long-time affiliate of DDII and Mashadi, a former Media Dakwah writer, 
was an assistant to Masyumi leader Mohammad Roem. Abu Ridho became PK's main voice on 
international Islamic politics and relations with the West. 
198 The two most important entries from PII, Abu Ridho and Mutammimul 'Ula, were both atypical 
PII activists. Mutammimul chaired PII from 1984 to 1986. During his time in office, he attempted to 
steer PII toward a more puritan course by establishing cell-like training structures within PII. After he 
98 
organisational breadth of inaugural members was necessarily narrower than in PPP 
or PBB. A party, PK's statutes granted, was a 'manifestation of Muslim groupings' 
[manifestasi kejama 'ahan] of various ethnic backgrounds and languages 'but with 
one ideology'. Bringing about party solidity was impossible if 'its adherents consist 
of supporters of several ideologies' .199 The key to this solidity was the method of 
training cadres. This approach made an organisation 'similar to a school' in which 
new cadres 'enter in internal diversity, then become standardised through 
guidance' .200 Abu Ridho wrote: 
For an Islamic party, Islamic ideology is the foundation of all structures of its actions 
[fondasi seluruh struktur gerakan] and, at the same time, [it works] as the axis of its 
political moves. In this context, the department [of] cadreisation is responsible to 
implant [ menanamkan] Islamic ideology among all cadres so that their political 
mind-set [kiprah] unequivocally is based on ideology.201 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that campus activists saw a formal alliance with other 
Islamist parties as potentially undermining its internal strength and, as a 
consequence, its dedication to the Islamic struggle. It was 'difficult to go together 
with parties affiliated to Masyumi, including the senior leaders' because 'PK's 
system is unique'. Some keluarga figures were 'flamboyant and egocentric'; by 
contrast, PK aimed for strict party discipline and was 'interested in issues much 
broader than getting involved in little [internal] squabbles without any purpose' .202 
These activists also felt a tinge of arrogance in DDII attitudes toward the political 
debutants. Senior Bulan Bintang leaders did not expect the inexperienced 'students' 
would manage to establish their own party. 203 
The results of the 1999 elections confirmed that Masyumi symbols and references 
are unable to draw mass support in contemporary politics. PBB received a meagre 
left, PII returned to more traditional forms of cadres training. Interview, Hillal Tri Anwar, Aye 
Sudarto and Surahman, Jakarta, 20 March 2001. 
199 Jati Diri Partai Keadilan, DPP PK (no time, no date, very likely 1998), also reprinted in Sekilas 
Partai Keadilan, DPP PK, Jakarta, 1998, (quote p. 24). 
200 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 5 October 2000. 
201 Abu Ridho, "Ideologi dan Energi Politik", Suara Keadilan, October-November 2001. 
202 Interviews, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 10 October 2000 (first quote); Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 
October 2003 (second quote). 
203 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 10 October 2000. 
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1.94%?04 PPII Masyumi won merely 0.43%, Partai Umat Islam 0.25% and Masyumi 
Baru 0.04%, results which brought activities in these parties to a near halt. It was 
obvious that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims had not considered Masyumi's 
labels and agendas a priority when casting their vote. Far more important was the 
party affiliation of leaders with a mass appeal such as Abdurrahman W ahid (NU) and 
Megawati Soekamoputri (PDI). The appeal of senior keluarga Islamists like Qadir 
Djaelani, Hartono Mardjono or Eggy Sudjana proved to be limited to very narrow 
constituencies.205 In retrospect, PBB officials conceded that the party had been built 
on leaders 'without having a body' .206 The party, Yusril told cadres, was only known 
in cities; the weak spot was that 'PBB has not entered the villages yet' .207 Moreover, 
regional branches remained poorly managed. 208 By 2001, the results of enhancing the 
quality of party management still were considered 'far from optimal' .209 
After 1960, no Islamic group had appeared thoroughly devoted to a rejuvenation of 
Masyumi's ideology. Serving as a guide for a number ofbroad attitudes and policies, 
in post-1998 the Masyumi model exposed obvious deficiencies in determining 
political behaviour. It left unspecified how its assorted values have to be carried out 
both in private life and in daily politics. Tensions among Islamists who consciously 
endeavoured to take on the lofty ideals of Masyumi were exposed during the crisis-
ridden Abdurrahman Wahid presidency (October 1999 until August 2001). In PBB, 
the strains illustrated how disagreement over the exact nature of an ideological role 
204 The result would have only given two MPR seats to PBB. However, through a concordat between 
Islamist parties PBB obtained additional 11 seats and was therefore still able to fulfil the electoral 
threshold regulations, which required minimally ten seats in the legislative. 
205 PBB had claimed to expect good results in West Java, a traditional stronghold ofDDII, BKSPPI 
and Persis, and also in West Sumatra, Masyumi's traditional voter basis. In the greater Jakarta era, the 
party claimed it would be able to benefit from As-Syafiyyah's mosque network. See "Langkah 
Penerus Cita-Cita Masyumi", Tekad, 7-13 June 1999. The influence of all these groups, however, was 
very limited. 
206 Interview, Jurhum Lantong, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
207 Speech by Yusril reprinted as "Rebut Simpati Rakyat", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 December 2000, 
p. 23. 
208 The central leadership lamented about low motivation and the time local cadres spend on activities 
outside the party. "Sahar L. Hassan: Akidah Kader Partai Segera Benahi", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 
January 2001. In turn, regional branches often felt poorly informed about the headquarters' policies. 
Cadres travelled to Yusril's residence in Jakarta, queuing in the early morning hours to ask for his 
advise in order to overcome difficulties at home. Remarks by Ka'ban and Yusril to cadres in Padang, 
West Sumatra (personal notes, 18 November 2000). 
209 Interview, Sahar L. Hassan, Jakarta, 15 March 2001. 
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model can trigger accusations against a leadership of being illegitimate. At its first 
Congress in late April 2000 the party board almost completely disintegrated.Z10 
Further Splits of Islamist Parties 
Originally scheduled for 2003, PBB's Congress was brought forward due to the 
disappointing election results and due to the need to consolidate the party internally. 
It confirmed the leadership of the pragmatists, Yusril and M. S. Ka'ban.211 Critics 
declared the outcome illegal, blaming the pragmatic Islamists Ka'ban, Sahar Hassan, 
Rifyal Ka'bah and Anwar Shaleh of having orchestrated the proceedings to ensure 
the re-election of the incumbent leadership.212 As former senior activists in PII, the 
organisation ideologically closer to Masyumi than HMI, many doctrinaire Islamists 
claimed a greater affinity to Masyumi than their HMI-based colleagues.213 Their 
accusations were closely connected to the tight grip Yusril had established on the 
party.214 Officials had become increasingly reluctant to confront him, underscoring 
the overriding position he had gained in the short period of less than two years. 215 
210 The dissenters included the deputies Hartono Mardjono, Kholil Rid wan and Anwar Sanusi and the 
Chairmen Fadli Zon, Qadir Djaelani, Farid Prawiranegara and Sumargono. Laporan Eksponen 
Anggota DPP Partai Bulan Bintang Kepada Para Peserta Muktamar I Partai Pada Tanggal 26 SID 
30 April 2000 Di Jakarta, 26 April2000; "Kubu Hartono akan Gelar MLB", Media Indonesia, 2 May 
2000. Sumargono ultimately withdrew his signature after being offered to become Deputy Chairman 
and the leadership ofPBB's MPR faction. "Personalia DPP PBB Diumumkan", Kompas, 16 May 
2000 and "Ketika Bulan", Panji Masyarakat, 20 May 2000. In early 2001, Hartono declared himself 
General Chairman ofPBB and Qadir Djaelani Secretary-General. Hartono ran a de facto rival board 
from his home in South Jakarta. In July 2001 the case was brought to the High Court which 
disallowed the dissenters from using Masyumi's label and symbols. "DPP PBB Gugat Hartono-Qadir 
ke Mahkamah Agung", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 August 2001, pp. 12-13; "Akhimya Amar itu Lahir", 
Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 October 2001. 
211 Yusril gained the support of24 out of27 regional boards. 
212 "Kelompok 16 tak Akui Hasil Muktamar'', Republika, 1 May 2000. 
213 As such, the dispute between the pragmatic Islamists and their critics broadly followed a HMI and 
PIIIGPI division. The senior GPI and PII activists claimed to be genuine Natsir cadres, perceiving 
Yusril as a studious outsider, who had learned and written about Masyumi. They also held that he had 
never been fully active in DDII. Confidential interview with a former PBB leader, 2001. Yusril met 
Natsir first in 1978 and the two men became personally close. 
214 The reporting style of the Congress j oumal was seen as fawning. An uncritical book about Yusril 
titled Sang Bintang Cemerlang ('The Shining Star') published shortly prior to the Congress further 
added to the resentment. "Fadli Zon Juga Calonkan Diri", Kompas, 26 April2000. 
215 DDII's leadership did not have the authority to bring about reconciliation. It was held against the 
new Chairman Afandi Ridwan that he had a Persatuan Umat Islam ('Union of the Islamic 
Community', PUI) background rather than rising from within DDII. Moreover, the dissenters saw him 
as pro-Yusril. At the same time, having remained in PPP, DDII Secretary-General Hussein Umar was 
in an awkward position to call for unity. Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. 
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But support from the regions for the dissenters remained scant as 'Yusril had already 
taken roots [merakyat], already had become an idol' .Z 16 
In PPP, internal struggles continued to be motivated by disputes between groups and 
individuals for political gain and positions. The 1998 party board was the oldest 
among Islamic parties and thus widely criticised for ignoring the aspirations of 
younger leaders (see Appendix Ill). 80% of officials were between 58 and 70 years 
of age. Moreover, together with PBB, the PPP parliamentary faction had the highest 
share ofMPs above 56 years ofage.217 This hinted at a 'lost generation' in the party 
which was led by 'the status quo group', many ofwhom had been active since 1973 
and, therefore, had become 'unenergetic'. What was more, PPP's elite was out of 
touch with younger constituencies.218 This was significant, since the generation of 17 
to 30 years of age had been a major support base for PPP. Deputy Chairman 
Zainuddin MZ criticised his own party: 
... there are three types of cadre: [the] successor cadre [cader penerus], the "forever-
waiting" cadre [kader tunggu terus] and the "forever-continuing" cadre [kader terus-
menurus]. In PPP there are many 'forever-waiting' and 'forever-continuing' cadre. 
But the 'successor cadre' is ... held back.219 
Against such disgruntlement, the modernists' self-proclaimed loyalty to the Bulan 
Bintang tradition was an opportune tool for countering PPP's traditionalist 
leadership. The latter had come about as a result of the first post-New Order 
Congress (Muktamar) in November 1998. But PPP modernists expressed little 
concrete desire to bring about a clearer identification of their party with former 
Masyumi goals. Rather, reviving the associative keluarga spirit was stirred by 
competition over high office, at times alongside the continuing modernist-
traditionalist discrepancy in PPP. 
216 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. At the Congress, delegates searched for Qadir to 
~hysically attack him. Confidential talks with cadres, 2003. 
17 "Tidak Perlu Cari Kambing Hitam", Kompas, 23 January 2002. 
218 Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 25 October 2001. 
219 Zainuddin quoted in "Saya Akan Mengomandani PPP Refomasi", Tempo, 18 November 2001. 
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The enduring rivalry between its two main power groups was evident in the 1998 
Congress.220 Yet on this particular occasion, it succumbed to the political necessities. 
PPP's strategy for the 1999 elections led to a NU-dominated leadership with Hamzah 
Haz as the new Chairman. Hamzah became the first PPP Chairman from NU after 
the government had ensured that men from a non-NU background would hold the 
position continuously from 1973 to 1998?21 His victory was part of a wider effort to 
guarantee PPP's survival in the new political situation?22 In mid- to late 1998, 
people's sympathies appeared to gather behind Ami en Rais and Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, both major symbols of past state repression. PPP lacked a personality 
promising to mobilise a comparable mass electorate. Its strategy for the elections 
thus was to advance its appeal among traditionalist constituencies. With Hamzah, 
PPP hoped to boost its result by attracting traditionalist voters and thereby 
minimising defections to its main rival party Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa ('National 
Awakening Party', PKB), led by Abdurrahman Wahid.223 This was because of the 
strong fragmentation among modernists with none of the new parties likely to 
become a serious contender to PPP. Hence, whereas most modernist notables were 
likely to stay in the established PPP, there was a bigger likelihood that many in the 
NU camp would desert PPP if a modernist or somebody outside NU once again got 
the chairmanship. 
Hamzah achieved victory in the Congress despite modernists being more strongly 
represented in regional boards than NU.224 But as a leader who promised to be more 
popular among constituencies and more helpful for the party's electoral interests, 
220 PPP leaders insisted that the party's management problems had receded after former Chairman 
Djaelani Naro was sacked in the 1989 Congress. As a result, the relationship between modernists and 
traditionalists improved and they were now regularly praying together. Nonetheless, the two camps 
held separate press conferences in the weeks leading to the 1998 Congress. Shortly beforehand, each 
camp met separately at two hotels in Jakarta. Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Jakarta, 18 October 
2000; Pertarungan di Taman Bunga", Tempo, 7 December 1998. 
221 Hamzah had been a member of the PPP's DPR faction since 1971. From 1993-1998 he chaired the 
faction. His doctorate is a honourius causus from an unknown American university. A rarity among 
the Islamic elite in Indonesia, he is married to at least four women. There was no female candidate for 
any leading position except Aisyah Amini, active in the party since 1967 and a third time MP. "PPP 
Kembali Ke Lambang Ka'bah Dan Asas Islam", Suara Pembaruan, 1 December 1998. 
222 See also chapter six. 
223 "Untung ada pendukung tradisional", Merdeka, 4 February 1999. 
224 168 regional chairs were held by MI, 133 by NU, 22 by Sarekat Islam and 2 by the small, Sumatra-
based traditionalist Perti. "Pertarungan di Taman Bunga", Tempo, 7 December 1998. · 
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many modernists supported the NU candidate. 225 Moreover, Hamzah had a 
reputation as a strong pragmatist and promised to accommodate the interests of 
Parmusi. Indeed, after his victory, Hamzah approached the modernist elite by 
offering seats on the new party board, including to his direct rival A. M. 
Saefuddin. 226 
This, however, only was a temporary consensus and there was continuing though 
mostly concealed factional competition in PPP. Modernists persistently claimed a 
right to leadership in PPP, asserting that they were more professional and efficient 
than NU people. They were discontented with the commitment of PPP MPs. In 
August 2000, a party Congress criticized its leadership for coming across as 'too 
cautious, not decisive enough, not responsive and assertive enough, a wait and see 
leadership'. Moreover, the role of intellectuals in newly created boards such the 
Majelis Pakar ('Expert Council') had remained unclear and the 'quality of the 
recruitment, role and effectiveness' of cadres substandard. 227 Most of the critique 
came from the modernists. Parmusi-based Chairman Bahtiar Chamsyah lamented 
that 'it is as if we are drowning in the critical stance and the vocalness of members of 
other factions'. The centre and the leadership of the departments were 'sterile' 
[mandul] and the capacity ofPPP's internal administration poor.228 
Predictably, it did not take long for modernist opposition against Hamzah to rise. 
When he became minister in Habibie's first post-New Order cabinet, rumours held 
225 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 31 October 2000. Hamzah's camp won the support of the 
modernist leaders Alimarwan Hanan, Bahtiar Chamsyah and Muhsin Bafadal. Lobbying between the 
factions had begun around five months before the Congress. MI leaders were promised central 
positions in the party's board if they backed Hamzah. "Kisah lain Kekalahan Pak AM", Tekad, 7-13 
December, 1998. PPP's propensity for internal coercion was further illustrated through a pamphlet 
circulating at the Congress, in which a party faction threatened to split away ifHamzah was not 
elected. "PPP Kembali Ke Lambang Ka'bah Dan Asas Islam", Suara Pembaruan, 1 December 1998. 
226 Further MI leaders (including Husnie Thamrin, Hussein Umar, Faisal Baasir and Muhsin Bafadal) 
and one SI official (Syaiful Anwar Hussein) were included in PPP's new line-up. Bahtiar Chamsyah 
became Deputy Secretary-General. In August 2001, when Hamzah became Vice-President both 
Bahtiar and Alimarwan received ministerial posts. "PPP Kembali Ke Lambang Ka'bah dan Asas 
Islam", Suara Pembaruan, 1 December 1998; "'Don't Speak First About The Presidency (sic)"', 
Kompas, 3 Desember 1998, "Hadimulyo: Bukan Gol Bunuh Diri", Merdeka, 4 December 1998. 
227 Keputusan Musyawarah Nasional (Mukernas) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Nomor: 
01/Mukernas/PPP/VII/2000 tentang Pemantapan Visi, Misi/Khidmat, dan Paradigma Baru serta 
Reposisi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 2 August 2000 (italic in original). 
228 Speech by Bahtiar Chamsyah at the first National Congress ofParmusi (Persaudaraan Muslimin 
Indonesia), Jakarta, 26 September 2002, pp. 9-10. 
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that sections in the party made corruption allegations against him because of anger 
over NU's domination.229 In September 1999, several Parmusi-based MPs founded a 
new splinter organisation called Persaudaraan Muslimun Indonesia ('Brotherhood of 
Indonesian Muslims', Parmusi)?30 This organisation was equal to a formal division 
within PPP. Parmusi had distinct structures complete with its own cadre programs. 
Initiators left open the possibility to split from PPP and form their own party.231 
Parmusi initiators claimed they acted on the 'strong request' from younger MI 
cadres, which in their view implied the weakness ofMI leadership. Parmusi held: 
When PPP changed its leadership it became difficult for MI to consolidate. With a 
weak MI leadership, it meant to further weaken the organisation which, in practise, 
is totally stuck. Not a single leadership mechanism and program works 
organisationally.232 
Beause of this, MI leaders held they were to attempt a 'breakthrough' (terobosan) in 
order to achieve a 'revitalisation' in PPP, arguing that: 
The reestablishment of Parmusi is a response toward the increasing decline, 
qualitatively and numerically, of MI cadres in various levels of PPP's leadership. 
[This is] a result of weak bargaining position ... 233 
This endeavour, Parmusi claimed, would equal an attempt to revive the Bulan 
Bintang spirit. Those PPP leaders driving Parmusi's revival claimed that they acted 
out of concern at the 'scattering of the potential of the greater Bulan Bintang family' 
229 "Getah untuk Yusril dan Hamzah", Perspektif, 11-17 November 1999. NU cadres, including 
Hamzah, also obtained more key positions in Abdurrahman Wahid's government. When Hamzah was 
appointed minister, his position as Deputy Chairman of parliament became vacant. This led to 
squabbles both between NU and MI cadres and also between senior and younger leaders. After the 
position was passed to the NU-based Tosari Widjaya, younger officials demanded an even distribution 
of posts alongside the various PPP camps. Feeling outmanoeuvred, Sarekat Islam and Perti also 
claimed a right to obtain the deputy chairmanship of parliament. "PPP pecah, rebutan wakil ketua 
DPR", Suara Merdeka, 29 October 1999; "Hamzah 'dijegal' Orang Dalam PPP?", Suara Merdeka, 2 
December 1998; Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
230 Among others Husnie Thamrin, Bahtiar Chamsyah, Aisyah Amini, Hussein Umar, Lukman 
Hakiem, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Faisal Baasir and Saleh Khalid. 
231 Parmusi was not revived as a political party but as a 'societal organisation' (ormas). The name for 
the new organisation thus was Persaudaraan Muslimin Indonesia ('Brotherhood oflndonesian 
Muslims'). The acronym, however, remained the same. Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, 
footnote 30. 
232 Laporan Kerja DPP Parmusi Periode Deklarasi 1999-2002, Muktamar I Parmusi, 23-26 August 
2002, pp. 3-5. 
233 Laporan Kerja DPP Parmusi. 
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and the need for a new 'vehicle for the Islamic community's struggle as a 
continuation' of PPP's Parmusi faction.234 Similar to other Bulan Bintang groups, 
Parmusi referred to what it termed the 'Keluarga Besar Bintang Bulan' as a historical 
national movement which unified the 'Islamic and national' struggle?35 There was, 
however, no explanation what this elusive spirit consisted of and what impact it was 
supposed to have on party policies. Indeed, the dissent appeared to have been 
triggered more by the preceding loss of modernist influence in PPP on NU. As such, 
the keluarga association worked as an obvious and convenient brand name to unite 
dissenters without bringing about a formal separation from PPP with its manifold 
political and financial uncertainties. 
Nonetheless, while Parmusi remained associated with PPP, in early 2002 the power 
struggles eventually brought about a party split leading to the formation of PPP 
Reformasi ('PPP Reform'). The dissidents favoured the preacher Zainuddin MZ as 
Chairman because of his immense popularity with traditionalist voters. 236 While 
Zainuddin claimed to have traditionalist credentials many dissident cadres came from 
the modernist MI.237 This underscored that the schisms in PPP were no longer simply 
a matter of rivalry between its two main components. The dissidents, however, failed 
to win the crucial support of NU ulama affiliated with PPP. A meeting of Javanese 
ulama in December 2001 decided to back the "old" PPP.238 
The aspiration to perpetuate Masyumi's lofty standards in private life and politics 
were necessarily more directly harmful for a homogeneously modernist party such as 
234 Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar I Parmusi, p. 49; "Tak Puas dengan Hamzah Haz, Parmusi 
Dideklarasikan", Kompas, 29 September 1999; Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta 31 Oktober 2000. 
Parmusi leaders prefer to speak of 'Bintang Bulan' rather than Bulan Bintang in order to distinguish 
themselves from other groups. 
235 Laporan Kerja DPP Parmusi, p. 5. 
236 PPP Reformasi was officially founded on 20 January 2002. Inaugurates comprised Zainuddin MZ, 
Djafar Badjeber, Saleh Khalid and Mohammad Buang, a former Deputy Secretary-General. "Gertak 
Sambal Para Politisi Muda?" Tempo, 28 October 2001. 
237 Without being a formal party member, Zainuddin had campaigned for PPP at the 1977 and 1982 
elections. 
238 "45 Ulama Pekalongan Temui Haz", Suara Merdeka, 11 January 2002. There was widespread 
anger that Zainuddin MZ, who had been a newcomer in PPP's board, had aggravated the split of the 
party. 
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PBB.239 Here, initial agreement over allegiance to Masyumi policies proved to be 
shallow. There was common praise for Masyumi's dedication to constitutionalism, 
democratic commitment and shari 'ah-mindedness but the miscellany of these values 
prompted disputes about their internal hierarchy and what behaviour particular ideals 
called for, especially from Islamist members of cabinet. Possible differences over 
how to do justice to Masyumi' s values were not considered significant prior to 
PBB's launch and were not thoroughly discussed. The party 'was just put on the way 
[dilepas saja] ... with all our hopes and ideals'.240 Henceforth, pragmatic and 
doctrinaire Islamists battled over an attitude authentic to the historical example and 
to Islam.241 
Masyumi had always taken pride in its steadfastness and believed it to be a religious 
duty. Muslims had to 'be radical in those domains that require a radical stance' .242 
Natsir said: 
Those who say that the ideology of Muslims is not practical [and] ... far from reality: 
Indeed! ... Do not people have to change the facts, change the situation; [and] follow 
the ideology? [It is] not the reverse, it is not ideology that has to move back and 
forth in accordance with times and situations, from one time to the next... [It is] 
difficult to realize ideology like that, they might say. We reply 'Indeed' !243 
Hartono Mardjono and Qadir Djaelani carried on this credo by holding that Islam 
demanded a 'straightforward attitude' (sikap terus terang), a directive which had to 
be obeyed as it was a Masyumi core value.244 This concerned the transformation of 
shari 'ah-mindedness into political action. The doctrinaire leaders held PBB to be 
239 These rifts set an ironic contrast to the idea behind the 'Islamic Brotherhood Forum' (FUI) and the 
'Coordinating Body of the Muslim Community' (BKUI) which both had endeavoured to unite 
Muslims. 
240 Interviews, Ramlan Mardjoned, Jakarta, 12 November 2001 (quote); Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 
November 2001; Adian Husaini, Jakarta, 30 October 2001. 
241 Unlike PK, PBB leaders often assaulted each other publicly in blunt tones. At one point, Yusril 
attacked his critics for using means of agitation that are 'usually used by Nazi activists, even 
communists' in order to ridicule their foes in the eyes of the public. Quoted from a letter to Qadir 
Djaelani. Reprinted in Djaeleani, Anak Rakyat, p. 215. PK leaders highlighted the Qur'anic ban of 
personal accusations [qadaj] on religious grounds and overcame almost any dispute internally. 
Mahfudz Siddiq, Shariah Islam dan Penegakkannya, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 20. 
242 Natsir, "Islam Demokrasi", reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, p. 90. 
243 Natsir, "Bukan ideologi yang harus mondar mandir" ('It is not ideology that has to waver') 
reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, pp. 105-7. 
244 Press Release, Pemyataan DPP Partai Bulan Bintang Tentang Penempatan Kedudukan Partai 
Sebagai Partai Oposisi, May 2000. 
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undetermined in the struggle for Islam, thus abandoning the essence of Masyumi's 
ideology.245 Though support for shari 'ah in earlier decades had comprised 
traditionalists and modernists, the latter invested greater intellectual and political 
capital in their campaign. PBB's statutes announced to 'carry out "trias politika" in 
accordance with Islamic principles' and 'transform Islamic law into national law' .246 
The guiding principle (khittah) was to 'make Islam the motivational and inspirational 
source to be transformed into the national system' and to 'build up Izzul Islam wa 'I 
Muslimin (the glory of Islam and the Muslim community)' .247 'Every statement, 
thought and activity' of party officials 'always' had to 'be based on universal Islamic 
teachings' .248 It was not clear what attitude these provisions called for and how they 
were to be implemented in daily political practice?49 Claiming that the party would 
fall foul of its statutes, the doctrinaire camp demanded a commitment to shari'ah that 
was 'historically consistent' with the struggle ofMasyumi. Both Masyumi's statutes 
from 7 November 1945 and PBB, Qadir emphasised, set out to bring about Izzul 
Islam wa 'I Muslimin and 'to establish Islam in oneself, family, society and state' as 
goals, a directive which PBB would fail to comply with.250 He thus claimed: 
[T]he PBB Central Board under the leadership of Yusril Ihza Mahendra is not 
serious in its effort to make Islamic values the ultimate source of the political 
struggle guideline of the party... [I]t increases evidence that the PBB does not want 
to implement shariah values [nilai-nilai Syariat Islam] to determine the personality 
of the party, both in relation to its organisation and [its] leadership ... The name 
245 A small book by Adian Husaini attacked Yusril's understanding oflslamic modernism and his 
promotion ofMasyumi. Adian Husaini, Yusril versus Masyumi- Kritik terhadap Pemikiran 
Modernisme Islam Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Dea Press, Jakarta, 2000. The number ofMasyumi devotees 
who did not know the Chairman's thesis baffled the author who then set off a debate to inform PBB' s 
elite. Interview, Adian Husaini, Jakarta, 30 October 2001. The Indonesian publisher ofYusril's thesis 
was Nurcholish Madjid's Paramadina foundation. This automatically raised suspicions given that the 
Chairman is a DDII member and formally chief editor of Media Dakwah. Interview, Kholil Ridwan, 
Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Yusril never responded to the allegations, as he did not recognise Adian as 
a genuine scholar ofMasyumi. Interview, Yusril lhza Mahendra, Jakarta, 22 November 2001. 
246 "Program Umum Perjuangan", in Profil Partai Bulan Bintang, (no date, probably 1998), p. 11. 
247 Profil Partai Bulan Bintang, p. 3; Mengapa memilih Partai Bulan Bintang, KAPPU PBB, 1999. 
248 Hasil Muktamar I Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP PBB, Jakarta, 2000, p. 62. 
249 It is noteworthy that the status oflslamist issues in the party was unrelated to the ideological base 
(Pancasila or Islam). The interpretation of the 'Pancasila and Islamic ethics' party base and the 
subsequent Islamic party base was almost the same. 
250 See Program Perdjoangan Masjoemi, p. 4 and "Anggaran Dasar Masyumi", in H. Aboebakar 
(Atjeh) (ed.), Sedjarah Hidup, p. 404; "Masa depan Indonesia dan Perdjuangan Masjumi", Hikmah, 
10 November 1956, p. 5. Qadir wrote he had joined PBB 'because of the ideological awareness which 
I had been following for 38 years and for which I used revolutionary means so that I had to sit in 
prison for 15 years'. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 180. 
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"Islam" that sticks to PBB is only to deceive the Muslim community, so that 
Muslims join the party. 251 
PBB Deputy Chairman Kholil Ridwan revealed that, despite commonly paying 
homage to the legacy of Masyumi, there was disagreement over the precise nature of 
Masyumi's ideology, especially in relation to alternative Islamist concepts and 
lifestyles endorsed by foreign organisations such as the Jamaat-i-Islami and the 
Muslim Brotherhood: 
Yusril thinks he fights for, defends and continues Masyumi but the Masyumi 
understood by Yusril is a secular Masyumi. [It is] being made the same as Ali 
Jinnah's party in Pakistan [the Muslim League]. This means that Yusril is secular ... 
In reality, Masyumi was not like that. Masyumi did not have the views of Ali 
Jinnah's party ... but its views were like Jamaat-i-Islami. Mawdudi. Or like lchwanul 
Muslimin in Egypt. [These were] three political movements with the same ideas, the 
same soul [roh] ... To strive for Islam by bringing into effect the shariah through 
parliament, democratically ... For [Yusril] modernist is the same as Ali Jinnah. But 
Ali Jinnah is a secular Islam [Islam sekuler] ... Yusril interprets Masyumi as if it was 
secular so that the people conclude that Masyumi is not fundamentalist. [But] if [we 
are] not fundamentalist, it means [we] can be secular, can be liberal.252 
Avowals of straightforwardness also touched on the controversy following 
Abdurrahman Wahid's proposal to abolish the legal ban on 'Marxism, Leninism and 
Communism' (an MPR decree of 1966). It became problematic due to Yusril's 
position in cabinet. Tensions worsened when at an official visit to Amsterdam in 
early 2000 Yusril met a delegation that included former members of the outlawed 
Partai Komunis Indonesia ('Indonesian Communist Party', PKI).Z53 DDII and KISDI 
speculated whether Yusril had endorsed the return of PKI members by informing 
them about the plan to abolish legal hindrances. 254 Although commonly devoted to 
Masyumi's animosity toward communism, their reasons for supporting the ban 
differed. Basing his argument on Masyumi's standpoint, Yusril asserted that his 
251 Such was Qadir's conclusion after the PBB board had blocked the distribution of his personal 
interpretation ofPBB's statutes which he saw as being in conformity with Masyumi's ideology. 
Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 207-8 and 224. 
252 Interview, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Yusril's doctorate is a comparative study ofMasyumi and 
the Indian-Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami. 
253 There are differing versions of this symbolically important meeting. Yusril pointed out that he was 
sent on a presidential order following an invitation from the Netherlands' Ministry of Justice. 
Abdurrahman instructed Yusril to meet students sent overseas in the 1960s by the government and to 
assess the possibilities for them to return to Indonesia. 
254 ''YIM: Saya tak Setuju Tap itu Dicabut", Republika, 11 April2000; "PBB Mengancam Tarik 
Dukungan", Suara Merdeka, 17 April 2000. 
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rejection would not be because communists were atheists but because they were 
hostile to democracy. 255 Qadir recalled meeting the Chairman head-on in a plenary 
session in which he pointed out that communists were infidels and that PBB would 
dissent from the example ofMasyumi: 
... I said that Partai Bulan Bintang opposes Marxism, Leninism and Communism not 
merely because there is the MPR Decree... But because there is an ideological 
reason, as Masyumi at its National Congress in Surabaya in 1953 decided that 
Marxism, Leninism and Communism are prohibited as heathen [hukumnya kufur] 
and that those who consciously embrace this ideology are infidels [hukumnya kafir]. 
And PBB as the rightful heir ofMasyumi is obliged to accept this decision.256 
After the pragmatic leadership refused to bring the party in formal opposition to the 
Abdurrahman government, the doctrinaire camp accused it of 'plunging Islamic 
values in the struggle of the party into an abyss' and having 'deceived [ mengecoh ]' 
participants of the (PBB 2000) Congress 'even until they backed the position 
of ... Yusril as the 'assistant' [pembantu] of President Abdurrahman W ahid'. 257 The 
doctrinaire camp also saw it as pivotal to initiate the advance of a 'formal opposition' 
in the government and end the 'transsexual system' (sistem 'kebanci-bancian ')of the 
Abdurrahman period.258 Again they pointed out that allegiance to Islam demanded 
straightforwardness: 
On principle ... a "two-faced" political position toward the regime of Abdurrahman 
W ahid infringes Islamic political ethics, which teaches honesty, truthfulness and 
255 Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, p. 226. Also "Tujuh Kata: Perintah Kepada 
Negara", Buletin Bulan Bintang, Agustus 2002; "Kalau Gus Dur Mengusulkan Tap itu dicabut, Kerja 
Sarna Selesai" ('Cooperation is over if Gus Dur suggests to annul this decree'), Republika, 16 April 
2000. 
256 Letter by Qadir to Yusril, 19 March 2000. Reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 210-1. Also 
Interview, Hartono Mardjono, Jakarta, 25 January 2001. 
257 Siaran Pers DPP Partai Bulan Bintang, "Tentang Pemecatan atau Rencana Pemecatan DPP PBB 
Versi Yusril", 2 February 2001. By April2000, Yusril had announced several times he would leave 
cabinet if he was ordered by the President to seek to lift the ban on communism. "Yusril Tolak 
Keinginan Gus Dur", Media Indonesia, 3 April2000; "Yusril Tunggu 20 Mei, Nurmahmudi Masuk 
PKB?", Pelita, 4 May 2000. His critics, however, questioned the seriousness of his threats to resign 
and accused him of tactical manoeuvres while clinging to his post. "Partai", Saksi; "Hartono 
Mardjono-Mestinya Dia Sudah Mundur", Tekad, 1-7 May 2000; Hussein Umar, "'Oposisi' Ulama", 
Media Dakwah, April 2000, pp. 6-7. "Ancaman Mundur Taktik Kampanye Yusril", Suara Karya, 28 
April2000. PBB's Congress then decided that Yusril should remain minister conditional on 
Abdurrahman's further standpoint on the ban on communism. On 13 May 2000, the Chairman 
affirmed that Abdurrahman had agreed to maintain the ban. Hence, he argued that there was no more 
reason for him to resign. "Rekomendasi PBB-Presiden dan Wapres Dipilih Langsung", Kompas, 1 
May 2000; ''YIM: Bukan Hanya Saya, Gus Dur Mundur Juga", Rakyat Merdeka, 13 May 2000. 
258 Hartono Mardjono, "Menyambut Muktamar I PBB", Republika, 28 April2000. 
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straightforwardness in making politics .... [W]e continue to defend the purity of the 
struggling mission of PBB ... which tries hard to defend Islamic ethics and values in 
making politics in accordance with the ideological base and the ethics of the party, 
that is Islam. We show this ... by declaring [us] as an oppositional party and acting 
fair and clear toward the leadership of Abdurrahman ... We vigorously reject 
misleading the Muslim community-by pretending to be continuously critical 
toward President Abdurrahman Wahid (in order to hunt for sympathy from the 
Muslim community) ... We hold that such politics is unethical and uncivilised.259 
The pragmatists' aim, however, had been to 'join the government while maintaining 
a critical stance' and to be not 'too close and not too far away from the 
government' .Z60 They used typical Islamic stipulations to justify their stance. To 
branches and supporters, they pointed to the Qur' anic injunction amar ma 'ruf nahy 
munkar ('to enjoin good and forbid evil'). This, PBB argued, was a religious 
platform for 'developing an Islamic form of opposition' .261 As a small party, PBB 
had become increasingly dependent on Yusril's position as minister in successive 
cabinets. Only with an access to power could Islamists hope to enter the high 
bureaucracy as mayors, deputy regents ( bupati) and governors. 262 Regional branches 
expected financial support from the centre, something that only high offices with 
access to funding opportunities could ensure. Cadres would thus have resented it if 
Yusril quit his prestigious post.263 
A second major charge linked to Masyumi was a lack of humility. Masyumi is 
remembered as a party untainted by corruption. This made accusations of financial 
259 Siaran Pers DPP Partai Bulan Bintang: Tentang Pemecatan atau Rencana Pemecatan DPP PBB 
Versi Yusril, 2 February 2001. 
260 Interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000 (first quote) and "Pidato Politik Ketua Umum 
Prof. Dr. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, SH. pada Acara Miladnas II Partai Bulan Bintang 16 Juli 2000", 
reprinted as "Mensyukuri Nikmat Kemerdekaan" in Buletin Bulan Bintang, No. 1, 1 Agustus 2000, p. 
14-5 (second quote). 
261 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 68-9; "Dua Arus Besar Sikapi Peran Oposisi", Republika, 27 April2000. 
Qur'an al-Imran (3:104) is the most cited verse. 
262 During campaigning, however, Yusril had said that PBB would go into opposition if losing the 
elections. "Skenario Menangkal Penggagalan Pemilu", Republika, 2 June 1999. In a letter to the editor 
of the journal Tekad, a self-declared 'PBB constituent' criticized: 
'I still remember the thundering 'God is Great' yells and clapping of thousands ofPartai 
Bulan Bintang followers ... when Yusril. .. said 'If we win, we govern. If we loose, we will be an 
oppositional party'. When the elections were over and the cabinet of President Gus Dur was formed 
... Yusril repeatedly explained an understanding of opposition as daring to have a different view .... ' 
Tekad, No. 36, 10-16 July 2000. 
263 Local cadres had wildly exaggerated expectations of what the party could achieve. Delegates of the 
2000 Congress urged the Chairman to run for the next presidency and demanded to target 25% at the 
2004 elections. Comments by Yusril and Ka'ban to cadres in Padang, West Sumatra, 18 November 
2000 (personal notes). 
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malpractice against PBB particularly hurtful. In early 1999, inaugural member Fadli 
Zon accused Yusril of accepting a billion rupiah donation from then President 
Habibie. The Chairman made conflicting statements whether this was accurate, about 
the identity of the donors, and regarding the precise amount. 264 Based on a report of 
board members, prior to the 1999 election campaigns, Yusril and Ka'ban distributed 
75 to 200 million rupiah respectively to regional boards without notifying other 
board members.265 The critics claimed that the bulk of the money was secretly 
allocated to those branches supporting the incumbent leadership.266 
It also became a contested matter how the private life of Muslim leaders could live 
up to the example of Masyumi and, indeed, Islam. The doctrinaire Islamists deplored 
shortcomings in the 'character' and 'morality' and a dearth of 'humility' (ke-
tawaduh '-an) among the lifestyles of party leaders and their families.267 A major 
scandal was that the Chairman's wife was disinclined to wear a headscar£268 In a 
letter to Yusril sent to all members of the Central Board and all regional branches 
Qadir wrote: 
Since you [ Saudara] have led the PBB, the dress and behaviour of your wife 
continuously met the sharp response from the PBB community fjama 'ah] from 
almost all parts of our country. As a result. .. Kholil Ridwan, Ahmad Sumargono and 
264 "Fadli Zon-Belum Ada Komunikasi dengan Yusril", Media Indonesia, 21 May 2000; "Kami ingin 
Menyelematkan Partai", Saksi, 17-30 May 2000. The reported sum varies between 1 billion and 1.6 
billion. Yusril said to have received a donation of 1 billion rupiah in January 1999 from unidentified 
people known to Habibie. This had happened before a new law regulating party donations became 
effective and thus was legal. The donation had been reported to the National Congress (Muktamar) 
and was used for financing the Working Congress (Mukemas) in early 1999. "Yusril Ihza: Saya tak 
Tahu Dana Itu Berasal dari Mana", Kompas, 10 Kompas 2000. His opponents, however, asserted that 
Yusril had denied having received the money until a board meeting in June 1999. They feared the 
news that PBB had accepted money in exchange for channelling support behind Habibie would make 
the party look like a crony of the President. Farid Pertanyakan Integritas Yusril di PBB", Kompas, 13 
May2000. 
265 Anak Rakyat, p. 212; "Farid Pertanyakan Integritas Yusril di PBB", Kompas, 13 May 2000. 
266 Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. Against the openly expressed contempt of 
other participants of the 2000 Congress, Kholillamented that 'it is a historical note for the party which 
is heir to Masyumi and is based on Islam to allow fraud and money politics'. 
267 Hartono Mardjono, "Menyambut Muktamar I PBB", Republika, 28 April2000. 
268 Local party leaders visited by the Chairman and his entourage pleaded with Qadir on the phone to 
remind Yusril that his wife was not veiled. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 221. Yusril also was publicly 
reprimanded for wearing jeans at prayer times and for smoking. His wife was chastised for wearing 
clothes that would show her body shape, receiving guests and enjoying a casual round at hotel 
swimming pools. Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, p. 208; Interview, Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 
2001. Article Eight in PBB's interpretation of its ideological base demands party members to 'follow 
the Islamic rules on .. . aural'. The regulation of dress code is mentioned specifically. Hasil Muktamar 
I, p. 67. 
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I expressed our criticism toward the ways your wife dresses. But you once replied 
that the headscarf problem is a matter of 'differing legal opinion' [khilafiah]. As a 
result, up to the present day your wife has never shown her willingness to use the 
Muslim way of dressing [busana muslimah]. In April1999 ... you were seen filling in 
gas at the station arena Jaya Ancol, North Jakarta. From there you directly went to a 
place called 'Matador' (an indecent, improper place) ... Since this incident, rumours 
began to spread ... As a result, PBB board members ... often were asked about this 
incident. We tried to keep this 'shame' [aib] secret. But obviously it leaked, 
although we had kept it secret for almost a year.269 
Directly referring to Masyumi, Hartono asked: 
Are the leaders of this party already capable to model themselves after [meneladani] 
the leaders of Masyumi among whom none ever gained pleasure to lay emphasis on 
themselves in order to demand position or rank? From Masyumi's history it is 
interesting that we have never heard of a leader who was charged because of 
corruption. Also ... Masyumi leaders consistently remained humble [tawadhu 1 when 
facing criticism... If the criticism was correct, they affirmed it with candour and if 
the criticism was wrong, they explained it patiently. Personal enmity was never 
heard of, although they were capable of differing sharply ... Has all this already sank 
among the leadership of Partai Bulan Bintang?270 
The doctrinaire Islamists thus only gradually became aware that their support for 
Yusril and Ka'ban was, in their view, a slip-up. They had backed Yusril on the 
premise that he was an eloquent intellectual who could draw votes; that had studied 
and published on Masyumi and presumed congeniality with their ideological attitude. 
Subsequent disagreement convinced the doctrinaire leaders that 'Yusril's heart is not 
with Dewan Dakwah', and they believed that he had deliberately downplayed 
Masyumi's Islamist disposition. The quarrels lessened after the doctrinaire leaders 
left the party and Yusril strengthened his grip over PBB, remarkably by steering 
greater attention to shari 'ah issues.271 
This chapter thus argued that it has been difficult to give a cohesive definition of 
Masyumi's agenda due to the party's supposed commitment to a miscellany of 
values comprising shari 'ah-implementation, tolerance toward other religious 
269 19 March 2000, reprinted in Djae1ani, Anak Rakyat, p. 212. The headscarf polemics showed how 
religious standards have changed in the course of four decades as the issue had much less priority in 
Masyumi during the 1950s. Addressing the critique on his wife, Yusril countered by saying that 
Qadir's wife would herself not meet the standards of Mawdudi who demanded that women had to 
wear the cadar (p. 216). The row escalated to a point where Qadir called on the Chairman to make an 
oath before God (mubahalah) which rules that the lying party will be doomed (laknat) (p. 218). Also 
"PBB Pasca Muktamar 1: Mengulang Sejarah Kelabu", Khutbah Jumat, June 2000, pp. 72-5. 
270 Mardjono, Menyambut. 
271 See chapter five. 
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communities and good relations with non-Muslim political parties, democracy, 
constitutionalism, anti-communism, anti-militarism and high standards of integrity 
and morality. The pragmatists in PBB emphasised the Masyumi values democracy 
and constitutionalism and whilst the doctrinaire leaders in the keluarga showed 
dedication to the same values, they at the same time detested that the pragmatists 
distracted from the controversially deemed facets of Masyumi's Islamist program 
and what they saw as an attempt to disengage the Masyumi tradition from Islamist 
ideology. These controversial issues comprised Masyumi's devotion to shari'ah and 
the party's preferential treatment of Muslims and Muslim affairs. Still, on both the 
shari 'ah and the pluralism issue, chapter five will point out, PBB leaders sought to 
convey an 'undogmatic' image to the public. 
PPP's dedication to the Masyumi tradition has been even harder to pin down. One 
obvious reason has been the presence of the traditionalist NU in the party. NU 
originally had been a division within Masyumi but then became a rival party. 
Another reason was the restrictions the New Order government imposed on Islamic 
politics and PPP, which, however, still enabled the party to uphold and defend a 
number of Islamic themes such as opposing cross-religious marriage, syncretism and 
a secular interpretation of the state ideology Pancasila. Debarred from making the 
Jakarta Charter a policy during the New Order, PPP re-adopted the Charter in the 
reformasi era. Still, as chapter four will argue, the party's commitment to the Charter 
was strongly linked to political considerations and it showed little interest in a 
substantive discussion of shari 'ah related issues. A certain superficiality regarding 
PPP's identification with the Masyumi tradition was also revealed in the party's split 
in early 2002. The rifts had no perceptible relation to different readings of the 
Masyumi tradition even though PPP's modernist camp in Parmusi claimed to be 
motivated by reviving the spirit of the Bulan Bin tang legacy. 
Furthermore, this chapter argued that there has been widespread awareness in the 
Keluarga Bulan Bintang as to the dwindling of Masyumi's legacy since the 1950s. 
This decline strongly suggested to keluarga activists that it was impractical to mould 
a party close to the Masyumi example in the post-New Order era. Most in the 
broader Bulan Bintang community who broadly identified with the historical role of 
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Masyumi therefore decided to remain in one of the established parties (PPP or 
Golkar). A smaller number joined Amien Rais in the religiously-neutral PAN. Again 
others swapped the Islamist struggle derived from the Masyumi model for an 
approach taken from contemporary Middle Eastern sources. Overall, the significance 
of the Masyumi tradition is likely to advance its decline in the years to come whilst 
the Islamist approach represented by PK is likely to enhance its impact on the 
country's political culture. 
Significantly, despite the decreasing role of the Masyumi tradition in Indonesian 
political Islam, its proponents have maintained an essentialist position on the role of 
Islam in Indonesia and officially sustained the assertion to be a central part of the 
national character. This discrepancy between the wish to dominate Indonesian 
political culture and the realities are the topics of the following chapter. At the same 
time, a religiously defensive spirit made an increasing impact on Indonesian 
Muslims. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a perception of international politics as 
broadly anti-Islam had bolstered an unreflective sectarianism among many Masyumi 
devotees. Partai Keadilan and parts of the Masyumi camp have increasingly seen 
themselves in a global conspirational context. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ISLAMISM'S ESSENTIALIST VIEW ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE 
INDONESIAN NATION AND ISLAM 
Islamists in Indonesia claim to have greater socio-cultural authenticity than other 
religions and beliefs. This claim is framed by the truism that Indonesian cultural 
identity is grounded in a shared religious awareness. 1 Islamists always claimed to be 
the vital component of this identity. They, in effect, guard an essentialist position of 
Islam's role in Indonesian history and society. 
All Islamists v1ew the Indonesian nation and Islam as being interrelated and 
inseparable but Islamists following the Masyumi tradition have voiced this claim 
with special vigour. At the same time, they often speak vaguely about Islam whereas, 
in fact, referring to the explicitly political and shari 'ah-related aspects of faith. The 
Islarnist view appears to defy the premise that all political cultures have, at some 
point in history, been learned and incorporated into society. This also applies to 
followers of the Masyurni tradition, as this tradition was shaped by the concepts of 
Islamic modernism corning from the Middle East in the early decades of the 20th 
century. This chapter will present the Islarnist stance on the role and legitimacy of 
Islam in Indonesia before critiquing their claims. 
Their essentialist view of the position of Islam in a religious society means that 
Islamists view "imported" ideologies such as atheism and materialism as alien and 
thus as illegitimate parts of Indonesian identity. Adherents of the Masyurni tradition 
are especially outspoken in their condemnation of 'non-Indonesian' beliefs. When 
the supposed atheists in the Partai Kornunis Indonesia ('Indonesian Communist 
Party', PKI) declared allegiance toward Pancasila despite rejecting the monotheistic 
principle Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa (The One All-Powerful God), the doctrine lost 
1 The Department of Religious Affairs interprets Pancasila as acknowledging Islam, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism as official religions but does not recognise Judaism and 
mysticism. 
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its Islamic credibility? Once communists would agree to Pancasila as a 'meeting 
point', it would lose its spiritual quality and become 'a dead concept'. 3 It also meant 
that Pancasila could no longer be used as a tool against the rise of communism.4 
Conviction in the leading role of Islam had strong implications for how Masyumi 
legatees decreed the legitimacy of their ideals in the reformasi era. The open 
promotion of Islam's ascendancy has been less common in Partai Keadilan ('Justice 
Party', PK). While maintaining a preoccupation with defending Islam against 
domestic foes and threats such as Christian campaigns to convert Muslims and Sino-
Indonesian economic hegemony, a number of Masyumi legatees adopted the notion 
of an absolute and timeless cultural tension between Islam and the West. The result 
combines a commitment to political participation through representative 
governmental institutions with feelings of cultural demise and global suppression of 
Muslims. This echoes a sentiment in much of the contemporary Muslim world. 
Today' s adherents of the Masyumi tradition have upheld the claim to correspond to 
Muslim interests and national identity despite evidence of the increasing gap to the 
Muslim community they desire to represent. The 1999 election results affirmed that 
the significance of Masyumi's style of Islamic politics had fallen sharply. The 
assertion of cultural ascendancy has thus been hollow. It is a repetitive discourse 
with a fixation toward the domestic past. Prior to Dutch colonialism and the influx of 
other ideologies and creeds, Masyumi legatees suggest, Muslims had embraced 
shari'ah rule as the optimum political system. It was Western influence, they lament, 
that brought down the rule of sacred law. Shari 'ah thus became the lost heritage of 
the political community. 
2 Deliar Noer, "Pengantar", in Mohammad Natsir, Islam sebagai Dasar Negara, Media Dakwah, 
2000, p. xiv-xv. 
3 Natsir, Dasar negara, in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, pp. 215-18. Masyumi wantedKetuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa to be the point of reference for the following principles. Anwar Harjono and Lukman 
Hakiem, "M. Natsir: Sumbangan dan Pemikirannya Untuk Indonesia", in Anwar Harjono and Lukman 
Hakiem, M Natsir: Sumbangan dan Pemikirannya Untuk Indonesia, Media Dakwah, Jakarta, 1995, 
pp. 1-37 (p. 23). 
4 Harun Nasution, The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, The Movement for its 
Creation and the Theory of the Masjumi, MA thesis, McGill University, 1965. 
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Masyumi legatees are resentful at this loss and the little support they get from 
ordinary Muslims. In contrast to the constant highlighting of the supposed correlation 
between an unspecified "Islam" and national identity, not enough Muslims have been 
sufficiently committed to this belief and to support Islamist parties of any kind, either 
in elections or through a popular movement. These unfulfilled hopes helped to foster 
an increasingly distorted view of the history and legitimacy of Islamism in Indonesia 
while the paradigm of Indonesia as a "Muslim nation" triggered ongoing 
representational claims. 5 
The case of Masyumi typifies the lack of popular support. Masyumi founders 
believed that it would be the only Islamic political outlet and that it would become 
the governing party. With the grand majority of Indonesians being Muslim, Masyumi 
leaders as many secular nationalists and communists expected that it would dominate 
elections. 6 Masyumi, however, never held more than one-quarter of all parliamentary 
seats. In the un-elected provisional legislature that was in place between 1950 and 
1955, it was the leading party but held only 21% of seats. 7 Neither did the first 
general election in 1955 turn out to be the hoped-for triumph. Slightly above 
Nahdlatul Ulama's 18.4% share and behind the nationalist-secular Partai National 
Indonesia ('Indonesian Nationalist Party', PNI) 22.3%, Masyumi's share of the vote 
was20.9%. 
The Dogma of a "Muslim Nation" 
Islam as Bonding Agent 
. 
During the first half of the 20th century, Islam was a primary force in Indonesian 
movements that strove for liberation from foreign rule. It has been argued that 
5 Of course, the awareness described in the previous chapter that the segmentation oflslam and the 
conversion of Muslim leaders to pluralist parties would obstruct forming a united Islamist party in the 
post-New Order era refuted those claims. 
6 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 78. Feith and Castles observed that most politicians in the 
1940s and 50s seemed to have only perfunctory knowledge of the political likings of electorates. 
Indonesian Political Thinking, p. 19. 
7 In the preceding proto-parliament (KNIP, 1946 to 1949), Masyumi held 60 seats. This was more 
than any other party. Yet Masyumi' s position never exceeded 15% of the total number of seats. See 
also Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy; p. 79. 
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Muslim populations saw colonialism as a direct threat to their religion and identity. 
Masyumi devotees always sought to emphasise their legitimacy by pointing out that 
the "umat Islam" (Muslim community) was a forerunner in the struggle for national 
sovereignty. As such, they drew on the argument that Islam 'came to provide the 
earliest channel of development of modem, mature Indonesian nationalism' .8 Both 
nationalism and Islam demanded self-determination; Islam thus gave further impetus 
to the resistance against the Dutch colonialists and their Christian mission. Islamists 
thus proclaim that Islam became the bonding agent of nationalism and the national 
idea.9 It united the vast number of societies in the archipelago and created a sense of 
brotherhood and national unity. 10 Islam had, in Natsir's words, 'first planted the 
seeds of Indonesian unity, removed the attitudes of isolation of various islands ... ' 11 
In 1931, N atsir wrote 
[A ]t the time of the rise of Budi Utomo, the door had not been opened yet for those 
who are not Javanese ... a long time before the notion of 'the Indonesian nation' was 
mentioned in our Indonesian sphere, [all] movements which were solely based on 
the religion of Allah had for a long time been endowed with the "Indonesian nation" 
tie [ di mas a itu pergerakan-pergerakan yang berdasarkan kepada Agama Allah 
semata-mata, sudah lama mempunyai ikatan "kebangsaan Indonesia"] ... . 12 
At the same time, Masyumi and its later adherents have proclaimed to operate within 
the framework of habits and customs of domestic communities. Natsir wrote: 
People often presume that Islam opposes the existence of nations; it is said that 
Islam demurs the existence of a nation ... This is not right! We can become a pious 
8 Kahin, Nationalism, p. 44. 
9 See Amry Vandenbosch, "Nationalism and Religion in Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 21, 
Issue 18, 1952, p. 182; Kahin, Nationalism, p. 38. The 'proud claim' (Ward, Foundation, p. 9) to have 
constituted the main force in the nationalist movement is grounded in the Islamic character of anti-
Dutch resistance in Minangkabau (West Sumatra), the Java war (1830s) and the three-decade long 
colonial war in Aceh. It also owes much to the struggle of the Java-based Sarekat Islam. This claim is 
contested by the secular-nationalists. For them, the Budi Utomo (established 1908 and seen as the first 
anti-colonial movement formed by nationalist, Dutch-educated Javanese) marked the beginning of the 
national fight for freedom. Indeed, in the course of the 1930s the Sarekat Islam became less important; 
hereafter the secular-nationalists in Partai Nasionalis Indonesia ('Indonesian Nationalist Party', PNI) 
headed the independence movement. 
10 Andi Faisal Bakti, Islam and Nation Formation in Indonesia: From Communitarian to 
Organizational Communications, Logos, Jakarta, 2000; Hatjono and Hakiem, Natsir, p. 13. 
11 Pembela Islam, 42, January 1932, quoted in Howard Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform 
in Twentieth Century Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1970, p. 89 and Bakti, 
Islam and Nation, p. 150. 
12 "Indonesische Nationalisme", Pembela Islam, No 36, Oct. 1931, re-printed in Natsir, Agama dan 
Negara, pp. 11-4. 
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Muslim who with joy and pleasure sings [the song] 'Indonesia my home'. How is it 
possible, that we could loose our Indonesianness [ke-Indonesiaan] when God made 
us of different nations ... We have to be happy and pleased to show the outside 
world, that this is us the Indonesian people; this is our language, this is our culture, 
this is our batik, this is our wood-carving, this is our music and so on ... There is no 
need for a Muslim to leave behind his/her nationality and culture.13 
Despite such assurances, Islamist pride in the achievement of independence has been 
inseparable from the belief that this was a struggle led by Muslims and driven by 
Islam. Nationalist sentiment, therefore, only became conceivable when Islam 
dictated it. 14 'Nationhood' (kebangsaan) detached from Islam was jahiliyya 
('ignorant') and ashabiyah ('an erroneous concept') and as such, equal to tribal 
partisanship in pre-Arabic times. 15 The Masyumi affiliate Hamka wrote 
Islamic teachings establish that a feeling of service [rasa-kebaktian] in whichever 
place, whichever area we are ... the fundament is devoutness toward Allah. People 
are not asked what their nationality [bangsmy'a] is; what is asked earlier is peoples' 
religion and devotion [bakti] ... Taking Islam, automatically, secures [melifamin] 
Indonesian nationalism [kebangsaan] and unity. But by exposing only nationalism 
without Islam, people again have to rummage in ancient traditions [tambo lama], 
and this is a disastrous ... basis ... We exist of hundreds peoples, which each have 
their own greatness. In order to foster this unity, search for a native bond [perekat 
yang aseli], [with] an example from heaven. Not with Gadjah Mada-Hajam Wuruk, 
not with Hang Tua and Tjindur Mata! But with ISLAM because this is the core 
[pokok] of our tranquility. 16 (Capital letters in original) 
Reflecting the central position of Islam in the notion of nationhood, Islamists have 
been pointing to Islam's aspiration to act as a "protector" of other creeds and 
communities by stressing that a reverse order was not viable. 17 They argued that, 
because of nominal Muslim supremacy, the umat Islam had more responsibility than 
13 Mohamad Natsir, "Revolusi Indonesia", reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, p. 179. 
14 This is at the same evident in the way Islamists have justified the use of the Islamic ideological 
party base. Islam, they asserted, acknowledges the concept of nationhood, hence there was no need for 
an explicit reference to kebangsaan. Natsir, "Apakah Pancasila Bertentangan dengan Ajaran Islam?", 
reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, pp. 158-66. A few Islamic organisations such as GPII (later: 
GPI) used 'Islam and Nationhood' (Islam dan Kebangsaan) as ideological base. Masyumi rejected 
such double reference for the above reasons. Harjono and Hakiem, Natsir, p. 15. 
15 Masyumi leaders from a Persis background, most notably Ahmad Hassan and Isa Anshary, most 
ardently voiced this view. Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 259; Hatjono and Hakiem, Natsir, p. 
16; Bakti, Islam and Nation, pp. 142-53. 
16 Hamka, "Islam alat perekat kebangsaan & kesatuan Indonesia" ('Islam is the tool for Indonesian 
nationalism and unity'), Hikmah, 9 March 1957, pp. 9-10. The text refers to Javanese and Malay 
heroes. Gadjah Mada, for example, was a famed leader of 141h century's Majapahit Empire in East 
Java. 
17 Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 278. 
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other religious communities to represent and defend the interests of the Republic and 
thus a right to steer public affairs. 18 This view held: 
We, the Indonesian Muslim community who is the largest population, have the 
greatest responsibility toward the wellbeing and the development of the Indonesian 
Republic. We see this as a Godly gift [kurnia Ilahi] for which we are obliged to be 
grateful; by means of maintaining, cultivating and defending it, with all the strength 
that we have.19 
The particular logic that proclaims Islam as the final creed, the vital part of national 
identity and a "protector" of other religious communities deemed "Muslim" 
leadership good for Indonesian people in general. This dogma of a "Muslim nation" 
has always been an obstacle to a religious and cultural pluralism based on full 
equality. 
Within the "Muslim nation" dogma, Islamists do not distinguish between their 
shari 'ah-minded brand of Islam and the Muslim peoples in general. This stance is 
rooted in Islam's emphasis on communality and collectiveness, manifest in the 
notion of the global bond of believers (the umat). Islamists at all times endeavoured 
to highlight the historical roots and the prominence of a shari 'ah-minded Islam 
within the national idea. They underscored this position by arguing that Islam came 
to Indonesia on direct route from the Middle Eastern region, and that what is known 
in modem times as Arab customs was more important in shaping Indonesian Islam 
than commonly believed. This debate on historical legitimacy has been strongly 
flavoured by religious sentiment and pride?0 Islamists see a politicised, rational and 
puritan brand of Islam as more comprehensive, purer and of higher value than an 
educational-intellectual (i.e. partial), mystic or "liberal" variant. It was thus claimed 
to be desirable for any Muslim. 
Ironically, the self-awareness of shari 'ah-minded Islam corresponded with what 
European Orientalism identified as a pure, pristine form of faith, illustrating 
18 "Apajang diperdjuangkan Masjumi Untuk Bangsa dan Tanah Air", Hikmah, 12 November 1955, 
pp. 8-9 and 19. 
19 Apajang diperdjuangkan, p. 19. 
20 Johan Hendrik Meuleman, "Indonesian Islam Between Particularity and Universality", Studia 
Jslamika, No.3, 1997, pp. 103-22. 
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Islarnisrn's unreflective essentialism. But contrary to the Islarnist claim, the common 
view is that Islam carne from the Indian subcontinent not earlier than the 12th 
century.21 Western scholarship taught that pre-Islamic beliefs were at the heart of 
Indonesian Islarn.Z2 This became the scholarly excuse for the Dutch colonial policy 
known as teori resepsi, determining that local customs and beliefs (adat) should be 
taken as the main reference drafting laws for Indonesian Muslirns.23 Islamic 
regulations had to be compatible with adat to be validated. As a result, later Islarnists 
carne to see Western scholarship as the agent of its governments whose target it was 
to repress the advance of Islam first in their colonies and later in the post-colonial 
states. Islarnist scholars, of course, have always downplayed the frictions between 
local customs and their ideal of Islam. 24 They believed and promoted that the agenda 
of Western scholarship was to disguise and distort Muslim unity in order to suppress 
Islam. This was how many academics carne to be seen as a collaborator with 
imperialism and, in the view of contemporary Islarnists, a very successful one. 
Masyurni legatees such as Dewan Dakwah Islarniyah Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic 
Propagation Council', DDII), Kornite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam 
('Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World', KISDI) and Persis 
('Islamic Association') maintained their stance after Masyurni's dissolution. The 
discourse in these organisations reflected the wish to portray Islarnisrn as something 
inherently Indonesian, often by stressing that Masyurni notables, above all Natsir, 
had been a 'leader of the Muslim community [ummat] and the people [bangsa]' and 
'a statesman [negarawan], not the leader of a [certain] group [golongan]'.Z5 To 
underscore Masyurni's nationalist devotion, they pointed to Natsir's and Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara's merits in drafting the 'integral motion' (mosi integral), which in 
21 Meuleman, Indonesian Islam, p. 110. Among the Dutch scholars oflslam defending this view were 
B.J.O. Schrieke and Christiaan Snouk Hurgronje (1857-1936). The Islamist thesis was strongly voiced 
by Hamka, for example in his Sejarah Umat Islam, Pustaka Antara, Kuala Lumpur, 1965, p. 432. 
22 This is a central argument of Geertz' Religion of Java. 
23 The main proponent of this view was Prof. Hurgronje, the Dutch colonial advisor. It also was 
proposed by European Orientalists such as Theodore Pigeaud and Adrian Reland and, though with a 
different emphasis, more recently by Geertz and Benedict Anderson. 
24 A good example is Hamka, Ayahku: Riwayat Hidup Dr. H Abd. Karim Amrullah dan Perjuangan 
Kaum Agama di Sumatera, Umminda, Jakarta, 1958. 
25 Haryono dan Hakiem, Natsir, (first quote); "Sambutan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia", in 
Natsir, Agama dan Negara, p. v (second quote). Proponents of this view liked to argue that Masyumi 
obtained support from more regions than secular parties like the Java-centred PNI, thus giving 
evidence ofMasyumi's claim to represent the national idea. 
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1950 dissolved the federal system and returned Indonesia to a unitary republic. 
Natsir's name therefore was, as Anwar Haryono noted, 'written with golden ink in 
the history of the struggle of our nation' .Z6 In a paper on Islam as the 'essence of the 
nation' (jati diri bangsa), Anwar attacked the academic output of Western historians 
as: 
... a very coordinated attempt to dissolve the awareness of the people of the Melayu 
nations on the close spiritual relation [ hubungan rohani yang mesra] between them 
and the Arab soil or [regarding] the Arab people as the first source in the arrival of 
Islam in Indonesia. 27 
Anwar further reasoned that 'we can say for sure' that Indonesian Muslims had 
carried out Islamic law since it arrived, arguing: 
[It is] not exaggerated [to] conclude that Islamic law and teachings had been living 
and had been the essence Uati diri] of the inhabitants of the archipelago Nusantara 
since the beginning of [Islam's] arrival in Indonesia.28 
Shari 'ah was more appropriate for Indonesia than Western-derived "alien" civil law 
because Islam had preceded the advent of European rule in the archipelago. It was, 
therefore, closer to the way of life and spiritual sensibilities of the Indonesian people 
than civillaw.Z9 In the Islamist perspective, therefore, the subsequent subordination 
of western legislation over Islamic law was the result of imperialist coercion. It was 
invasive and therefore came to be seen as an anomaly. Islam, Islamists believe, was 
at the cultural core of the Indonesian people and would have prospered in following 
centuries were it not for Dutch intervention. But this natural depicted process was 
interrupted by the arrival of the Dutch colonial power, who were aware that the 'real 
strength' and the 'potential of the Indonesian people' was embedded in their 'Islamic 
soul' Uiwa Islamnya].30 
26 Anwar Haryono, "Gelar Pahlawan Nasional untuk Lima Tokoh Pejuang (Bapak M. Natsir dan 
Kawan-kawan)", Media Dakwah, May 1995, pp. 6-8. Keluarga Bulan Bintang affiliates commonly 
share this positive view of the historical role of Masyumi leaders. During the New Order, 
Muhammadiyah and Golkar notables regularly paid tribute to Masyumi in numerous DDII meetings 
and seminars. 
27 Anwar Haryono, Perjalanan Politik Bangsa: Menoleh Ke Belakang Menatap Masa Depan, Gema 
Insani Press, Jakarta, 1997, p. 3. Anwar referred to a later edition ofHamka's Ayahku. 
28 Anwar Haryono, "Memperingati 22 Juni dan 5 Juli 1959", Media Dakwah, Agustus 1996, p. 6. 
29 Also Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 90. 
30 Haryono, Memperingati. 
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The Bitter History: Muslim Concessions 
Islamists believe that the failure to convert Muslim historical and eschatological 
supremacy into political power was because the Muslim community had repeatedly 
made concessions to religious minorities in order to safeguard the existence of the 
unitary Indonesian state. Moreover, they hold that the minorities had used 
inappropriate means of imposing their will on Muslims. The first case in point was 
the failure to make Islam the ideology of the independent Republic. Muslims initially 
supported an Islamic state, then proposed the Jakarta Charter as a compromise, but 
eventually lost almost completely to the secular-nationalist camp.31 The final 
Indonesian Constitution of 1945 was de-confessionalised, lacking any particular 
Islamic terms including a reference to shari 'ah. Adding to the humiliation was the 
awareness that Indonesia was to become the largest Muslim country in the world. 
Islamists have come to depict these defeats as outcomes of manipulation or 
inadvertent incidents. Indeed, proponents of a strongly Islamicised Constitution had 
been under-represented in the pro-independence committees handling constitutional 
matters such as the Komite Pusat Nasional Indonesia ('Central Indonesian National 
Committee', KNIP). Both real and perceived irregularities had strong implications 
for how Islamists came to understand the legitimacy of their ideological struggle. 
The parameters of this debate remained very much the same during the New Order 
and afterwards. 
The trigger was the deletion of the Jakarta Charter. In 1945, Islamists have argued 
since then, the religious minorities had blackmailed Muslims to drop the clause. 
Referring to the Japanese officer who conveyed the opposition of non-Muslim 
communities, Natsir showed the indignation over the coercive means by which the 
intolerant minorities conferred their will on Muslims: 
This envoy did not come to discuss the issue. Only to convey a warning. Full stop! 
[The matter] does not need to be talked about any more. Up to you whether the 
31 MIAI had also proposed a quota that two thirds of parliament and the President had to be Muslim. 
Nasution, Islamic State. The 1945 Constitution, however, only says that the President has to be an 
'indigenous Indonesian' (orang Indonesia asli). It is unclear whether only a Muslim can be an asli 
Indonesian~ I am grateful to Prof. Harold Crouch for his comments on this. 
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message is taken or not. The main thing is you know what the consequences are. 
This was an ultimatum. An ultimatum, not only against Indonesian Muslim citizens. 
But essentially against the Indonesian Republic itself which was only 24 hours old. 
The 17 August is Independence Day, our holiday. The 18 August is the day of the 
ultimatum by the Christian Indonesian community from the East. Both occurrences 
are historical. If we celebrate the first, at least do not forget the second. When we 
welcome proclamation day on 17 August we thank God. When we welcome the 
following day on 18 August we ask God for forgiveness [beristiglifar]. God-willing 
the Muslim community will not forget.32 
It is, however, clear that the Islamist stance on key issues such as the omission of the 
Jakarta Charter in 1945 and 1959 in the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) was 
inseparable from the "Muslim nation" -dogma. Concentrating on rather isolated 
events such as the unclear role of the Japanese envoy, they have downplayed the 
broader social and religious circumstances without which a particular incident could 
not have taken place.33 This discourse ofloss formed an ideological folklore through 
which Masyumi adherents have come to see their commitment to cultivate Islam in 
Indonesia. Anwar Haryono recapitulated: 
This is it-our national history. Twice a consensual result has been annulled. First: 
The consensual result of the state founders on 22 June 1945 was annulled only 
because an officer from Japan (his name is still not uncovered [gelap]) is said to 
have submitted a message that non-Muslims in East Indonesia would not join the 
Indonesian Republic if the supplement "with the obligation to implementing 
shari 'ah Islam" would not be deleted. Second: The consensual results of the 
Konstituante were annulled by the presidential decree only because there were 
factions, which boycotted the session, although it was known that the leaders of the 
largest factions undertook approaching efforts.34 
The painful defeat in the competition for state ideology and the misapprehension of 
Islamism's mandate at home manifest in the 1955 election outcome biased a 
following generation of Masyumi legatees who acted on a personal affinity with their 
elders and their agenda. A 1995 DDII publication re-asserted that in early 20th 
century Indonesia 'Islam was identical with nationhood' and that all Muslims 
32 Mohammad Natsir, "Tanpa Toleransi Tak-kan Ada Kerukunan" ('There will be no harmony 
without tolerance'), Media Dakwah, August 1989 and reprinted in January 2000, pp. 6-7. 
33 See Anwar's argumentation in his "Jati Diri Bangsa: Memperingati 22 Juni dan 5 Juli 1959 Bagian 
II", ('The Essence of the Nation: Remembering 22 June and 5 July 1959'), Media Dakwah, September 
1996, pp. 6-7. DDII, for example, regularly holds that a 'party-outside factor' had abolished the 
decisions of the Badan Penelitian Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia ('Investigating Body for 
the Preparation oflndonesian Independence', BPUPKI). Common to all alleged incidents is that they 
are seen as interference and the cause for a disproportionately small share of "Muslim" power in the 
independent state. 
34 Anwar Haryono, "Pikiran-Pikiran Pak Natsir Mendasar", Suara Masjid, February 1993. 
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regardless of their ethnicity were termed as 'native' (pribumi). 35 DDII assured the 
reader that, despite the efforts of Christian missions, 'Islam became increasingly 
identical with 'indigenousness' (kepribumian) and 'nationhood' (kebangsaan)'. 36 
Anwar highlighted the key role of the Jakarta Charter in this framework: 
In our history, the Jakarta Charter has already taken in a position that is more 
glorious [luhur] than just in juridical-constitutional terms. The Jakarta Charter is 
already connected to the foundations of the morality of the nation, that is the 
sacredness of a promise [kesucian perjanjian]. Because of this, the Muslim 
community perceives the abolishment of the seven words, which once had made this 
gentlemen's agreement, as breach of a promise fpengingkaran janji]. What is 
formulated in the Jakarta Charter is truly very profound, deeply rooted, part of our 
blood and flesh [ mendarah-daging], and even inspires [ menjiwai] every Muslim 
fighter fpejuang Muslim]. It is a life task fpanggilan hidup] of every Muslim fighter 
to struggle that every Muslim carries out shariah Islam.37 
In accordance with the characteristic claim of ideologies to know 'what is in the best 
interests of "the people"', Islamists have been depicting the mass of ordinary 
Muslims to be devoted shari 'ah supporters. The postulation of a collective Muslim 
aspiration and its promotion had always been important for the poise of Islamism. 
The aim to insert shari 'ah terms in the Constitution and to oblige the state with the 
task to implement Islam has been portrayed as a Muslim desire. It was, N atsir 
argued, what distinguished a Muslim from a non-Muslim. He wrote: 
... in our, the Muslim's [kaum Muslimin] viewpoint, the Islamic religion is not 
merely a supplement that has to be infused in the state, but in our viewpoint, the 
state will be the tool and the instrument to put Islamic law into force [ alat dan 
perkakas bagi berlakunya hukum-hukum Islam]. Here lies the difference of opinion 
between a Muslim [seorang Islam] and a non-Muslim [orang yang bukan Islam]. 38 
This has turned into a recurring premise: Islamists put emphasis on the numerical 
majority of Muslims compared to other religious groups and suggested that 
"Muslims" had the same desire and needs which the government needed to consider. 
This distorted the umat Islam necessarily to a uniform entity and an ideal. Masyumi 
depicted the 1955 elections as a 'decisive time for our fight, the UMMAT ISLAM, to 
35 Haryono and Hakiem, Natsir, p. 5. 
36 Haryono, Memperingati. 
37 Haryono, Jati Diri Bangsa, pp. 6-7. 
38 Natsir, Islam Demokrasi. For similar statements see Natsir, "Dualisme Dalam Caesaro- Papisme", 
"Berhakim pada Sejarah", dan "Syekh yang maha hebat". All reprinted in Natsir, Agama dan Negara 
(quote: p. 89). 
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implement the divine order [ kalimah illahi] in our country, the Indonesian 
Republic'. 39 It reminded Muslims through the Masyumi-linked tabloid Hikmah that 
an 'anti-religious' or 'religiously-neutral' government would 'allow dozens of 
millions of Indonesian Muslims to be thrown into the valley of evil; physical and 
spiritual destruction' .40 In the case of a victory, Masyumi announced it would 'adjust 
every paragraph to the wishes of the Indonesian Muslim community' without 
recognising that these wishes may be very diverse.41 This assertion of a buried 
agenda and objective common to all Muslims prevailed aside from ongoing political 
frictions among modernists and traditionalists during the 1950s. Anticipating 
quarrels at the Konstituante, modernists sought solace by proclaiming a common 
ideological aim of the Muslim camp. Hamka wrote: 
All this [difference] is political practice which to understand is sometimes not the 
same as to understand that two plus two makes four. [There are] ... many 
complications [belit]. But when it comes to strive for Islamic law to become the 
basis of the Indonesian Republic, that the head of state has to be a Muslim, this is a 
matter of life and death for Masjumi, PSII, NU, Perti ... and PPTI!42 
Up to the 1950s, shari 'ah had been an integral part of what made Islam a political 
force. The commitment for shari 'ah was braced by the supposition that such an 
agenda was the desire of a majority of the Muslim population. The view that an 
ideological, shari 'ah-minded Islam was at the cultural core of most Indonesians, 
however, continued despite the disappointing results of the 1955 elections. During 
the Konstituante, Natsir said: 
For us, as state philosophy Pancasila is vague and unable to do anything for the soul 
of the Muslim community which already has and owns an ideology that is 
unequivocal. .. comprehensive and lives in the heart of the Indonesian people as an 
obligation for life and the source for spiritual and physical strength: this [ideology] is 
Islam ... For us it is clear that the state must have roots which are directly implanted 
in society. Because of this the basis of the state, too, must be a belief that lives and is 
39 "Seman Umum" reprinted in Hikmah, 24 September 1955, p. 3 (capital in original). The author was 
Natsir. 
40 "Kalau Masjumi Pegang Pemerintahan", Hikmah, 2 April1955, p. 5. 
41 Kalau Masjumi. 
42 Hamka, "Harapan Kostintuante [sic] dengan dasar Islam", Hikmah, August 1956, p. 5. PPTI stands 
for Persarikatan Tionghoa Islam Indonesia or Chinese Indonesian Muslim Association, a small 
Sulawesi-based Islamic organisation. 
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carried out daily; which is clear and can be understood to arrange the daily lives of 
each individual in society and as a collective.43 
Yet, as shown in Chapter two, many Muslim groups and intellectuals gradually 
receded from central Islamist goals, thus showing the erroneousness of 
representational claims. Most importantly, they ceased to promote the state as being 
the patron of shari 'ah with the obligation to implement Islamic teachings among 
Muslims. Between the year of independence and the end of the New Order the 
ideological agenda of the Masyumi camp became disconnected from the Muslim 
mainstream. These setbacks led to palpable frustration among its adherents but they 
did little to revise their rhetoric. A recurrent pattern of Masyumi legatees thus 
became the exaggerated depiction of their potency and support in society, claiming 
that a state with a stronger Islamic component was the aspiration of the majority of 
Muslims. 
Frustration and Victimisation 
Masyumi legatees identified the enduring impact of regtme repression and 
propaganda on the self-awareness and the confidence of Muslims as a major 
domestic factor in their decline.44 Interference in Islamic organisations had diluted 
Islam's intellectual integrity and disrupted cadre formation. They lamented, in 
particular, that both the Old and the New Order successfully formed an image of 
Masyumi as counter-revolutionary.45 This had led to a misleading trend in history 
writing in which schoolbooks portrayed Masyumi as something "un-Indonesian", a 
party of radicals and subversives. It was an intentional distortion of the Masyumi 
legacy, which estranged Islam from Indonesian Muslims. As a result, many gifted 
young cadres were deterred from becoming involved in Islamist organisations. They 
feared it would lead to problems with New Order security and undermine their 
careers. DDII's ability to promote understanding of its ideological agenda both 
43 Combined quote ofNatsir, Dasar Negara, in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, p. 217 and p. 199 ("For us 
it is clear ... "). 
44 The "Muslim dogma" also explains why the oppression of Muslims was given greater attention and 
seen as having greater legitimacy than state reprisals against the left, human rights activists and labour 
movements. Douglas Ramage, Ideological Discourse in the Indonesian New Order: State Ideology and 
the Beliefs of an Elite, 1985-1993, PhD Thesis, 1995, p. 193. 
45 For critiques on this view see, for example, Yusril Ihza, Activism and Intellectualism and numerous 
Anwar Haryono editorials in Media Dakwah. 
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within and outside the organisation was also limited. The outcome was that only few 
members were well informed about Masyumi' s philosophy and legacy. 46 These 
factors made it difficult to set up a cadre base for the future. 
Disgruntled by four decades of political subjugation, the failure of the Masyumi 
camp to live up to its own expectations inspired a sizeable amount of literature 
lamenting the injustice of past defeats. Bulan Bintang leaders repeatedly attempted to 
disperse the view that Masyumi was directly involved in the establishment of the 
Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia ('Revolutionary Government of the 
Indonesian Republic', PRRI), countering regime propaganda that their brand of 
Islam was "un-Indonesian".47 They did so by underlining Masyumi's own nationalist 
credentials and denying that of Indonesian leftists. History, DDII proclaimed, had 
proven that Masyumi's dissolution in 1960 following the revolt was 'the result of a 
conspiracy of pro-PKI forces'. 48 Masyumi had never intended to replace President 
Soekarno but targeted the subversive communists. To obliterate Islam thus was part 
ofPKI's strategy to grasp power.49 
This domestically based frustration led to growmg defensiveness. 50 Masyumi 
legatees have increasingly come to believe in the existence of opponents who denied 
the involvement of Islam and nationhood and strove to severe this bond. They 
accused religious minorities of 'intolerance' as these were very rigid in their 
46 Fealy and Platzdasch, Masyumi Legacy, p. 88. 
47 This blame was based in Masyumi's support for Islam to become state ideology in the Konstituante 
and the involvement ofNatsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara in the PRRI 
revolts. "Korban Penulisan Sejarah?" ('A victim of history writing?'), Suara Masjid, February 1993. 
Bulan Bintang leaders, in response, deplored that Natsir found no mention in publications of the 
Department of Education and Culture such as the book 'Indonesia's National History'. Historians, 
they have demanded, ought to re-evaluate the role of the 'Muslim community' during the revolution 
and afterwards. Mahendra, Kongress. The PRRI was the regional government established 1957 in 
West Sumatra in opposition to the government in Jakarta. 
48 Siaran Pers: Pertemuan Pengurus Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) dengan Presiden 
Habibie tangal (sic) 30 Juni 1998 di Bina Graha, Jakarta. DDII leaders held that the involvement of 
Masyumi leaders was manipulated by Soekamo to control the party. Masyumi had affirmed that the 
PRRI rebellion was unconstitutional but its remaining leadership refrained from condemning party 
colleagues who had taken part in the uprising. According to Yusril, remaining Masyumi leaders, 
among them Prawoto, Pro£ Kasman Singodimedjo, Yunan Nasution and Mohammad Roem had not 
been informed about the flight of their comrades to Padang, West Sumatra. See Yusril Ihza Mahendra, 
"Prolog PRRI dan Keterlibatan Natsir-Sjafruddin", in Endang Saifuddin Anshari (ed.), Pak Natsir 80 
Tahun: Buku Pertama Pandangan dan Penilaian Generasi Muda, Media Dakwah, Jakarta, 1988. 
49 "Islam, Nationalism and Democracy-a Dialogue with Dr. Anwar Haryono", Studia Islamika, No.1, 
1995, pp. 185-207. 
50 Hefner mentions this in his Public Islam and Print Islam. 
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opposition against a greater political role of Islam, thus obstructing what Masyumi 
devotees wanted to see as the aspiration of the Muslim peoples to fully live in 
accordance with Islamic teachings. Natsir lamented: 
They [the Christians] do not tolerate any regulation that gives an opportunity to the 
Muslim community to order its lives in greater accordance with Islamic teachings ... 
If it already becomes customary [membudaya] that there is no tolerance for anything 
wanted by Islamic citizens ... before no green light is given by the fellow Christian 
citizens-if this becomes customary, do not be surprised if the Indonesian Islamic 
community which has been fighting together for the existence of this Indonesia 
Republic will perceive itself to be seen as second-class citizen. Or even less-
existing only if tolerated by others.51 
Characteristic of later decades was the accumulation of perceived foes, domestic and 
foreign, coupled to an apologetic rhetoric. Masyumi devotees strove to influence 
fellow Muslims by portraying PKI as tool of the Soviet Union, underscoring its alien 
nature. The PKI, they held, 'has to disguise as nationalist, has to feign to defend our 
national interests, because this is Stalin's order' .52 These endeavours to persuade the 
public opinion rose from an increased awareness that shari 'ah-minded Islam was 
only one contender for national identity despite a nominal Muslim majority. Hamka 
complained around the time of the Konstituante about what he spotted as an alliance 
of anti-Islamic forces: 
For the majority of nationalists ... only to hear the name Islam, not only to write 
[Islam] into the Constitution already is [a] sensitive [issue]. They endeavour not to 
mention this. Islam must not be advocated! They are unable to respect that for the 
Muslim community [Ummat Islam] this matter is a struggle of life and death! Any 
power, even if necessary a dictator, they do not mind; the main thing is that Islam 
does not emerge. And for this they have the same view as the communists. Because 
of this, they do not mind forming a united front with the communists ... And they 
also agree with Catholics and Protestants, that the main thing is that Islam is not 
adapted into the Constitution! Therefore, the nationalists, communists and Catholic 
Christians and the Protestants do not mind forming a united front to oppose this. 53 
The sense of loss and dependency grew in the New Order years. This mindset built 
on the resentment that had started with Dutch attempts to downplay the impact of 
Islam on cultures in the archipelago. Now, however, it was indigenous religious 
minorities and the Christian missionaries who were specifically identified as the 
51 Natsir, Toleransi, pp. 6-7. 
52 "PKI a/at Negara Asing" ('PKI is a tool offoreign countries'), Hikmah, 16 March 1957. 
53 Hanuca, Harapan, p. 5. 
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enemy. 54 In the longer run, Masyumi legatees have come to tackle the 
Christianisation issue in a similar absolute fashion as Islamists elsewhere. They 
associated it with the medieval crusades which Islamists tend to tum 'into something 
like a holocaust, better to extract confessions of culpability from the West' .55 This 
victimisation inspired an idealised discourse of Islam's role in history and the 
spreading of its teachings. Masyumi legatees always highlighted that Christians, 
unlike Muslims, used inappropriate means to proselytise. In 1954, Natsir wrote that 
'Muslims are only obliged to 'call [ memanggil] ... ! To call, unrelated to any 
coercion.' 56 And in 1967 he lamented that 'ten thousands [Muslims] were forced' to 
become Christians because of' sweet-talk' and the money of Christian missions. 57 
Masyumi legatees did not so much envisage the New Order state as enemy, but 
rather competed for its favour to counter the Islamic decline. Their adversary was a 
supposed alliance of nominal Muslims and non-Muslim minorities shielded by the 
military. Together, this alliance had captured the state from its rightful Muslim 
"owners" and used missionary programs to further misrepresent the Islamic national 
character. Disillusioned that it lost the support of the urban Muslim middle-class as 
many chose to adapt to the "necessities" by dropping Islamist agendas, DDII stated 
in a typical resentful statement in 1993: 
We together will be incessantly confronted ... through several ways, from flattering to 
betrayal, many in the Muslim community are robbed. They even applaud with 
pleasure ... We are not anti-minority. During the time of the Prophet there were also 
minorities ... What we cannot approve is if the minority dominates the majority, 
because it will disturb the balance.58 
54 This happened despite a 1967 government decree which excluded adherents of 'religions' as targets 
of missionary activities and other regulations that aimed to protect Muslims (No. 70 and 77/1978, 
Ministry of Religion). Islamist organisations held these decrees to be ineffective. Anwar Harjono, 
Melangkah Dalam Cuaca Yang Sedang Berubah (Penjelasan Mengenai Kebijakan-Kebijakan Dewan 
Da 'wah 1991-1993), Jakarta, 23 April1993, speech at the Pertemuan Silaturahmi DDII, Jakarta, 23-
24.4.1993, p. 5. 
55 Martin Kramer, "Islam for viewers like you", Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2002. 
56 Mohammad Natsir, Keragaman Hidup Antar-Agama, (no publisher, no place), 1954. In reality, 
Islam had been spread through peaceful as well as through coercive means. See, for example, Kramer, 
Viewers. 
57 Mohammad Natsir, Kode Toleransi Beragama, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1967. 
58 Perlu Mawas Diri Seusai Idul Fithri: Pidato Silaturrahmi Idul Fithri Keluarga Besar Dewan 
Da'wah Islamiyah Indonesia di Jakarta, 6 May 1993. Also Penjelasan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia Tentang Situasi dan Perkembangan terakhir di Tanah Air & Penentuan Iedul (sic) Fithri 
1414 H, Sekretariat DDII Pusat, 1994. 
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The New Order regime further distorted the meaning ofPancasila from a uniting to a 
divisive doctrine. When the government enforced Pancasila as the 'sole ideological 
foundation' (asas tunggal) in the mid-1980s, Masyumi legatees saw it as the pinnacle 
of initiatives against Muslims; a development initiated 40 years earlier with the 
removal of the Jakarta Charter. In the regime's language, the 'sole ideological 
foundation' was aimed at the final stage of Islam's 'inclusion' in the state. But for 
the Masyumi camp and indeed many ordinary Muslims it debarred their religion 
from the shared platform Pancasila had promised to be. Natsir echoed this feeling of 
segregation: 
Is the inner tranquillity [ketentraman perasaan] of the [Muslim] ummah in our 
country still equally seen as one aspect of what is said to be the national interests 
which are always mentioned in those official speeches? This is what needs to be 
answered, if not with words then with deeds and [improved] conditions. Please listen 
• 1s9 to our v01ce, too. 
The feeling of segregation prevailed despite the regime maintaining religious 
elements in politics which it aimed to control rather than to eradicate altogether.60 
The government also attempted to make up for the political restrictions by ensuring 
that Muslims could privately pursue a pious life.61 Many Muslim activists saw asas 
tunggal as a chance to spread Islam to all parties, including Golkar. 62 Yet though 
Golkar adopted a stronger Islamic temperament, it certainly never contemplated 
adopting an ideological agenda. With asas tunggal, the state once again suggested to 
constitutionally operating Islamists that their aims were illegitimate. This was the 
tenor of a letter by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to then President Soeharto: 
If Pancasila, rather than being the foundation of the state has to be turned into the 
basis of human life, then this means that the religions revealed by The Almighty 
God ... have to be exchanged for an ideology, which does not call itself a religion, but 
in its behaviour seems to wish to replace existing religions ... Why ... has the Islamic 
59 Mohammad Natsir, "Tolong Dengarkan Pula Suara Kami", Media Dakwah, 101, 1982. Re-printed 
in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, p. 302. 
60 Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 89 and 101. The best example for this was the continuing importance of the 
Ministry of Religion. 
61 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 120. The active support for Islamic religious life contrasted with the Dutch 
policy of non-interference, with which the New Order, however, shared the dislike of a politically 
active Islam (p. 122). 
62 Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 122. 
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foundation to be replaced by the Pancasila? What crime has the Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan or the HMI, or any other Muslim organisation committed?63 
Such sense of victimisation rendered Masyumi legatees increasingly sectarian. The 
outcome was a more cheerless and gloomy mind-set that helped to isolate its 
proponents from the society they had claimed to represent and desired to lead. But in 
depicting themselves as victims, Islamist attacks against Christians and seculars took 
on a sense of a profoundly just cause. The resulting antagonism was, as a DDII 
document put it, 'only to protect ourselves. It is self-defence' .64 A Forum Ukhuwah 
Islamiyah ('Islamic Brotherhood Forum', FUI) meeting summed up the stiff 
formulas and the dourness many Masyumi legatees had taken on by the mid-1980s. It 
held: 
History shows that the colonialists who are minorities were able to prevail three and 
a half centuries because they used the tactics of 'divide et impera' ... by not 
permitting the majority (native citizens fpenduduk pribumi]) to form a united 
struggle. The strength ofthe majority is the spirit of togetherness which contravenes 
the tactics of divide et impera. History notes that when the Indonesian people 
regained their independence ... after having faced colonialists (Portugal, Holland, 
Japan) for approximately five centuries, the majority of the Indonesian people are 
Muslim +- 90% and the rest (+-10%) are Christians, Catholics, Hindus and 
Buddhists. As a colonised nation [we] have deficiencies ... toward the colonialist 
nation (the West) that is: poverty, stupidity and backwardness. And so the Muslim 
community, which is the majority ... qualitatively is in a worse condition (poorer, 
more stupid, more backward, and more suffering!).65 
The belief in the encroachment of non-indigenous value systems on national identity 
turned gradually into an inseparable part of this conviction. Without the intrusion of 
incongruous concepts-most importantly communism-and customs, Islam, they 
insist, would have prospered. As Islam was closest to the character of most 
Indonesians, its undisturbed flourishing had prevented ideological conflict and the 
resulting social upheavals of recent decades. Indonesia, therefore, would be self-
reliant and prosperous. The abolition of the Jakarta Charter merely remains as a focal 
point of vast symbolic meaning for this belief. 
63 Letter by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to President Soeharto, 7 July 1983, reprinted as "Pancasila as 
the Sole Foundation", Indonesia, No. 38, October 1994, pp. 74-85. 
64 Da 'wah Bil-Lisan Dan Bil (Lisanil) Hal (Laporan Kebijakan Dewan Da 'wah Islamiyah Indonesia 
Selama 24 Tahun), (no place), 24 May 1991, p. 3. 
65 A.M. Luthfi, "Sambutan Presidium FUI Pusat pada Simposium Nasional Gerakan Muda Islam", 25-
27 August 1996, Jakarta, reprinted in Sejarah Pergerakan Umat Visi & Misi FUI, (no publisher, no 
place, no date, probably 1996), pp. 7-8. 
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With the obsession of Masyumi legatees of re-positioning Islam as the fundamental 
pillar of the state and nation, it was not surprising that, in the 1990s, they reacted 
pragmatically to the regime's rapprochement. Their relationship with the 
bureaucracy smoothed and Islamist groups were allowed greater access to financial 
resources. 66 The government also started to promote Islamic laws, though most of the 
initiatives only affected regulations on family law and inheritance. The laws were 
passed through the Religious Judicature Act of 1989 that restored and simplified the 
jurisdiction of Islamic courts handling inheritance. 67 This promotion of Islamic laws 
suggested to parts of the Islamist camp that the Islamisation of the state was feasible 
without having to change the Constitution. In 1995, the government rehabilitated 
several Masyumi leaders. This was a symbolically important step.68 In the following 
years, Anwar Haryono intensified the guarded accommodation that had begun under 
Natsir and toned down criticism of the government. In the course of the 
rapprochement, several Islamist leaders joined Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
('United Development Party', PPP).69 
Many Masyumi legatees pragmatically adapted to the regimes' shifts of policy but 
they sustained their deep distrust toward their secular and non-Muslim rivals. Anwar 
tellingly addressed a DDII meeting under the dictum, 'Taking steps in the middle of 
66 The government provided more facilities to organisations such as DDII; the working relationship 
with the Department of Religion improved and local bureaucrats stopped harassing Muslim preachers. 
Interview, Rifyal Ka'bah, Jakarta, 22 September 2000. It also permitted female students to wear the 
Muslim headscarf (jilbab) in state schools. 
67 See Mark Cammack, "Islam and Nationalism in Indonesia: Forging an Indonesian Madhhab", in 
The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution and Progress, Harvard University Press, 2001. In 
1988, the government approved an Islam-friendly law on national education; one year later it formally 
recognised Islamic courts. An Islamic bank was established in 1992 and the state lottery dissolved. 
Muslims obtained better access to the bureaucracy and the military. Despite various concessions, 
however, the regime, similar to the governments of many other Muslim countries, ensured it 
maintained firm control. Mark Cammack, "Indonesia's 1989 Religious Judicature Act: Islamisation of 
Indonesia or Indonesianisation of Islam?", Indonesia, No. 63, April 1997, pp. 143-68. 
68 Six Masyumi notables received a medal of honour: Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Ki Bagus 
Hadikusomo, Kasman Singodimedjo, YusufWibisono, Dr. Abu Hanifah and Mohammad Jamil 
Jambek. Natsir, Sjafruddin and Burhanuddin Harahap, DDII leaders believed, were not considered due 
to their involvement in the PRRI regional uprisings. Anwar Haryono "Pak Prawoto dan Tokoh-tokoh 
Masyumi mendapat Bintang Kehormatan", Media Dakwah, November 1995, pp. 6-7. From the late 
1980s on and especially since the mid-1990s, the jail sentences of several leading Islamist activists, 
such as the GPI and PII cadres A.M. Fatwa and Abdul Qadir Djaelani were reduced. 
69 Among those were DDII Secretary-General Hussein Umar, the DDII Chairmen A.M. Saefuddin and 
Faisal Baasir and the outspoken DDII activist and writer Lukman Hakiem. 
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a climate change', and advised 'to make the best of it'.7° Citing Natsir, Anwar asked 
whether the 'Dewan Dakwah Family forever only wants to be a spectator' and 
contemplated strategic questions on how to consolidate Muslims politically. He 
raised the question by once again evoking the ideal of a uniform and united Muslim 
community leading Indonesia ahead. Anwar unintentionally revealed the futility of 
this hope by linking it to two umbrella organisations, MUI and FUI, whose impact on 
broader umat affairs were minor at best: 
[A]re we, the Muslim community, already one community [shaj] now? Indeed we 
have the Indonesian Ulama Council [MUI], which is a bridge between the umat and 
the government. Indeed we have the Islamic Brotherhood Forum [FUI], a receptacle 
for leaders of various Islamic organisations to meet. But can they already speak by 
representing the voice of the Muslim community? ... To the leaders ofthe umat ... I 
invite them to answer this for themselves. In fact, the answers are already there, even 
have been there for a long time. But when are we capable of giving a joint answer? 
And on this basis, [will] we make joint steps? Make steps in which direction? We 
[will] have to answer this question together. Because, while proceeding, we have 
also to investigate the climate around us. Does the climate already allow us to make 
this joint step? I see that the climate already has changed. What was previously a 
climate strongly dominated by the winds brought by the minority; lately the wind of 
the majority has begun to blow. Whether this wind, which is only light at the 
moment, really will bring fresh air in our lives, is among other things dependent on 
our stand and the steps that we undertake. If we want to stay only spectators in the 
schemes [permainan-permainan], which currently take place, then the light breeze 
might just tum into a haunting hurricane.71 
The desire to regain what Islamist rhetoric typically depicted as "Muslim" political 
and economic power was most apparent in the contest over Soeharto' s successor as 
President. With the start of the economic crisis in late 1997, Masyumi legatees 
geared up to regain the political centre stage for which they had claimed legitimacy. 
But their weak position against the secular opposition suggested acting cautiously in 
bringing about the end of Soeharto's presidency. At that stage, anticipating the end of 
Soeharto' s term, PPP and sections of the Bulan Bin tang community stepped up 
support for the Chairman ofiCMI, B.J. Habibie.72 This support was then channelled 
70 Anwar Haryono, "Mengamati Situasi di Era Reformasi", in Suharsono and Edi Ryanto (compilers), 
Partai Politik Era Reformasi, PT Abadi, Jakarta, 1998, p. 11-21 (quote: p. 11). 
71 Perlu Mawas Diri Seusai Idul Fithri. For similar statements, see Penjelasan Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia Tentang Situasi dan Perkembangan terakhir di Tanah Air & Penentuan Iedul 
(sic) Fithri 1414 H, Sekretariat DDII Pusat, 1994. 
72 In late 1997, PPP once again had been urged into backing Soeharto's candidature for presidency. At 
the same time, PPP strongly supported Habibie's bid for vice-presidency in anticipation of a change of 
regime in the near future. Faisal Baasir, "Mengawal Agenda Reformasi", in Lukman Hakiem, Sultan 
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through the Badan Koordinasi Umat Islam (BKUI), the modernist-dominated body 
that was charged to prepare a sole political vehicle for the Bulan Bintang 
community. 73 The prospect of advancing their strategic position was the reason that 
Masyumi legatees opted to conserve the New Order rather than overthrowing it too 
early. It was pivotal to prevent the secular-nationalist opposition around PDIP 
Chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri from gaining power and thus once agam 
obstructing the progress of Islam in the formation of the national character. 
This mindset prompted several Masyumi legatees to look for influential allies in the 
political elite. To curb PDIP and its army allies, from the mid-1990s on, these 
Islamists strove to build up relations with the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara 
N asional Indonesia, TNI). The goal was for officers sympathetic to Islam to gain 
high ranks in the military. In return, their key ally, the Head of the army's strategic 
command Kostrad, Prabowo Subianto, and his associates, provided funding for DDII 
and KISDI and helped to make individual associates in the wider Bulan Bintang 
camp quite well-heeled. 
The anticipation of getting back centre stage was thus more immediately relevant 
than gaining instant political freedom. 74 A DDII leader recapitulated his 
organisation's focus on interim targets after having pragmatically collaborated with 
the regime: 
DDII and parts of the Muslim community saw this as an ... opportunity to enter into 
the political inner circle ... When Soeharto was about to fall he ... approached DDII 
and DDII saw this ... as a moment of which advantage can be taken to return into the 
inner circle of politics ... temporarily with Soeharto as President. So that in the post-
Soeharto era [we] would be in a good position. But Soeharto fell too quickly ... DDII 
and the others [Islamist organisations] did not have the chance yet to gain strength in 
Mufit and Miftahudin (eds.), Faisal Baasir: Politik Jalan Lurus, Dharmapena Nusantara, Jakarta, 
2001. See also chapter six. 
73 See, for example, DDII's 'recommendations' of the Musyawarah Besar ('Great Consulation'): 
"Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia", reprinted in Suharsono and 
Edi Ryanto (compilers), Partai Politik Era Reformasi, PT Abadi, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 81-97; Haryono, 
Mengamati, p. 18. Also Interview, Mohammad Soleiman, Jakarta, 29 September 2000. 
74 Islamist students groups also were more guarded in their actions against the faltering government 
than the secular opposition. The former demonstrated against regime policies without making the 
resignation of Soeharto a top priority. Their motive was not to endanger the position of Islam. 
Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Andi Rahmat and several KAMMI activists, Jakarta, 16 January 2001. 
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia ('United Action Front oflndonesian Muslim Students', 
KAMMI) was the largest and most influential of these groups. 
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power elites. DDII did not oppose reformasi and [did not want to] etemalise the New 
Order regime but desired for a chance to gain more power [ingin punya kesempatan 
berkuasa lebih kuat]. . . After Soeharto would have made a configuration in which 
Islam entered, only then he [was supposed] to resign and DDII could take part ... 
Because [we] saw the danger of [our] political opponents seizing power.75 
The representational claim of Masyumi legatees over national identity resumed in the 
post-1998 reformasi era. In a bid to re-write the historical assessment ofMasyumi, in 
mid-1998 DDII requested President Habibie to rehabilitate the 'fighter champions for 
independence' (tokoh-tokoh Pejuang Kemerdekaan) Natsir, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap and awarding them the title 'national 
hero' .76 In addition, they demanded the abolition of the ban on Masyumi 
(presidential decree No. 200/1960).77 The rehabilitation was realised in early 
November 1998 during a DDII summit. 78 Habibie described Natsir as a 'great man' 
and extolled his merits in bringing about the unitary form of state. This was the first 
official appreciation by the Indonesian government in 32 years but it did little to halt 
the sentiment of victimisation among Masyumi legatees. 79 
By 1998, the globalisation of information had heightened Muslim awareness toward 
international political issues. This awareness was accompanied by an accumulation 
of perceived enemies. Masyumi legatees nowadays identify the policies of the US 
and its allies as historical continuation of the Dutch colonial power. Both operated on 
the same premise; that is, to inflict an alien value system and lifestyle on Indonesia 
and oppress the political and material progress of Muslims. The call from the Middle 
Eastern icons of Islamism to face up to the global Islamic crisis through a 
comprehensive effort to revitalise Islam gripped senior Indonesian Islamic leaders 
75 Interview Kholil Rid wan, Jakarta, 8 November 200 I. 
76 A DDII press release reiterated Natsir's role in drafting the 'integral motion' and his other efforts 
for the public weal such as being granted financial help from Japan for Indonesia in the 1980s. 
Further, DDII highlighted Sjafruddin's role as President of the Emergency Government, managing to 
safeguard the republic internationally while Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta were imprisoned by 
the Dutch. Siaran Pers: Pertemuan Pengurus Dewan Dakwah lslamiyah Indonesia (DDII) dengan 
Presiden Habibie tangal (sic) 30 Juni 1998 di Bina Graha, Jakarta. 
77 Hasil-Hasil Musyawarah Besar Dewan Dakwah, in Partai Politik Era Reformasi, pp. 81-97. 
78 This was the Silaturahmi Nasional ('National Goodwill Meeting'). 
79 "Sambutan Presiden R.I. Prof. Dr. B.J. Habibie", Silaturrahmi Nasional dan Peluncuran Home 
Page Keluarga Besar Dewan Dakwah, 1-2 November 1998, Jakarta, p. 4. The meeting was attended 
by many state officials and opened by President Habibie in the state palace. Participants included 
State-Secretary Akbar Tanjung (Golkar), Minister for Religious Affairs Dr. Malik Fadjar 
(Muhammadiyah) and former Finance Minister Dr. Fuad Bawazier (HMI). 
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since the 1950s. 80 The emergmg thought pattern echoed that of other Muslim 
societies. As elsewhere, the adaptation of conspiracy theories that reinvigorated the 
belief in the perennial foes of Islam was, at its core, 'rooted in the frustration ... of 
colonialism and dependency' .81 Nonetheless, its jihadist drive never became the 
intellectual basis for the actions of Masyumi legatees. They adopted a defensive 
spirit and the amassing of enemies but did not modify political strategies. 
Reconstructing Muslim Identity in a Global Conspirational Context 
The influx of foreign Islamist ideology incited a higher degree of ideological 
sensitivity and antagonism into Indonesian Islamism. It enhanced cross-religious 
suspicion and popularised the view that Islam was under siege by Western ideologies 
intruding on Muslim homelands. At the same time, it proclaimed that Islam was to 
finally emerge as the victor in this historic battle of cultures. The global impact of 
capitalist and communist rivalry and the perceived role of Christian and Zionist 
ideology in it encroached Islam no later than the 1950s.82 Islam's hostility toward 
communism had provided common ground with the US during the Cold War. In the 
1950s, Indonesian Islamic parties, including Masyumi, looked with sympathy to the 
US, also for its conception of democracy. They had accepted constitutionalism and 
nationalism as the fundaments of the state, even though striving for a formal Islamic 
character. The adaptation of the nation-state model led to a revision of the ways 
Muslims conducted relations with other nations. 83 It became customary to pursue a 
secular-pragmatic line in maintaining relations with other, non-Muslim, countries. 
They were no longer based on the stipulations of the Islamic canon but were brought 
within the framework of modem international law. They necessitated a peaceful co-
80 Natsir's senior positions in several international Islamic organisations in the 1950s fostered this 
connection. He was Vice-President of the World Islamic Congress in Pakistan and headed a number of 
international Congresses in Saudi Arabia and Damascus. 
81 David Zeidan, "The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle", MERIA, Vol. 5, 
No.4, December 2001, pp. 26-53. 
82 See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia ('Islam amidst the World's 
Turmoil') Bandung, Al-Ma'arif, 1950, p. 27. With its concentration on communal duties and the 
collective, Islamism is inherently hostile to capitalism. Though connected to technological and 
scientific advance, capitalism, the common judgment holds, had failed to bring about social justice. 
With its rejection of God, communism, of course, is an Islamic anathema, despite any social 
consciousness and sympathy for the deprived Islamists might share. 
83 Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law. 
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existence and dropped the doctrine of jihad and the division of the world in an 
Islamic (dar-a! Islam) and an infidel and thus unreceptive (dar-a! harb) domain.84 
They also marked the start of apologetic discourse in the Muslim world, which 
attempted to prove that Islam demanded an egalitarian co-existence of nations and 
not to conquer, both peaceful and through physical means, in the name of religion. 
The first significant setback came in the later 1960s when the US gave military 
support to Israel in the confrontation with Arab nations. 85 Around the same time, 
western pop culture invaded Muslim lands to an unprecedented degree and enhanced 
the antagonism of devoted Muslims who proclaimed the alienation of Muslims from 
their religion and suspected this to be part of a master plan to subdue them. 86 
Responding to this, Masyumi leaders called on fellow Muslims to give consideration 
to the works of ideologues such as Qutb and Mawdudi, which were 'already far 
different' from earlier reformists such as Abduh and which became more easily 
available in Indonesia from the 1970s on. Hamka anticipated the common view in 
today' s Muslim world that Western nations desired to subvert Muslims to their 
secular life-styles with the goal of obliterating Islam. He said: 
84 Ibid. 
... [ u ]ntil today the Islamic world is an object, and its soil [seen as] extremely rich. 
At the same time [Islam] has an ideology which until now has been dormant ... After 
the Islamic world found itself again, their [the West's] aim is for [the Islamic world] 
to take on Western thought, Western teaching, Western life-style. Therefore, by the 
time the political colonisation has been fmished, the West and the communist world 
endeavour to implant a new colonisation which is more shattering, that is, 
intellectual colonisation r,penjajahan fikiran] ... Al-ghazwul Fikri [lit: 'the invasion 
of ideas'] is a tremendous propaganda technique, through all means, both uncouth 
and civil, both cultural and academic, so that the Islamic world departs its way of 
thinking from its religious basis ... For this it is not necessary to change one's 
85 The US subsequently tolerated Israeli occupation of the Gaza strip, the West bank and East 
Jerusalem. This was despite that several UN resolutions had declared the occupations as illegal. US 
economic sanctions against Iraq and large sums of US foreign aid going to Israel were other factors 
making the belief in a global Jewish-backed US effort against Muslims accepted wisdom. The 1987 
foundation ofKISDI reflected the heightened concern of the 'Masyumi community' for international 
Islamic issues. 
86 Islamists thus see Western 'crusaderism' as 'a systematic plan to eradicate Islam linking medieval 
Christianity, modem imperialism, and Western consumer culture'. Though Southeast Asian Islam was 
untouched by the crusades, its notion, Kramer observed, has appeared to touch on 'collective Muslim 
memory'. Kramer, Fundamentalist. 
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religion. One may well remain a Muslim, while no longer holding on to [meyakini] 
the teachings of Islam. 87 
With the presence of Israel amidst Muslim lands as its pinnacle, global events 
evoked latent prejudices and awareness of their religiously legitimated 
underpinnings. Muslims at all times put themselves on the defensive. Islam, senior 
Masyumi economist Sjafruddin Prawiranegara assured his readers, was established 
as a 'synthesis' of Christianity and Judaism and did 'not act hostile but always 
sought brotherhood' toward these faiths. But 'in reverse, Christians and Jews always 
tried to destroy Islam though in vain.' 88 Such preconceived formulas cemented a 
binary ideological and intellectual battle line between Islam and an assortment of 
other doctrines and creeds with Islam's final victory depicted as a divine certainty. 
Aided by the fictitious anti-Semitic document 'The Protocols of the Elders of Zion', 
it postulated a Jewish plan for world domination.89 This pamphlet, which has been 
easily available throughout the Muslim world, portrayed any innovation of political 
and economic doctrine in the 20th century-communism, secularism, liberalism, 
individualism and Women's liberation-as threats for Muslim societies imposed and 
steered by a Zionist plot.90 Ready for use by Middle Eastern polemicists, an 
increasing number of Indonesian Muslims, too, came to see Jews as the heralds of 
societal transformation, infiltrating other countries with the goal 'to destroy barriers 
of creed' and reaping the benefit 'into the hands of the great usurious Jewish 
financial institutions' .91 Sjafruddin evoked the allegations of the "protocols" when he 
proclaimed in 1950: 
In fact, communism has since long infiltrated the world. [Among the] Western 
Christians, in the form of cruel "capitalism" brought by Jews ... The Jews' entire 
87 Speech at a conference of the Muhammadiyah Tanwir (Religious) Board, 25 to 28 December 1969, 
Ponogoro, reprinted as Beberapa Tantangan terhadap Islam Dimasa Kini ('Several Challenges for 
Islam in the Present Time'), Bulan Bintang, 1973, pp. 9-10. 
88 Prawirane~ara, Pergolakan, p. 65. 
89 In mid-19 century, a French lawyer, Maurice Joly, wrote a fictitious dialogue between 
Montesquieu and Machiavelli as a veiled critique against Napoleon III. In the late 191h century, 
Russian anti-Semitists falsified their polemics as being based on a Jewish plot for world domination. 
See Martin van Bruinessen, "Y ahudi sebagai Simbol dalam W acana Islam Indonesia Masa Kini", 
unpublished manuscript, 1993. 
90 Van Bruinessen, Yahudi. Islamists, van Bruinessen points out, have distorted the meaning of 
Zionism. The term stood for the Jewish secular movement grounded in a Jewish national identity. 
Zionism was not related to religious zeal. 
91 Zeidan, Perennial Battle, referring to Qutb's Social Justice in Islam. 
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soul is chained to the world, toward materialism [mat erie]. . . Communism and 
capitalism are different as a doctrine (paham] [but] with regard to those who 
establish and propose them it is the same... It is no coincidence that both the 
American capitalists and the Russian communists support the Israeli state, because 
both of them are Jews. It is the Jews who will eventually lead this world into a lethal 
fight on top of two dogmas, [that is] communism and capitalism, which in fact are 
completely hollow [hampa]. The life and fate of hundreds of millions of souls are 
manipulated [ dipermainkan] and wagered [ dipertaruhkan] in a devastating conflict 
as if the soul of humankind has no meaning, has no virtue.92 
The tensions at home and cathartic events such as the 1967 Israel victory over an 
alliance of Arab states were fundamental in triggering the conviction in the 
incompatibility of hybrid ideologies such as Arab Socialism or Pancasila with Islam 
and the need to cultivate a comprehensive (kaffah) form of Islam instead. Muslims 
appeared in danger to "Westernise" Islam, in the sense that they seemingly detached 
their faith from its philosophical essence. This, Islamists argued, was enabled 
through uncritical submission to the Western modernity and progress paradigm, 
driven by the subordination of faith to reason. The epitome of this crisis in Islam and 
a major symbol for the demise of Muslim unity in a global context had been the 
downfall of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924.93 This set off the corrosion of Islamic 
identity. Natsir recorded: 
With free reasoning the Turkish people have ... endanger[ed] progress ... destroy[ed] 
all the strength of the Turkish people ... With free reasoning they modernised the 
administration of government, they introduced Western science, technics and 
Western organisations. With free reasoning they also discarded Islamic law, Islamic 
legal penalties [hudud]. Intoxicated by free reasoning they did not know to 
differentiate between what is harmful...and has to be dropped and ... [what is] useful 
and has to be maintained. Free reasoning does not know limits, does not draw limits. 
With free reasoning they shed everything of the old traditions ... without thinking 
critically ... without ... investigation, whether all of this is in agreement with the basis 
of Islam, in accordance with the "Spirit of Islam". No, the main thing is that it 
92 Prawiranegara, Pergolakan, p. 41. The charges against the Jews have rested on their perceived 
breach of God's orders. Very common has been the naming of usury. Watt, Mohammad, pp. 205-6. 
93 See, for example, Kepel, Jihad, p. 43. The Ottoman caliphate was one of several Islamic empires in 
which Muslim political power had reached its peak in the 161h century. The Turkish state, coming 
about as a result of its overthrow, brought about the first formal separation of the personal and the 
public realm in Muslim history and enabled the triumph of nationalism. Echoing the Islamist view that 
the demise of the caliphate marked the first major defeat of the Islamic civilisation against Western 
hegemony, Hamka described the founder of Turkey, Mustapha Kemal (Attatiirk), as the 'first pioneer' 
of ghazwul fikri. Hamka, Beberapa Tantangan, pp. 9-10. The indictment that the end of the caliphate 
caused among Indonesian Muslims was nonetheless more reserved than in the Middle Eastern region, 
partly for geopolitical reasons. Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 316. 
141 
matches with the want of free reasoning; the main thing is [to be] in accordance with 
the "Spirit of the West/". 94 (Italic in original) 
Despite such unease and bellicose rhetoric, the political themes of Masyumi legatees 
continued to be domestic, unlike the broader focus of adherents of foreign Islamist 
ideology. At the same time, litanies over the perceived acceptance by Muslims of 
Western conceptions showed that the Masyumi camp had, at no stage, resolved the 
problems arising from the blend of European state concepts and the desire to sustain 
an Islamic identity of this state including its obligation to execute shari 'ah law. Yet 
still there appeared to be greater willingness to succumb to the 'law of nations' based 
on European concepts and the belief that such a system could also be made suitable 
for Muslim lands. In comparison, foreign Islamist models, at least in their long-term 
conception, moved beyond such an allegiance and envisaged a different societal 
model. 
One distinct trait of the Masyumi tradition has been unequivocal devotion to a 
constitutional struggle. Although groups such as Jamaat-i-Islami also mostly 
operated as a legal political participant rejecting armed struggle, this did not amount 
to the Masyumi principle of strict constitutionality (taat hukum ), which persisted 
even if the laws it had to adhere to were deemed un-Islamic. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, by comparison, was at times a secretive organisation prone to 
revolutionary means including violence, and, at other times, a legal political party 
claiming to back democracy. 95 The commitment to other key features of a democratic 
system varied as well. Mawdudi, al-Banna and Qutb at times argued in favour of a 
one-party system, an ideal of classless society. Masyumi saw this aim as 
contravening a central democratic principle. Masyumi also appeared more supportive 
toward freedom of speech, the separation of powers and parliamentary rule. Most 
Masyumi devotees also appeared flexible in their shari 'ah approach and application. 
By contrast, major non-Indonesian ideologues, especially Qutb, claimed to be 
94 Mohammad Natsir, Islam dan Aka! Merdeka, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1970, p. 21. This pamphlet 
was an attack against Ali Abd al-Raziq, the main conceptualist ofKemalist Turkey. Al-Raziq was 
pivotal in cementing the argument that Islam was not related to political authority. He strongly 
influenced later generations in sketching a modem Muslim state more strictly along Western lines. 
95 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 34-5. The swift in the Brotherhood's strategy from Islamic revolution to 
missionary and educational activities appeared to have taken place in the late 1960s. Sana Abed-
Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt", 
International Studies of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No.3, August 1995, pp. 321-39. 
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staunch defenders of a literal adaptation of Islamic teachings. 96 All, however, did 
little to specify the technicalities of the envisaged Islamic system.97 
Another difference was the direction and scope of the Islamisation of society. 
Mawdudi dismissed the concept of a nation as un-Islamic and postulated a Muslim 
homeland freed from state paradigms. 98 By contrast, the Masyumi tradition, though 
equally devoted to the universality of the Islamic message, remained faithful to the 
idea of a national state desired to govern and to become active in the execution of 
Islam among Muslims. Both camps had a different sensitivity to the ideological 
enemy. Masyumi legatees, above all, remained dedicated to a struggle against groups 
whom they held to have captured the state from Muslims. Jihadist spirit, however, 
not only targeted impious governments but above all an "impious" worldview in its 
historical context. 
Hence, the doctrinal arguments of post-New Order Masyumi legatees repeated those 
of other transitional periods in 1945, 1957 to 1959 and 1966 to 1968 but its 
awareness had turned international, depicting Muslims as victims of a global 
manipulation of commerce, wealth and political culture. In the major features of its 
outlook and rhetoric, Indonesian defensive sentiment entirely fitted in the global 
model.99 It did not add any distinctive features to a discourse that, by 1998, already 
had been evolving around binary stereotypes of good and bad. 100 As such, a US-led 
campaign allegedly conspired to maintain Sino-Christian domination of the 
Indonesian economy. 101 The ensuing associations from domestic to foreign plots and 
from Christian plots to Zionist ones illustrated the strong ties between the sense of 
loss, the need to make out culprits for the perceived defeat and accumulating them 
which at the same time shuts them off from rational debate. Domestic motives for 
96 Akhavi, Dialectic. 
97 Kotob, Accommodationists. For Islamist parties' promotion of shari'ah, see chapter four. 
98 Mawdudi promoted an Islamic state covering the Indian subcontinent. 
99 Islamists commonly condemn the West--especially the US-for backing authoritarian Muslim 
regimes for strategic and economic benefit and only supporting democracy if it does not bring 
Islamists to power. They also have critiqued US exploitation of the world's oil resources and the 
alleged manipulations of global finances, the latter charge mostly being targeted against Israel. 
100 B" f ft . d th . . d mary stereotypes, o course, are o en mrrrore on e recetvmg en . 
101 These concerns supplanted the ubiquitous propaganda against Christian missionary activities in the 
New Order years. 
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Islamist suspicions against non-Muslims were fed by growing sensitivities for the 
plight of fellow Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere which appeared to 
confirm Qur' anic warnings. 'Hatred and hostility', the Partai Keadilan ('Justice 
Party', PK) -based Almuzzamil Yusuf proclaimed, 'are de rigueur [sunnatullah] for 
those outside Islam [and] will continue until judgment day, as alluded to 
[diisyaratkan] by the Qur'an' .102 
The public Muslim discourse in the reformasi era showed that the translation of this 
sense of dependency and vulnerability into a defensive spirit had by now exceeded 
those Islamists embracing foreign ideological models as basis for their actions. 
Israel's occupation of Palestine and the atrocities against Bosnian Muslims nurtured 
the pervasive belief in the contemporary Islamic world that Muslims are the 
community most discriminated. 103 PPP claimed in the MPR: 
In every place in the world with a Muslim majority, there is no repression of the 
minority. Difficulties only arise anywhere [dimana-mana] where Muslims are the 
minority; this is a fact from history itself. 104 
Muslim-majority countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Malaysia have a 
long history of discrimination against their non-Muslim minorities. This renders such 
incorrect statements as either ignorance on the part of the Islamists or intentional 
misinformation. 
In particular, it has become a comfortable typecast for Islamism in all places to 
condemn the International Monetary Fond (IMF) as a Jewish-backed tool. The IMF 
was implicated in a 'five-decade lasting strategy' to 'pull up a giant supermarket 
under the control of the US ... To loan money as done by the Jews, the US and also 
the IMF is necessary for them to dominate and control the receiving countries' .105 
102 Almuzzamil Yusuf, Hizbus Syaithan Mengepung Dunia Islam, reprinted in Irwan Prayitno, 
Kepribadian Dai: Bahan Panduan bagi Dai dan Murabbi, Seri Pendidikan Islam, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 
Bekasi, 2002, pp. 85-93 (quote: p. 91). 
103 The Palestinians, the Filipino Moros, the Chechens and the Chinese Uighurs are examples of 
oppressed minority Muslim populaces. 
104 Risalah Sementara Rapat Komisi A Ke-3 Sidang Tahunan MPR Tahun 2002 6 Agustus 2002, 
Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2002, p. 70. 
105 Irwan Prayitno, "IMF Perpanjang Tangan Hizbus Syaithan", reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian 
Dai, pp. 147-53 (quote: pp. 147-148). I am indebted to Dr. Prayitno for giving me copies ofhis 
writings. 
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The PK ideologues Abu Ridho and Dr. Irwan Prayitno put this condemnation in the 
context of the shared Islamist paradigm in the late 20th century: 
For terrorist countries such as Israel, the US and its allies, blame[s] ... against the 
actions of certain groups and countries who do not comply with their imperial spirit 
have ... become an effective tool. .. to justify the destruction of a nation, movement or 
individual, even the destruction of a particular government. The objective is no other 
than to oppress, eliminate or control their political opponents so that they can freely 
apply their imperial politics on the world. 106 
Irwan further wrote by referring to Qur'anic warnings: 
The Jews seek to dominate the world by gaining control of the [political and social] 
systems ... of every other race or nation. The Jews, by manipulating the Zionist 
movement, have always had the goal of gaining control of the world by whatever 
means is available. At the present time, every effective political, economic and 
social system in the world is controlled by the Jews. The desire to rule the world is 
based on the conviction that God has chosen the Jews to be superior to every other 
race and rightful heirs of the world and everything within it. Islam has a similar 
conviction expressed by the word khalifa, an institution embodying faith and 
righteousness, which holds in trust responsibility for the development of and care for 
the earth and all it contains. It is this conviction of the Islamic community that 
motivates the Jews to wage war against Islam because Islam has the power to defeat 
the Jews ... The Jews are doing their outmost to wage war [memerangi] against the 
Islamic umma until the Muslims subject to them as stated in the Qur'an: 'The Jews 
and Christians will not tolerate until you follow their religion' (al-Baqarah, 2:120) ... 
They [the Jews] use all means available to realise their obsession. It is well known 
that the Jews are behind many secret organisations. They ... are behind many 
calamities throughout the course of history. The history of the Jews is replete with 
wickedness-such as the shame of slavery, arrogance, extreme racism, blind 
fanaticism in preserving their blood-line, materialistic greed, an economic system 
based on usury together with other forms of wicked behaviour such as flattery, 
cunning, cruelty, hypocrisy, foul design, obstinacy, plundering the property of others 
by improper means, and preventing humankind from [entering and] following the 
Islamic path... Such is the conduct of Satan. They systematically plan wicked 
conduct in ... a comJ;Uunity, nation, country and organisation ... An effective way of 
gaining control of the world .. .is through economy. History ... shows that the Jews 
use economic might to subject others... To dominate the world, the Jews 
accomplished to take economic command over the US ... the Jews control American 
policy.107 
All Islamist parties advocated closer fiscal relations with Arab nations, arguing that 
the relationship with the IMF had worsened the country's economic plight. The PPP, 
106 Abu Ridho, Apakah Terorisme Itu, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 17. 
107 Irwan Prayitno, "Yahudi Sebagai Hizbus Syaithan Mengusai Dunia", reprinted in Prayitno, 
Kepribadian Dai, pp. 139-46 (quote pp. 139-41 ). The reference to Satan alludes to the Qur' an (7: 17) 
which states that Satan swore to God to lead humankind astray after God had expelled him from 
heaven. I am indebted to Prof. Anthony Johns for his illuminating comments on this quote. 
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for example, appealed to reject 'foreign interference in any form whatsoever' and 
called on the government to pursue a 'free and active' foreign policy and 'not to 
follow blindly [mengekor] the will of the superpower' (the US). 108 All Islamist 
parties demanded from the government not to resume the work with the IMF after 
the completion of the Memorandum of Intent in late 2003. The government had to 
free itself from its dependency from western donors by, instead, establishing 
relations with international Islamic financial institutions. 109 
Promoting Islam as the nation's bonding agent, Masyumi legatees have always 
displayed a very protective stance over national unity. During the transitional period 
in 1998 and 1999, there were mounting protests about perceived foreign meddling in 
Indonesian domestic affairs. Not solely an Islamist concern, these theories were 
readily accepted among ordinary Muslims. The belief that Western allies desired to 
control, weaken or break up Indonesia has been inseparable from the conviction that 
this was part of a broader plot to keep Muslims powerless. This underscored the 
traditional assertion that Islam and Indonesia's national identity and fate were 
inextricably linked. 
The doctrinaire Islamists in Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB) and its 
affiliated organisations DDII and KISDI were the most candid in addressing alleged 
foreign operations. Whereas the pragmatic Islamists such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra 
and Ka'ban did not appear to give conspiracy theories wide attention, doctrinaire 
Islamists nurtured the deeply embedded sense of susceptibility in the light of the 
global weakening of Muslim authority. Foreign interference thus became both a 
cause and a symptom of Muslim weakness. Official party statements demanding 
greater Muslim control over national affairs, however, were rare. In one instance, 
PBB demurred that religious conflicts and socio-economic woes had turned more 
volatile and unstable through the operations of 'foreign forces' who had an interest in 
108 Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Pertahanan Negara, 21 March 2001. 
109 Risalah Sementara Rapat Paripurna Ke-6 Lanjutan 1 Sidang Tahunan MPR Tahun 2002 10 
Agustus 2002, Sekretariat Jendera1 MPR, Jakarta, 2002, p. 31; "Pemyataan Politik Partai Bulan 
Bintang", 17 September 2000, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, October 2000, p. 6. This sentiment 
was not confined to Islamist parties but also common among the secular-nationalist camp. The receipt 
of foreign aid was commonly seen as humiliating; a loss of self-determination to the dictum of 
foreigners. 
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'breaking up' (rnernecahbelah) Indonesia in order to 'dominate' the 'political, 
economical and cultural life' according to their interests. The party, therefore, 
insisted that secession demands, in particular armed secessionist movements, had to 
'be overcome in firm [tegas] and unbending [tanpa kornprorni] ways' and 'without 
opening the slightest chance' for independence proponents to consolidate. 110 
Carrying on the suspicions by DDII or FUI against Sino-Christians, it further 
speculated that domestic groups would 'prepare' to become the 'extended hand' of 
foreign players. 111 
Foreign interference purportedly planned to destabilise the Habibie government 
which came into power after President Soeharto's resignation in May 1998. The 
Habibie administration had broad Muslim-including Islamist-support and its 
demise would have been seen as undercutting rightful "Muslim" aspirations to regain 
political supremacy. Islamist organisations expressed the hope of forming a wider 
bastion against this perceived conspiracy. They held: 
At the moment the consolidation of anti-Habibie [forces] clearly begins to identifY 
the current government as representation oflslamic power ... The anti-Habibie force 
stretches on very wide spectrum: nationalist groups, secular-liberals, Christian-
Catholics and leftist groups. They agree to topple Habibie, [to] dissolve the 
government. They picture that Habibie becomes the vehicle of modernist Islamic 
political forces, [that he] becomes the common denominator to unite them. 112 (Italic 
in original) 
In another comment by Qadir Djaelani, the point is made even more explicit: 
The national domestic forces, both because of ideological similarity and political and 
economic interests, join a conspiracy with foreign countries to destroy Indonesia, in 
particular the government ofBJ. Habibie.113 
110 Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Bulan Bintang Atas Rancangan Undang Undang Tentang Program 
Pembangunan Nasional, 16 November 2000. PBB referred to pro-independence movements in Papua 
earlier the same year. 
111 Pandangan Dan Sikap Politik Partai Bulan Bintang, Pusat Studi dan Pengembangan Informasi 
PBB, Jakarta, (no date, probably 1998), pp. 7-8. 
112 Laporan Tim Sidang Istimewa MPR BKUI, (no place, no date, probably June or July 1998). Also 
"Musuh Demokrasi itu Bangkit Lagi" ('Those enemies of democracy re-emerge') Bulan Bintang, 1-15 
October 1998. 
113 Abdul Qadir Djaelani, "Konspirasi Asing dan Nasional Menghancurkan Indonesia" ('The foreign 
and national conspiracy to destroy Indonesia'), reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 166-79. The 
author claimed that Christian-Chinese conglomerates had taken large amounts of money to accounts 
overseas, particularly to Singapore. Furthermore, Indonesian mass media, 'to 90% owned by 
Christians and Socialists', had started a smear campaign 'against the Muslim community, in particular 
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With their orientation toward domestic agendas, PPP and PBB appeared more 
adamant to safeguard the unitary state than Partai Keadilan. The scale and intensity 
of defensive rhetoric varied. Like other Islamist parties, PPP used the imagery of 
undesired foreign values making inroads. Prominent in the rhetoric of PPP, however, 
was the highlighting of the presumed religious character of Indonesians rather than 
an exclusively Islamic identity. Moreover, PPP had no policy of building up 
defensive religious sentiment among its cadres. Indonesia, the party held in more 
temperate rhetoric, was in the middle of 'facing the removal (pelucutan) of its 
identity' as a 'religious people'. It was conceivable that the 'intemationalisation of 
values' would 'take away' (melucut) 'our human values' (nilai-nilai kemanusiaan 
kita) ifnot anticipated on time. 114 
The main Masyumi legatees PBB and DDII most stridently maintained the perceived 
inseparability between the nation and Islam and the resulting demand for "Muslim" 
home ruleY 5 The PBB 2000 Congress echoed the concerns voiced earlier by DDII 
and other Islamist Masyumi successor organisations by stressing the principal role of 
the umat Islam in Indonesian affairs. It held: 
As the largest national community, the Muslim community is more burdened and 
has more responsibility in leading Indonesia ahead. Because of this, the Bulan 
Bintang community opts to defend the existence of the Indonesian people and state 
against any force that attempts to destroy ... it. This endeavour is part of the religious 
struggle because for the Bulan Bintang community Islamic-ness [keislaman] and 
nationality [kebangsaan] are not separated things but an integral unity. The Bulan 
Bintang community endeavours to become true Muslims and at the same time ... true 
national patriots [patriot sejati bangsa]. The first commitment is to fight because of 
Allah for the greatness of the Indonesian people, of which the Muslim community is 
the largest component. 116 
against B.J. Habibie' and initiated riots in places such as Ambon and Aceh, equipped by weaponry 
coming from the US, Australia and Israel. Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Persengkongkolan Jahat Kristen dan 
Yahudi Sedunia Menghancurkan Republik Indonesia ('The malicious plot of the Worlds' Christians 
and Jews to Destroy the Republic oflndonesia'). Qadir printed 10.000 copies of this pamphlet and 
sent them to mosques and campuses. Reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 314-7. 
114 "Risa1ah Rapat Paripuma Ke-8 (Lanjutan) Sidang Tahunan MPR 15 Agustus 2000", reprinted in 
Buku Ketiga Jilid 17 Risalah Rapat Paripurna Ke-7 SID Ke-10 (ST 2000), Sekretariat Jendera1 MPR 
RI,Jakarta,2000,p. 166. 
115 Parallel to this highlighting of the national idea, the ideal of a global umat under Islamic guidance 
certainly prevailed. The PBB 2000 Congress, for example, described Islam as a 'way of life for 
humankind' and a 'universal way oflife'. Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 61-3. 
116 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 74-5. 
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This conviction was manifestly brought to light through President Habibie' s consent 
to a referendum for East Timor in early 1999 and the subsequent warning by the US 
to impose an economic and military embargo if the Indonesian government would 
not step up efforts to guarantee the safety of Catholic East Timorese citizens in the 
aftermath of independence. These events evoked a strongly Islam-tinged and 
defensive nationalism against the perceived anti-Muslim biased interference by 
Western nations, especially the US and Australia, in Indonesian domestic affairs. 
'[I]t is nothing new-this is the American way', the Buletin Bulan Bintang for 
example commented: 'PROPAGANDA, DICTATING and INTERVENING. And 
all this is part of the ZIONIST INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY which is 
commonly undertaken against Muslim-based countries' .117 The common position by 
Islamist parties was that all Indonesians should have a say in the referendum as 
Indonesians had contributed and financed the development of East Timor with their 
'pouring sweat' .118 This stance depicted the Catholic population in the province as 
ungrateful dissenters, ignorant of the human resources and money a Muslim majority 
nation had invested to bring about their integration. 119 
At the same time, aware of constituting only a small section of the Muslim 
community, Masyumi legatees have been eager to win allies for their cause. To this 
end, they made frequent avowals of having a common purpose with the Indonesian 
army, giving another indication of their domestic political orientation and the weight 
of its parameters on their mind-set. It rested on the prevailing view that "Muslims" 
and the army were the two main pillars of Indonesian identity as they had been the 
achievers and guardians of independence. A crucial target of the West, particularly 
Israel, was the destruction of this historical bond. To achieve this, foreign 
intelligence attempted to undermine the reputation and the efficiency of the 
Indonesian armed forces and to ensure that officers unsympathetic to Islam 
117 "Atambua, Konspirasi Politik, Zionisme dan Ekonomi", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 Oktober 2000, p. 
7 (bold and capital in original). 
118 Hasil Mukernas (Musyawarah Kerja Nasional)-1 Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP Partai Bulan Bintang, 
(no place), 1999, p. 34. Though all Islarnist parties accepted the President's decision, they were 
infuriated that Habibie had not consulted with parliament before making his proposal. By giving in to 
international demands, Habibie's offer appeared to confirm the view that Indonesia had occupied East 
Timor. "Ada yang Menerima, Ada yang Menolak", Media Indonesia, 16 October 1999. 
119 There were other Islamists who argued that giving independence to East Timor had the positive 
side-effect of getting rid of a "rebellious" Catholic province. I am thankful to Prof. Harold Crouch for 
this point. 
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dominated its command. In these typecasts, the survival of the unitary state and the 
fortune of its Muslim population become the same: 
Because Indonesia [is the country] with the largest Muslim population in the World, 
with a very strategic geographic location ... destroying Indonesia is a Western 
priority... [H]istorically and factually, the backbone of the unity state of the 
Indonesian Republic is, apart from the Muslim community (integral motion 
Mohammad Natsir/Masyumi), the army. Hence, to destroy the Unitary State of the 
Indonesian Republic ... and making it many small nations is impossible to be 
achieved well without destroying the role and the existence of the army. The right 
moment to realise the strategy to destroy the army is [the] reformasi [era]. 120 
Frequently, however, the same authors accentuating Muslim unity and cross-
sectional alliances to face an external enemy argued from a deep sense of cultural 
defeat and inferiority. Speeches by doctrinaire leaders were strongly tinged with a 
sense of deprived self-esteem, the accumulation of enemies characteristic for jihadist 
rhetoric and, at the same time, a defiant attitude against the perceived assault. In the 
words ofKISDI and PBB leader Ahmad Sumargono: 
The problem is that the imperialist crowd has already destroyed our personality, [the 
personality] of Muslims. Our attitude and life-style is already like theirs. We see 
Western culture as something to be followed. We admire and are crazy about the 
West. We are not a priori [in our stand] toward Western culture. But the inferior 
mental attitude when dealing with the West is what devastates most of us. Especially 
h 1. . 121 t e e 1te m our country. 
Lamenting the surrender of a majority of Muslims to Western concepts and secular 
life-style, Sumargono thus deplored: 
... the mentality of our people who are proud to become "slaves". We are proud if 
other nations that morally are actually not better than us have too big a say in our 
affairs... We are already strangled, already trapped in debt... But what is 
saddening ... we are already infected with pride in our debt. .. we already lost our self-
esteem and dignity ... the IMF [International Monetary Fund] is in fact not 
120 Abdul Qadir Djaelani, "Konspirasi Asing dan Marxis-Sosialis Menghancurkan TNI Angkatan 
Darat" ('The foreign and Marxist-socialist Conspiracy to destroy the Indonesian Army'), 25 
September 1999, reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 317-9. An important part of the Western 
strategy was to separate the army from the police, with the latter failing to maintain security, which 
eventually would lead to the break up of Indonesia. Domestic helpers of the West were Human Rights 
institutions. The author again distributed 10.000 copies among mosques and campuses. 
121 Speech by Sumargono at the Al-Azhar mosque, Jakarta, 5 April1998, reprinted as "Jangan 
Korbankan Kehormatan Kita Demi 3 Miliar USD" in the unpublished compilation KISDI Menggugat, 
Jakarta, 1999, pp. 25-9. Many Media Dakwah editorials by Hussein Umar followed a similar line, for 
example his "Membabi Buta", Media Dakwah, May 2001, pp. 6-7. I am indebted to Adian Husaini for 
giving me a copy of the KISDI booklet. 
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necessary ... the problem is that we [feel] inferior [minder] ... For the Indonesian 
Muslim community, national unity is very important because this country is the 
largest Muslim country in the world. I suspect that many foreign forces, especially 
the Zionists, do not want this country to be united, [they] want to weaken and 
diminish this country ... 122 
To counteract the cultural assault and Indonesia's economic dependence on Western 
aid, Masyumi legatees adopted the emblematic jihadist supposition that 
strengthening Muslim identity was the only way to prevail: 
[W]hat makes us sad [is that]. .. policies are adopted because of the IMP's pressure. 
Not because of our own self-determination, independence and wish .. .it is indeed 
difficult for us to reject the IMF' s presence because we are not capable ... Fine, we 
concede our weakness, so that we gladly let foreign nations trample on our dignity, 
[nations] of which we are sure that in their background are the Jews. But what we 
have to evaluate is 'why we turned weak', so that we turned into the target [bulan-
bulanan] of other nations ... My brothers, we are weak because our mentality is 
indeed weak. Our quality [ mutu] is indeed small. We do not develop and strengthen 
our character Uati diri] as a Muslim nation. It is as if we are ashamed of being 
Muslims. Say it to the world that we are a Muslim nation. Develop an Islamic 
personality in every Muslim citizen. We have to be sure that only the Islamic might 
is capable of facing the international imperialist crowd, which today is ruled by the 
Jewish and Christian force. Allah commands: 'He is God who ... sent His Prophet to 
bring guidance and the true belief [Ad Diin yang haq] to be victorious over other 
beliefs. Even though the Polytheists detest it' .123 
In this as in most similar instances, Islamists themselves did not address material 
disadvantage separately but within the framework of resuming Muslim identity and 
regaining political power. This call was directed against non-Muslims who cannot 
claim to represent national identity and who have accumulated an inappropriate share 
of political power and prosperity. 
Taking up the embittered stance of previous years, the crucial obstacle for returning 
Indonesia to its erstwhile Islamic personality, all Islamist parties argued, was the 
domestic and foreign deceit against Muslims through the stigmatisation of shari 'ah 
law. Guided Democracy and New Order alike had further endorsed the view that 
Islamic ideology was irrational and harmful to Indonesia's political and economic 
interests. The bitter tone of the rhetoric gave further indication that most Islamists 
122 Untitled speech by Sumargono at the Technological Institute Bandung (ITB), 22 April1999, 
reprinted in Media Dakwah, May 1999, pp. 52-5. 
123 Sumargono, Jangan Korbankan. The quote is from the Qur'an, verse Al-Saff(61:9). 
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have come to see this as a successful undertaking. It was founded on the recurring 
historical pattern that, since colonialism, Muslims had been kept in thraldom. The 
deviation from Islamic law, PBB restated the customary lament in 2000, was rooted 
in the modification of Dutch policy with which its chief advisor Snouk Hurgronje 
attempted to weaken the influence of Islam on its adherents. 124 The ensuing superior 
status of civil law in post-independence Indonesia thus came about as a fallacious 
diversion ofthe Muslim character of society. 
In the 2000 MPR sessiOn, PBB depicted the effort of several generations of 
orientalists as responsible for an unfavourable image of shari 'ah. This had deformed 
its worth in the awareness of Indonesian Muslims and alienated Muslims from Islam. 
The statement by Ka'ban at the same time underlined the global framework in which 
Masyumi legatees have come to see the perceived assault on their faith: 
Our faction very much indeed understands the anxiety of other groups toward 
shariah Islam. [This is] because ... of a systematic effort to marginalise shariah Islam 
undertaken by the secular orientalists and their followers by establishing a public 
opinion of shariah Islam as cruel and inhumane ... with the goal to divide shariah 
Islam from its adherents both in other parts of the Islamic world and in Indonesia ... 
On the contrary, long before the Dutch came to Indonesia, Islamic law already was 
effective in Islamic kingdoms ... from Aceh to Temate and Tidore. Even during the 
Dutch period, before the arrival of Christian Snouk Hurgronje ... shariah Islam was 
implemented [diberlakukan] toward natives of the Islamic religion ... But after the 
arrival of ... Hurgronje ... the Dutch politics of law changed and were adjusted to the 
Teori Resepsi. .. Until now the impact of the Teori Resepsi ... is still felt ... 125 
It has, of course, added to the frustration that many indigenous Muslims appeared to 
have accepted and absorbed this shari 'ah-stigma themselves and to have adjusted 
their political preferences accordingly. The lack of support of major Muslim 
organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama for the establishment of 
an Islamist party in 1998 and 1999 confirmed this tendency. Again, the party more 
frankly attacking this deflection of Muslims was PBB. It picked up the thought 
model of a preceding generation of Masyumi adherents by pointing out the character 
124 "Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang pada Sidang Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2000", 
reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang (supplement), 1 September 2000, pp. i-iv. 
125 Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. Such references to the glory of shari 'ah law in the 
pre-colonial sultanates of Aceh, Banten, Demak, Tidore and Deli were made repeatedly. See, for 
example, "Syariat Islam: Solusi Krisis Bangsa", Forum Keadilan, no. 15, 28 July 2003, pp. 44-5. In 
the Konstituante, both Masyumi and NU had defended their pro-shari 'ah position with a similar 
argumentation. Fealy, Ulama and Politics, p. 208. 
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of the Jakarta Charter as an historical compromise, and held that the divine origin of 
shari 'ah made it a religious 'obligation' for Muslims to follow and a panacea for 
solving Indonesia's manifold problems. The faction argued: 
The greatness of Syariat Islam drowned because of dominant bad public opinion; the 
impact of trauma and phobia brought on by those who say to follow Islam but who 
are secular, together with non-Muslims who are at random anti-Islam [anti-Islam 
secara membabi buta]. The wall of dislike toward Syariat Islam strongly touches the 
heart because Syariat Islam is an obligation for its people and historically the 
consensus of the founders of the republic ... But all this is denied. This reality is 
something that has to be fought against by every member of the Indonesian Islamic 
community. The Indonesian nation will not achieve glory [kegemilangan] unless 
Syariat Islam is made the fundament on which to build the prosperity of its people. 126 
Proclaiming shari 'ah to be at the cultural core of Indonesian Muslims and Muslims 
to be the quintessence of being Indonesian, Islamists automatically railed against the 
claim that shari 'ah issues would endanger social peace. Both PPP and PBB went to 
great lengths to anticipate the critique that special constitutional consideration for 
Islam was divisive and a threat to national unity. The general rationale for PPP, 
however, was to defend a form of Islamic ideology that appeared congruent with the 
needs of a plural society and thus to thwart antagonism from outside the party. PPP, 
therefore, promoted the Jakarta Charter disposed to give equal emphasis toward 
reassuring non-Muslims and nominal Muslims, by claiming that shari 'ah's universal 
values would create an all-purpose benefit and strengthen national unity by 
'increasing the bond (mengikat) between the whole Indonesian people' .127 Although 
in content very similar to PBB, PPP did not base its stance explicitly on the assertion 
that shari 'ah was closest to the identity of Indonesian Muslims. Accordingly, PPP 
leaders avoided addressing shari 'ah themes exclusively, by putting them into the 
context of nationhood or religious pluralism instead. A typical statement aimed for 
reassurance, made in similar form during all MPR sessions between 1998 and 2002, 
was: 
126 Untitled Release by the PBB MPR Faction, 16 August 2002, reprinted as "Kata Pengantar" in Haril 
M. Andersen, Hamdani, Husni Jum'at, Nasruddin Muharor and Zaun Fathin (eds.), Memperjuangkan 
Syariat Islam, Sekretariat Fraksi PBB MPR, 2003, p. xv. I am indebted to PBB Deputy Chairman 
Sahar L. Hassan for bringing my attention to this book. 
127 Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 27. 
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[T]he PPP Faction is convinced that this saddening crisis can only be overcome by 
the obligation to carry out Islamic syari'at, which very much promotes moral values 
and honourable ethics. This ... can form the axis of brotherhood, the axis of national 
brotherhood/friendship, which at the same time is the core or the glue for national 
unity. The emphasis of this stance also ... underlines the significance to depart from 
the thought this [would lead to] a religious state or a theocracy. But once again: [it 
is] to strengthen Indonesian nationalism [memperkukuh nasionalisme Indonesia]. To 
re-solidify the significance of Islamic nationalism at home is also meant to avert 
[ menghindarkan] the characteristic of universal Islam, which pretends not to know 
nationalism [seolah tidak mengenal nasionalisme].128 
Indonesia, the less cautious rhetorical variant asserted, had to recover its Islamic 
identity to overcome its multiple difficulties. This view held that the separation of 
Islam and the state was the real cause for the country's social and religious conflicts. 
Using a favourite metaphor, PBB proclaimed that because the 'body' (the 
Constitution) and the 'soul' (shari 'ah and the Jakarta Charter) were separated, 'moral 
decadence' was able to spread, leading to conflicts such as in Ambon and Central 
Sulawesi. 129 Islam was the predominant cultural factor in Indonesian identity; 
therefore a constitutional recognition of Islam was needed 'because it is hoped that 
the adherence (ketaatan) of the majority of the people to shari'ah Islam can 
strengthen unity ... and give peace and order to the whole nation' .130 A press release 
from September 2001 even linked shari 'ah exclusively to the objective of bringing 
about national unity and religious harmony. The Jakarta Charter would be needed to 
'guide' (mengarahkan) and 'motivate [Muslim's] discipline' so that they 'step up 
participation in retaining' the unitary state. 131 
The dogma of a "Muslim nation" combined with the depiction of shari 'ah as 
panacea, at the same time, reinvigorated the paternalistic image of Muslims as 
protectors of other religions. Islam was the final, perfect creed in a nation of 
128 Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia terhadap Hasi/-hasi/ Badan Pekerja MPR-RI tentang Perubahan Kedua Undang-
Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 dan Rancangan-rancangan Ketetapan 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Lainnya disampaikan pada Rapat Paripurna 
Sidang Paripurna Sidang Tahunan MPR-Rl tanggal1 0 Agustus 2000. 
129 Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. 
130 "Pemyataan Politik Partai Bulan Bintang", 17 September 2000, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 
Edisi 4, 1 Oktober 2000, p. 6 
131 "Press Release Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang MPR R1 ("Piagam Jakarta")", 10 September 2001, 
reprinted inBuletin Bulan Bintang, 1 October 2001, p. 13. Such statements, at the same time, 
highlighted the need to downplay the contentious aspects of shari' ah by pointing out shared values 
like national unity. Compare with chapter five. 
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Muslims. If order and security were achieved because Muslims were obligated to 
carry out shari 'ah, non-Muslims would automatically benefit. PBB, for example, 
proclaimed that with the implementation of shari 'ah 'those who are Muslims will 
improve the quality of their Islamic-ness and as a consequence will improve the 
quality of the Indonesian people as a whole' .132 In characteristic rhetoric, Islamist 
parties endeavoured to reassure other religious communities that their life would 
benefit by the constitutional recognition of shari 'ah. To back this assertion, they 
pointed to the popular Qur'anic saying that Islam was 'a blessing for all 
surroundings' (rahmatan l'il alamin). 
Hence, despite adoptingjihadist sentiment and rhetoric, Masyumi legatees sustained 
the customary themes of Indonesian Islam to remake a "Muslim nation" in the post-
New Order years. During the constitutional debates of the MPR between 1999 and 
2002, PPP and PBB put strong emphasis on domestic historical reasons for a 
constitutional recognition of shari 'ah. The arguments repeated those presented 
earlier, as during the constitutional debates of the late 1950s and by the Partai 
Muslimin Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim Party', Parmusi) at the MPR session in 
1968. At the core of the argumentation remained the charge of treachery against 
"Muslims". It repeated the standard point that President Soekamo and the members 
of the Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(BPUPKI), which included Catholics and other Christians, had approved the June 
1945 draft Preamble of the Constitution featuring the Jakarta Charter as an ideal 
compromise between the secular-nationalists and the "Muslims" or the "umat Islam". 
BPUPKI members came from various regions and featured Muslims and Christians, 
Islamists and nationalists; their decision, therefore, had equalled a national 
consensus. 133 Removing the Charter shortly afterwards meant to violate this consent. 
The unremitting accusation is, therefore, that of a 'broken promise' (pengingkaran 
132 PBB asserted this during various sessions of the constitutional panels between 2000 and 2002. 
133 Islamist parties made this point frequently. See, for example, "Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-17 Panitia 
Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR 21 Maret 2001 ", reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Risalah Rapat Panitia 
Ad Hoc I Badan Pekelja MPR RI Ke-11 s/d Tangga/11 Maret 2002 s/d 27 Maret 2002 Masa Sidang 
Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2002, Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2002. PPP even claimed-
incorrectly- that 'since 1945, Sukamo was at the forefront [digarda depan]' trying to maintain the 
insertion of the "seven words". Risalah Sementara 10 August 2002, p. 26. See also Pemandangan 
Umum Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia 
Atas Hasil Kerja Badan Pekelja MPR RI Disampaikan pada Rapat Paripurna Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 4 November 2001, pp. 3-4. 
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janji) against the umat Islam. 134 Moreover, highlighting the treacherous nature of the 
removal, they stress that the Charter was 'unilaterally deleted' without previous 
meeting and thus snubbing the commended Indonesian tradition of finding a decision 
through consultation (musyawarah). 135 
A further tenaciously argued point was that the status of the Charter had been 
restrengthened by the presidential decree of 5 July 1959, proclaiming that the Charter 
'inspired' (menjiwai) the Constitution. The Charter was thus not merely a historical 
document but entailed concrete juridical consequences. It was a source of law and, as 
such, required or at least authorised the state to pass shari 'ah laws. 136 The inclusion 
of the clause by means of the constitutional amendments was a 'logical consequence' 
of this correlation. 137 Most serious legal experts do not agree with this view. 
The presumption of the 'broken promise' rendered ongoing commitment to the 
Charter to be a righteous endeavour to restore a lost Islamic identity for the 
Indonesian people. PPP and PBB, in particular, were the apologists of the Charter's 
removal. PBB MP Zubair Bakri stressed: 
Other people see the incident on 16 and 17 August [1945] as insignificant. For us 
this is the most significant. This is the root of the problem. As long as this does not 
prevail, our nation will not be safe. 138 
PPP and PBB further proclaimed that the removal of shari 'ah terms had severed the 
1945 Constitution from its spirit. In illuminating rhetoric, PPP claimed in the MPR to 
be on a 'holy mission' (misi suci). 139 The 'seven words' were the lost 'soul' (jiwa) of 
134 Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. Islamist parties again highlighted the role of the Japanese 
envoy who did not belong either to Christian or secular groups and, therefore, could not be seen as 
their representative. 
135 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Sambutan Ketua Umum Partai Bulan Bintang", in Andersen, Hamdani, 
Jum'at, Muharor and Fathin (eds.), Memperjuangkan, pp. vii-viii (quote p. vii). 
136 This argumentation followed the explanation of the Djuanda government before the DPR in 1957. 
See also PPP's view in its Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. Some Islamists claim that this 
'spirit of the Jakarta Charter' had enabled the establishment of a number of Islamic laws in the 1990s. 
See, for example, Rifyal Ka'bah, "Piagam Jakarta buat Umat Islam Indonesia", Buletin Bulan 
Bintang, 1 September 2000. 
137 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
138 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. 
139 Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 28. See also Pemandangan Umum 4 November 2001. 
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the Constitution that had to be reunited with the 'body' (badan). 140 The constitutional 
amendments, PPP proclaimed, were the right time and place to 'set straight history' 
(meluruskan sejarah). 141 The party used the same metaphor as PBB, stating: 
The PPP Faction asks whether we still acknowledge the 1945 Constitution, which 
has been made effective by decree if we accept that national life can develop without 
soul [jiwa] even though our anthem speaks of growing the soul [and] growing the 
body [ badan]. Because of this, we first have to construct the soul of the 1945 
Constitution, only then construct its body. For 41 years the 1945 Constitution has 
proceeded without soul. Now is the time for us to give the soul to our 
Constitution.142 
The continuation of the claim to know what was best for "the people" and thus 
portraying the majority of Muslims as shari 'ah supporters is intriguing. The Islamist 
premise once again was that a legal system had to be in keeping with the sociological 
and religious conditions in society, which in Indonesia was predominantly Muslim. 
As foreign legal models had covered up this quality, these Islamists claimed to 
represent a 'silent majority' of Muslims who supposedly yearned for the 
reinstallation of the Charter clause. 143 This assertion was strongest in PBB and PPP 
and prevailed despite a mere 2% and 11% respective share of the votes at the 1999 
elections. In particular, support for shari 'ah was strong among the lower social 
strata, such as among Muhammadiyah and NU cadres despondent with the policies 
of Muslim elites. 144 Knowing of Amien Rais's practical motives to refuse leading an 
Islamist party in 1998, Islamists in PPP and PBB claimed that privately he approved 
enhancing the role of Islamic law because he could not belie his own roots as 
Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah, they held, only had adopted an anti-
140 PBB and PPP repeatedly used this allegory. Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 27; "Risalah 
Rapat Pleno Ke-27 Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR 13 Juni 2002", reprinted in Buku Kedua 
Jilid 3 Risalah Rapat Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR RI Ke-21 s.d 30 Tanggal 28 Maret 2002 
s.d 19 Juni 2002 Masa Sidang Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2002, Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 
2002, p. 410; Mahendra, Sambutan, p. vii. 
141 Risalah Rapat Plena 21 Maret 2001 reprinted inBuku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002. Also 
Pemandangan Umum I 0 August 2000 and Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. 
142 "Risalah Rapat Paripuma Ke-8 (Lanjutan) ST MPR, 15 August 2000", reprinted in Buku Ketiga 
Jilid 17 Risalah Rapat Paripurna Ke-7 SID Ke-10 (ST 2000), Sekretariat Jendera1 MPR Rl, 2000, p. 
167. The Perserikatan Daulat Ummah Faction ('United Faction of Muslim Sovereignty', PDU) used a 
similar analogy in the 2002 MPR session. 
143 Interview Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. 
144 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Risalah Rapat Plena 13 June 2002. PBB 
claimed to get strong support from local and regional Muhammadiyah boards for writing Islam into 
the Constitution, for example from the youth organisation Pemuda Muhammadiyah (ibid). 
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Charter position in order to back up Partai Amanah Nasional ('National Mandate 
Party', PAN). 145 
Behind this, of course, stood the view that only a Muslim surrendering to shari 'ah 
could be called a Muslim. In the 2000 MPR Session, PBB argued that 'we should 
give the Muslim community the opportunity [ kesempatan] to organise its life in 
accordance with the teachings of its religion' .146 Again claiming an obscured affinity 
between shari 'ah and national identity, the party held: 
[t]his time is the right moment [for] the MPR to become the forum to set straight 
history [ meluruskan sejarah] ... by forming a politics of national law which 
transforms the legal values and norms which live amidst society.147 
A pledge by the party in 2001 made this desired correlation even clearer. It 
announced 'to continue to fight for the aspirations of the majority of the nation 
[ memperjuangkan aspirasi mayoritas bangs a] of which 85% are Muslims that 
"Piagam Jakarta" will be re-established' .148 
Such mantra-like statements have exhibited the mixture of incapacity and reluctance 
among many Islamists to come to grips with the fact that a majority of ordinary 
Muslims are lackadaisical about the shari 'ah agenda of Islamic parties. The 
persistence of the Islamist representational claim is based on Islam's perception of 
the community of believers as an entity with identical 'aspirations', the insistence 
that being a Muslim and submission to the shari 'ah are indivisible and the belief in a 
doctrinal demand of a top-down enforcement of a number of Islamic laws. The 
chapter described the failure in 1945 to make Islam a central constitutional reference 
in Indonesia as a focal point for the Islamist belief that Muslims have both a right 
and a duty toward the establishment of Islamic law and the rendering of non-
Muslims as intolerant, as they failed to recognise this duty as a central aspect of 
Islam. 
145 Interview, Jurhum Lantong, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
146 Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000; "Dicoret Piagam Jakarta, Penipuan terhadap Umat 
Islam" ('Abolishing the Jakarta Charter is to betray the Muslim Community'), Mimbar Ummat, 30 
October 2000. 
147 Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. 
148 Press Release "Piagam Jakarta". 
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The chapter further pointed to vanous repressive measures smce the end of 
parliamentary democracy in 1959 as having increased a sense of victimization among 
Islamists and triggering an unreflective essentialism. Today's Islamists often cling to 
the notion of an Islamic past 'untainted' by colonialism and westernisation and allege 
a prominent status of an unspecified shari 'ah ruling at that time. They, in effect, 
propose that the deeds of the west (i.e. non-Muslims) are to blame that a majority of 
Muslims does not support contemporary Islamist parties. 
An increased awareness of international Islamic politics over the last decades 
coupled with the perception that western nations had a generic interest in oppressing 
Islam and promoting secularism in Muslim majority countries took the sense of 
victimization of Indonesian Islamism to a global scale. The desire for restoring a 
Muslim national identity within an international conspirational context has been a 
common Islamist theme. There were, however, great differences in the approaches to 
return Indonesian Muslims to a lifestyle comprehensively governed by shari 'ah law 
and to face the challenge of ideologies seen as harmful. As the next chapter will 
show, the political themes and approach of PPP and PBB remained domestic and in 
various ways linked to the Masyumi tradition. Unlike the Masyumi tradition, foreign 
ideological concepts approached the restoration of Islam as a systematic long-term 
plan to counteract the impact of any other doctrinal models on Indonesia's Muslim 
society. This approach became central to PK. These Islamists transformed the 




THE CALL FOR SHARI'AH: MOTIVES AND FEATURES 
The previous chapter depicted shari 'ah as being a focal point for promoting the 
restoration of a Muslim national idea. For reasons to be described now, despite the 
rhetoric, Islamist parties' shari 'ah politics have rather been both desultory and 
formalist-symbolic. Moreover, the quality of the shari 'ah discourse has been 
markedly shallow. Islamist promotion of shari 'ah and the Jakarta Charter clause 
comprised little or no plan for their realisation. A plain reason for this shallowness 
was the lack of Islamist political power. Gaining only a minority of parliamentary 
seats in 1999, Islamists were well aware that their bid for shari 'ah would be defeated 
in parliament. This futility of the effort to succeed shari'ah in post-New Order 
Indonesia made a genuine and profound discussion of shari 'ah issues gratuitous. 1 
In present-day Indonesia, shari 'ah is partly recognised and effective in family law 
(marriage, inheritance), banking, religious foundations (waqf) and parts of the 
economy. But it is not fully effective law. The marriage law, for example, above all 
handles divorce. Indonesia's jurisdiction lacks a Shari'ah High Court. There is 
unclear and divided authority over the Religious Justice administration and an erratic 
application of existing regulations. Shari 'ah laws, above all, have been subject to the 
willingness of the executive to carry them out.Z In many ways, this continued in post-
New Order administrations though these brought a number of new shari 'ah 
regulations on the way. The Habibie administration (May 1998 to October 1999) 
and, to a smaller extent, the Abdurrahman Wahid government (October 1999 to July 
2001), passed regulations on zakat (alms), an improvement of pilgrimage services 
and Islamic banking, and acknowledged a special status of shari 'ah in Aceh. Yet 
1 Up to the 1950s, many prominent Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia had supported Islamist agendas. 
The theological and philosophical debate was extensive and ofhigh quality (between 1936 and 1941 
alone, Natsir produced around 90 commentaries and articles). But even then comparatively little 
attention was given to the practical challenges related to the execution oflslamic law in a diverse 
society. This perhaps reflects the dearth of political writing in classical Sunni doctrine devoted to 
technical aspects of shari'ah implementation (as mentioned in chapter one). 
2 MB Hooker, "The State and Syariah in Indonesia 1945-1998", in Azyumardi Azra and Arskal Salim 
(eds.), Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia, ISEAS, Singapore, 2003, pp. 33-48. 
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most of these laws were only intended to make the fulfilment of Islamic duties easier 
for Muslims, without making them compulsory. 3 
This chapter and the next will argue that the motives of Islamist parties in resuming 
debate on shari 'ah issues in post-New Order Indonesia were broadly ideological 
whilst the disclosure and promotion of such issues followed practical considerations. 
The shallowness of the discourse in Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United 
Development Party', PPP) and Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB), 
however, gave the ideological motive an overall symbolic quality. There was little 
intellectual depth in a discussion often strongly tinged by emotions of loss and 
segregation. By calling for shari 'ah, PPP and PBB above all expressed what they 
regard as the rightfulness of the majority "umat Islam" to pursue Islamic political 
aspirations in their homeland after being barred from doing so for almost four 
decades. This chapter will also argue that, among the Islamist parties and 
organisations, the ideological motive of loss was strongest among the Masyumi 
legatees PBB and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic 
Propagation Council', DDII). 
At the same time Islamist parties hoped that shari 'ah issues would give them a 
distinctive agenda to draw ideologically minded Muslims to their cause. A potential 
vehicle to promote shari 'ah demands were the iconoclastic "seven words" of the 
Jakarta Charter. The perseverance with which Islamist parties stressed the 
significance of the Jakarta Charter, however, was exaggerated. In fact, they had 
anticipated that the Charter has been left with very little real political meaning in 
post-New Order Indonesia.4 When it became manifest that most present-day Muslims 
have little concern for the Jakarta Charter agenda, PPP and PBB gradually began 
stipulating the implementation of "shari' ah" because the appeal of the word seemed 
to surpass by far that of the "seven words". 5 
3 Arskal Salim, "Epilogue: Shari' a in Indonesia's Current Transition", in Azra and Salim (eds.), 
Shari'a and Politics, pp. 213-35 (esp. p. 229). 
4 Chapter five will show that Islamist parties did not openly promote shari 'ah issues or the Jakarta 
Charter until after the elections in June 1999. 
5 This happened in late 2001. 
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Both the aim to instruct the Muslim public about the historical decline of shari 'ah 
and the purpose-to appeal to ideologically minded Muslims-required little 
intellectual rigor. Contributing to the shallowness was a "pluralist" -dominant 
discourse. Present-day Islamists deal with the difficulty of cultivating shari 'ah in 
diverse nation-states. Inevitably, the public promotion of shari 'ah issues usually 
takes place in "politically correct" style. Supported by the necessity to consider non-
Muslim sentiment, shari 'ah supporters often argue cautiously, promoting shari 'ah 
through broader moral norms and values, ethics (akhlak) or religious teachings 
(ajaran) and the flexible interpretation of individual shari 'ah rulings.6 These 
affirmations take the edges from matters that might be contentious because of their 
association with explicitly Islamic rules.7 Avowals of flexibility also distract from 
the lack of methodology in deriving explicit legal directives from Islamic sources 
other than in the more unambiguous sectors of family and inheritance law. 
Hence, in contrast to the historical and ideological commitment to shari 'ah rule, 
most Islamists showed little interest in initiating a substantial debate to elaborate its 
details or the critical seven-word Jakarta Charter clause, or to develop a systematic 
rationale of how shari 'ah could be implemented in Indonesia. There was, above all, 
little effort to overcome major disagreements between traditionalists and modernists 
who differ on sources of law; traditionalists seek to apply Syafi'i legal teachings 
whilst modernists promote freedom from any particular legal tradition. 8 There also 
was little coordination between Islamist parties; officials conceded never having 
consulted among themselves in order to clarify or synchronise approaches to 
implement Islam. 9 This neglect of the practical aspects reflected awareness that there 
was little prospect that shari 'ah goals could have succeeded in the post-New Order 
constitutional debates. 
6 Reality has often refuted this association between shari 'ah and what are usually asserted to be 
"universal religious values". The implementation oflslamic law in Aceh showed that many, perhaps 
most, Muslims give great importance to the most obvious symbols oflslam, such as that female 
Muslims must wear a proper headscarf, rather than "universal" values. There is thus a persistent gulf 
between such Islamist apologetics and the Muslim lay interpretation of his or her faith. 
7 Compare with Brown, Sharia and State and chapter one. 
8 For example, Indonesia's marriage law only covers broader issues. It probably would be difficult to 
find a consensus on details. 
9 Interviews, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
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During the constitutional debates, Islamist parties proposed the insertion of both 
shari 'ah and neutral religious terms into Paragraph 29 of the Constitution (Undang-
Undang Dasar) on 'religion' (agama). 10 Three proposals were made on the First 
Article of Paragraph 29. The first proposal was to maintain the current wording 'the 
state is based on the One All-Powerful God' (negara berdasar atas Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa). The Army and Police Faction, the Golkar Party Faction, the Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa ('National Awakening Party', PKB) Faction, and the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan ('Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle', PDIP) 
Faction proposed this. The PPP and the PBB revived the idioms and arguments rife 
in Indonesia's 1940s and 1950s. Their exclusively Muslim-targeting clause 
(henceforth: Shari'ah Clause) took on the original wording of the Jakarta Charter: 
'the state is based on the One All-Powerful God with the obligation [kewajiban] to 
carry out [ menjalankan] syari' at Islam for its adherents [penganutnya or pemeluk-
pemeluknya]'. The small Perserikatan Daulatul Ummah ('United Faction of Muslim 
Sovereignty', PDU) Faction supported PPP and PBB at the later stages of the 
constitutional amendments but also appeared open toward other proposals. 11 The 
Fraksi Reformasi ('Reform Faction'), consisting of Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', 
PK) and Partai Amanah Nasional ('National Mandate Party', PAN), proposed a self-
proclaimed pluralist variant of the Charter clause that replaced the term shari 'ah with 
the expression 'religious teachings' (ajaran agama, henceforth 'Plural Clause'). It 
stated: 'the state is based on The One All-Powerful God with the obligation 
[ kewajiban] to carry out [ menjalankan] religious teachings for its respective 
adherents [ bagi masing-masing pemeluknya]. 12 
The legal implications ofboth the Shari'ah- and the Plural Clause were contested and 
poorly elaborated. There was a particular lack of clarity what the term 'obligation' 
(kewajiban) in the two proposals implied. As in the 1956-9 Constituent Assembly 
(Konstituante ), the main question again was whether it made the state accountable to 
10 Apart from the chance to promote Islam's formal acknowledgment in the Constitution, the 
reformasi era opened a window to endorse shari 'ah-laws through the enhancement of regional 
autonomy and the decentralisation of the legal system. This debate took place separately. 
11 The Utusan Daerah Faction ('Regional Representatives Faction') was divided between maintaining 
the original wording and supporting the Shari'ah Clause. 
12 The idea to use neutral religious terms was not new. 30 years earlier, NU leaders suggested 'that 
followers of other religions should be put under obligation to abide by the doctrines of their respective 
religions'. Api Pancasila, 15 April 1968, quoted in Samson, Islam, p. 1013. 
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implement Islamic law/religious teachings among Muslims/non-Muslims or whether 
each individual Muslim/non-Muslim was to be held responsible for adhering to 
shari 'ah laws/ religious teachings. 
Despite their shari 'ah agenda, all Islamist parties were eager not to appear dogmatic. 
They all maintained that an Indonesian Islamic party had to pursue a shari 'ah 
approach adjusted to domestic conditions. They also proposed additional clauses 
endorsing the right of religious freedom. Fraksi Reformasi's proposal read: 'the state 
guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace [memeluk] his/her religion and to 
live according to his/her religion'. The wordings of PPP and PBB were similar. The 
PBB proposal stated: 'The state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to adhere 
[ memeluk] to his/her religion and to live according to his/her religion.' PPP 
suggested: 'the state guarantees the religious freedom of every citizen to worship in 
accordance with his or her religion.' These changes were supposed to be inserted into 
the Second Article of Paragraph 29. By opting for a wording solely targeted toward 
Muslims, PPP and PBB claimed that it was their Shari' ah Clause which guaranteed 
religious freedom. Its indifference to non-Muslim affairs was to ensure that religious 
communities would 'not disturb' each other. 13 
There were, of course, differences in the personal views and political authority of 
individual Islamist leaders which played a crucial role in how parties promoted and 
weighed their positions on shari 'ah. PPP, for that matter, had always been short of 
figures able to provide a lucid doctrinal model and intellectual guidance. In post-
1998, the party once again lacked individuals of guiding intellectual weight and 
influence. As an alliance of competing groups, PPP came into existence without a 
distinct historical reference for its ideology and has itself never formulated a 
doctrinal guide, written or oral, that on its own could be taken as a unifying 
intellectual source. It stands for a type of Islamist party in which leaders who are 
primarily politicians have supplanted the role of intellectuals and, to an important 
extent, theoretical discipline. 
13 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
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PPP's Desultory Shari 'ah Agenda 
Between 1998 and 2002, PPP attempted to steer a course between Islamism and 
pluralism. The party wanted to draw more ideologically minded Muslims without 
alienating pluralist Muslims. To attract the former, PPP ultimately adopted the 
Shari'ah Clause as a defining party policy. In addition, PPP took on its quasi-
ideological agenda of previous years, focussing on a limited number of Islamist 
issues. Overall, from 1998 on PPP continued its New Order legacy of an Islamism 
that is strongly based on pragmatic considerations. 
The platform for PPP's partial and cautious Islamist agenda had been established 
during the New Order. Throughout its history, PPP had lacked the strength and 
means to implement its own policies. Rather than desiring to bring about 
comprehensive change, its struggle became to be defined by fear of the state's 
interference. 14 The only option was trying to avert the New Order government's 
stipulations. 15 This was accompanied by a softening of ideological ambitions to what 
the government regarded as tolerable. 
PPP has not called on the government to implement shari 'ah issues but rather 
concentrated on warding off individual policies broadly seen as anti-umat. It 
staunchly opposed threatening policies such as the Pancasila education program but 
did not directly challenge or question the form of government or the legitimacy of 
14 Compare with Garvey, Introduction, p. 24 and chapter one. 
15 Sidney R. Jones, "'It can't happen here': A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam", Asian 
Survey, March 1980, p. 320. As voting against an undesired policy was futile in the New Order, PPP 
established to walk out of parliamentarian sessions as the last resort to voice opposition. In some 
cases, as in 1974, when PPP opposed the secularisation of marriage law, "walking out" proved to be 
somewhat effective as it threatened to undermine the political process and encouraged demonstrations 
from sympathetic religious groups on the streets. To "walk out" meant that PPP did not consent to the 
government's decision. But the party, of course, had to accept the regulation after it had become 
effective. An example of this attitude was PPP's position toward the Pedoman Penghayatan dan 
Pengamalan Pancasila ('Guidelines for the Comprehension and Implementation ofPancasila', P4) 
regulation. Although opposing the policy vehemently, PPP announced in the 1984 statutes that it 
would 'actively participate' to develop and implement 'Pancasila Democracy' through P4. Anggaran 
Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Khittah Perjuangan dan Pernyataan Politik Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, Jakarta, 1984, p. 110; Umaidi Radi, Strategi PPP 1973-1982: Suatu Studi tentang 
Kekuatan Islam Politik Tingkat Nasional, Integrita Press, Jakarta, 1984, p. 152. To "walk out" 
remained an alternative way to voice dissent in the post-New Order years. 
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Pancasila. 16 PPP never endeavoured to achieve sweepmg societal change by 
thoroughly Islamising community and state, nor did it train its cadres to achieve this 
goal. The case of PPP confirms the view that the internal organisation of a party is 
critical for creating ideological steadfastness. PPP, similar to Masyumi but unlike 
many advocates of Middle Eastern models-such as the Muslim Brotherhood and 
PK-always had lax membership criteria and paid little attention to cadre training. 17 
The choice of training material, PPP decided, should be based on 'a number of 
certain considerations', 'common sense' and the 'experience in the field until now 
with regard to the needs of cadres close to PPP' .18 The selection of cadres for high 
office more often depended on patronage rather than on merit or commitment to 
ideological goals. The willingness of PPP leaders to concede to these shortcomings 
has appeared greater than efforts to stamp them out. They held that 
... cadres are not consistently indoctrinated. Until now the training of cadres is very 
diverse. Because ... as for the method to train cadres, the Central Board never made a 
final decision which material has to be bestowed. . . . [T]he regional and the local 
boards have been given the opportunity to put together [the material] according to 
their needs. So there is no ideological indoctrinisation ... [It is] in accordance with 
what is needed [and] the interests of the regional and localleaderships. 19 
Indeed, PPP's whole party culture is obstructive for a more profound ideological 
approach. In PPP, several independent power groups have been operating 
independently. This always hampered developing an original ideology shared equally 
by its members. The factionalism particularly obstructed the development of an 
authoritative position on shari' ah issues. 20 It also fettered a successful 
implementation of party policies. Chairman Hamzah Haz deplored how policy 
16 Radi, Strategi, p. 151. Also, PPP expressed opposition toward unwanted policies indirectly. It 
commonly criticised the government for breaching an earlier agreement or violating its own 
principles. For example, the 1973 draft to amend the Islam-friendly marriage law was criticised on 
grounds that it violated Pancasila. In circuitous argumentation, the party held that the new draft would 
protect religious minorities but neglect Islam as the faith of the majority. Overall, PPP rarely pointed 
straightforwardly to the rules and stipulations of Islam to argue its case. A similar pattern can be found 
in PPP's stance toward the regime's policies. PPP approved broad provisos like the New Order's 
economic policies and only questioned particular aspects of it by calling, for example, for a stronger 
consideration of small industry as it believed this to be beneficial to local (Muslim) traders. 
17 See the cadreisation material in Sistem Pelatihan Kader Persatuan Pembangunan (Buku Satu), DPP 
PPP Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan, Jakarta, 1995, which has been largely left intact in post-1998. 
Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 24 October 2001. 
18 Sistem Pelatihan, p. 17. 
19 Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 24 October 2001. 
20 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
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resolutions of PPP's 1998 National Congress (Muktamar) were 'rarely' considered 
'even by the majority ofPPP leadership, personnel and party activists' .21 
Moreover, with different histories and intellectual traditions, modernists and 
traditionalists derive their political ideology from different sources. They vary over 
methods of exegesis and sources of law and have a wide range of views on the 
precise content and implementation of various aspects of shari 'ah. With its historic 
links to Masyumi, Parmusi-based notables often have a higher commitment and 
emotional connection to the "seven words", in particular after NU had returned to its 
original socio-religious platform (khittah) in 1984. Because of these differences, PPP 
at all times had to maintain a difficult consensus which narrowed its doctrinal 
options. It is illustrative hat PPP notables have produced much less literature on 
Islamist themes than Masyumi legatees or groups emerging out of campus Islam, 
most prominently Partai Keadilan.22 Parmusi-based Chairman Faisal Baasir gave a 
hint of PPP's pliable ideological self-awareness in comparison to other Islamist 
parties: 
PPP is more flexible than others, for example PK... They [PK people] have 
doctrinal-ideological concepts. They have a record of forming cadres ... [T]he 
system of their cadreisation is like the system of the ... Muslim Brotherhood and this 
is different from PPP because PPP consists of the NU camp, Parmusi. . . These are 
two groups, which unite their shared political interests. But they differ with regard to 
religious doctrine and concerning the political concepts that are based on religion ... 
In PPP two camps have compromised. The result of this compromise is that there is 
no firm position [tidak ada suatu sikap yang kenta/].23 
It is an illustration of this that PPP evaded any ideological debates in the post-New 
Order era other than very broad statements in favour of Islamic principles. At the 
same time, however, PPP had to be alert not to erode the ideological issues central to 
party identity, as it otherwise risked alienating the core of its followers. 
Lacking the ideological drive and the human resources to overhaul its identity and 
agenda, in 1998 PPP went ahead with its customary support for a religiously defined 
21 Dr. H Hamzah Haz Rapatkan ShafTegakkan Amar Ma 'rufNahi Mungkar, DPP PPP, no date 
(probably 2000), p. 6. 
22 Two exceptions, Hartono Mardjono and A.M. Saefuddin, have both a Dewan Dakwah background. 
23 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
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Pancasila. More often and more emphatically than other Islamist parties, PPP 
declared allegiance to the state ideology and the 1945 Constitution and highlighted 
that it would 'maintain, develop and defend' the unitary republic while stressing its 
allegiance to religious and ethnic pluralism?4 It declared during the November 1998 
MPR assembly: 
The Persatuan Pembangunan Faction is convinced that all Indonesian people, all 
factions [golongan] and socio-religious camps [ali ran] see as final and feel 
comfortable living under the shelter of the state's platform Pancasila. There is no 
more intention from any section whatsoever to replace this state platform, even 
though now there are demands, including from the Persatuan Pembangunan Faction 
to abolish ... Pancasila as the sole [ideological] base. The Persatuan Pembangunan 
Faction holds that the demand to abolish the sole base Pancasila is related to 
respecting the reality of the diversity of our society.25 
PPP leaders often commented positively that even a "shari 'ah-free" Constitution 
enabled the passing of Islamic laws through parliament. Of all Islamist parties, PPP 
argued most consistently that Pancasila was a spiritual doctrine and thus would allow 
the creation of Islam-friendly laws. Officials pointed to the 1990s, which produced 
several shari 'ah-based laws without constitutional recognition of shari 'ah.26 The 
creation of such regulations, they argued, showed that there was an 'informal 
consensus' among a majority of parliamentarians of all parties to object to the 
making of laws conflicting with Islamic ethics and values. 27 One month prior to 
Soeharto's resignation, PPP once again argued that the promotion of what it 
customarily endorsed as Pancasila's religious spirit had to be the basis for 
governmental policies and laws: 
24 Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar IV Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, DPP PPP, Jakarta, 1999, p. 34. 
25 "Jangan Mencurigai Rakyat (Tambahan Penjelasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI 
terhadap Rancangan Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Pencabutan TAP MPR No.IV/MPR/1983 tentang 
Referendum Disampaikan pada Sidang Komisi B Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia Tanggal12 November 1998)", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api 
Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam: Senerai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Pada Sidang 
Istimewa MPR RI 10-13 November 1998, FPP MPR, 1999, pp. 91-94 (quote p. 93). Mostly, PPP 
treated the preservation ofPancasila as national ideology as something given, often by reiterating the 
standard phrase ' ... the Indonesian Republic which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution'. 
Prior to the first post-New Order National Congress, Hamzah Haz already had announced that PPP 
regarded the Indonesian unitary state with its ideology as final. "Asas Islam, tapi Tetap Partai 
Terbuka", Media Indonesia, 28 November 1998. 
26 Such as the regulations on the Muslim pilgrimage, alms (zakat) and the special status for Aceh. 
27 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
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With Pancasila as basis of the state, the religious character [jati diri] of the 
Indonesian people has been again re-strengthened. Because the first pillar of the 
Pancasila is [the belief] in The One All-Powerful God ... As for Paragraph 29 First 
Article of the 1945 Constitution which reads "The state is based on The One All-
Powerful God" and the ... Second Article ... we hold that the pillar The One All-
Powerful God cannot be linked to [anything] else than religion. Efforts to separate ... 
The One All-Powerful God from religion, or to separate Pancasila from religion, is 
just the same as the effort to separate sugar from its sweet taste ... With The One All-
Powerful God as first pillar of the Pancasila, there must not be a single effective law 
and regulation in the Indonesian Republic that contradicts religious teachings.28 
Hence, as in the New Order, PPP endorsed Pancasila as a spiritual 'national unifier' 
while strictly opposing readings of Pancasila as being quasi-religious itself. The 
party insisted that 'only in the lap of firm adherents of religion', Pancasila will 
'healthily grow' as national doctrine.29 A definition ofPancasila as the 'source of the 
Indonesian soul', as suggested in the P4 statutes was intolerable because the 
intrinsically religious term 'soul' could not be related to a human construct.30 PPP 
thus remained first and foremost determined to prevent any further attempt to put 
Pancasila and Islam at odds, to restore Islam as its ideological base and to preserve 
its chances to insert Islam-friendly laws into the Constitution. 
To this end, PPP obstructed efforts by secular-nationalists to label Pancasila as the 
philosophical law principle on which national law should develop in the future. In 
the October 1998 MPR session, PPP demanded the abolition of separate provisions 
such as the Pendidikan Moral Pancasila ('Pancasila Moral Education Program', 
28 "Meniti Zaman Bersama Partai Persatuan Pembangunan", in Muhammad Buang, AS. Darussamin, 
Alihardi Kiai Demak, Lukman Hakiem, Endin A.J. Soefihara and Rasyid R. Sulaiman (compilers), 
Menuju Reformasi Politik, Ekonomi, dan Hukum: Perjuangan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan dalam 
Sidang Umum MPR 1998, FPP MPR-RI, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 8-9. 
29 "Koreksi Total dan Kelanjutan Perjuangan: Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan 
MPR-RI Pada Rapat Paripuma Badan Pekerja MPR-RI Tanggal15 September 1998", reprinted in 
Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan 
Pembangunan dalam Badan Pekerja Sidang Istimewa MPR RI 15-30 September 1998, Fraksi 
Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI, 1998, (pp. 29-59, quote p. 49); also "Tinggalkan Kepentingan-
Kepentingan Sesaat (Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia terhadap Rancangan-Rancangan Ketetapan Hasil Badan Pekerja Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Disampaikan dalam Rapat Paripurna Sidang Istimewa 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tanggal 11 November 1998)" reprinted in 
Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi, pp 1-45. 
30 "P-4 Mereduksi Pancasila: Tambahan Penjelasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI terhadap 
Usul Pencabutan Tap No.: II/MPR/1978 tentang Pedoaman (sic) Penghayatan dan Pengamalan 
Pancasila (Eka Prasetnya Pancakarsa) 18 September 1998", reprinted in Hakiem (compiler), 
Menegakkan,pp. 123-7. 
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PMP).31 In the 2000 session, it objected to a re-statement of Pancasila principles in 
the Constitution itself and to introduce a MPR Regulation whose wording suggested 
further emphasis on the status of Pancasila as the source of national law, the 1945 
Constitution and its amendments. 32 This was because a definition of Pancasila as the 
'only source of national law' was likely to hamper the struggle oflslam-friendly laws 
on a one-by-one basis. 
Whilst pledging loyalty to a religiously defined Pancasila, PPP continued to defend a 
limited number of umat interests which had been its trademark policies and which it 
had shielded vigorously during the New Order. In 1998, PPP again publicly made 
known that it would 'combat' (memberantas) communism and atheism, 
characteristically avowing that such beliefs would violate not only Islam but also 
Pancasila.33 The 1998 Congress also resumed other umat core issues such as to 
increase the scope of religious education. 34 In addition, PPP revived its previous 
determination to maintain shari 'ah regulations on marriage and divorce, including 
the banning of inter-religious marriages which had been another focal point in 
previous years. 
PPP also continued to fervently oppose the acknowledgment of mystic and syncretic 
beliefs (kepercayaan) as formal religions by means of an MPR decree and to adopt 
kepercayaan for the constitutional Paragraph 29 on 'religion'. Most pious Muslims 
hold that the term 'belief (kepercayaan) would distort the fundamental nature of the 
paragraph and PPP, too, aimed to ensure that the state only recognised monotheistic 
religions.35 As in the past, PPP argued that, in its original wording, the 'religion' 
paragraph had been misinterpreted and distorted in order to foster the spread of 
'heretic' (bida 'h) kepercayaan. 
31 "P 4 Harus Dicabut: Penjelasan Tambahan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan MPR Rl terhadap 
Rancangan Ketetapan tentang Pencabutan Ketetapan MPR-RI No.IIIMPR/1978 tentang Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa) 18 September 1998", reprinted in 
Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan, pp. 119-22. 
32 Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. 
33 Muktamar IV, p. 35. 
34 Muktamar IV, pp. 183-4. 
35 For example: Risalah Rapat Plena 21 Maret 2002, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002, p. 
356. 
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PPP's promotion of the Shari'ah Clause to be inserted in Paragraph 29 claimed to be 
based in a genuine commitment to the Jakarta Charter's importance as a 'historical 
assignment' (pesan sejarah).36 Party leaders claimed to respond to parts of the 
Muslim population who would desire a formal recognition of shari 'ah by the state. 
They argued that since the beginning of the reformasi era, there had been increasing 
'demands from below' to strive for shari'ah, which PPP then opted to 'channel' 
(mengkanalisir) through political institutions.37 
Most PPP leaders, however, adjusted promotion of the Shari'ah Clause and any 
clarification of its legal implications to what they believed to be useful. Presenting 
PPP as a firm shari 'ah defender, party leaders shaped the basic tenets of its rhetoric 
with an eye to pluralist-minded Muslims and its main constituencies, under the prime 
consideration that PPP had always been a party for the average Indonesian Muslim 
and claiming a nationalist orientation as much as an Islamic. 38 With the bulk of its 
voters consisting of self-aware Muslims perceived to have an assured but indistinct 
shari'ah commitment, the party's stance appeared firm but the need to appear 
pluralist rendered this firmness hollow. Few in the party displayed an interest in 
exploring and spelling out clearly the consequences of a constitutional recognition of 
shari 'ah. In fact, most PPP politicians remained convinced that a comprehensive 
enforcement of shari 'ah and specific rulings such as corporate physical punishment 
for certain offences were not possible in present-day Indonesia. PPP MP Ali Hardi 
Kiai Demak said ofhis party's actions: 
This is what is called struggle ... we toss a statement ... at the same time we wait for 
the maturity of the umat [kematangan umat] ... after all we see the reality ... the matter 
is only tactical because indeed [we] consider time and situation. As an analogy: in a 
war it is possible to announce war while the armies have already entered [the field]. 
We announce [and] attack first; then we set it up [persiapan] (laughing).39 
Zein Badjeber, PPP's representative in the constitutional commission that debated on 
Paragraph 29, commented on his party's shallow approach toward shari 'ah issues: 
36 Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. 
37 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
381bid. 
39 Interview, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Jakarta, 7 October 2003. 
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We are still only in the political struggle ... we are still only pursuing a concept what 
we call struggle program. We are still to develop a practical concept, a subsequent 
model on, say, Islamic marriage law on which we can agree ... We are not yet at the 
finer details.40 
Hence, while identifying the Shari'ah Clause as policy with a resonance among 
ideologically minded Muslims, PPP acted on the awareness that a formal 
constitutional recognition of shari 'ah would leave central jurisdictional matters and 
technical questions regarding its implementation unanswered. Because of the 
awareness of the 'immaturity' of the umat and its eagerness to simultaneously appeal 
to pluralist minded Muslims, PPP has shown little haste or fervour to suggest that the 
wording was linked to the state's obligation to execute shari 'ah.41 There was 'no 
guarantee whatsoever' that with the insertion of the Charter clause 'everything will 
be changed just like that' .42 Publicly, most PPP leaders thus opted for the less 
threatening reading which holds that 'the interpretation [of the term] "obligation" 
does not mean the state but obligation of the Muslim community itself [kewajiban 
dari umat Islam itu sendiri]' .43 A formal recognition of shari 'ah was to bring about 
an 'organic' structure as it would 'correlate' and 'connect' existing shari 'ah-derived 
laws such as family law, alms, pilgrimage, and religious courts and the 
Constitution.44 Ali Hardi commented on the difference between a shari 'ah and a 
shari 'ah-free Paragraph 29: 
If the second alternative [the Shari'ah Clause] uses the words 'with the obligation to 
carry out shariah for its adherents', this really is ... only ... to bridge psychological 
factors in society [menjebatani factor-faktor psikologis]. [T]here are two positions 
in ... society. [T]here are those who argue that already with the original wording: 'the 
state is based on the One God' ... [Islamic] laws ... can be enforced. But there are 
[also] people who want it explicit [sejujurnya]. Well, if [they want it] explicit, then 
40 Also, PPP leaders held that the party had 'never' met to specifically discuss the technical aspects of 
implementing the Shari'ah Clause. Interviews, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001; Zein Badjeber, 
Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
41 For example, PPP cautiously argued that the state indeed was not responsible for spreading a certain 
creed but to support the 'development of religious communities' (mengembangkan ummat beragama) 
in order to bring about 'prosperity' and 'benefit' (kemaslahatan). Risalah Rapat Plena Ke-44 Panitia 
Ad Hoc I Badan Pekelja MPR 14 June 2000, Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2000. 
42 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
43 Interview, Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. Also Saleh Khalid "Menggugat 
Sejarah: Hilangnya 7 (Tujuh) Kata Piagam Jakarta Dari UUD 1945" ('Blaming history: The 
disappearance of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter from the 1945 Constitution'), (no place), 
2000. The author is a long-time PPP activist. 
44 Interview, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Jakarta, 7 October 2003; Risalah Sementara 6 Agustus 2002, 
Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2002, p. 74. 
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that's the way we do it [ya kalau sejujurnya ya kita buka saja gitu]. This is the 
question of alternative one and alternative two ... 45 
PPP's central leadership, however, did little to attune internal positions, so that 
individual views among PPP politicians tended to be more diverse than in PBB and 
in PK.46 Some suggested that constitutional recognition of shari 'ah would give an 
'enhanced guarantee' that the law-making process takes into account the teachings of 
Islam. At least, there will be 'an easing' as the insertion of shari 'ah terms will be 'an 
umbrella' or can be 'a reference' and a 'common declaration' .47 Zein Badjeber 
pointed out: 
We don't fight for this [the Shari'ah Clause] to obtain a legitimation to implement a 
certain law that is in accordance with Islam. This is not meant! There is no 
impediment to this [at the present]. We only ask for a written guarantee in the 
Constitution in order to prevent differing interpretations [among political factions] 
so that the state must not issue regulations that go against Islam-under the 
Pancasila.48 
In summary, though PPP adopted the Shari'ah Clause as key policy, the party 
downplayed that its insertion would oblige the government to implement Islam 
among Muslims. Party leaders did not link the constitutional recognition of shari 'ah 
to the state's obligation to revise existing regulations or to adopt new laws with an 
Islamic temperament even if several officials did not explicitly reject such an 
obligation, or that constitutional recognition would aid a wider instalment of Islamic 
laws or give the state more authority in carrying out existing laws.49 
This effort to please Islamists whilst reassuring pluralist-minded Muslims rendered 
PPP's promotion of shari'ah issues not only as eager to appear non-threatening but 
also as desultory. Common to all explanations was a profound lack of clarity and 
explicitness. In the 2000 MPR session, PPP argued that the purpose of the Shari' ah 
45 Ali Hardi quoted in Risalah Rapat Pleno 13 June 2002, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 3 Tahun 
2002, p. 393. 
46 PPP officials payed little attention to Masyumi's standpoint that Islam demanded the state to 
implement Qur' anic stipulations dealing with 'social relations' (mua 'malah) among Muslims. See this 
chapter's section on PBB. 
47 Interview, Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
48 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
49 PPP leaders described their colleagues in PBB to be more reckless in the struggle for shari' ah as 
Islamists in that party wanted to put obligation on the state to enforce shari 'ah. See the further 
discussion. 
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Clause was 'merely to give unequivocal legitimacy to the creation of public law to be 
made obligatory for adherents of Islam, which has been already effective until 
now' .50 PPP's suggestion that the Shari'ah Clause would oblige individual Muslims 
to carry out Islamic law was not backed by explanations of what this meant in 
jurisdictional terms. A typically paradoxical assurance was that 'if shariah will be 
made obligatory for the Muslim community [ diwajibkan pelaksanaannya kepada 
umat], it will not lead to compulsion [paksaan]' .51 
Significantly, at the start of the reformasi era PPP appeared hesitant about whether it 
was likely to get many votes with shari 'ah issues and the Jakarta Charter. This 
hesitation, chapter five will show, determined the party's political strategy in 1998 
and 1999. In the immediate post-New Order era, PPP promoted a reform agenda that 
focussed on non-Islamist issues and only included those Islamist themes which it 
considered to be widely accepted. Up until mid-2000, PPP hardly mentioned any 
shari 'ah goals. 
The Formalist-Symbolic Shari 'ah Outlook of PBB 
Unlike the scarcity of intellectually dominant individuals in PPP, Chairman Yusril 
Ihza Mahendra quickly controlled the political course of PBB, Masyumi's most 
devoted legatee. Yusril's dominance meant that PBB's shari 'ah agenda appeared 
low-key. Again in contrast to PPP, PBB consciously adopted a single model to 
cultivate shari 'ah. Entrenched in the thinking of Masyumi legatees has been the idea 
of some unspecified form of "restricted" democracy in which certain issues pre-
determined by "the position of Islam" were no longer open for discussion. 52 Its 
historic example is what Mohamad Natsir in the Constituent Assembly had called a 
"theistic democracy". 53 
50 Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. 
51 Pemandangan Umum 4 November 2001, p. 3. 
52 An early PBB document in clumsy English seemed to reveal that party leaders were aware of the 
potential problems to pin down exactly what it means to be a democratic party that desires an Islamic 
Constitution to the largest extent practicable. The document stated: 'we are doing our best to be 
democratic and Islamic at the same time'. A Brief Profile of Partai Bulan Bintang, (no place, no date, 
probably 1998). 
53 Natsir, Dasar Negara, in Natsir, Agama dan Negara, p. 220. 
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Masyumi differentiated between shari 'ah as ibadah (worship or, more generally, the 
five pillars of Islam) and as mua 'malah (Arab: mua 'mala, rules on social relations, 
dealings between people). This equalled a quite common recognition among 
Islamists of two 'differentiated spheres of human life and activity'. One area covered 
faith and worship and the other area dealt with worldly matters. 54 At the 
Konstituante, Natsir said: 
Islam is an ideology. Islam is not merely a religion understood as a relationship 
between humans and God. Islam comprises two elements ... relationship between 
humans and their God and the relationship between humans: The element of ibadah 
[worship] and muamalah [social relations]. 55 
Masyumi further held that, in Islamic law, issues dealing with 'social relations' 
(mu 'amalah) needed the involvement of state authorities. At the same time, other 
religious communities were to keep full rights to 'carry out' (mengamalkan) their 
faith and to 'develop' their culture.56 As the state's assignment only concerned 
Muslims it would not contravene Pancasila or infringe on other religions. 
Masyumi did not promote a literal application of Qur' anic stipulations but, for the 
most part, claimed to be content with the application of the main principles of the 
Islamic canon. Islam, it was argued, provided the 'main fundamentals' and not all the 
technical details for the organisation of the state. Natsir said: 
People maybe wonder how Islam is able to rule this modem state that has to face 
1001 complex issues. In order to banish such suspicion, may I clarify that people do 
not have to ask how, for example, Islam deals with ... the exchange rate ... traffic rules 
and so on ... Islam does not regulate 1001 detailed things, which are 
technical. .. which can change according to the conditions and the necessities of 
time .. .Islam provides the fundamentals ... [I]t clarifies the limits [hudud] of what is 
allowed and not allowed, the limits of what is proper and not. .. Apart from those 
norms already determined and several limitations that have to be implemented for 
the wellbeing of humankind itself, there is a field very wide open for humans to take 
initiative using its reason or its interpretation [ijtihad] .. .in accordance with 
advancement and the requirements of time and place. Religion ... only meddles if 
endeavours toward ijtihad and reason will clash with the limits of morality, fairness 
[and] humanity already illuminated by religion.57 
54 Kramer, Islamist Notion, p. 4. 
55 Natsir, Dasar Negara, p. 219. 
56 Kalau Masjumi, p. 5. 
57 Natsir, Dasar Negara, pp. 219-20. 
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These views became equally important for pragmatic Masyumi legatees promoting 
the party's dedication to broader "Islamic values" and for doctrinaire Islamists who 
made little such accommodating efforts. The two camps differed on how and how 
much an Islamic party that claimed to continue Masyumi's legacy had to promote 
Masyumi dedication to shari 'ah. 58 While equally vague about explaining shari 'ah 
stipulations, the doctrinaire Islamists were more emphatic regarding the defence and 
promotion of what they broadly defined as Islam. 
Led by two pragmatic Islamists-Yusril and Secretary-General M.S. Ka'ban-PBB 
promoted the state's responsibility to take up steps as the promoter of Islam while 
depicting the distillation of shari 'ah law as to strive for universal 'Islamic values' 
(nilai Islam), 'ethics' (akhlak) or 'teachings' (ajaran). The party was devoted to the 
idea that being a Muslim meant submission to shari 'ah rule. But its pragmatic 
leaders also were aware that obliging a government with a non-Islamist majority with 
the task to enforce shari 'ah on an unprepared society was unrealistic. To resolve this 
dilemma and citing Natsir, they promoted a flexible application of "Islamic values". 
Islamic texts were not 'self-evident' and 'a priori truths'. The results of the PBB 
2000 Congress held that it was of secondary importance whether the state was 
termed 'Islamic' as long as Islamic 'principles' and 'values' were effective.59 
The belief in the state's obligation to carry out Islam derived from classical Sunni 
political theory which holds that the major task of a government was to establish 
Islamic rule. Its legitimacy stood and fell with whether it complied with this task. 
PBB and other Masyumi legatees such as DDII, Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas 
Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World', KISDI) 
and Persis ('Islamic Association') argued that a state with a majority Muslim 
population was obliged to facilitate its citizens to live in accordance with shari 'ah to 
the largest extent possible. Otherwise the state would sin against Muslims and put at 
risk people's salvation in the afterlife.60 
58 See also chapter two, last section and chapter five. 
59 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 72. 
60 Hasil Muktamar I; Haril M. Andersen, Hamdani, Husni Jum'at, Nasruddin Muharor and Zaun 
Fathin (eds.), Memperjuangkan Syariat Islam: Kumpulan Pidato Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Pada 
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The view that nominal Muslims are not free to decide whether to succumb to Islamic 
rules stands for an unresolved matter between Islam and international rights norms.61 
It showed that many Islamists, whilst operating in institutions representative of a 
plural democracy and supportive of its mechanisms, have not accepted the belief in 
religion as a matter disconnected from political authority. They appear to suggest that 
it is impossible for a Muslim to refuse putting oneself under the state's religious 
supervision and still consider him or herself a believer. 
PBB juxtaposed such insistence with avowals of flexibility. Ostensibly recognising 
the benefit of treading softly on potentially dividing issues, its large number of senior 
doctrinaire Islamists left the sketching of PBB's ideological profile to Yusril and Dr. 
Rifyal Ka'bah, who had a much smaller public profile.62 Yusril had been known for 
comparative studies on Islamic politics, especially Masyumi, which he categorized as 
'Islamic modernists' and set apart from 'Islamic fundamentalists' such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Jamaat-i-Islami. In Yusril's view, modernist and fundamentalists 
differed in their 'tendencies to interpret doctrine to overcome political issues'. 
Modernism tended to read doctrine 'elastically and flexibly whereas fundamentalism 
tends to interpret [doctrine] rigidly and literally' .63 'Fundamentalists' wanted to 
establish shari 'ah 'totally' (mutlak) and without compromise and contextualisation.64 
'Modernists' prioritised implementing shari 'ah rules that dealt with mua 'malah 
(social relations) and based the technicalities of the implementation on a generous 
application of 'individual reading' (ijtihad). Yusril wrote: 
Sidang Tahunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tahun 2000-2002, Fraksi PBB 
MPR, (no place), 2003. 
61 This position is also alien to Christians. Christian doctrine puts less emphasis on community 
concerns and the rising individualism in Christian-majority countries has led to its further erosion. At 
the same time, many Muslims have difficulties in understanding Christian concerns that nominal 
Muslims may lose part of their religious freedom if the state enforces shari' a h. Ward already observed 
this in the late 1960s in his study on Parmusi: Foundation, p. 47, Footnote 22. 
62 Rifyal Ka 'bah was appointed Supreme Court Judge in 2001 and had to resign from the PBB board. 
63 Yusri1 Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: Perbandingan 
Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jama 'at-I- Is/ami (Pakistan), Paramadina, Jakarta, 1999, p. 
304. This distinction seems rigid. In fact, 'fundamentalists' such as the various branches of the 
Muslim Brotherhood have often been very pragmatic, especially since becoming active in plural 
political systems. Similarly, when Jamaat-i-Islami turned into a political party, it had to make a wide 
range of concessions. 
64 Yusril Ihza "Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme sebagai Gejala Politik", Media Dakwah, November 
1993. 
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[For] Modernism, the application of doctrine only concerns principles related to 
societal issues. These principles are eternal and universal values. Because societies 
constantly develop, individual judgment has to be emphasised to adjust 
[menghadapkan] doctrine to social change ... Societal diversity, too, is seen as 
positive. Muslims, therefore, need to be open to adapt several 'wisdoms' ["hikmah"] 
that exist in other societies. [Fundamentalists] see the scope of individual judgment 
confined to maintaining the purity of doctrine. [For them] the precedent oflslam's 
early days is comprehensively binding, as it is the most authoritative example in the 
application of doctrine from the sources ... Because Islam is the only truth and 
outside there is misinterpretation [ kesesatan], [fundamentalists are] inclined to see 
pluralism pessimistically and negatively.65 
Their features made modernist parties 'mass parties' established by Muslim 
community leaders whereas 'fundamentalists' were cadre-based parties initiated by a 
charismatic ideologue. Natsir, Yusril proclaimed in obvious divergence to NU or PNI 
leaders of the 1950s, was a people-oriented leader rather than an ideologue or an 
aloof intellectual. Masyumi's blend of Islamism was home-grown and inseparable 
from the indigenous socio-cultural setting. Jamaat-i-Islami and the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, by contrast, were Islamic movements striving to enhance Islamist 
awareness on a broad scale. 66 
It was modernists, Yusril argued, who 'tend to make compromises when they held 
parts of power or even themselves held power'. For Islamist movements, to be 
principled was easier because they operated at the fringes of society. 67 In view of 
that, they were inclined to 'see problems in black and white'. But 'to overcome 
problems in a black and white fashion is less significant to prevail over current 
problems Indonesian society is facing'. 68 
The tribute to Masyumi and the alleged roots of its blend of Islam in Indonesia 
became a self-serving argument for PBB and DDII.69 The praise of Masyumi's 
65 Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, pp. 304-5. 
66 Yusril Ihza Mahendra "Mohammad Natsir dan Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi: Telaah Tentang 
Dinamik Islam dan Transformasinya ke Dalam Ideologi Sosial dan Politik", in Taher (ed.), Pemikiran 
dan Pefjuangan Mohammad Natsir, Pustaka Firdaus, Jakarta, 1996. 
67 Mahendra, Natsir dan Maududi, pp. 71 and 80. 
68 Mahendra, Studi. 
69 According to Yusril, Masyumi's broad repute was underscored through the inclusion and 
performance of its leaders in cabinet and opposition. Mahendra, Natsir dan Maududi and Studi. By 
contrast, when becoming a political party, Jamaat-i-Is1ami had still lacked a representative both in 
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alleged flexibility, in particular, was at odds with the view of the party's political 
opponents in the past. Both NU and PNI had seen Masyumi as doctrinally stiff and 
opinionated, slating its blend of Islam as "anti-cultural" as it would collide with 
Indonesian religious customs. 70 
Yusril thus promoted PBB in accordance with his earlier established v1ew and 
attempted to distinguish the agenda of PBB from campus Islamism and Partai 
Keadilan. He often described the position of PBB as distinct from Islamists 
concentrating on proselytisation and preaching (dakwah). 71 To cadres, he said: 
This [PBB] is a political party, not an ideological movement, [it is] not a dakwah 
movement ... A political party has a clear political agenda. It drafts an organisation, 
[sets up] its structure; then puts together its policies. [(T)his is then] publicised, put 
into a program, [and then the party] takes part in the elections ... [this is] generally 
different to establishing a dakwah organisation. A political party has a very clear 
political agenda; that is [it] wants to enter the corridor of power in a particular 
country. The scope and range of a dakwah movement is very wide. Those who 
pursue dakwah are not confined to a particular country ... but the working place of [a] 
political party clearly is only in a particular country.72 
Paying no heed to his conviction that, by 1998, little popular support had been left 
for Masyumi, Yusril claimed that, like Masyumi and-by definition-modernist 
Islam, PBB was widely accepted in the broader Muslim community.73 The pace with 
which PBB could set up regional boards was a sign that 'this party [PBB] has 
ideological, sociological and historical roots in our society'. 74 Such avowals seemed 
to pick up representational claims in the Bulan Bin tang camp throughout the New 
Order. Now, they had turned into a rhetorical tool to portray PBB as having strong 
cabinet and national parliament. It only had one representative in a regional parliament (Natsir dan 
Maududi, p. 71). 
70 I am thankful to Dr. Greg Fealy for this point. 
71 Yusril, under ongoing attacks from the doctrinaire camp, became increasingly thin-skinned. He 
brushed away debate over party ideology, arguing that he had never anticipated leading a political 
party and categorically dismissed any connections between the views on Islamic modernism presented 
in his academic output and his performance as PBB Chairman. Interview, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, 
Jakarta, 8 November 2001. 
72 Speech at the inauguration of the PBB board in West Java, reprinted inBuletin Bintang, 15-30 
September 1998, pp. 1-2 and 4-5. 
73 "Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Bulan Bintang Bukan Gerakan Ideologi Islam" ('Bulan Bintang is not an 
Ideological Islamic Movement'), Kompas, 31 July 1998. 
74 Speech at the opening of the first National Working Congress, 25 February 1999, reprinted in Hasil 
Mukernas I, p. 6. 
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democratic legitimacy and being a major contestant in the June 1999 elections. Of 
course, a mere 1.94% share of votes clearly refuted these assertions. 
The shari 'ah approach of Masyumi legatees remained entrenched in national history 
despite most of their leaders having taken on a more critical view of what they saw 
as Western-dominated global issues. Underscoring their claim for domestic roots, 
Masyumi and its legatees alike proclaimed to blend 'Islamic-ness' (keislaman) and 
'Indonesian-ness' (keindonesiaan), which suggested an Islam infused with 
Indonesian qualities.75 This blend proclaimed appreciation of "Indonesian-ness" in 
the application of Islamist agendas. Rifyal Ka'bah again made a distinction between 
the Masyumi tradition and PK: 
[The] difficulty that the Ikhwan [Muslim Brotherhood] faces [is that] it wants to 
implement Islamic politics but the model is from overseas. For Masyumi [and] 
Bulan Bintang more examples come from Indonesia. Bulan Bintang looks more 
toward Natsir than al-Banna and others. An experiment [percobaan] that fits 
overseas cannot be suitable in Indonesia because we have a different environment. 
Even more so since the Ikhwan never succeeded in its struggle except a little in 
Jordan and in the Sudan ... This has to do with the method. Indeed, Masyumi was 
applied [diterapkan] for the Indonesian conditions. This is the difference to PK. 
Because PK is a cell movement [gerakan usrah]. U srah comes from Ikhwan. PK is 
even the Indonesian copy of Ikhwan. 76 
In spite of the dual platform typical of Masyumi and PBB, Islam remained as the 
absolute, universal truth and the notional source of all actions. 'Islamic-ness' was the 
superior reference and circumscribed the application of 'Indonesian-ness'. With 
'Indonesian-ness' closely related to Islam, PBB merely re-confirmed the traditional 
claim of the Masyumi camp that the Muslim community had a common boundary 
with the nation. 'Islamic-ness' (keislaman) and 'nationhood' (kebangsaan), the PBB 
2000 Congress declared, was an 'integral unity'. 77 
Reflecting the superior status of 'Islamic-ness', the advocates of a home-grown 
Islamism have always claimed propinquity to the 'Islamic-ness' of foreign Islamist 
groups. It was merely the adaptation of Islam that differed. The Muslim Brotherhood, 
75 This is thus different to the notion of 'Indonesian Islam'. This notion suggests endorsement of 
Islam's cultural diversity in Indonesia and the role of pre-Islamic customs in it. 
76 Interview, Rifyal Ka'bah, Jakarta, 5 February 2001. 
77 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 74-5. 
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Jama'at-i-Islami and Masyumi, Rifyal Ka'bah argued, had 'through means of an 
organisation, with strategies and tactics which perhaps were different but with an 
identical goal' strived to bring about an Islamic society.78 For this aim, the superior 
position of Islam in the ideological platform must be ensured: 
The perception of 'an Islam infused with Indonesian qualities' [Islam 
keindonesiaan'] can only be accepted in the context of authenticity [al-aslahah]. If 
the idea [of Islam keindonesiaan] is put in this context, it refers to an original 
understanding and practice of Islam. [As such it] comes from an authentic reading 
[ijtihad murni] of Islam. [This is] perhaps what currently can be implemented in 
Indonesia but [it] is still authentically Islamic [tetap berciri asli Islam]. [Islamic] 
authenticity has a strong connection ... with the consistency [and] solidarity ... that 
still prevails among the international Islamic movement. [But] if the perception of 
Islam keindonesiaan is based on an image of Indonesian nationhood which is only 
emergent, [and] then adjusted to dismembered [telah pecah] Islamic concepts; the 
perception [of an Islam infused with Indonesian qualities] may be seen as having lost 
its Islamic authenticity [al-aslhalah al-islamiyah]. If the latter [approach] is forced, 
the idea will loose the consistency, solidarity and the international Islamic trait.79 
PBB promoted the insertion of the Shari'ah Clause into Paragraph 29 on 'religion', 
as did PPP. The party similarly argued that, first, inserting shari 'ah terms would give 
a 'constitutional framework' to Islamic laws currently existing and to people's 
adherence to religious teachings which 'until now has been taking place without a 
constitutional basis protecting [menaungi] it' .80 Second, the mentioning of shari 'ah 
in the Constitution was essential 'because it will become a solid legal basis for the 
implementation oflslamic law within the framework ofnationallaw'. 81 For Muslims 
alone state and religion were interrelated; the basis of the state would still rest on a 
nationalist-pluralist formula. 82 
But of the parties advocating the Shari'ah Clause, only PBB argued that the term 
'obligation' referred to an obligation of the state to implement Islamic law among 
Muslims. This perception of the state as executor of shari'ah resumed Masyumi's 
78 Rifyal Ka'bah, "Pergerakan Islam dan Permasalahannya", in[?], Jakarta, 1987. I was unable to 
locate the title of the edited book which features this writing. 
79 Ka'bah, Pergerakan, p. 147. 
80 Mahendra, Sambutan Ketua Umum, in Andersen, Hamdani, Jum'at, Muharor and Fathin (eds.), 
Memperjuangkan, p. vii-viii. 
81 "Laporan Fraksi Bulan Bintang MPR RI Pada Mukemas DPP Partai Bulan Bintang 14-17 
September", Jakarta, 14 September 2001, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 September 2001, pp. 
12-3. 
82 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Sekitar RUUP A: Menjawab Mingguan Hidup", Serial Media Dakwah, 
August 1989, pp. 58-60. 
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position. The Constitution, PBB argued, had to 'bind [mengikat] the state' to execute 
Islamic law among Muslims. 83 The reason was that crucial parts of Islamic teachings 
needed the active involvement of the state and its institutions. 84 It was the Charter's 
'historical context and essence [hakekat]' to 'enable shariah Islam to become 
effective law for Indonesian Muslims'. 85 The deletion of the Jakarta Charter in 1945 
had until now denied Muslims the right to fully live in accordance with Islamic 
teachings. Yusril wrote: 
This [the deletion of the Charter] had the result that the Muslim people in Indonesia 
do not have national legal protection to carrying out the teachings [ syariat] of their 
religion, in particular those relating to juridical legal dealings fperkara-perkara 
hukum peradilan, qada'i]. It is the obligation of the state to establish [menegakkan] 
the aforementioned law toward its Muslim citizens. This notwithstanding, the 
Muslim people are still able to carry out the teachings of their religion limited to 
individual legal dealings fperkara-perkara hukum perorangan, diyani]. 86 
Yusril declared that other Islamist parties would misunderstand the legal implications 
of the term 'obligation' .87 The inclusion of the Shari'ah Clause would have to entail a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of laws, both those existing and those imminent, to 
ensure they follow Islamic principles.88 PBB's argumentation in the constitutional 
commissions adopted this understanding. 89 In the MPR 2002 session, MP Qasthalani 
once again touched on the friction between the Islamist view deriving from classical 
Sunni political theory and the Western affection for free individual decision over 
religious matters. He said: 
'Obligation' means obligation for the state to implement syariat Islam, not the 
obligation of every citizen to adhere to the teachings of his religion. For a 
Muslim ... he or she is obliged to carry out [melaksanakan] syariat Islam from the 
moment he or she becomes a Muslim.90 
83 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
84 "Piagam Jakarta Perjuangan Tiada Henti", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 September 2000, pp. 4-6. 
85 "Rekomendasi Musyawarah Kerja Nasional II Partai Bulan Bintang", 16 September 2001, reprinted 
in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 September 2001, pp. 7-8. 
86 Mahendra, Sambutan, in Memperjuangkan, p. vii. 
87 "Banyak Salah Faham" ('Many misunderstand'), Buletin Bulan Bintang, July 2002, pp. 8-9. In 
response to PPP' s promotion that the term 'obligation' referred to the obligation of each individual 
Muslim, Yusril pointed out that the Constitution could not give a direct order to the people but gave 
directives to the state and its organs (ibid). 
88 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
89 The party's stance, often presented by Hamdan Zoelva, was established in association with Yusril. 
Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
90 Risalah Sementara 6 Agustus 2002, p. 46. See also Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang Tahun 
2000. 
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The party, however, made a general distinction between which aspects of Islam had 
to entail state involvement and which did not. Its obligation was to implement those 
sections of the Revelation that 'are definitive and unalterable' (qoti, qati). This 
excluded what the common non-Muslim view would most strictly deem as personal 
matters. Hamdan Zoelva said in the constitutional commission: 
[T]hose issues which relate to worship [ibadah], the relation between humans and 
God [Tuhan], [this] we leave to human beings, and there is no need for the 
intervention of the authorities. But if we speak in the context of the implementation 
of syariah related to the enforcement of law that is qoti in syariah [considered 
definitive and unalterable], then it is impossible to be implemented without the help 
of an authority or the state. For example, how is it possible to implement Islamic 
family law, which is explained in the Qur'an in a qoti way, if there is no tribunal 
which is recognised and installed by the state? This is not possible. Like other qoti 
laws, what is clear is they cannot be executed without the help of an authority or the 
state ... [t]here is a part of syari'at Islam which is related to public aspects, social 
relations and penal law Uinayah] which cannot be implemented without the state 
being responsible for being involved in their implementation.91 
The promotion of a flexible interpretation of the Islamic canon also covered those 
aspects of shari'ah that were depicted as needing the state's direct involvement. 
PBB' s 2000 Congress announced: 
[The] party is aware that ... mu' amalah [social relations] ... is a field wide [open] for 
ijtihad to find [menggali] Islamic teachings [and] to overcome new problems which 
emerge at any given time, while always considering situation, place and era. The 
principles do not change, but the era always changes.92 
Yusril had defined the goals of a modernist party accordingly. Avowals of flexibility 
aimed to counter the common charge held against Islamism that in various aspects 
'the gap between medieval and contemporary attitudes and customs is ... seemingly 
unbridgeable' .93 The only area where Islam needed to be adapted literally was family 
91 Risalah Rapat Pleno 21 Maret 2002 reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002 (first part of 
quote) and Risalah Sementara 6 Agustus 2002, (second part: '[t]here is ... '). In a 2002 MPR session, 
Hamdan asked 'How should a state be able to control whether somebody prays? Shall we have a 
policeman in every room? This is not meant.' Risalah Rapat Pleno 13 Juni 2002 reprinted in Buku 
Kedua Jilid 3 Tahun 2002, p. 411. The term 'worship' refers to religious duties that are left to 
individual responsibility such as the five daily prayers (sa/at). In others like the pilgrimage (hajj), the 
state needed to become involved in organisation. 
92 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 63-4. Also Hasil Mukernas I, p. 56. 
93 E.I.J. Rosenthal, "The Islamic Law and Constitution: Review Article", International Affairs, No.3, 
July 1962, pp. 365-8. 
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law. In a 1998 article, Yusril outlined a position that was reminiscent of N atsir and 
which also became PBB's stance: 
[I]n the field of law in the Qur' an ... only two aspects of social relations [ muamalat] 
are covered .. .in a detailed [rinci] manner: marriage law and .. .inheritance .. .in how 
we organise ... economics, bank law, fiscal law, traffic law, penal law [pidana] and 
others it is left open to the widest extend to conduct individual reading by referring 
to the fundaments .. .in shariah. In criminal law [pidana]. .. [w]hen the delict is 
clear.. . the sanction is clear [too]. But outside this, for example in computer crimes 
[and] bank crimes ... the Qur'an only provides principles. Widest freedom is given to 
us the Muslim community to interpret [berijtihadJ, [and to] transform those shariah 
principles to crush the problems we face. These principles are truth [kebenaran], 
justice [ keadilan] . .. 94 
Assurances of flexibility, however, also cloaked the lack of insight into how a wide 
application of shari 'ah by the state could be realised in Indonesia. PBB demanded 
the state to enforce amorphous and indefinite "Islamic values" on Muslims but-as 
PPP-showed little interest to find ways to flesh out ways to distil and apply Islamic 
law. To party colleagues, Yusril called for circumspection. Obliging the state to 
enforce Islam would be difficult if society was not "prepared" and if the state lacks a 
Shari'ah High Court.95 Deputy Secretary-General Suaib Didu noted: 
PBB has a concept for the Jakarta Charter but. .. not what technical steps [have to 
follow] ... Yusril himself says: 'do not rush until there is an infrastructure. Including 
a Shari' ah High Court. There has to be one. How do you want to rule a court case if 
there is no Shariah High Court?. . . And there is the question of human resources, 
people who really know about the content of the Qur'an in a technical way. This is 
not ready yet. Do not rush too much ... You better set up such infrastructures first; 
only then [it] can be carried out'. But there is also another view, we implement it 
first, later we set up the infrastructure. But this is quite dangerous. It can rebound on 
Islam that Islam was not able to respond to the challenges.96 
At various occasions, Yusril pointed to the problems other Muslim countries had in 
implementing Islamic law.97 His frequent highlighting of the most universal of 
94 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Keislaman dan Keindonesiaan", Abadi, 12-18 November 1998, also 
reprinted in Sabar Sittangang, Muladi, Maulana & Agus Salam (eds.), Catalan Kritis dan Percikiran 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Bulan Bintang, Jakarta, 2001, p. 185. 
95 PBB hearing in Padang, West Sumatra, 18 November 2000, headed by Yusril and Ka'ban (personal 
notes). 
96 Interview, Suaib Didu, Jakarta, 19 November 2001. 
97 Examples were Pakistan under Zial ul-Haq and Malaysia. "Yusril: Sistem Pemerintahan Islam 
Belum Tepat" ('Yusril: The Islamic system of governance is not yet in order'), Jawa Pos, 8 May 
2000. To cadres in Padang, Yusril cautioned that Islam's imperative to trace 10 witnesses for cases of 
adultery showed that 'the implementation oflslamic law was not simple [sederhana]'. PBB hearing in 
Padang, West Sumatra, 18 November 2000, (personal notes). 
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Islamic values directly responded to these challenges. Moreover, officials conceded 
that, by early 2002, the party was still struggling to establish itself in the regions and 
to improve the internal administration which meant that it had 'not yet arrived at the 
Islamic conceptualisation of matters in order to carry them out' .98 Also, PBB held 
symposiums in which puzzled party officials asked Muslim scholars for advise on 
how to implement shari 'ah.99 
The current wording of Paragraph 29 ensures a monotheist state ideology which was 
minimal and not negotiable. It is a sufficient compromise, particularly for the 
pragmatic Islamists. 100 A less than 2% share in the 1999 elections guaranteed that 
PBB's efforts in the constitutional panels to argue its case for a formal recognition of 
shari 'ah in the Constitution would be futile. It was a formalist-symbolic struggle. 
The party was aware that it would get few votes and so PBB showed little concern 
for developing a concept that would go beyond a mere acknowledgment of shari 'ah 
terms in the Constitution. 
Although Masyumi legatees continued to claim to defend umat interests by 
supporting shari 'ah, they have attracted support from only a small minority of those 
Muslims they claim to represent. A tiny minority in parliament, PBB did not have the 
people's mandate to suggest there was extensive backing for its design of Islam's 
position in state and Constitution and that its brand of Islam was strongly rooted in 
society. Despite such attempts to give legitimacy to its shari 'ah-mindedness, PBB or 
DDII leaders expected little public support for such an agenda. This was the chief 
reason that PBB downplayed shari 'ah goals up until after its 2000 Congress. By the 
time the party made shari 'ah and the Jakarta Charter an official policy, most 
doctrinaire Islarnists, who had remained publicly tacit on shari 'ah issues due to the 
pragmatically endorsed domination ofYusril, had left the party. 
98 Deputy Secretary-General Nabhan Husein quoted in "Partai-Partai Islam: Pluralisme Berbau 
Kemunduran", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 01 January 2002, p. 19. 
99 Personal notes, 2000 and confidential remarks by scholars from lAIN Hidayattulah, Jakarta, 2000. 
100 Interview, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Jakarta, 22 November 2001; "Tujuh Kata: Perintah Kepada 
Negara" ('The seven words: An order to the State'), Buletin Bulan Bintang, August 2002, p. 8. (Both 
references refer to the monotheist state as minimal compromise). 
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Both PPP and PBB politicians have shown awareness that their parties' lack of 
conceptual depth might be exposed if electoral success would require them to 
implement the Charter or shari 'ah on a comprehensive scale. The nonchalant pretext 
for the time being has been that if the implementation of the Jakarta Charter fails 
then people are free to vote for other-i.e. non-Islamist-parties in next elections. 
Accordingly, PPP and PBB have no overriding reverie of a post-democratic society. 
Unlike PPP and PBB, Partai Keadilan came into existence as a genuine cadre-based 
party. It acted on the conviction that the demise of Islam and the deflection of 
Muslim leadership to Western ideas only could be slowed down through a gradual 
strengthening of Islam through educational and social activities and dedicated cadres. 
As tarbiyah leaders, they had much less of an historical and emotional affinity with 
the Masyumi tradition, especially the struggle for the Shari'ah Clause. Because of 
this, PK was wary of supporting the insertion of shari 'ah terms into the present-day 
Constitution. 
The Gradualist Approach of PK 
Islamists commonly deem nationalist sentiment that divorces religion from the state 
as hollow and illusory. This view ranges across a wide spectrum and is clearest 
among Islamists driven by the spirit to refuse to give in to any cultural influences 
from outside Islam. PK endorsed that it was permissible to defend national interests 
and protect the notion of nationhood. Nationalist sentiment and national sovereignty, 
however, served to maintain and defend an Islamic system in society. The borders of 
nationalism were determined by the boundaries of the Islamic realm rather than by 
the boundaries of nation-states. 101 'The motive for people to love the nation', PK 
Secretary-General Anis Matta held, 'is religion. Religion encourages us to love our 
own country' .102 Echoing this agenda, the party adopted 'patriotism' as a guiding 
principle rather than 'nationalism'. The notion of 'Islamic patriotism' was less 
attached to a national sentiment but stood for the aim to protect the sovereignty of the 
Muslim community in a nation and under a government that enabled Muslims to live 
101 Mahfudz Siddiq, "Politik Dakwah Ikhwanul Muslimin", Suplemen Saksi, 16 October 2001. 
102 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 23 January 2001. 
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according to Islam. For this purpose, the idea of a nation and, its defence, was 
approved. 103 
PK based its gradualist strategy on the belief that Indonesia had deserted its Islamic 
identity. Mahfudz Siddiq asked: 
What actually is the core issue of this nation? ... First, this nation ... does not have 
strong values of faith to form the spirit for the development of nation and state. Who 
are those 'Indonesians'? .. .If we call ourselves Indonesians, are we "proud as 
Indonesians"? Let us watch our environment and ourselves. How many things exist 
which are actually "not Indonesian"? This is our first core issue: the crisis of 
identity values [krisis nilai identitas] as a religious community and, simultaneously, 
a nation ... The Indonesian nation is said ... to be the world's largest Muslim nation. 
So there is the question: has "Islam" become our "national identity value"? Is Islam 
something we are proud of? ... [H]as Islam already become the particular [khas] and 
dominant shade of the civilisational character of this nation? [Bold in original]104 
As Masyumi legatees, PK too asserted that shari 'ah was closest to the cultural 
identity of Indonesian Muslims; it equally resented the long-term impact of 
colonisation and imperialism and repeated classic statements of a global Jewish and 
American-led operation to suppress Islam. In the words of Dr. Salim Segaf, head of 
PK's Shari'ah Council: 
[The] chances to make syari'at Islam effective in Indonesia are extremely 
good ... because the majority of our people are Muslims. The law that fits them ... best 
is law based on syariat Islam. Not the law inherited from the Dutch colonialists, 
which already has been modified in several ways and proven unfit to overcome the 
problems of our nation ... many provinces ... already have adopted syariat before 
independence ... All this is a historical fact, which this nation has to acknowledge ... 
But very saddening are the efforts of Allah's enemies who to try to stigmatise syariat 
Islam as something scary. Because of this, a great deal of society has antipathy 
toward syariat Islam [even] before it has become effective... [M]any people 
especially Westerners are impelled [terprovokasi, by the view] that syariat Islam is 
103 Syamsul Balda, "Prinsip Negara Islam", Peka Online, 16 October 2001. The Muslim Brotherhood 
approved national sentiment for similar reasons. Al-Banna acknowledged cultural specifications of 
different people but rejected national and racial pride because it would revivejahiliyah. This is giving 
a different twist to Rashid Rida's widely cited precept that 'love of the homeland is part of faith'. 
Patriotism is thus different from nationalism, which arguably has a wider and more aggressive 
overtone. Unlike patriotism, nationalism might be seen as a self-sufficient identity-platform for a 
community. 
104 Mahfudz Siddiq, Pemilu dan Urgensi Tarbiyatul Ummat: Agenda-agenda Besar Dakwah Menuju 
Perbaikan Umat dan Bangsa melalui Kemenangan Politik Islam, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003, p. 
32-3. 
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cruel or that Muslims are ... extremists. And all this is propagandised by the Israeli 
Zionists.105 
In statements of PK leaders, there was, however, comparatively little suggesting that 
the broader Muslim community would identify with its Islamist goals. It thus was 
alone in adopting a jihadist drive for a full ideology aiming to restore the Islamic 
identity of Muslims. PK sees the struggle to return Indonesian Muslims to their 
religious identity as part of a global clash of ideologies. Crucial was the notion of 
ghazwul fikri. PK defined ghazwul fikri as 'a system for the defence of culture 
[system pertahanan budaya]' attacking 'all regulations and systems that are not 
based in Islam and take mankind to apostasy [ kesesatan ]' .106 These systems have 
become known as jahiliyah, a notion made famous by Sayyid Qutb. 107 Muslims were 
weakened by apostate education (tarbiyatan) and culture (tsaqaafiyatan). Their 
politics and economy, therefore, were infected by harmful (ashabiyah) concepts like 
nationalism, secularism and capitalism. This had brought about a lack of morals, 
diluted Islamic missionary work, and eroded the authenticity of Islamic 
institutions. 108 
Ghazwul fikri enunciated a plain image of who was behind jahiliyah. In a guideline 
written specifically for preachers (dai) and leaders of Islamic study circles 
(murobbi), Irwan Prayitno, ideologue and leading PK economist, addressed the topic 
of globalisation and Western hegemony. He described Christians and Jews as 
original 'Peoples of the Book' who have been corrupted and estranged from their 
faiths. Irwan wrote in a rehash of Islamist stereotypisation: 
The infidels fpihak kafir] .. .look for another way to destroy the Muslim community 
[menghancurkan umat Islam]. They will never give in [rela] and never cease to 
attack until Muslims follow their religious community [millah]. The strategy that is 
chosen to destroy Islam is al-ghazw al-fikri. Al-ghazw al-fikri is an intellectual 
attack, cultural, mental, and conceptual, constantly and systematically undertaken ... 
The objective of al-ghazw al-fikri is to destroy morals and thought, dissolve 
105 Salim Segaf quoted in "Insya Allah, Syari' at Islam Akan Tegak di Bumi Indonesia", Suara 
Keadilan, 10 March- 10 April 2001, pp. 10-1. 
106 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003 (first quote); Irwan Prayitno, "Al-Islaam Diin Al-
Haq (Islam adalah Agama yang Benar'), ['Islam is the True Religion'], reprinted in Irwan Prayitno, 
Kepribadian Muslim: Bahan Panduan bagi Dai dan Murabbi, Seri Pendidikan Islam, Pustaka 
Tarbiatuna, Bekasi, 2002, p. 488 (second quote). 
107 See especially Qutb's Milestones. 
108 See the contributions in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai and Kepribadian Muslim. 
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[melarutkan] [Muslim's] personality and to separate Muslims from their religion. 
This has been attempted ... by severing the relations between Islamic nations under 
the Islamic caliphate, thus leading to the emergence of nationalism, ethnocentrism 
[ kekauman] and national identity [ kebangsaan]. The separation of religion and state, 
orientalism, christianisation, and the women's liberation movement, too, are 
activities of al-ghazw al-fikri, which already have shown results with a part of the 
Muslim community that now has changed to jahiliyah. The perpetrators of al-ghazw 
al-jikri, in general, consist of Jews, Christians, Parsees [Mqjusi], polytheists 
[Musyrikin], hypocrites [Munafikin], atheists and infidels ... Returning the beliefs of 
Muslims to Islam is difficult except through propagation [dakwah] and individual 
endeavour [jihad], put into effect by a movement [ harakah] and the tradition of the 
Islamic community [jama 'ah Islamiyah] .109 
In dealing with the perceived Western intrusion, shari 'ah-minded Muslims 
characteristically demand to separate the useful from the harmful influences. 110 
Science and technology have merits if they can be morally verified. The 
technological and scientific inferiority of Muslims, PK repeated another familiar 
Islamist claim worldwide, was one particular result of the subjugation by Western 
powers of Muslim societies. 111 In a 1996 sermon, the later PK MP Mutammimul 'Ula 
said: 
The West has experienced bankruptcy in all fields. [A] fragile [rapuh] ideological 
view; a hypocritical political system, the destruction of [its] social system with the 
family at its core ... the only superiority they have left is TECHNOLOGY. 112 [Capital 
letters in original] 
The blatant proof for successful Western cultural intrusion was the appearance of the 
"liberal" Islamic movement in Indonesia as elsewhere in the Muslim world. Both PK 
and many Masyumi legatees believed that fellow Muslim leaders and intellectuals 
had made the mistake of submitting to strategic necessities by forming non-Islamist 
parties and thus betraying their true self. Their compliance meant these fellow 
Muslims met the terms of foes that wanted to prevent Islamist parties from getting 
109 Irwan Prayitno, "Al-Ghazw Al-Fikri", reprinted in Kepribadian Dai, pp. 3-4. The Qur'anic 
references listed are al-Saff (61:8) and al-Tawbah (9:32). The author further stressed that it was the 
orientalists' objective to establishjahiliyah. The text mentions the leftist Egyptian intellectual Thaha 
Husein as example of a Muslim who participated in this effort. 
110 Siddiq, Syariat Islam, p. 43. 
111 Irwan Prayitno, "Ahwaal Al-Muslimin Al-Yaum (Kondisi Umat Islam Saat Ini)" ('The Current 
State of the Muslim community'], reprinted in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai, pp. 191-8. Also "Islam 
Tolak Konsumtifisme" (Interview with Daud Rasyid), Percikan Imam, No.7, 2001. 
112 Sermon, London, 20 February 1996. Reprinted as Kembali ke Fitrah, Kembali ke Islam, 
Membangun Masa Depan, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001. 
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political and technological power and developing military force. 113 Granting Islam to 
be "liberal" thus was but the most recent example of Muslims yielding to Western 
imperatives. 114 Surrendering to the Western allures and pressure, Dr. Daud Rasyid 
wrote, made Muslims like 'fish baited by their enemies. Who gives the bait are the 
enemies and the fish is the Muslim community'. A prominent case of an Indonesian 
Islamist leader who had 'taken the bait' was Amien Rais, underscored by his refusal 
to lead an Islamist party into the 1999 elections. Daud Rasyid lamented: 
[I]t is difficult to comprehend why someone like Amien Rais who grew up as a son 
of Masyumi and lived in a Muhammadiyah environment until he became its top 
leader, dared to establish a secular party. The answer is that Amien has fallen into 
the trap oflslam's enemies. The enemies oflslam very much did not want Amien to 
be in an Islamic party. If that had happened, Amien could have become the key to 
unite all components of the Muslim community ... And that is very dangerous for the 
continuity of secularism in Indonesia ... So what the enemies of Islam have planned 
indeed became reality. 115 
The crucial means to counter the forsaking of Muslims was the systematic build-up 
of ideological awareness among cadres. Protecting and defending Islam against 
threatening influences became a major aspect in PK's sweeping cadreisation 
material. A main objective of its cadre training was to build an 'historical awareness' 
about Islam's historical fight against non-believers and their desire to conquer 
Muslim lands and destroy Islamic civilisation. 
The plan to destroy Islam is depicted as being something intrinsic to Western culture. 
Medieval Western leaders had come to notice that the 'bravery of the Islamic armed 
forces in war' was based in 'the teachings of jihad as an integral part of Islamic 
teachings itself. Recognising that armed force was inappropriate to destroy the 
Islamic spirit, the West decided to wage an ideological war to divide Muslims from 
113 See, for example, "Tidak Lepas Dari Trauma Sejarah" (Interview with Abu Ridho ), Sabili, 21 April 
1999, p. 36. 
114 Abu Ridha, Saat Dakwah Memasuki Wilayah Politik, Seri Tarbiyah Siyasiyah 02, PT Syaamil 
Cipta Media, Bandung, 2003, pp. 29 f£; "Mereka Merampas Wewenang Allah" (Interview with Daud 
Rasyid), Sabili, January 2001 and Interview, Daud Rasyid, Jakarta, 5 November 2001. 
115 Daud Rasyid, "Membedah Politik Islam Yang Lumpuh", reprinted in Daud Rasyid, Islam & 
Reformasi: Telaah Kritis Atas Keruntuhan Rezim-rezim Diktator dan Keharusan Kembali Kepada 
Syari'ah, Usamah Press, Pondok Pesantren Unggulan Al-Makmuriyah, 2001, pp. 116-7. 
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their Islamic identity. 116 The cadreisation material echoed this change of tactics on 
behalf of the enemy. After Western armed aggression had proven to be ineffective, 
the opponents changed their strategy from confrontation to a 'cultural invasion' that 
undermined Muslim countries with Western ideologies and lifestyle. This was 
because of growing conviction in the West that '[we] can only defeat them 
[Muslims] ifwe can cut them offfrom their energy supply [Islam]'. 117 
To counter this assault, the party's cadre training taught material on 'ghazwul fikri', 
'international Zionism', 'cloaked movements antagonising Islam' and 'institutions 
that oppose Islam' .118 It claimed that all physical efforts to oppress or destroy Islam 
had 'always failed'. On the contrary, this failure had strengthened the resilience of 
Muslims. Therefore, the 'enemies of Islam' had changed their strategy toward a 
'very gentle assault, however, the result is lethal.' 119 Underscoring that "liberal" 
Muslims are essentially seen as victims, it held that Western ideas were 'extremely 
professionally socialised' which meant that this 'appears like something beautiful to 
those who see it without Islamic glasses'. 120 A key target of raising awareness about 
ghazwul fikri, therefore, was to build up vigilance against Muslims allying with the 
Western foes of Islam. 
Particularly damaging was for Muslims to study Islam in the West. This was 
apparent in the "heretical" Islam taught by "liberal" pioneers such as the late scholars 
Prof. Harun Nasution and Nurcholish Madjid. 121 Misleading Muslims about the true 
nature of Islam, the "liberal" movement was part of the apologetic trend in Islam 
which struggled to deny the importance of key concepts such as jihad, which, PK' s 
ideologue Abu Ridho pointed out, was 'a proper [ absah] way to bring about the 
116 Ridho, Jihad, p. 28. The author claims that the French king Louis IX had been the first Western 
ruler to· recognise the Islamic might and, therefore, had proposed an assault on the Islamic civilization 
that comprised both armed force and cultural penetration. 
117 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
118 Tim Departemen Kaderisasi PK-Sejahtera (compilers), Manajemen tarbiyah anggota pemula 
('Tarbiyah management for new members'), DPP Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Departemen Kaderisasi, 
Seri Manjaj Tarbiyah, 2003, pp. 151-61. PK Sejahtera is the new name ofPartai Keadilan. 
119 Manajemen, pp. 155-56 
120 Manejemen, p. 152. 
121 Both scholars had received their doctorates in religious studies: Nurcholish Madjid from the 
University of Chicago and Harun Nasution from Montreal's McGill University. 
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ideals of Islam, regardless whether the infidels like it or not'. As such, he argued, 
Muslim apologists 
[l]ike to gain the sanction [keridhaan] of those aggressive to Islam by defending 
themselves [by saying] that Islam was no religion of combat [ agama perang]. This 
view clearly is based on a psychological defeat which causes one to evade 
everything that appears formally-legalistic and to declare oneself adherent of 
substantial Islam, cultural Islam and the like. 122 
Abu Ridho concluded that 'jihad is an obligation for Muslims to defend Allah's 
religion', reacting against 'disturbance' (gangguan) and 'hostility against Muslims 
and their religion' while at the same time consenting to a 'rationalisation of the 
jihadist concepts'. 123 But because of its reduction of the Qur' anic meaning of jihad to 
a meek spiritual effort, "liberal" Islam becomes, quite necessarily, a Zionist-friendly 
'satanic ideology' .124 To reverse liberalism's "destructive" impact, PK more than 
other Islamist parties promoted the idea that appropriate training in Islamic studies 
cannot be acquired at Western institutions. Studying Islam in non-Muslim countries 
had a negative impact on the beliefs of Muslim graduates who, returning to their 
home countries, helped to prolongjahiliyah. It was only justifiable to study scientific 
and technological subjects in the West. 125 
PK, moreover, saw it as crucial to spread knowledge among the umat about various 
'projects' which appeared Muslim-friendly but had the goal of destroying Islam. 
These projects were undertaken by Western-led institutions, foundations and NGOs 
active in Muslim countries, which, PK held, 'in essence want to destroy and sideline 
the existence of Islam and its community'. Cadres needed to be instructed how these 
institutions worked, what they promoted and how they were connected. They 
particularly needed to understand the danger of getting involved with these 
organisations and should only become active in Islamic bodies. Instructors taught 
122 Ridho, Jihad, p. 30 (both quotes). 
123 Ridho, Jihad, pp. 28-40. (quotes p. 32 und p. 30). The author refers to Mawdudi, al-Banna and 
Qutb as having correctly interpreted the meaning of jihad. 
124 Abu Ridho quoted in "Serba Pandangan tentang Nurcholish", Media Dakwah, Desember 1992, p. 4 
and "Pembaharu dan Yahudi", Media Dakwah, Mei 1995, p. 47. 
125 Interview, Daud Rasyid, Jakarta, 5 November 2001. Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail, PK's first President 
received his PhD in Food Engineering from the University of Texas. All other PK leaders graduated 
from universities in the Middle East or Muslim Southeast-Asia. Among PPP and PBB leaders only a 
few received degrees from universities outside Indonesia (see Appendixes III to V). 
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cadres to 'brace oneself in order not to 'go down' (terjerumus) in the assault against 
Islam. To foster this idea, they provided material to cadres which 'can awaken 
emotions and strengthen belief (menggugah emosi dan menimbulkan kepercayaan). 
The overall goal was to build up '[cultural] suspicion' (waspada [kebudayaan}) in 
order to protect an already severely blemished umat Islam from further harm. 126 Anis 
Matta argued: 
It is necessary to build up cultural suspicion [kewaspadaan budaya]. Because we 
experience an invasion, a cultural invasion ... We have the conviction that the umat 
Islam is finished. [It] does not have a solid intellectual structure. Because of this, 
they [Muslims] can easily be invaded. [We only have to] look at the TV soap operas, 
the magazines ... people have no cultural defence system [system pertahanan 
kebudayaan] whatsoever. Actually, ghazwul fikri has more to do with 
revitalisation... Because we the Muslim society are severed [tercerabut] from 
our ... own cultural roots. We do not have a reference in life. Our politics does not 
use its own reference. Our economics does not use its own reference. We create a 
cultural product, such as a film; [yet] we do not have our own reference. 127 
To counter Western 'invasion' on a broad communal basis, the gradualist strategy 
focused on dakwah (proselytisation) activities. 'Dakwah', the first point of PK's 
'vision' proclaimed, 'is the party and the party is dakwah'; the 'dakwah to convey 
the truth', the Shari'ah Board held, was 'the primary jihad Uihad paling utama]'. 128 
The backwardness and ignorance of Muslim people had to be halted through an 
'active and comprehensive form of dakwah (ad-da 'wah al-harakiyah asy-
syaamilah).129 PK therefore promoted that: 
There is only one simple solution: Dakwah has to tell to the umat and the people of 
this country: "You are Muslims!" until they openly declare with conviction: "We 
are Muslims!" Or in other words the solution is to REESTABLISH THE ISLAMIC 
IDENTITY. (Bold, capital letters and underlining in original)130 
126 Manejemen, p. 160; Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
127 To challenge cultural intrusion, PK organised what it called 'cultural counter products', for 
example, stage plays that were intended as alternatives to Indonesia's popular but "un-Islamic" TV 
soap operas. Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003; Komisi C Kebijakan Dasar Partai, 
Musyawarah Nasional I Partai Keadilan, 18-21 May 2000. 
128 Fatwa of the Shari'ah Board on "Political Parties in Islam", in Fatwa Dewan Syariah Partai 
Keadilan, (no publisher, no place, no date), p. 96. 
129 See the sections "Takwin Al-Ummah", "At-Tarbiyah Al-Islaamiyah Al-Harakiyah", "Fiqh Ad-
Da'wah" and "Membentuk Kepribadian Muslim" in Prayitno, Kepribadian Dai. 
130 Siddiq, Pemilu, p. 35. 
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This form of dakwah gave great attention to the duty of each Muslim to improve the 
moral qualities of society. This central significance of both cadre training and 
dakwah has been lacking in the organisational models of other Islamist parties in 
Indonesia. 
On this commitment rests PK' s proud claim to promote an understanding of Islam 
that covered every aspect of life and highlighted its universality. Other Islamist 
parties, by contrast, separated social and political engagement. 131 The long-term goal 
was one ofliberation from servitude other than toward God. It was: 
... to make Islamic ideology the spirit of humankind's liberation fight from 
subjugation [penghambaan] amid humans toward subjugation only. toward Allah ... ; 
the liberation of humankind from the poverty of imaginary human ideologies toward 
Islamic justice [keadilan Islam] and to lead humankind to happiness and serenity in 
life. 132 
Islam, the party statutes stressed, was complete, self-sufficient and integral 
(syumuliyatul Islam). 133 Islamic teachings, Mahfudz Siddiq pointed out, 'are not just 
valid and not just designed for a certain people but for the whole of mankind [ untuk 
seluruh manusia ]' .134 'All mankind is one', Syamsul Balda reiterated a key position 
of Middle Eastern ideologues, with no separation between 'the bourgeousie' and 'the 
proletarians', 'the blacks and the whites' or 'Eastern and Western people'. It was 
Islam that gave 'a revolutionary concept for the whole of humankind' in accordance 
with the prophet's mission to 'unite humankind on Divine order and to revive the 
human consciousness [for His wishes]' .135 This is the reason that, although primarily 
targeted at Muslims, the propagation of Islam also aimed at non-Muslims, including 
those perceived as enemies. 136 The results of PK's first National Congress in 2000 
declared: 
131 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000. 
132 Komisi C Kebijakan Dasar Partai, Musyawarah Nasional I Partai Keadilan, 18-21 May 2000. 
133 PK documents linked Islam's integrality to Qur'an, verse al-Baqarah (2:208): 'Oh ye who believe! 
Enter into Islam wholeheartedly ... '. Partai Keadilan: Menuju Indonesia Sejahtera Berkeadilan, (no 
date), translation by Yusuf Ali, Meaning, p. 83. 
134 Siddiq, Syariat Islam, (back cover) and, similarly, p. 39. 
135 Syamsul Balda, Ma 'rifah A!-Islam, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2002, p. 20. 
136 Though speaking out against coercion, the Qur'an certainly welcomes non-Muslim conversion to 
Islam. Dakwah organisations such as DDII, however, often took particular care only to target fellow 
Muslims in order to distinguish themselves from the activities of Christian missionaries which they 
have accused to act in the tradition of the Crusades by trying to convert Muslims. 
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The form of dakwah adhered by Partai Keadilan is da'wah rabbaniyah 'alamiyah, 
that is da'wah that guides humankind to know its God and da'wah that is targeted at 
the whole of humankind [seluruh ummat manusia]. It is da'wah that aims toward a 
just brotherhood in the human community far from forms of racism or tribal, racial 
or ethnic fanaticism. On this basis, dakwah is the prime axis of all actions [gerak] of 
the party ... [B]oth the objective and also the target which will be achieved are global 
[ 'alamiyah (mendunia)] in accordance with the universality of Islam... It is an 
activity which does not know limits of a certain ethnicity, state or area.137 
The transformation of society toward Islam was to be achieved by gradual 'social 
engineering' (rekayasa sosial). This involved a process in which humanity 
progressed from a status of 'ignorance toward the truth [haq] to knowing it' and from 
passive knowledge to drafting concepts which eventually will tum into deeds with a 
benefit for all humankind. Ultimately, the party held, these steps 'lead to the 
accomplishment of the holy target of Dakwah, which is to obtain Allah's blessing 
(ridha)' .138 
Democracy, evidently, promised greater prospect for the success of dakwah than an 
authoritarian system. Unlike the New Order, democratic conditions enabled 
unrestricted possibilities for the propagation of Islam, which, the PK 2000 Congress 
demanded be 'optimally' utilised. 139 Preachers could freely mingle with all parts of 
society to persuade them oflslam's and thus the party's strengths. 140 A pivotal aspect 
in the dakwah teachings was to instruct people about the benefits of Islam so they 
could behave "responsibly" and vote for the right candidate. The aim was to 'win the 
public mind so that the public opinion stands on our side' .141 Anis Matta informed 
potential constituencies in the Islamist magazine Saksi: 
We, for example, want to eradicate pornography in this country [and] this is the way 
to do it: put together a structure of suggestions [struktur gagasan] to persuade the 
public how destructive pornography is for our life. If we win there, issue legal drafts 
to stamp out pornography in all forms. And if we win there, control tightly whether 
the government carries it out well or not. If not, we can sue the government. This is 
how dakwah has to work in the democratic era. There is freedom that we enjoy 
137 Komisi C Kebijakan. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Anis Matta "Menikmati Demokrasi ('To Enjoy Democracy')", Saksi, 3 April2001. 
141 Matta, Menikmati, and "Memenangkan Wacana Publik ('To win over public opinion'), Saksi, 17 
April2001, pp. 2-3. 
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together. But there is also left a specific way to wipe out evil [kemungkaran] and to 
penetrate into power. Consider this an art, which dakwah politicians have to know. 142 
The message of Islam is seen as giving wide attention to the dignity of human 
beings. As Islamists commonly stress, humans could only be dignified in a moral 
environment that is based on religious teachings. Despite the immediate attention 
toward dakwah programs, PK strongly believed in the obligation of the state to 
implement shari 'ah in order to ensure that Muslims live decent lives. 'Muslims', 
Syamsul Balda insisted, 'will not (and in fact are unable to develop into) true [sejati] 
Muslims except they wish to erect an Islamic state' .143 It was the duty of the 
individual Muslim and the family to ensure moral life, but ultimately it also became 
the task of the state. The formal acknowledgment of shari 'ah in the Constitution 
remained essential for the state to be able to comply with its task. This was because 
Islam provided the clearest concepts for efficient law enforcement. Unambiguous 
rules of right and wrong were the crucial underpinning to organise social life 
effectively. Where states and law enforcement were weak, societies would eventually 
drift into anarchy. 144 In an ideal Islamic system, Salim Segaf stressed, 'the key word 
is sanction; because without sanctions many laws are ineffective' .145 He further 
explained: 
[W]e want this community that calls itself Muslim [ mengaku orang Islam] to know 
that in Islam there are firm sanctions. Because there is no legal certainty in this 
country. Religion [agama] already provides [rules for sanctions]. But merely 
religious words [kata-kata agama] are not binding [menyambung]. They have a 
general character. But shari'ah has implications, a meaning that binds [terikat] ... 146 
The lack of legal competence and security in contemporary Indonesia was because 
national law lacked a solid base and tradition and had not taken on Islam as 
philosophical foundation. In the section 'law', the PK statutes therefore called 'to 
142 Matta, Menikmati. 
143 Syamsul Balda, "Kekenyalan Syari'at Islam (3-habis): ResponsifSepanjang Masa", PeKa Online, 
20 November 2001. 
144 Mutammimul 'Ula "Mensikapi Isu Piagam Jakarta, PerspektifPenerapan Syariat Islam", 
http://www.mastammim.or.id, 18 September 2000. 
145 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. 
146 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. PK's reaction to the new law on zakat (alms) 
illustrated the belief in the state's responsibility to issue sanctions. Party leaders deplored that the state 
still lacked power to force Muslims to pay their religious dues and to issue sanctions if this was 
breached. They critiqued that with the existing regulation only institutions could be held liable but not 
individual Muslims (ibid). 
196 
end any hesitations in the choice of the character of Indonesian law (kepribadian 
hukum Indonesia)'. The 'forced' adoption of Western law had already 'separated the 
law from the philosophical, sociological and historical roots of society' .147 Anis 
Matta asked: 
What are the references for Indonesia in orgamsmg [mengatur] the state? The 
references are legal sources [but] what are these sources?! [T]he state lacks an 
identity. Pancasila is not an ideology. Pancasila is a joint declaration ... more or less 
that we are governed by religious principles ... [T]he MPR wants to draft laws, 
where do they look for? ... They only go overseas to learn about this, learn about 
that... That means that people lack a reference. Although Islam provides this 
reference. 148 
The question remained over the right time for making Islam the philosophical law 
principle for national law. PK leaders, like PBB, argued that writing shari 'ah terms 
into the Constitution gave order to the state to implement Islamic teachings. 149 But 
acting on a self-perceived sense of moral superiority and of being the only genuine 
defender of Islam, PK leaders and cadres tended to have a cynical view of the 
motives behind the shari 'ah-mindedness of other Islamist parties. They believed the 
motives of colleagues, especially PPP, in promoting shari'ah were 'entirely 
pragmatic'. The juridical consequences of the constitutional mention of shari 'ah 
would be 'manifold' which meant that 'for us (PK) the implications are too strong at 
this point in time for the current condition of society ... This is an issue too far-
reaching to be trivialized' .150 As such, there was an amused sense of 'surprise' that 
western journalists and observers held the shari 'ah stance of other Islamists parties 
to be 'really serious' .151 
147 Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan. 
148 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 23 January 2001. 
149 PK leaders believed that Yusril, who claimed that PK's reading of the Charter's wording was 
misguided, would do so only to promote his own party. 
150 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. PK leaders pointed to the ineffectiveness of 
shari 'ah laws that had been implemented in several regions. One example was the ban on alcohol that 
existed as 'regional directive' (perintah daerah). As the government needed the tax income, in reality 
the order had no meaning. Such examples had demonstrated to PK that the state's enforcement of 
shari'ah was untimely and thus counterproductive (ibid). 
151 Overall, PK interpreted the pro-shari 'ah stance ofPPP and PBB as merely grounded in the 
calculation that Muslim voters had 'gone through a radicalisation process. Because of this they [PPP 
and PBB] use issues, which according to them can draw these groups'. PPP MPs had told their 
colleagues in PK that they would support shari 'ah issues only for the Islamist public. Confidential 
remarks from a PK leader, 2003. 
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PK thus was disinclined to engage the state in the comprehensive implementation of 
shari 'ah due to the belief that such a role would be untimely. Endeavours to write 
Islam into the Constitution, under the current circumstances, would encounter strong 
resistance. 152 Abu Ridho pointed out: 
There are those who say, first of all the [capture of the] state is important. This is not 
possible. We have to form the fundament [pol a] first, only then the instrument. 153 
Inflicting shari 'ah law on an unprepared and reluctant population would erode the 
government and heighten people's opposition. 154 Heading an infidel nation in the 
name of Islam therefore was a great risk for the prestige of Islam itself. Instead, 
society had to be forged from within toward moral restoration and a religious life. 
The most distinctive trait of this conviction was the strategic dakwah focus on every 
individual whose 'thinking, feeling and behaviour was to be returned toward a 
complete Islamic identity (kaffah)' .155 In the words ofMP Mashadi: 
Parts of society are still phobic against Islam because they do not understand. We 
attempt to change this through dakwah. After all a state is built on individuals. If we 
proselytise on an individual basis, there will be a large impact. It is of no use if we 
fight following a structural state approach without the understanding of society. The 
strategy has to start from below. Automatically it will have an impact upwards.156 
Striving for the incorporation of shari 'ah into the Constitution required a set of 
preparatory steps, known as tadarruj (Indon: pentahapan, gradualism). 157 The first 
step was to establish an Islamic personality in each individual (gerakan individual or 
also known as takwinusy-sykhshiyyah al-Islamiyyah), mirroring the frequently cited 
tarbiyah motto 'if you want to establish an Islamic state, begin by establishing it in 
152 'Ula, Mensikapi Isu; Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
153 Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April2001. 
154 It also was deemed futile to bring about Islamic rule by means of a popular uprising or revolt. 
Since the Iranian revolution, the idea to remove a government in a Muslim country through force has 
almost exclusively been linked to Shiite doctrine. Sunni Islamist groups, generally, have a deep 
distrust of Shiite theology and its concepts, including using the means of resurgence to topple a 
government. See, for example, Hidayat Nur Wahid, "Syi'ah Dalam Lintasan Sejarah", Mengapa Kita 
Menolak Syi 'ah ('Why we reject Shiism'), Kumpulan Makalah Seminar Nasional Tentang Syi'ah, 
LPPI, 1998. 
155 Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. Mahfudz extensively cited Hassan al-Banna 
in this belief In Siddiq, Politik Dakwah. 
156 Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000. 
157 The following brings together information from Qamaruddin, Beginilah, pp. 30-31 and 'Ula, 
Mensikapi lsu. 
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yourself .158 The next step was missionary work on an individual basis (dakwah 
fardhiyyah), in particular to Islamise family (takwin al-bait al-muslim) followed by 
guiding and proselytising society (gerakan sosial or irsyadul-mujtama' wa 
ishlahuhu). 159 The following effort was to Islamise the government (ishlahul-
hukumah). This was divided into a 'legislative movement' (gerakan legislasi), 
referring to the parliamentary struggle and one-by-one legalisation of Islamic laws 
and, after that, a 'constitutional struggle' (perjuangan konstitutionalisme), referring 
to writing shari 'ah terms into the Constitution. The final two steps were 
endeavouring to restore the Islamic caliphate (i 'adatu kayanil-khilafah al-
islamiyyah) and, lastly, to establish Islam as the fundament of human civilization 
(ustadziyyatul- 'alam). 160 Abu Ridho summed up: 
First, the state protects Islam that has been established [tegak] on an individual scale. 
Like a garden that is already growing but lacks a fence and therefore can be 
devastated by goats. The fence is the state. But apart from this, the state also spreads 
the starting point [titik tolak] to establish Islam on the scale of a civilisation. If 
Muslims want to contribute to human civilisation a state is required. The state 
distributes [menyebarkan] civilization. This constellation is proven by history ... 
Why did the Prophet migrate to Medina? To form a state which develops 
civilisation. Civilisation is the final goal. The state is the starting point [titik 
. ] 161 myang. 
PK's concentration on transforming the legislation rather than the Constitution gave 
a strong indication of its matter-of-fact mind-set. The day-by-day socialization of 
Islamic laws in parliament was much easier whereas constitutional changes 
engendered automatic resentment. 162 Small support from Muslims made the 
constitutional struggle inopportune. PK, therefore, acted on the premise that there 
were no swift means to accomplish the re-Islamisation of society and diminish 
Western influences. They thus were dismissive of the endeavour of PBB to make the 
state responsible to carry out Islamic law among Muslims before these were 
158 The goals were to build a personality free from polytheist belief; to build correct worship, firm 
ethics, strong intellect, a healthy physique (PK activists regularly met for soccer sessions), self-
sufficiency, personal restraint, efficient use oflife-time, organised in all situations and activities and a 
social commitment. Qamaruddin, Beginilah, p. 34. 
159 Many PK officials lead or have been active in social foundations or engaged in educational 
institutions (see Appendix V). 
160 Qamaruddin, Beginilah, p. 3. 
161 Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 April 2001. 
162 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
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sufficiently prepared through missionary and educational activities. PK's motive for 
the gradualist ideological approach was: 
If our condition is still weak, but this [the constitutional struggle] is forced, there 
will be lasting consequences. [It will] cause new resistance. Those resisting will 
consolidate. Eventually they will not only be resistant toward shariah but this will 
expand to issues, which appear [ berbau] Islamic. They might question Islamic Banks 
and other things. Thus [they] might destroy the cultural movement that already gains 
momentum. In other words, this will add to the list of conflict sources. 163 
Hence, PK concentrated on dakwah programs and cadreisation efforts whilst striving 
to insert shari 'ah laws on a one-to-one basis into the current legislation. The party 
explained this policy by holding that Islam continued to shape thought, everyday 
habits and custom, even though the cultural alienation throughout the last decades 
until the present day had obscured this or weakened its impact. Mutammimul 'Ula 
argued: 
Indonesian ... Muslims, at least in their conviction [keyakinan] already chose Islam. 
The adoption of Islam, in particular its laws, indeed is arranged hierarchically 
[ bertingkat-tingkat]. Despite this, Islam has become the dominant value in everyday 
life, both in ... spiritual form, language, culture [and] practise. Muslims, regardless of 
the shallowness of their ... execution [pengamalan] of Islam, still are the section, 
which 'mostly' carries out their religion compared to sections with other religions. 
Islamic law already has become the 'living law' in society. Hence, the step-by-step 
integration of Islamic law into national law, and supported by the expert 
development of dakwah, is the best alternative to overcome the complication of legal 
life ... 164 
The preliminary goal thus was for shari 'ah laws to gradually replace Western-
derived law and local customs and beliefs (adat) law as the major legal source. The 
humiliating failure of Islarnists in other Muslim countries to take over governments 
played an important role in establishing this view. The ongoing tensions in other 
parts of the Muslim world had proven the strategic benefit of the gradualist strategy. 
At the same time, Western-derived law, the party envisioned, was permissible in the 
field of science and technology. Mutarnmimul 'Ula argued: 
163 Ula, Mensikapi Isu. For similar views see "Persoalannya Bukan Teks Piagam Jakarta An Sich, 
Tapi ... " (Interview), Suara Keadilan, 1-15 September 2000, pp. 4-5. 
164 Mutammimul 'Ula, "Introduksi Hukum Dalam PerspektifPerbaikan Krisis Kenegaraan", 
http://www.mastammim.co.id, 26 September 2000. 
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The development of national law must take Islamic law as its main inspiration, 
supplemented by adat law to provide a local context and Western law ... to take 
benefit of technological development and civilisation which earlier ['terlebih 
dahulu'] developed, especially, which concerns practical regulations. Islamic law 
becomes the 'mainstream' and adat law and Western law become 'complementary'. 
This is the choice that has to be emphasised ... These [steps] decrease the level of 
resistance or the allergy of those who until now are afraid of shari'ah Islam. Only 
after that [comes] the last [step]: the constitutional struggle ... One can say that no 
Muslim country succeeded in striving for constitutional [acknowledgment] through 
democracy. Turkey-clobbered. Algeria-clobbered. Indonesia itself, the Jakarta 
Charter and the Konstituante ... abolished. Even more so since in Indonesia 
constitutional change needs a quorum of two thirds and this is difficult... So the 
qualification for the constitutional struggle is that the public as a whole supports it. .. 
We very much agree with the implementation of shariah Islam carried out on the 
level of governmental jurisdiction [tingkat tataran ketatanegaraan] but it has to 
become the agenda of the Muslim community not the agenda of party per party. 165 
The gradualist approach toward a "re-Islamisation" of society was characterised by a 
romantic belief that this goal could be realised through the zeal that carried the 
struggle. With this long-term strategy, immediate attention automatically turned 
toward the consolidation of democratic rule and the promotion of general values such 
as 'justice'. They signalled common interests and emphasised benefit for society as a 
whole. This separation of short-term goals and end objective, the following chapter 
shows, quite necessarily led to a concealment of the party's dogmatic character. 
This chapter thus established the motives and the qualities of the Islamist approach 
toward the implementation of shari 'ah. It argued that PBB was the party which, 
while attempting to comprehensively follow the Masyumi-model, mostly was 
contented with a symbolic dedication to the Masyumi-derived ideal of a formal 
recognition of shari 'ah in the Constitution through the Jakarta Charter. The shari 'ah 
agenda of PPP was even more superficial and even desultory. The party desired to 
have it both ways: It wanted to appear pro-shari 'ah and pro-pluralist at the same 
time. It called for the constitutional inclusion of shari 'ah while downplaying, even 
denying the legal consequences of such a step. This stance has led to a number of 
sophistical explanations from party officials regarding their motives and objectives. 
There are no signs that PPP will develop a more substantive shari 'ah approach in the 
future. This seems particularly unlikely because of the party's fragmented character. 
A common ideological denominator for its traditionalist and modernists factions first 
165 Combined quote from 'Ula, Introduksi Hukum, and 'Ula quoted in Persoalannya. 
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became a formula deemed pleasantly familiar such as the "seven words" of the 
Charter and eventually-as chapter six will show-a more straightforward reference 
to shari 'ah itself once party strategists believed the Charter to be an outmoded issue 
that had little support left. The significance of practical political considerations 
became further obvious as though Parmusi has been historically more devoted to 
Masyumi and its Charter agenda, eventually the party's NU leadership turned into 
the Charter's most determined backer. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ISLAMISM IN PLURALISTPOLITICS: DILEMMAS IN 
POLICY AND STRATEGY 
This chapter deals with the dilemmas of constitutional Islamism in pluralist politics 
and their impact on Islamist policy and strategy. The first part discusses the 
hesitation of Islamist parties to promote shari 'ah issues until after the June 1999 
elections. It argues that Islamists were uncertain about voters' preferences; they 
therefore concentrated on Issues of broader political reform. The second part 
discusses the Islamist position toward non-Muslims and religious pluralism. It 
proposes that the main challenge for Islamists is not tolerance for other communities 
but willingness to grant them equal status. For the Masyumi legatee parties with their 
strong domestic references, it is the perception of Indonesia as a "Muslim nation" 
that feeds their claim for supremacy. For Partai Keadilan, the organisation of 
communal life under the Prophet provides the superior reference for this conviction. 
Voter Maximation: Highlighting Popular Issues over Shari 'ah Concerns 
The 1998 student-led reformasi movement did not put pressure on political parties to 
Islamise the state and Constitution. This greatly influenced the policies and strategies 
of Islamist parties in the immediate reformasi era. At the outset, no Islamist party 
had an official shari 'ah policy. The electoral strategy of Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP), Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent 
Star Party', PBB) and Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) was based on a staunchly 
reformist agenda. They did not want to appear sectarian, while at the same time they 
wanted to ensure a broad appeal to Muslims. Between 1998 and mid-2000, they only 
showed determination on Islamist issues deemed uncontroversial and which did not 
seem to cost votes in the elections. The reason for downplaying shari 'ah goals was 
the uncertainty over voters' responses. It appeared to be more helpful for Islamism's 
political survival to focus on issues of broader political reform. Also, accentuating 
shari 'ah issues was likely to leave Islamist parties open to charges of sectarianism 
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and endanger their democratic credentials. With the elections scheduled only a year 
after the fall of the old regime, it was crucial to avoid any images of Islamism as 
divisive. 
In mid-2000, PBB and PPP added shari 'ah to their agenda. The policy outlook of 
PK, by contrast, was steadier as it temporarily put aside shari 'ah goals. This cloaked 
the party's strong ideological spirit. All Islamist parties, therefore, pursued a strategy 
that differentiated between short-term and long-term concerns. After the end of the 
New Order, it was paramount for parties to struggle to foster democracy and combat 
corruption. Both the Islamist and the secular-national camp believed these issues to 
have great popular appeal. The shared claim to defend reformasi ideals meant that in 
the early post-New Order era, ideological differences between Islamists and secular-
nationalists were somewhat hidden. 
A central reformasi goal was to amend the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution was 
commonly seen as vague, and as enabling authoritarian rule and the breach of 
democratic checks and balances. The public and press, therefore, pressured parties to 
direct political power to the legislature. Other popular demands were to initiate direct 
presidential elections, to enhance political and economic self-rule of regional 
administrations, to end military participation in parliament and to expand the legal 
protection of human rights. In taking up these issues, Islamist parties did not target 
an exclusively Islamist electorate for the 1999 elections. This rendered assertions that 
shari 'ah was closest to the culture of Indonesians a rhetorical device illustrating the 
Islamist desire to represent national identity. 
The consequence of the Islamist hesitation to disclose ideological issues was that in 
the constitutional panels, discussions on shari 'ah issues built up gradually. Serious 
debate did not take place before 14 June 2000. 1 But from then on, PBB and PPP 
MPR members devoted a third of their speeches to the defence of the Shari'ah 
Clause. At times, Islamist parties also modified their proposals. They changed the 
syntax of the clause or proposed to arrange the articles of the constitutional 
1 Risalah Rapat Plena Ke-44 Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR 14 June 2000, Sekretariat 
Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2000. 
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Paragraph 29 on 'religion' in a different order. The following table covers the 
proposals over four MPR sessions between 1999 and 2002. 
I Faction I ST MPR 1999 I STMPR2000 I ST MPR 2001 I ST MPR 2002 
No mention of Shari'ah Clause Shari'ah Clause Shari'ah Clause 
ppp 
shari 'ah agenda with obligation of 
every Muslim to 
live according to 
Shari'ah 
PBB Hesitant shari 'ah Shari'ah Clause Shari' ah Clause Shari' ah Clause 
agenda, incl. with obligation of 
promoting Plural the state to 
Clause for implement Shari'ah 
tactical reasons 
FR (PAN No specifics 
&PK) 
Plural Clause Plural Clause Plural Clause 
PDU No specifics 






Plural Clause with ? 












Highlighting non-Islamist reform goals, in November 1999 Islamist parties agreed to 
stay away from sensitive issues such as the Preamble of the Constitution, the unitary 
state and the presidential system.2 This reconfirmed Pancasila as state ideology and 
excluded the possibility of reinstalling the "seven words" of the Jakarta Charter into 
2 They also did not address the question whether the President had to be Muslim. The agreement was 
made in one of two Ad Hoc Committees, which were formed to prepare the amendments. No formal 
declaration was made. The agreement was augmented when all parties repeated their commitment 
during speeches in the MPR. There also were severe technical hurdles to changing the Preamble. 
Procedures to replace or change the state ideology and the form of the state are time-consuming and 
costly. They require a national referendum in which the consent of more than half of the population is 
necessary before the MPR can debate on these issues. Such arduous mechanisms have made changes 
very unlikely. 
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the Preamble of the Constitution.3 Hence, the reforms were to be achieved without 
abandoning the religiously neutral characteristics of the political system.4 This 
'gentleman's agreement for the sake of the amendments' promised to facilitate 
revision of those sections of the Constitution on which a broader consensus existed.5 
The readiness to exclude the constitutional Preamble from the debates was strongly 
shaped by the memory of the Konstituante, where the dispute over Pancasila and 
Islam as state ideology had led to a stalemate, bringing about the end of 
parliamentary democracy. Resuming the debate over the Preamble promised to be 
'complex' (rumit) and merely 'using up energy' .6 All Islamist parties therefore only 
proposed changes to the constitutional Paragraph 29 on 'religion'. The Preamble has 
commonly been seen as an overriding philosophical directive for the character of 
national law. The precise difference to the inclusion of the term shari 'ah into 
Paragraph 29, however, is contested. PBB and PK leaders, particularly, held that the 
legal implications would be more or less the same: the state would receive the 
constitutional order to carry out shari 'ah or, in the Plural Clause ofFraksi Reformasi, 
various religious teachings toward the respective communities. 7 
Islamist parties faced different challenges ahead of the elections, though. When 
President Soeharto resigned, PPP had to defend a party record to a public that 
appeared overwhelmingly supportive of non-Islamist political reform. PPP identified 
as one reason for its dwindling election results in the later New Order years the weak 
leadership under Djaelani Naro and Ismail Hasan Metareum (1993-1998). During 
3 See, for example, PPP's Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. 
4 The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Indonesia's Road to Constitutional 
Reform: The 2000 Annual MPR Session, 2000, p. 17. Amendments required a majority vote of more 
than two-thirds ofMPR members present at the time of debate. They were first discussed in two 
commissions (A and B). If these commissions failed to achieve a consensus, the matter was re-
allocated to the leadership of the factions, which then started lobbying. If this did not lead to an 
agreement, authority was referred to the Ad Hoc Committees. The final solution was a decision made 
through voting in the MPR. 
5 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
6 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002 (first quote) and A.M. Luthfi (Islamist faction 
PAN) quoted in "Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-51 Panitia Ad Hoc 1 Badan Pekerja MPR, 29 Juli 2000", 
reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 3 C Hasil Rumusan Seminar Panitia Ad Hoc I (Sidang Tahunan 2000), 
Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2000 (second quote). 
7 Interviews, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Irwan Prayitno 4 and 5 December 2002. 
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both terms, PPP often caved in to the demands of the regime. From early 1998 on, 
PPP's leadership-still headed by Ismail-put most of the blame on Naro. During 
his term, Ismail granted, PPP leadership and cadres had an indifferent attitude toward 
the 'little people' and seemed to be 'dozing in an air-conditioned room' .8 
PPP responded to its reputation for being flexible by vigorously taking up key 
reformist issues, helped by several publications portraying it as a devoted proponent 
of democracy and reform. PPP also sought to cast itself as a major victim of New 
Order repression. In November 1998, the MPR faction in 'full humility' 'apologised' 
to the people that the outcome of its efforts to bring about democracy had not been 
'yet optimal' as the party had faced 'very strong despotism' .9 At the same time, PPP 
insisted that people could no longer call it a 'toady' and 'yes-party' and that 'those 
who don't close their eyes' knew that PPP 'spoke with a clear voice' when others 
were 'still afraid to open their mouths'. 10 PPP also insisted that, since the 1997 
elections, it had repeatedly called for "reformasi", stressing that this was at a time 
when the term had not yet been widely popular. 11 It called other community leaders 
who equally claimed reformasi credentials 'belated heroes' who earlier had 'with 
pleasure sawn the seeds' to 'silence and sideline' PPP .12 In this regard, PPP could 
back its claim by pointing out its former opposition to several "inequitable" draft 
laws of the government, including endeavours to change the election laws. 
8 Ismail Hasan Metareum's address at PPP's 251h anniversary, Jakarta, 5 January 1998 reprinted as 
"Reformasi Tidak Bisa Ditunda Lagi" ('Reform can no longer be delayed'), in Alfian M. Darmawan, 
Ismail Hasan Metareum, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Endin A.J. Soefihara, and M. Kaoy Syah 
(compilers), Perubahan Demi Keadilan Untuk Kepentingan Rakyat ('Change toward justice for the 
people's needs'), DPP PPP, 1998, pp. 26-38 (quote: p. 29). The book was published in April1998 and 
contains speeches ofPPP leaders from 1997 and 1998 that ought to give evidence ofPPP's reformist 
credentials. 
9 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api 
Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam ('The Fire of Democracy must not go out'), p. 9. Later in 1998, PPP 
considered a formal apology to voters in particular for backing Soeharto's re-election at the MPR's 
General Session in March 1998. This idea was eventually dropped. 
10 Metareum, Reformasi, pp. 26-38 (quote: p. 29); "Pengantar Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat ('To 
Implement People's Sovereignty'), pp. 11-22. The contributions in this book are candid critiques of 
the New Order govermnent's repressive measures against PPP. 
11 Interview, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Jakarta, 18 October 2000. In January 1998, Ismail told PPP 
cadres that 1998 had to become 'the year of reform in all fields'. He attacked 'undemocratic 
behaviour' and made a 'pledge' to 'pioneer change and renewal' and 'to initiate reformasi'. 
Metareum, Reformasi, in Perubahan demi Keadilan, pp. 33-4 and 37. 
12 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat, inApi Demokrasi, p. 21 (first quote) andPengantar 
inMenegakkan, p. 13 (second and third quote). 
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At the first post-New Order MPR session in October 1998, PPP pursued a head-on 
attack on Golkar termed koreksi total ('total correction') which stood for a non-
Islamist reformasi agenda. 13 It spoke out against non-civilian presence in the 
legislature and firmly demanded the elimination of the military's participation in 
parliament and MPR in one single step. 14 Among the five factions in the assembly-
TNI, Golkar, PDI, Regional Representatives and PPP--only PPP voted to end the 
appointment of parliamentarians, to initiate an investigation into the wealth of New 
Order leaders including the former President and his family, and to issue a decree on 
corruptionY 
This means that, initially, PPP concentrated on issues of broader political reform and 
then 'step by step' (bertahap-tahap) built up its shari 'ah agenda. MP Ali Hardi Kiai 
Demak explained: 
[This is] because the central topics in the reformasi era were macro political 
issues ... hence, debating Islam was only part of general political issues [perpolitikan 
umum] ... A campaign is about how to appeal to one's constituencies. It remains for 
us to be smart to see what is the makeup [gaya] of constituenqies ... If constituencies 
have views like the [1998 reformasi] students we do not connect [nggak nyambung] 
if we talk only in Islamic terms ... so, we do not put Islam first but [stress] how we 
can create good living conditions ... we are pragmatic in this .. .in the way we take 
steps, we look at the objective conditions around us. So we naturally start from the 
big issues [such as] democracy. Only then we hook up democracy with Islam. 16 
13 "Koreksi Total dan Kelanjutan Perjuangan" ('Total Correction and Continuation of Struggle'): 
Pemandangan Umum FPPP MPR RI pada Rapat Paripurna Badan Pekerja MPR RI Tanggal 15 
September 1998" and "Siaran Pers FPPP MPR 24 September 1998", reprinted inMenegakkan, pp. 29-
59 and pp. 240-6. 
14 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat, in Api Demokrasi, p. 40 and "Sikap Politik Kita: 
Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia terhadap Hasil-hasil Komisi Majelis Sidang Tahunan MPR RII disampaikan dalam Rapat 
Paripuma Sidang Tahunan MPR RI pada tanggal15 Agustus 2000", reprinted in Politik Amar Maruf 
Nahi Munkar: Perjuangan dan Sikap Politik FPPP pada ST MPR RI Tahun 2000, FPPP MPR, 2000, 
pp. 95-116 (p. 107). PPP proposed to regulate the composition of the DPR directly in the Constitution; 
other factions only opted for a MPR decree which would have secured the military's position in 
parliament. It was particularly the party's younger MPs who vehemently demanded the Army and 
Police Faction to instantly withdraw from politics. Senior PPP leaders such as Ismail, Hamzah Haz 
and Tosari Widjaya, had opted for greater restraint in order to prevent a quarrel with the Army. The 
final decision was made through an open vote in which PPP lost clearly. "Faisal Baasir, Produk 
Reformasi", Kompas, 16 November 1998, "Kereta Api Cepat itu Tak Terhadang" and "WO untuk 
Militer di Senayan", Tempo, 23 November 1998. Notably, PPP's stance differed from the prime 
reform figures Amien Rais and Abdurrahman W ahid around the same time. Both had, together with 
Megawati Soekamoputri, agreed to gradually reduce the military's political role. 
15 Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat, in Api Demokrasi, p. 42 and Siaran Pers in 
Menegakkan, pp. 240 ff.; Baasir, Mengawal, p. 171; "Hanya PPP yang menolak", Kompas, 25 
September 1998. 
16 Interview, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Jakarta, 7 October 2003. 
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In accordance with this strategy, PPP's first post-New Order National Congress 
(Muktamar) which was held around the same time as the MPR session, evaded 
spelling out the Jakarta Charter and only mentioned the Second Article of Paragraph 
29 ensuring religious freedom, described by PPP as 'one of the most fundamental 
human rights' Y In characteristic rhetoric, PPP defined Islamic law as values and 
norms and put references to it in a nationalist context. 'Islamic values', the Congress 
declared, ought to become the 'moral, ethical, inspirational and motivational source' 
for national development; PPP will 'defend' (mempertahankan) laws that reflect 
'religious, in particular Islamic values' and, in a more straightforward passage, 
attempt to 'propose, correct and improve legal regulations' devoted to bringing about 
life in accordance with Islam. 18 A summit soon afterwards in early 1999 restated the 
intent to 'defend' Pancasila as national ideology. 19 
To brace its reformist credentials before the elections, PPP recruited a number of 
well-known economists and thinkers for its Majelis Pakar ('Council of Experts'), 
formed in early August 1998 and with the task to advise the Central Board on policy 
matters.Z0 Many of these 'recruits' were former Golkar cadres and had no particular 
Islamic credentials. There was also an influx of artists and singers to attract 
sympathy from ordinary Muslim voters.Z1 In early 2002, a dozen retired officers 
joined PPP, which the central leadership explained as strengthening nationalism in 
the party.22 Internally, these steps were seen as 'increasing pragmatism' in PPP.Z3 
17 Muktamar IV, p. 112. 
18 Muktamar IV, pp. 92-114. 
19 Pernyataan Politik Pertai (sic) Persatuan Pembangunan: Hasil Rapat Pimpinan Nasional I di 
Jakarta 31 March-I Apri/1999. 
20 "Inflasi Partai Islam", Tekad, 2-8 November 1998. The new members included the Secretary-
General of the National Human Rights Committee (Komnas HAM), Prof. Baharuddin Lopa, Prof. 
Bustanul Arifin, Salahuddin Wahid (NU, Abdurrahman Wahid's younger brother) and Supreme Court 
judge Prof. Bismar Siregar. "Lopa dan Bismar Gabung PPP: Mar'ie Belum Beri Jawaban", Republika, 
21 September 1998. 
21 Trie Utami, singer of the pop band Krakatau, appeared at a Congress of a PPP youth organisation, 
sitting next to Chairman Ismail Hasan Metareum. "Trie Utami Gabung PPP", Suara Merdeka, 19 
October 1998. 
22 "Agar Ka'bah Jadi Nasionalis" ('So that the Ka'bah becomes nationalist'), Tempo, 9 December 
2001. Among these men were former Minister of Information Yunus Yusfiah and former Attorney 
General Andi Ghalib. 
23 Interview, Faisa1 Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
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PPP, however, did not merely pursue genuine reformasi issues; the party attempted 
to steer a course between pluralism and Islamism. As argued in chapter four, it 
desired to remain attractive to ideologically more aware Muslims without estranging 
pluralist-minded Muslims. In early 1999 Zainuddin MZ, one of Indonesia's most 
popular preachers, joined PPP to boost the party's Islamic credentials.24 As further 
cause for the party's decline in the 1990s PPP identified its meek resistance to as as 
tunggal ('sole ideological foundation'). Quicker than Muhammadiyah and HMI, PPP 
had in the early 1980s given in to government pressure to accept asas tunggal and 
now felt this weighed down its Islamic credibility.25 The party concluded that in 
order to wipe out the blame of having 'sold out' the Muslim community, it had tore-
establish the Islamic party base and the ka 'bah (Holy Shrine) as party symbol. 
In the 1977 and 1982 elections, PPP campaigners had said publicly that the party 
with the kab 'ah symbol was the genuine Muslim party and thus it was obligatory for 
Muslims to vote for that party.26 The loss of the ka 'bah and the Islamic ideological 
base thus had deprived PPP campaigners of a crucial asset.27 Both called immediate 
attention to PPP's claim for an Islamic identity. 
A further motive to revitalize PPP' s formal Islamic identity were fears that large 
sections of its voter base in Central and East Java would defect to the new Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa ('National Awakening Party', PKB) led by NU's most 
influential leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. PKB promoted Pancasila as its platform and 
campaigners had the problematic task of defending a pluralist doctrine to Muslims, in 
24 Passing over bureaucratic hurdles, Zainuddin instantly gained a Chairman's position at PPP's 
National Working Congress (Mukemas) in Aprill999 so that he could campaign for the June 
elections. "Nakhoda Bam di Kapal Tua", Tempo, 14 December 1998. Zainuddin later became 
Chairman of the Lajnah Syuro 'Ulama 'il Ka'bah ('Consultation Committee ofKa'bah Ulama'), 
established in June 2002. Unlike the Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (MPP), the other ulama-led body of 
PPP, the Lajnah had mainly campaigning tasks and to recruit constituents for PPP, including 
increasing its appeal to traditionalist ulama. Interview, Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 
2003. 
25 PPP's National Congress in 1984 approved Pancasila as the party's ideological base. 
26 Aminuddin, Kekuatan Islam dan Pergulatan Kekuasaan di Indonesia sebelum dan sesudah 
Runtuhnya Rezim Soeharto, Pustaka Pelajar, Jakarta, 1999, pp. 105-6. 
27 Haris, PPP, pp. 112 & 124. 
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particular, to the NU community.28 PPP hoped to attract Muslim voters unhappy with 
this policy. 
At PPP's Congress in late 1998, party branches thus strongly demanded the re-
adoption of the Islamic ideological base and the ka 'bah symbol. 29 This provided PPP 
with strong ammunition for the 1999 election campaigns. PPP's electoral slogan 
asserted to voters that 'Islam is my religion, the ka 'bah is my symbol; PPP is my 
party' (Islam agamaku, kabah simbolku, PPP partaiku) and claimed that PPP was 
'the party inherited from the ulama' (partai warisan ulama).30 This claim was also 
directly addressed at PKB. PPP Chairman Zainuddin MZ held that 
PPP is liked because of its Islamic platform. If we imagine [PPP] as a football team 
[we can say that] in the 1999 elections PPP was a team that never practised but 
immediately played.31 
The return to the Islamic ideological base, however, did not impinge on the Islamic 
policy outlook which PPP officials liked to put together in a package with 
nationalism: 
At the beginning the ideological base of PPP was Islam; then [PPP] ... was forced to 
[adopt] the 'sole base', [all] this did not have a significant impact. After all, during 
the time of the 'sole base' PPP emerged as Islam-nationalist. It is just the same. It 
remained the same when [PPP] returned to Islam. There is no noteworthy 
difference. 32 
The ka 'bah, the Chairman ofPPP's MPR faction Faisal Baasir explained: 
28 Campaigners proclaimed that NU was split because NU ulama would not fight for Islam. "Hindari 
Bentuk Kekerasan", Media Indonesia, 1 June 1999. Holding PPP's Islamic base against PKB's 
pluralist platform, they referred to PKB as a party of unbelievers. Marcus Mietzner, "Nahdlatul Ulama 
and the 1999 general election in Indonesia", in Susan Blackburn, Pemilu: the 1999 Indonesian 
election, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series No.22, 1999, pp. 73-87 (esp. pp. 79-80). 
29 Interview, Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin, Jakarta, 24 October 2000; "Katakan dengan Kabah ('Saying 
it with the Ka'bah')", Media Indonesia, 6 December 1998. The Congress was held earlier than 
scheduled to prepare for the elections. Delegates also debated which party name and symbol would be 
most appealing to constituencies. They decided to retain the party name because of the closeness of 
the election, fearing that supporters might not recognise PPP under another label. "Dua Menteri 
Menuju Pucuk PPP", Forum Keadilan, 14 December 1998. 
30 Personal notes during PPP's 1999 election campaign. 
31 Zainuddin MZ quoted in "Saya Akan Mengomandani PPP Refomasi", Tempo, 18 November 2001. 
32 Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 25 November 2001. Also "Menggapai Ka'bah yang Hilang", 
Tekad, 30 November-6 December 1998. 
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... is a symbol with an appeal...We use it to appeal to the Muslim community. And to 
be able to say, that we are an Islamic party. This means that if the ka 'bah is 
interpreted as being connected to the [party] program, there is no such thing ... The 
party base stands for a moral, not an ideological platform. We endeavour that all 
governmental and political steps have their roots in Islamic morals and ethics.33 
The Islamism-free reformasi directive and uncertainty how voters might respond to 
Islamist messages meant that it was not immediately clear which umat themes other 
than the Islamic party base and the ka 'bah symbol, anti-communism and the fight 
against kepercayaan beliefs (chapter four) were beneficial for PPP. It, therefore, had 
no official shari'ah or Jakarta Charter agenda for the 1999 election campaigns. PPP, 
however, did not strictly settle on its political strategy. This meant that though 
shari'ah issues played a very small role in the rhetoric of the party's elite in Jakarta, 
this did not stop individual campaigners from calling for Islamic law or shari 'ah 
rule.34 
After the elections, PPP gradually developed a more Islamist profile. The party's 
consideration was that, by early to mid-2000, the general Muslim public and the 
press had shown more attention toward shari 'ah issues. The awareness that 
"shari 'ah" had become a popular topic while enthusiasm for reformasi had begun to 
wane, led to an increasingly Islamist rhetoric in PPP. In addition, there was a rise in 
shari 'ah demands from various Muslim organisations from the radical fringes. 35 
Hence, when in the 2000 MPR session PPP for the first time demanded inclusion of 
the Shari' ah Clause, it believed to respond to a rising sentiment. 36 Around the same 
time, non-Muslim organisations stepped up their opposition to shari 'ah and the 
Jakarta Charter, ironically in analogous exaggeration of the Charter's significance. 
33 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
34 Personal notes during PPP's 1999 election campaign. 
35 In August 2000, large numbers oflslamists demonstrated in front of parliament. The activists came 
among others from Front Pembela Islam ('Front of the Defenders of Islam', FPI), KAMMI, GPI, PII 
factions, HMI factions, KISDI and DDII. A much smaller counter-demonstration featured Christian 
and Buddhist groups and NU-affiliated organisations. "Berbagai Ormas Islam Minta Syariat Islam 
Dimasukkan UUD", Republika, 16 August 2000. 
36 According to PPP politicians, the Working Congress (Mukemas) in August 2000 formally approved 
the party's support for shari'ah in the following MPR session. The Mukemas document, however, 
lacks a clear reference to shari 'ah though it indirectly calls on the party to 'be able to articulate' 
current demands and 'to understand the issues that come up in society' and thus to put these into 
policies. Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(Nomor: 01/Mukernas/PPP/VIII/2000) tentang Pemantapan Visi, Misi/Khidmat, dan Paradigma Baru 
Serta Reposisi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 2 August 2000. 
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Their position was similarly immovable as during earlier occasions in 1945 and 
1956-9, with little willingness to understand the Islamist arguments.37 
PBB, too, compromised shari'ah issues in the interest ofvote maximisation. Though 
claiming a comprehensive commitment to the legacy of Masyumi, the party did not 
devote the same immediate attention to all Masyumi values and policies. In the 
months following its launch, PBB emulated Masyumi' s devotion to democratic 
principles and maintaining the rule of law. The party also presented itself as opposed 
to militarism and staunchly anti-communist. While all these positions had been 
prominent with Masyumi, they also promised to meet widespread approval among 
Muslims. 
PBB's central agenda in 1998 and 1999, however, was to amend the Constitution, 
promoted as essential in establishing democracy. 38 Yusril was the driving force 
behind this policy. He wrote prior to the first round of amendments: 
To prevent the return of veiled dictatorial governance [pemerintahan diktator 
terselubung]-Sukamo and Suharto always hid behind the 1945 Constitution-there 
is no other choice than to amend the Constitution. The Constitution has to be more 
elaborated [rinci] so that there are no liberties left for the power-holder to furnish an 
understanding benefiting his/her own position. I would like to remind all camps, 
never will there be a real reform in any country in this world without a 
constitutional reform. Without amending the Constitution, the new imminent regime 
will only be ... a regime status quo part two.39 (Italic in original) 
37 Christian interest groups such the Sulawesi-based 'Minahasa Forum' threatened to break away from 
Indonesia, if Paragraph 29 was amended. "Kongres Minahasa ultimatum MPR, Piagam Jakarta 
Diterima, Minahasa Merdeka", Manado Post, 7 August 2000. 
38 "Program Umum Perjuangan", in Profil Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP PBB, (no place, no date, 
probably 1998), p. 11; Pandangan Dan Sikap Politik Partai Bulan Bintang: Resolusi Partai bulan 
bintang (sic) Kepada MPR-RI untuk Menerbitkan Ketetapan-Ketetapan MPR, Pusat Studi dan 
Pengembangan lnformasi PBB, Jakarta, (no date, probably 1999), pp. 5-6; "Partai Bulan Bintang 
Usulkan UUD 1945 Diamandemen", Kompas, 9 December 1998. 
39 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Tiada Reformasi Tanpa Amendemen Konstitusi", Gatra, 3 July 1999. Also 
"Yusril Ihza Mahendra, 'Reformasi Harus Juga pada Konstitusi"', Kompas, 15 May 1999; "Prof. Dr. 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, SH.: 'Koalisi Murni Hanya dalam Sistem Parlamenter"', Sabili, 7 April1999. 
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Other initial policy issues were to strengthen the power of parliament, introducing 
direct presidential elections and additional legislation on regional govemance.40 
It became a Bulan Bintang credo that to rely on iconic leader figures was detrimental 
to the establishment of an efficient system.41 To glorify individuals undermined 
democracy as prominent figures found it hard to fit into a system. 42 At the party 
launching, Yusril announced: 
Partai Bulan Bintang fights to establish a system. Not to fight that A or B becomes 
President... In Indonesia, it is always a problem when the President is replaced. 
Why? Because we do not build a system. We only elevate [menokohkan] somebody, 
whom we flatter, [whom we] see as having charisma. From Sukamo to Suharto 
recently, [these were] figures that we idolise and revere ... But we forget that if a 
figure only relies on charisma without a solid system, [he] has the potential to 
become a dictator. History has proven this.43 
The Chairman insisted that he, too, did not want to be idolised.44 There was also the 
call for frequent leadership change in order to prevent the domination of a single 
figure. This was intriguing as much of the Bulan Bin tang community concentrated on 
the thought of Natsir and elevated him almost to beatific status. Above all, Yusril 
himself would quickly assume a dictatorial attitude towards PBB and trigger 
accusations of personal vanity and intellectual arrogance. 
The other issues of anti-militarism and anti-communism were Masyumi-inspired and 
deemed uncontroversial. In 1998, Yusril said to PBB cadres: 
40 "Bulan Bintang Bertekad Amendemen 12 Pasal UUD", Jawa Pos, 14 September 1998; Mengapa 
Memilih Partai Bulan Bintang?, Komite Aksi Pemangan Pemilihan Umum (KAPPU) Pusat Partai 
Bulan Bintang, 1999. 
41 "Yusril: Megawati Orla Jilid II", Pelita, 28 Augustus 1999; Interview, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, 
Jakarta, 22 November 2001. 
42 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 63. 
43 "Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang", reprinted in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 78. Also the interview with 
Hartono Mardjono: "Bulan Bintang Tegakkan Sistem dan Budaya Politik yang Benar and Sehat" 
(Bulan Bintang implements a political system and political culture that is appropriate and healthy'), 
Bulan Bintang, August 1998, pp. 5-8, Abdul Qadir Djaelani: "Di Mata Kami, Habibie Konstitutional", 
Forum Keadilan, 30 November 1998 and "Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Tanpa Perubahan Sistem, Lahir 
Orde Baru Jilid Kedua", Panji Masyarakat, 17 November 1999. Natsir had condemned the iconisation 
of leaders in similar fashion. 
44 Speech in Indramayu, 15 July 2001, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, No.1, Edisi 14, 1 Agustus 
2001, pp. 8-11. 
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We reject vehemently [habis-habisan] two things: militarism and communism. We 
follow the guidelines of Masyumi. In the past, the Masyumi had a clear position. 
They were able to cooperate with everyone. The only one they could not work with 
was PKI. There are signs that communists are emerging again.45 
PBB 'strongly rejected' any attempt to 'give a chance' for the revival of 
communism, asserting that it still was a 'latent danger' in Indonesia.46 Publicly, party 
leaders argued this case by declaring that communists were undemocratic rather than 
because they were believed to be atheists. The Chairman held he would 'never trust 
communists, although they currently pretend to struggle for democracy' and that 'I 
am convinced that, after becoming strong, the communists will crush democracy and 
form a monolithic force' .47 At the party launching, Yusril said: 
The struggle platform [garis perjuangan] ofPartai Bulan Bintang is clear: 'this party 
is a democratic party'. In a democratic system all groups may exist. The only ones 
that may not exist are those anti-democratic and hostile toward democracy.48 
This view became another credo of the party. For PBB, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah 
Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council', DDII), Komite Indonesia 
untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic 
World', KISDI) and other Bulan Bintang organisations, the obsessive warnings of a 
purportedly leftist threat were a tool to advance their own claim for cultural 
ascendancy. Accordingly, the doctrinaire Islamists attempted to brush aside doubts 
that the communists were national traitors and responsible for the 1965 coup 
attempt.49 Such blame underlined the ongoing desire of Masyumi legatees to portray 
themselves as inherently Indonesian. Like the depictions of alleged Jewish 
conspiracies, anti-leftist rhetoric sought to foster Muslim solidarity against an enemy. 
45 Speech in West Java reprinted in Bulan Bintang, 15-30 September 1998, p. 5. 
46 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 115. PBB also called for 'suspicion' toward China, as it had once helped the 
communists in Indonesia (Ibid, p. 119). 
47 Quoted in "Yusril Siap Mundur", Pelita, 28 April2000. He said the same at the 2000 Congress 
(Hasil Muktamar I, p. 75). During the 1955 election campaign, Natsir's statements were almost 
identical. Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, p. 226. 
48 Address at the official declaration ofPBB, 26 July 1998, Jakarta, reprinted under "Deklarasi Partai 
Bulan Bintang" in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 80. Also Hasil Mukernas I, p. 6. Whether this rejection 
meant that party members had to refuse meeting with former PKI activists in their responsibility as 
state officials was not spelled out. As chapter two has shown, in 2000 such unresolved matters 
triggered tensions in which the doctrinaire leaders attacked communists for religious reasons rather 
than merely for lacking democratic credentials. 
49 See, for example, Fadli Zon, "Komunisme tidak mati" ('Communism is not dead') and "Ada Upaya 
untuk Membelokkan Sejarah" ('There are attempts to distort history'), Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1-15 
October 1998, pp. 20-3. 
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Wide sections of society could easily see communists as an enemy without 
necessarily sharing a shari 'ah agenda. PBB, DDII and KISDI argued the assertion 
that communists were inherently anti- or non-Indonesian with greater vigour than 
PPP, whose rhetoric was less influenced by feelings of segregation. 
In contrast to anti-militarism and anti-communism, PBB curbed Masyumi's 
shari 'ah-mindedness. Until the 2000 Congress, which initiated its split, PBB scarcely 
mentioned the aim to implement shari 'ah through the state, both in party documents 
and in statements to the public and the press.50 Most Masyumi devotees obviously 
held that promoting non-Islamist reform issues had a better chance to ensure political 
survival. It was 'not at all certain' that promoting the Shari'ah Clause in the election 
campaign would increase votes. 'For us', MP Zubair Bakri pointed out, 'the 
objective was: first the Constitution' while 'putting off [dibelakangkan] sensitive 
issues' .51 
'PBB', a campaign booklet stated, 'is ready to become the implementer of Allah's 
religion'. 52 As early as the February 1999 Working Congress, regional boards called 
on the central leadership to take on the Charter as policy. 53 In the early reformasi era, 
shari'ah therefore was not yet 'made a corresponding [setara] topic but the discourse 
[wacana] already existed'. But because 'we could not act randomly (serampangan)' 
the party warily exposed shari 'ah goals over a period of one and a half years. 54 PBB 
inaugural member Adian Husaini concluded by saying that early on, PBB was 'very 
up to date to propose direct presidential elections ... constitutional reform [and an] 
electoral district system. But the ... strategy ofPBB at that time greatly considered the 
realities' .55 
50 Yusril's speech at the party launch lacked any reference to shari'ah issues or the Jakarta Charter. 
51 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. PBB leaders explained their caution because they 
needed to know whether PBB would obtain sufficient democratic legitimacy to strive for an Islamist 
agenda and that a decision to support a fundamental issue such as shari'ah needed the approval of the 
National Congress. A 2% share in the elections, of course, hardly provided such a mandate. Also, 
other key issues such as the campaign for constitutional reform apparently did not need the Congress' 
endorsement. 
52 'Inilah Jalanku' Bahan Kampanye Untuk Jurkam Partai Bulan Bintang ('This is my way' ... ') 
DPW PBB Central Java, 1998, p. 4. 
53 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. 
54 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. 
55 Interview, Adian Husaini, Jakarta, 30 October 2001. 
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Hesitant to advance shari 'ah or the Jakarta Charter, PBB initially made known it 
would work toward Izzul Islam w 'al Muslimin ('the glory of Islam and the Muslim 
community') as target. Party strategists hoped that this catchphrase would tum into a 
trademark slogan but then realised that its meaning left electorates puzzled. 56 They 
thought that people, due to 'historical evidence', would view the party as heir of 
Masyumi and hoped that ideologically aware Muslims would automatically think of 
it as a shari 'ah advocate. 57 In an uneven election campaign the promotion of Islamist 
goals was left to the personal taste of the campaigner. Pro-shari'ah statements were a 
matter of where campaigning took place. Some campaigners adopted the slogan Izzul 
Islam wal Muslimin; others more bluntly demanded implementing shari 'ah in the 
state, while again others promoted PBB's goals as striving for "universal values". 
The more adaptable rhetoric was used in non-Muslim dominated regions such as East 
Indonesia. 58 
The performance of PBB in the constitutional debates, too, was slow. In early panel 
meetings in 1999 and 2000, PBB MPs did not mention Paragraph 29 directly. What 
is more, they had yet to declare championing the Shari'ah Clause. Notably, in 1999, 
MP Hamdan Zoelva appeared to back Fraksi Reformasi's Plural Clause, proposing to 
implement religious teachings among the respective religious communities. 
Changing standpoints were part of the MPs' strategy. 59 In the early MPR sessions, 
PBB was also less inclined to put forward its central argumentation that the state 
needed to adopt a central role in enforcing Islam; instead Hamdan argued in a 
roundabout way that Indonesia was not a secular country, a fact which had to be 
further elucidated through amending Paragraph 29.60 In fact, PBB believed that only 
56 Interview, Agus Dwiwarsono, Jakarta, 6 October 2003. 
57 Interviews, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003; Agus Dwiwarsono, Jakarta, 6 October 2003. 
58 Interview, Agus Dwiwarsono, Jakarta, 6 October 2003. 
59 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
60 Originally: "dengan kewajiban bagi para pemeluk agama untuk menjalankan ajaran dan syariat 
agamanya masing itu" and "melaksanakan ajaran-ajaran agama bagi masing-masing pemeluknya ". 
"Risalah Rapat Ke-3 Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Peketja MPR 6 Desember 1999", reprinted in Buku 
Kedua Jilid 3 A Hasil Rumusan Seminar Panitia Ad Hoc I (Sidang Tahunan 2000), Sekretariat 
Jenderal MPR, Jakarta, 2000, p. 122. This was a nice illustration of political strategy: Hamdan argued 
that the current wording of Paragraph 29 would refer to a 'passive task' of the state to enable religious 
life to prosper. The state thus only gave a 'guarantee' (jaminan) to its citizens that they were able to 
freely carry out their religion. The state would not obstruct religious life but allow 'as much space as 
possible' for every community to live according to its beliefs. PBB, however, argued that, in reality, 
the state had already taken on an active role in religious affairs. Therefore, to adjust Article One in 
accordance with the Shari' ah Clause merely meant an adaptation to existing conditions. Thus, at that 
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specific shari 'ah terms were communicable to Muslim constituencies and saw the 
Plural Clause as misguided. 61 
The 2000 Congress for the first time mentioned inserting the Shari' ah Clause into 
Paragraph 29 officially as policy and provided the MPR faction with clear 
instructions. It announced a 'permanent' (senantiasa) orientation toward ideology 
and cited Natsir, who was said to have compared a political program without an 
ideology to a robot. It expressed the participants' 'heartfelt desire to implement 
Islamic teachings and law' and 'strongly urged' the MPR to amend Paragraph 29.62 
Moreover, it suggested that the goal to implement Islam through the state was more 
essential than non-Islamist goals, proclaiming that 'for Bulan Bintang people, the 
state is the receptacle [ wadah] and the tool to fulfil the target to implement 
[ menegakkan] Islam. [T]he state itself is not the goal. ' 63 
Subsequent decisions reiterated this order. A Congress in 2000 instructed the party to 
'fight to the utmost in constitutional ways to implement shari 'ah in Indonesia' .64 
From there on, the pragmatic leadership around Yusril and Ka'ban stepped up 
Islamist rhetoric, amplifying their condemnation of secularism and depicting it as the 
nucleus of national problems. In early 2001, M.S. Ka'ban wrote in the party journal: 
Up till now, the Islamic community has been infected with the disease of 
SECULARISM. This sickness is a chronic epidemic. The implications of this 
paradigm are the loss of ethics, the collapse of morality, the absence of a clear sense 
of responsibility and the lack of moral norms that bind mankind. With secularism, 
there are no limits to what is permitted and prohibited, everything is 
permissible ... because with the secular paradigm, there is no absolute truth, 
everything is relative ... There is no other way except for the Islamic community to 
return to the new paradigm [sic]: worldly affairs are religious affairs, religion 
must regulate (mengatur) the state, community [and] individuals ... We should] 
begin by re-opening the Jakarta Charter discourse. This is not just an historical 
stage, PBB' s argumentation was retrospective: the state already takes on an active role; therefore the 
Shari'ah Clause had to be inserted. 
61 Interviews, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002; Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. PBB 
leaders insisted that the party never saw the Plural Clause as an alternative and that Hamdan's 
argumentation at the 1999 session was tactically motivated. 
62 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 115. 
63 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 71. 
64 Rekomendasi Musyawarah Kelja Nasional II Partai Bulan Bintang, 16 September 2001, reprinted 
in Buletin Bulan Bintang, Edisi 15, 1 September 2001, pp. 7-8. 
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obligation but more importantly it [aims] to save the nation, which is beset by the 
storms of crisis.65 (Capital and bold in original) 
In late 2001, Ka'ban led a delegation through the regions with the sole task of further 
promoting the party's support for the Shari'ah Clause.66 Yusril steered the new 
policy focus, arguing: 
[The] implementation of juridical legal dealings [syariat qada 'i] by the state cannot 
be carried out without the establishment of a political party. Therefore, it is also a 
legal obligation for the Muslim people to establish a political party. The obligation 
to establish a political party is only a tool for the implementation [terlaksananya] of 
shari'ah by the state. Because ofthis, Muslims must not be fanatic [ta'ashub] about 
their party since to be active in a party is not the goal. The goal is the realisation 
[penegakkan] of shari'ah, so that the Indonesian state will not fall victim 
[ melacurkan] to ideologies that are far away from the ideology of Indonesian 
Muslims as the majority population in Indonesia.67 
In 2003, PBB published a book named 'Fighting for Shari'ah Islam' that was to give 
evidence of the party's dedication to shari 'ah. In this, Yusril informed cadres: 
The Partai Bulan Bintang Faction ... has already made an effort [berikhtiar] to return 
the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into ... Paragraph 29 .... What has been done 
by the Partai Bulan Bintang Faction from the Annual MPR Session in 2000 to the 
Annual MPR Session in 2002 was the maximal effort ... [R]emembering that the 
effort to implement shari'ah Islam is Allah's command [merupakan perintah Allah]; 
as a faction and party which is based on Islam, surely this struggle does not end 
here.68 
Taking on the wish of party cadres for a shari 'ah agenda helped the pragmatic 
Islamists to consolidate PBB after the 2000 split. The disappointing election result 
(2%) and the rise of shari 'ah discourse in public and press were further practical 
motives for a change of agenda. The practical side-aspects of disclosing shari 'ah 
goals became particularly clear as by the time the party strengthened its Islamist 
agenda most doctrinaire leaders were about to resign. The shari 'ah policy 
65 M.S. Ka'ban, "Sekularisme Akar Masalah Bangsa" ('Secularism is the Root of National 
Problems'), Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 February 2001, p. 23. 
66 ""Sosialisasikan Syariat Islam!" ('Socialise Shari'ah Islam!'), Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 December 
2001, p. 10. 
67 Mahendra, Sambutan, in Memperjuangkan Syariat Islam, p. viii. 
68 Mahendra, Sambutan, p. ix. Yusril made no such public statements in 1998, 1999 and most of2000. 
He often referred to the 2000 Congress mandate as the reason for his party's persistent defence of the 
Shari'ah Clause. Given his skepticism that shari'ah can be comprehensively realised in present-day 
Indonesia, the motive behind his sudden pro-shari 'ah stance was to provide PBB with a new key 
agenda in accordance with the Congress' decision. 
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automatically weakened the dissidents who had hoped to snatch away cadres for the 
Islamist rival parties they intended to set up. 69 
More than the other Islamist parties, Partai Keadilan acted on a neat separation of 
ideological and political commitment. The party was staunchly devoted to reform 
and democratisation. But its ideal has been a society which is Islamicised to a degree 
that it blissfully embraces the rule of shari 'ah so that any elections will automatically 
reconfirm Islamist parties in power. 
In 1998, PK appeared as a firm political realist. While drawing on the notion of 
ghazwul jikri, which stipulates that the West wants to destroy Islam, as tutoring 
material for party cadres, initiators of the same party stifled any confrontationist 
attitude. 70 This accommodationism received official confirmation at the party's first 
major Congress (the Musyawarah Nasional) in May 2000. It formulated a 'vision' 
that highlighted the aim 'to become the binding element and initiator of unity of the 
Muslim community and the nation (unsur perekat dan pengarah kesatuan umat dan 
bangsa)' .71 
PK initiators believed in the benefits of participating in a democratic system, in 
submitting to the confines of law and, therefore, in the pursuit of the possible through 
compromise. This was no contested political participation like in the case of the 
Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhood branches in the 1980s. Over a short period 
of time, PK strategists succeeded in promoting their party as devoted to peaceful 
struggle through democratic means with transparent policies. They displayed an 
awareness of the concessions that the entry into party politics would entail. 72 
Mahfudz Siddiq argued: 
69 See chapter two. 
7° Compare with chapter four. 
71 Komisi C Kebijakan. 
72 Also, the party worked on a more sanguine image than the grim and gloomy posture of various 
Middle Eastern organisations. 
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Political parties necessarily enter a constitutional corridor and that is it. Whoever 
seeks complete withdrawal because of ideological reasons has to remove [his] party 
[from] the constitutional corridor... [P]olitical compromises or political 
consequences arise that have to be accepted. They come about from what we chose 
as means of[our] struggle Ualanperjuangan].73 
PK could only hope for a minor share of the vote in the 1999 elections and, thus, 
accepted that it was impossible to accomplish ideological goals in the foreseeable 
future. It was, therefore, important to signal a cooperative stance at an early stage, as 
it was to focus on short-term objectives. As a new party, the priority was to initiate a 
long-term dialogue with other political and religious sections and to build 
partnerships. 74 
The ensumg orientation toward gradualism and dakwah programs had strong 
strategic value. The party saw it as an outcome of the lessons of history and 
underscored its long-term orientation: 
[We are] aware that the objective of dakwah, which will be realised, is a large 
objective, that is to implement God's religion on earth and to install Islamic 
Sovereignty in an Islamic caliphate system [tegaknya agama Allah di bumi dan 
berdirinya Dawlah Islamiyah ' 'Alamiyah dalam system Khilafah Islamiyah] of 
which the results possibly can be enjoyed by following generations. Hence, every 
policy ... and program ... connects [to] three time dimensions. The past as lesson, the 
present as reality and the future as hope. 75 
Aiming to implement Islam on a global scale and even restore the caliphate, the 
party's dakwah approach remained firmly grounded in political realism. Politics were 
'a very strategic dakwah field yet with many risks and which can lead to conflict'. 
The 2000 Congress referred to the example of the Prophet as pattern for propagating 
Islam in a partly hostile environment. It held: 
[One has to] remember that dakwah in the political field is a strategic step of the 
Prophet to align [ mensejajarkan] his values with the objective of attesting one's faith 
in a war effort on the road to Allah fperperangan di }alan Allah]. This reality of 
course brings about various ... implications that cannot be neglected. Among others, 
dakwah will face logical necessities [tuntutan-tuntutan logis] coming from a number 
of internal and external challenges ... which definitely hamper the progress of 
dakwah. Dakwah thus will be confronted by a number ofproblems ... which demand 
73 Interview, Mahfudz Siddiq, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. Also Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 20 
October 2001. 
74 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
75 Komisi C Kebijakan. 
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a comprehensive revitalization of orientation: [this] includes its ... structure, 
direction, and modelling in accordance with the demands ... and the problems it 
faces. 76 
For dakwah to succeed, it had to be adjusted to the "Islamic qualities" of society and 
be temperate. A fatwa of PK's Shari'ah Board held: 'If dakwah is carried out too 
harshly [kasar], they will not acquire it and even run away from it' .77 This dakwah 
strategy went back to the model of the Prophet who advised to 'speak with other 
people in accordance with their level/quality [tingkat] of thinking' .78 Irwan Prayitno 
wrote as a guideline for cadres: 
A form of dakwah in correspondence with reality is the ... concept of mission 
according to Islam [ minhaj dakwah Islamiyah]. Dakwah has to be rooted where it is 
carried out; do not stray [ melangit] so that it [ dakwah] cannot be realised in 
everyday day situations [mad'u]. [To] consider reality ... was exemplified by the 
Prophet in undertaking dakwah in Mecca and also in Medina. The very strong 
ignorance [jahiliyah] in those days was likely to destroy Islam ... but the gradual and 
exact dakwah by the Prophet who began it secretly quickly prepared the situation in 
Medina. A non-controversial form of dakwah is the approach conveyed by the 
Prophet as ... result of his observation of the societal reality at that time.79 
The training material exposed the intimate connection between this acquiescent 
dakwah approach and the combatant doctrine of ghazwul jikri. It held: 
The condition of Muslims today is ... pitiful [ hina] and under the rule of the enemies 
of Islam. Muslims as the best and grand community [umat yang terbaik dan mulia] 
obviously no longer display their grandness amidst other humankind; even appears 
to wane more and more [terpuruk] because of ignorance [jahiliyah]... Muslims 
today ha[ve] deficiencies such as ethics [aqidah], training [tarbiyah], culture 
[tsaqafah] ... organisational management [and] intellect [akhlak]. This situation exists 
in a majority of Islamic countries. To improve all this, a comprehensive form of 
dakwah is needed which follows basic values which are educational, programmed 
[minhajiyah], and graded [marhaliyah, bertahap], with a sense of priority 
[aulawiyah, prioritas], in accordance with reality [and] balanced.80 
This understanding of dakwah was uncommon among Masyumi legatees. DDII, for 
example, has traditionally confronted foes by sending Muslim preachers to remote 
76 Komisi C Kebijakan. 
77 Fatwa of the Shari'ah Board on "Hukum Tahlilan dalam Islam", inFatwa Dewan Shariah Partai 
Keadilan, (no publisher, no place, no date), p. 19. 
78 Anis Matta, "Memenangkan W acana Publik", Saksi, 17 April 2001, pp. 2-3. 
79 Irwan Prayitno, "Ahwaal Al-Muslimin Al-Yaum (Kondisi Umat Islam Saat Ini)", reprinted in 
Prayitino, Kepribadian Dai, p. 196. 
80 Manajemen, pp. 150-1. 
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regions in order to counter Christian missionaries. PK, by contrast, understood the 
enemy as a dakwah target which underscored its desire to cultivate Islam beyond 
Muslims. It transformed a combative ideology into a form of political practice which 
pre-emptively rejected violence or the intimidation of opponents. Echoing this 
seeming paradox, Anis Matta asserted that it was possible to have a 'sense of war' 
while making diplomacy the rationale of behaviour: 
We do not view a person or a group or an ideology as permanent enemy. [Our] 
stance toward the US is that even though [the US] is categorised as enemy ... but at 
the same time it is also categorised as an object to which we have to introduce 
Islam... When we build awareness toward ghazwul fikri we also build an 
understanding [gagasan] for dialogue. These are not things that contradict each 
other. When you have a sense of war you still can be in dialogue with others. This is 
not something that has to be put into opposition [dipertentangkan].81 
There was thus a conscious demonstration of moderation and intellectuality.82 PK did 
not deliver its moral message through hard-hitting propaganda but through a display 
of reserved behaviour, underscored by the customary use of what it promoted as 
universal virtues such as 'courtesy' (kesopanan) and 'peacefulness' (kedamaian). It 
also claimed to be 'professional' and 'reformist'. These terms revealed a technocratic 
'problem-solving' and a hands-on mentality, which gave particular attention to 
Islam's call for social and political engagement.83 Other neutral values PK claimed to 
defend included 'moderation', 'democracy', 'moralist', 'independent' and, as 
mentioned earlier, 'patriotism' .84 These western-derived terms highlighted common 
interests and called attention to their supposedly general benefit. 
Promoted as a universal moral ideal, keadilan ('justice') was PK's casus belli and a 
major rhetorical device. As a Qur'anic key term, its prominence derived from the 
belief that God had created the world on the principle of justice. The Qur' an and the 
81 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
82 This is underscored through the references to western writers in the treatises ofPK ideologues such 
as Abu Ridho, Anis Matta, Syamsul Balda and Mutammimul 'Ula. 
83 Siddiq, Syariat Islam, p. 45 once more quoted the Qur'an, verse al-R'ad (13:11) as the Divine order 
for self-initiative: 'Verily never will God change the conditions of a people, until they want to change 
it themselves'. 
84 Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas Partai Keadilan, pp. 15-51. It is illuminating that the party invited 
Nurcholish Madjid as a guest speaker to its first National Working Congress (Mukemas). This 
happened without causing uproar. Reportedly, only Daud Rasyid, the long-time critic ofNurcholish 
from DDII, left the summit when hearing that Nurcholish was to speak to the participants. 
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Sunnah, PK proclaimed, demanded to bring about 'universal justice' as the central 
objective of a state. 85 It went so far as to describe 'justice' as the cosmic foundation 
on which any other virtue and accomplishment rested. Justice, it proclaimed 'opens 
the way toward true virtues, the good, the beautiful and happiness in life'. It 'not 
only provides the opportunity for every human to obtain his/her rights as a human 
being' but also 'contains all potentials of his/her innovation and creativity'. Justice 
'provides security and liberates mankind from all forms of intimidation and fear'. It 
'guarantees the proportional distribution of national wealth, giving equal 
opportunities to work and study. Justice installs law over power-holders and the 
people' and 'ensures effective social control mechanisms'. 86 The party manifesto 
reiterated the justice focus and put it into the frame of globalisation issues. Without 
spelling it out, the statement implied that the pursuit of justice was directly linked to 
countering the perceived global subjugation of Islam. It announced: 
In modesty, we want to make justice [keadilan] the rmsswn of Indonesian 
international diplomacy, because this is a benefit [rahmat], which has never been 
experienced by a majority of the current world population. The progress of 
transportation technology and telecommunication has already made this world 
increasingly integrated. Ironically, globalisation has changed and became the basis 
of a new hegemony and imperialism from various developed and strong countries 
toward the ... remaining world. Endowed with the vision of autonomy, patriotism, 
democracy, moderation, reformasi and the message of Islam as a blessing for all 
surroundings, we aspire to Indonesia becoming a strong country, which brings the 
mission of the blessing of justice to all humankind, so that its [Indonesia's] people 
become a contributor to human civilisation and its lands transform [and] become a 
garden to live in that is serene and peaceful. 87 
This obliging rhetoric and the rationalism it was based on conspicuously contrasted 
with the unclothed bitterness of the doctrinaire Islamists in the Masyumi camp. As 
such, PK's adaptation of western political ideas and terminology sought to blend the 
ideal model of an Islamic state and society to more common ideas and expressions in 
a way that comprised policies, attitude and language. To create good working 
relationships with other political camps, it suggested steering clear of quarrelsome 
themes. The aim was to brush aside any stereotypes as being fanatic or extremist by 
85 Syamsul Balda, "Antara Islam dan Politik (3-habis): Kedaulatan di Tangan Allah", Peka Online, 14 
March2002. 
86 "Manifesto Politik Partai Keadilan", also reprinted in Sekilas Partai Keadilan, Sekretariat DPP 
Partai Keadilan, Jakarta, 1998, p. 8. 
87 Manifesto Politik, in Sekilas, pp. 12-13. 
224 
being 'temperate' (imbang) in attitude.88 Islam would call for a 'middle position' 
(posisi pertengahan) and 'facilitation' (kemudahan). It was enlightening that the 
statutes quoted a hadith that underscored that moderation and accommodation was a 
fundamental necessity. The hadith demanded: 
Do what is easier and don't make things more difficult 
Do what pleases them and don't make them run away ([Muttafaq Alaih])89 
Such moderation blended harmoniously with the party's gradualist approach toward 
shari 'ah goals. Doubtful about the wisdom of writing shari 'ah terms into the 
present-day non-Islamised Constitution, PK did not support the Shari'ah Clause 
despite the conviction that it was the state's obligation to implement Islam. It 
specifically was sceptical of the Shari'ah Clause because of 'too many distortions'. 
'People', Anis Matta argued, 'get a wrong perception of shari 'ah issues if they are 
connected to the Jakarta Charter.' 90 The party thus approached the constitutional 
debates by evading ideological issues which could endanger the commitment toward 
broader political reform. Anis Matta reasoned 
We did not want shari 'ah Islam to be an issue, which will bring us into conflict with 
other groups. We wanted to become the national unifier fpemersatu bangs a]. 
Therefore, it was best to drop [ hilangkan] all factors that could incite conflicts on the 
basis of religious difference. One of those [issues] was the Jakarta Charter.91 
Originally, therefore, PK did not have a strategic motive to support amending the 
constitutional stipulations on 'religion' in Paragraph 29. The party believed that 
despite its historical significance, comparatively few Muslims were devoted to 
reviving the Shari'ah Clause. Moreover, the Charter was 'Masyumi's property' and 
'trump card'; it was the 'product of Masyumi and PBB' and 'not ours'. 92 PK's 
eventual commitment to an alternative wording of the clause was because parts of its 
own constituency found it difficult to apprehend that an Islamist party would not do 
so.93 Contenders, in particular from PBB, had spread the word among Muslim voters 
88 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. 
89 Jati Diri. The quote was put under the heading 'moderate'. 
90 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
91 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
92 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. 
93 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
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that PK would not fight for the Charter.94 This, PK complained, gave the impression 
to Muslims that not supporting the Charter would be same as not supporting 
shari'ah. The charge was a 'slander' and a 'lie'.95 It was 'as if to say that the Jakarta 
Charter is Allah's divine inspiration which must not be debated and must not be 
corrected' .96 Customarily brought up during the yearly MPR sessions, the Charter 
debates had turned perfunctory and stood for a partial devotion to Islam.97 The 
promotion of the Shari'ah Clause was in danger ofbecoming a 'political commodity' 
and a 'political image tool', sending the wrong message to Muslims.98 
A PK bayanat ('official explanation') proclaimed that there were 'many 
misperceptions' regarding the party's position on shari'ah and Paragraph 29.99 To 
back up its claim to represent the authentic Islam, the party listed broader 'Islamic 
issues' to which it was committed: it pointed to having forcefully rejected a 'secular-
communist' phrase inserted into the Human Rights regulations, succeeded in the 
inclusion of zakat (alms) into the tax system, an incessant fight against corruption 
and its smooth handling of internal matters such as changes in the leadership. But the 
central argument was the persistent dedication to enforcing Islamic teachings on 
themselves and their families. 100 Because of this, PK hoped that 'fair and non-
partisan observers' would correctly assess the 'commitment' of each political party 
to make Islam the pivotal factor in their politics. 101 Anis Matta said about PK's 
shari 'ah approach and its political strategy: 
94 Other Islamist parties also spread the word that PK had to dissolve before the next elections. 
Interviews, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
95 "Sikap PK Tentang Amandemen Pasal29 Ayat 1 UUD 45 Dalam Sidang Tahunan MPR 2002", 
Suara Keadilan, No. 23, 15 May- 15 June 2002. 
96 Qamaruddin, Beginilah Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menegakkan Syari 'at Islam: Klarijikasi Fitnah 
Piagam Jakarta ('This is how Partai Keadilan ... implements Shari'ah Islam: Clarification of the 
Jakarta Charter Slander') Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2003, p. 45. 
97 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. 
98 Mutammimul Ula, "Mensikapi Isu Piagam Jakarta, PerspektifPenerapan Syariat Islam", 
http://www.mastammim.co.id, 18 September 2000 (quotes); "Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam Tidak Perlu 
Menunggu Amandemen Pasal29", Republika, 19 November 2001. 
99 Hidayat Nur Wahid repeatedly had to defend the party's stance to constituencies. "Hidayat Tampik 
Tudingan PK Tidak Dukung Penerapan Shari' at Islam" ('Hidayat rebuffs the charge that PK does not 
support the enforcement ofShari'ah Islam'), PeKa Online, 26 July 2002, 
http://www.peka.or.id/dzoom.php?id=21&cd=6&no=O. 
100 Unlike other parties, PK supervised the correct worship practices of members and cadres. 
Qamaruddin, Beginilah, p. 35. 
101 "Sikap Partai Keadilan terhadap Penegakan Syari'at Islam Yang Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin Melalui 
Amandemen Pasa129 Ayat 2 UUD 1945", DPP PK, 19 September 2000, reprinted in Suara Keadilan, 
9 September 2000, pp. 4-5. 
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We avoid conflict with the secular camp so that we can come together. At the same 
time, we give an example of implementing shari 'ah Islam in everyday life. The umat 
Islam can judge by itself that though we do not use the term shari 'ah Islam, they 
[Muslims] still see that it is us who follow Islam in daily life... We carry out 
[shari'ah] first, only then we talk [about it]. We already said to them [officials of 
other Islamist parties]: deal first with your families, only then talk about shari 'ah 
Islam. What is the point to talk about shari 'ah Islam if ... the families of [Muslim] 
leaders themselves are not all right [heres]? ... The family of the Vice-president is 
involved in narcotics. As with others, the wife does not wear the headscarf, 
... smokes ... so what do you talk about? We give a bad example to society. That 
Islamic leaders obviously only can talk. This is why people including the umat Islam 
little believe in Islamic leaders. Because they talk a lot but do not live what they 
say.102 
Moreover, pointing to the number of its graduates from the Middle East with a 
diploma in Islamic studies, PK leaders claimed superior expertise on matters of 
exegesis and Islamic philosophy. 103 In a publication specifically designed to 
enlighten PK cadres on their party's stance toward shari 'ah, Tate Qamaruddin wrote, 
in a sideswipe to PPP and PBB: 
There are those who chose to urge those in charge and bureaucrats who are currently 
in power to execute syari'at Islam ... [T]hey are very poor in their information-to 
avoid the word 'stupid'-about Syari'at Islam. And there are those who with high 
spirits proclaim 'syari'at Islam has to be implemented now', while they are 
bewildered how and where they have to start.104 
PK's parliamentary coalition with Partai Amanah Nasional ('National Mandate 
Party', PAN) by itself made shari 'ah-based politics more difficult to implement. 
PAN's claim to represent religious diversity made it impossible to support the 
Shari' ah Clause even though Islamists in the party quietly sympathised with it. 105 
The proneness of the Shari' ah Clause to charges of sectarianism suggested a wording 
that omitted to name "shari 'ah" by using neutral religious terms. To comply with the 
102 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. As usual, the dress code of the wives ofMuslim 
leaders had a high symbolic status, especially that it was tolerable for these women to appear in public 
without a proper headscarf. Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 15 November 2000. 
103 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
104 Qamaruddin, Beginilah, p. 19. 
105 The large number of devoted Muslims in PAN's administration, particularly in regional boards, 
meant that there was ongoing disagreement over the proper place of religion in PAN's platform. The 
party, one of its nationalist Chairmen held, was unable to make up its mind whether 'to become an 
open party or the party ofMuhammadiyah'. Interview, Abdillah Toha, Jakarta, 24 August 2000. 
PAN's nationalist camp had preferred to form a coalition with PKB or PDIP (ibid), whereas 
Muhammadiyah-based leaders had opted for PK. Interview, Patria1is Akbar, Jakarta, 29 August 2000. 
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demands from its constituencies, the Syuro Council adopted the organisation of the 
medieval Medina Charter as basis for the Plural Clause. 106 In one instance the clause 
was termed as the 'Jakarta Charter illustrated through [ berwawasan] the Medina 
Charter' .107 
It was the claim of the Fraksi Reformasi that its option would overcome the 
controversy of the Shari'ah Clause, as this option suited Indonesian plural society. 
Intriguingly, as did PPP and PBB, Fraksi Reformasi claimed to respect religious 
pluralism, arguing that the original wording was flawed because it dealt with Muslim 
piety only. 108 The Plural Clause, Hidayat Nur W ahid argued, would be 'more just', as 
special status for Islam would be avoided and thus be more acceptable for other 
religious communities. 109 To enforce religious teachings only on Muslims '[w]hilst 
[giving the impression] that other religious communities are freed from being 
obedient or not obedient toward their religion, gives the impression of injustice 
[ ketidakadilan]'. 110 
Through the Medina framework, Islamic law could be implemented in 'a plural civil 
[ madani] society' whilst ensuring the rights of other religious communities. 111 
Insofar as its proposal encompassed non-Muslims as well, PK claimed that it 
mirrored the spirit of Pancasila as a 'word of togetherness' [ kata persamaan]' and 
reflected the identity of the nation as 'a religious people' .112 Fraksi Reformasi 
promoted its proposal as a 'middle way' on the premise that all religions were 
included. Salim Segaf noted: 
We have to understand that we are not alone in Fraksi Reformasi.. . We understand 
that PAN also has concepts; we can't force our will [on others] ... It does not have to 
be sacral as in the seven words as PBB wants it. But what we want is that, because 
the majority of our people are Muslims, the implementation of shari 'ah should be 
given a chance, too .... It does not have to be through the Jakarta Charter but can be 
106 To persuade readers of the genuineness of his party's devotion to shari'ah, Qamaruddin reminded 
them that the original proponents of the Charter had included many 'secular Muslims' whereas it was 
the Prophet who under Divine guidance had worded the Medina Charter. Beginilah, p. 45. 
107 "Piagam Madinah Solusi Polemik Amandemen Pasal29", Suara Merdeka, 4 November 2001. 
108 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. 
109 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 23 October 2000. 
110 "Sikap PK Tentang Amandemen Pasal29 Ayat 1 UUD 45 Dalam Sidang Tahunan MPR 2002", 
Suara Keadilan, No. 23, 15 May-15 June 2002. 
111 Sikap Partai Keadilan terhadap Penegakan Syari 'at Islam, in Suara Keadilan, September 2000. 
112 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 5 October 2000. 
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extended, can be reduced. What is clear is that shari 'ah terms are mentioned. That is 
what we want ... [T]he debate on Paragraph 29 is also a blend between us and PAN. 
We understand that if we formulate with the language of the 'seven words', it may, 
for the time being, not be approved by parliament. We want to use wordings that are 
safe [ ungkapan bahasa yang safe]. . . We want to use terms whose substance is not 
entirely different but which are easier to accept. 113 
PK claimed to have obtained support from non-Muslims for their proposal. They 
asserted that party leaders had consulted with representatives of other religions, most 
of them Christian organisations. Those who did not insist on maintaining Paragraph 
29 in its original form had expressed support as the wording supposedly had a 
positive impact on the moral life ofnon-Muslims, too. 114 
Fraksi Reformasi's justification for its proposition was characteristically Islamist. It 
claimed that stepping up moral restrictions on public life was the key to overcoming 
the nation's problems. The state must ensure broader piety. The endeavours of other 
Islamist parties, including Masyumi, PPP and PBB, to convince non-Muslims that 
the inclusion of shari 'ah terms into the conclusion would not affect their 
communities, has somewhat shrouded the fact that Islamism applies to broader 
religiosity. Both PK and PAN leaders argued that if people were obedient toward 
their religion they were also obedient toward the law; any violations were thus 
unlikely to happen on a large scale. The two parties shared the battle against 
corruption as a prime commitment, calling the corrupt 'national traitors', the 'rats of 
the state' that had to be 'eliminated' (dibasmi). The corrupt, the faction proclaimed, 
'know no God and have no nationalism' ... 'their God and nationalism is money' .115 
The best way to diminish corruption was to 'endeavour to increase our individual 
piety' .116 Fraksi Reformasi members suggested, though obliquely, that the Plural 
Clause put obligation on the state to achieve this obedience. They argued: 
... [T]o ensure that religious life develops well and, indeed, as it should [agar 
beragama itu memang harus bisa berkembang dengan baik], there needs to be a 
113 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. 
114 "Sikap PK Tentang Amandemen Pasal29 Ayat 1 UUD 45 Dalam Sidang Tahunan MPR 2002", 
Suara Keadilan, No. 23, 15 May- 15 June 2002; Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
115 The speaker was Irwan Prayitno. Risalah Sementara I 0 Agustus 2002, p. 8. 
116 MPR Chairman of Fraksi Reformasi A.M. Luthfi quoted in Risalah Rapat Pleno 21 Maret 2002 
reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002. Indonesia had a little earlier been listed as the most 
corrupt country in Asia on which Luthfi remarked sarcastically: 'Praise be. Now we are number one, 
Indonesia, the most corrupt country in Asia. We are the champions'. Ibid. 
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fundamental sentence in this our Constitution to remind all our people that 
adherence to religious teachings is an obligation [ merupakan satu kewajiban]. 117 
The wording of the Plural Clause, at the same time, resonated with the Shari' ah 
Clause as this was more familiar to Muslim constituencies. 118 Inventing an entirely 
new formula would have risked an indifferent response by a population to whom the 
concept of the Medina Charter was unknown or overly abstract. With its similar 
wording PK, at least, demonstrated affinity with the pro-shari 'ah policy of PPP and 
PBB. Boldly defying the position of fellow Islamist parties would have been difficult 
to sell to the Muslim community. 119 Nonetheless, there remained considerable 
difficulties in explaining the Plural Clause to shari 'ah-sympathetic constituencies. 
The Plural Clause was one key indication that Islamists were keen to allay sectarian 
fears. They showed little hesitation in condemning communism openly but were 
wary of publicly attacking non-Muslims and so-called "secular Muslims". All 
Islamist parties, however, maintained the premise that Indonesia was a "Muslim 
nation". This "Muslim nation dogma" had various implications for the quality and 
sincerity of Islamist policies and statements on pluralist issues. 
Islamism and Religious Pluralism: Tolerance, not Equality 
In Muslim-majority societies, there have been a number of obstacles in the creation 
of pluralist politics based on genuine equality between the religious communities. 
The Islamic tradition discriminates in several ways against Jews and Christians. It 
rules out recognition of non-monotheistic creeds. The proper place for other ahl al-
kitab (literally 'People of the Book') was under a Muslim protectorate. A qati 
(permanent) shari 'ah regulation bars unrestricted relationships between adherents of 
117 The speaker wasP AN Chairman Patrialis Akbar. Risalah Rapat Plena 21 Maret 2002, in Buku 
Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002, p. 368. 
118 Interviews, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
119 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. Underscoring that PK aimed to avoid a 
too-great distance from other Islamist parties, in August 2000, as a member of the umbrella grouping 
Forum Silaturahmi Partai Islam ('Goodwill Forum oflslamic Parties', FSPI), Hidayat Nur Wahid 
signed a declaration stating support for the original Jakarta Charter. Hamzah Haz, Yusril Mahendra, 
De1iar Noer (Partai Umat Islam), Abdullah Hehamahua (PPII Masyumi), Ohan Sudjana (PSII 1905) 
and leaders of the traditionalist Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU) and Partai Kebangkitan Ummat (PKU) 
were among the other signatories. Personal notes. 
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different religions, in particular forbidding Muslims renouncing the Islamic faith for 
another (murtad). Here and elsewhere Islamists treat the umat as a uniform group 
with the same duties and aspirations. Islamist use of the term "aspiration"-
Indonesian Islamists frequently speak of kepentingan or aspirasi umat Islam ('the 
aspirations of the Muslim coummunity')-is misleading because it is the Qur'an 
which is taken as the ultimate source to determine the "interests" of every nominal 
Muslim. 
The stipulations of the Medina Charter epitomise the Islamist problems with 
pluralism. The Charter's concepts are in frequent conflict with modem constitutional 
and intemationallaw. 120 In classical Sunni theory, 'infidels receive only guarantee of 
life, property, and freedom of religion and not the rights of man qua man' .121 
Echoing these inequities, Islamists have limited appreciation for Western 
philosophical roots of human rights and liberalism. 122 Western values are examined 
on the basis of whether they can be identified as 'Divine privileges', verified by the 
Qur' an. 123 Islamist acknowledgments of pluralism usually have engaged the classic 
position in Sunni political theory that Islam would tolerate and "protect" religious 
minorities. 
The particular historical situation has, of course, greatly influenced how Islamists 
have theorised relations with other religious communities. In Indonesia, the Islamist 
stance is tied to the conviction that, in the past, Muslims had overtly made 
120 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) legitimises the right to change religion 
(Paragraph 18); many Muslim jurists demand the death penalty for the same act. 
121 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western 
Conceptions of Human Rights", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No.2, June 1982, 
pp. 303-16. 
122 Illustrating the Islamist logic, Mutammimul 'Ula argued that if society perceived pregnancy 
outside marriage as 'shameful' (aib), it acted correctly to uphold the human right of dignity. 
Mutammimul 'Ula, "HAM Dalam Perspektiflslam", PeKa Online, 5 June 2001. The Islamic tradition 
has been widely held to endorse human dignity while it provided few grounds for supporting a liberal 
position on the problems of unmarried mothers. Showing the Islamist indignation over perceived 
Western bullying on human rights issues, PPP assured Indonesia's seriousness in tackling human 
rights 'without having to be lectured by other nations'. Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia 06 
Nopember 2000. 
123 Donnelly, Human Rights. PBB, for example, assured to value human rights that are 'in accordance 
with Islamic principles'. Representing not only Muslims, the Reform Faction instead held that 
Western human rights regulations needed to be adjusted to 'the religious character of the Indonesian 
people'. Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Reformasi MPR RI Terhadap Hasil Hasil Komisi Majelis Pada 
Sidang Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2000, Fraksi Reformasi MPR RI, Jakarta, 15 August 2000. 
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concessiOns to non-Muslims. This belief has a strong economic component as 
Islamists accuse non-Muslims, particularly Chinese Christians, of enjoying an 
unproportional share of political and economic wealth. The Muslim population in its 
entire, they have been insisting, suffered because of Chinese Christian controL 
Islamists, therefore, desired the state to issue affirmative action toward Muslims. The 
obvious example of this desire to "positively" discriminate in favour of Muslims is 
Malaysia. 
The Corollaries of "Muslim Home Rule" 
In PPP, affirmations of religious pluralism were a customary rhetorical component of 
its elusive doctrine. After re-adopting the Islamic ideological base and the ka 'bah 
symbol to highlight its religious credentials, PPP worked to convince the public that 
the supposedly nationalist character of the party had not changed. 124 In accordance 
with the popular Qur' anic maxim that there was no compulsion in religion, PPP 
declared to 'fight' for the right of religious freedom as stated in the Second Article of 
Paragraph 29 in the Constitution. 125 Hamzah Haz assured that '[m]aking Islam its 
ideological base, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan will never become a sectarian party 
which thinks only of itself [ mementingkan diri sendiri]'. 126 PPP, the Chairman 
recapped his party's mix oflslamism and pragmatism, was an 'Islamic party which is 
openly inclusive'. 127 These characteristically apologetic avowals stood against the 
fact that over the last 15 years, non-Muslims had consistently stayed away from PPP. 
Yet non-Muslim membership never became a divisive issue for PPP. 
Despite pluralist affirmations, PPP in various ways subscribed to the dogma that 
defined Indonesia as a Muslim nation. It was predictable that due to the belief in a 
124 This resulted in newspaper headlines such as: "Asas Islam, tapi Tetap Partai Terbuka" ('An Islamic 
base but still an open party'), Media Indonesia, 28 November 1998. 
125 This is often combined with the saying: 'your religion for you, my religion for me' ['bagimu 
agamamu, bagiku agamaku', Arab: lakum dinukum wa liya dini (Qur'an 109:6)]. Muktamar IV, p. 99. 
PPP's previous Muktamar in 1994 similarly had stated the goal to bring about a 'spiritual 
community'. Keputusan Muktamar III Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, DPP PPP, 1994, p. 4. 
126 Pidato Ketua Umum Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Dr. H Hamzah Haz 
pada Peringatan Hari Lahir Ke-26 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Jakarta, 5 Januari 1999, DPP 
PPP (no date). 
127 Hamzah Haz, Rapatkan Shaf Tegakkan Amar Ma 'rufNahi Munkar, DPP PPP, (no date, probably 
2000), p. 9. 
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disproportionate suffering of the "umat Islam" in the past, this dogma would 
influence Islamist economic policies. At the November 1998 MPR session, PPP 
proposed to add the words 'especially pribumi' (native Indonesian) to an amended 
economy bill. As most native Indonesians are Muslims this was designed to boost the 
economies of the deprived umat. In an obvious attempt not to sound racist or bigoted 
and aware that the plea would cause indignation, PPP sought to word its appeal 
carefully. The result, however, described Muslims as 'hosts' and other communities, 
including the Arab community-an illustration that PPP's Islamist orientation is 
more local- and pribumi centred-as 'guests'. This allegory was a rebuff of cultural 
and religious pluralism. PPP held: 
There are our brothers and sister citizens who are not pribumi [but] are Arab, Indian, 
European, Chinese ... descendents. [They] come from a country outside Indonesia. 
We have different cultures and customs. We respect this difference and we welcome 
[them] as honoured guests amidst our society ... Honourable as these guests are, they 
are still guests and not the hosts. We [Kitalah] are the host in our own country .... 
[The] special rights they [the guests] received during the New Order must not be 
sustained ... As we know, around 200 Indonesian conglomerates come from Chinese 
descendants and obtain more facilities than pribumi ... At the moment, the guest gets 
more facilities than the host. This is what we do not want. So this has nothing to do 
with racism. 128 (Italic in original) 
Islamist discrimination of other religious communities also became clear in the 
refusal to acknowledge syncretic beliefs (kepercayaan) in the constitutional 
Paragraph 29 on 'religion'. PPP, underlining its traditional concern for the 
· kepercayaan issue, proposed an additional third article, reading: 'The state prohibits 
the spreading of beliefs that contravene monotheism' .129 This proposal showed PPP's 
128 "Menangkal Gagasan Federalisme Dengan Menegakkan Keadilan (Tambahan Penjelasan atas 
Pengantar Musyawarah Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia terhadap 1. Rancangan Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Penyelanggaraan Otonomi Daerah, 
Pengaturan Pembagian dan Pemanfaatan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah dalam Kerangka Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 2. Rancangan Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Politik Ekonomi Disampaikan 
dalam Rapat Komisi D Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia 
Tanggal12 November 1998)", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi, pp. 150-165 
(quote pp. 157-161). PPP was forced to withdraw the proposal the same day and to agree to the 
supplement 'weak economy', arguing it would mostly refer to pribumi. "Suara Hati Nurani Rakyat 
Telah Kami Suarakan Di Majelis (Pendapat Akhir Mini Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Republik Indonesia terhadap Rancangan Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Politik 
Ekonomi dalam Rangka Demokrasi Ekonomi Disampaikan dalam Rapat Komisi D Sidang Istimewa 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tanggal12 November 1998)", reprinted in 
Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi, pp. 166-168. 
129 The proposal which, at the same time, expressed PPP's anti-leftist fervour, was dropped during the 
2002 MPR session. 
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selectiveness in its self-proclaimed protection of religious pluralism. Both the 
Buddhist and Hindu communities would be severely fraught by such a stipulation. 
As alternative, Islamist factions suggested inserting 'beliefs' into the newly created 
human rights paragraph. This, PPP asserted, would give equal recognition by the 
state but, in fact, it merely meant toleration short of full recognition. 130 It also meant 
lesser financial support by the government than that given to the recognised 
"religions". This episode was another example of a Western virtue being seen as a 
'Divine privilege'. Unlike in the Western mind, the Islamist perception ofthe human 
right to choose one's faith remained grounded in a privilege given by God. This logic 
demanded that it could not be a human right to be an adherent of kepercayaan as 
many kepercayaan followers were nominal Muslims whom the Qur' an forbids to 
choose another religion than Islam. 131 Illustrating the eminence of the Qur' anic rule, 
the Islamist camp in PAN also supported a minor status of kepercayaan beliefs. 132 
Islamist alliance strategies also tested the sincerity of their pro-pluralism statements. 
The period between late 1998 and the elections was marked by many tactical 
agreements between political parties to gain a good position ahead of the polls. 
Islamist parties followed quite different alliance strategies. PPP, initially working 
toward an image as a committed reformist party while taking on the symbols of 
Islam and, eventually, the struggle for the Shari'ah Clause, appeared undecided about 
building political alliances. In 1998 and early 1999, PPP leaders announced they 
would only form coalitions with 'reform-minded parties', usually adding that these 
also had to strive for religious values. In May 1999, Hamzah Haz agreed to a 
'communique' between PPP, PK and PAN in which the three parties expressed their 
130 The proposal for the human rights article stated: "everyone is free to choose his or her religion and 
worship in accordance with the teachings of the respective religion." Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 
2000. 
131 In one instance, PPP proposed the illuminating phrase 'to protect its citizens' as further addition to 
the Third Article of Paragraph 29. Pemandangan Umum 10 Agustus 2000. 
132 See Risalah Rapat Plena 21 Maret 2002, reprinted inBuku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002. But as a 
formal promoter of religious pluralism, the Reform Faction's position was slightly more hesitant. One 
the one hand, it considered that adherents of kepercayaan had the same rights as other citizens. On the 
other hand, Fraksi Reformasi could not diregard the classic Islamist concern that "beliefs" could be 
mixed up with "proper" monotheist religions. 
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dedication to reformasi values. 133 But shortly afterwards, PPP proclaimed it would 
seek coalitions with other Islamist parties. 134 This was a tentative and often ill-
synchronized quest for the most advantageous decision. 
In PBB, Yusril again played the central part in delivering the message to the public 
and press that the party's agenda was non-threatening. From cadres, he demanded 
they appear 'calm' and 'rational'. They should not express views that add to the 
common bewilderment but be ends-oriented. 'Most important for us', Yusril said, 'is 
to take hold of the sympathy and the hearts of the people' .135 The key message in his 
opening address at the party's launch was willingness for cooperation to ensure a 
wide acceptability. These avowals were at the same time natural for a new party 
whose goal was to pass the electoral threshold of 2%. 
Yusril also made direct efforts to appear open toward non-Muslims that appeared 
less contrived than PPP's attempts. Any political approach toward Islam had to 
respect Indonesia's diverse religious communities. 136 Masyumi had considered the 
interests of Christian Parties and the inclusion of five Christians in Natsir's cabinet 
gave proof of its 'pragmatic and flexible' character. 137 He held that 'when we talk 
about Islam, we talk about the Indonesian nation'; yet, 'if we talk about the 
Indonesian nation it is not certain whether we will talk about Islam.' 138 As Islam 
taught to take up a position free of extremes (ummathan wassathan) 139, PBB would 
133 "PPP berkoalisi dengan PAN" ('PPP goes into coalition with PAN'), Merdeka, 19 May 1999; "PPP 
takkan Jadikan Indonesia Negara Islam", Kompas, 26 May 1999. 
134 "PPP hanya berkoalisi dengan partai Islam" ('PPP only goes in to coalition with Islamic parties'), 
Jawa Pas, 29 May 1999. 
135 Speech in Banyumas, reprinted as "Rebut Simpati Rakyat ('To grab the sympathy of the people')", 
Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 December 2000, p. 23. 
136 See, for example, Yusril Ihza Mahendra "Mari Belajar dari Sejarah Bangsa", Buletin Bulan 
Bintang, 1 September 2000, p.l4/vii, viii (supplement) and Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Tentang Islam dan 
Demokrasi",Abadi, 25 February-3 March 1999. 
137 Mahendra, Activism and Intellectualism, p. 126. 
138 Speech at the inauguration of a party board in West Java, reprinted in Buletin Bintang, 15-30 
September 1998, pp. 1-2 and 4-5. At PBB's launch, Yusril indirectly equated the role of religion and 
the status of non-Muslim members in PBB to Germany's 'Christian Democratic Union' (CDU), 
stressing that the CDU had many Muslim members. Speech at the al-Azhar mosque, Jakarta, 26 July 
1998, in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 79. 
139 See Qur'an, al-Baqarah (2:143). Moderation is the popular but slightly manufactured interpretation 
of ummathan wassathan. It is often interpreted as 'intermediate'and thus God's 'best and chosen' 
community. 
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'adopt a moderate attitude in politics' and 'open the door as much as possible' to 
work together with other camps. 140 Yusril said at the party launch: 
Partai Bulan Bintang is ... not designed to become a rival. .. for other parties and 
forces. For Partai Bulan Bintang applies: 'cooperation, in the name of basic tenet 
[itikad], in the name of common interests'. And our approach is: 'a cooperative 
approach, not a confronting approach.' 141 
And in another instance, he wrote: 
[T]here is no need to fear that Partai Bulan Bintang will struggle only for the Muslim 
community. We fight for the whole society, our people. The platform of this party is 
'Islamic-ness' and at the same time 'Indonesianness' .142 
Several times, the Chairman proclaimed that Hindus and Christians would be 
welcome to join PBB as it was 'an open party' .143 If PBB won the elections, non-
Muslims could be offered ministerial posts. 144 
The sectarian discourse in PBB-close organisations such as DDII, KISDI and GPI 
was masked by the fact that Yusril gave a pro-reform, pluralist face to the public. 
PBB claimed to be non-sectarian but it did not approve of deals with non-Islamist 
parties and strictly banned alliances and coalitions with non-Muslims or secular 
parties. 145 PBB's central leadership wanted to avoid appearing as bigoted but many 
doctrinaire Islamists remained fixated on Christianisation issues and were unwilling 
to conceal their misgivings. While PBB promoted openness, the defensive reporting 
in KISDI and Media Dakwah continued unabated. It continued to demand Muslim 
140 "Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang", reprinted in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 79. 
141 Deklarasi, reprinted in Mardjoned, Sejarah, p. 80. 
142 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Keislaman dan Keindonesiaan", Abadi, 12-18 November 1998. Also 
"Sikap Amien Rais Tidak Moderat" (Interview), Tempo, 22 July to 1 August 1999. 
143 Deklarasi, in Mardjoned, Sejarah. Also "Partai Bulan Bintang Kumpulkan Kekuatan Umat Islam", 
Pelita, 27 July 1998; "Yang tak Boleh Hidup yang Musuhi Demokrasi", Republika, 27 July 1998. 
PBB's statutes did not require that members had to be Muslim, which Yusril emphasised in the 
address. 
144 "Partai Bulan Bintang: Tegakkan Sistem dan Moralitas", Kompas, 10 September 1998. 
145 Unlike other parties, PBB was reluctant to make any coalition deals prior to the elections. Worried 
not to be able to conclude a useful deal for his party, Yusril announced that PBB would face the polls 
alone, criticising cross-party pacts as political manoeuvring. "PBB Tidak Tertarik Koalisi", Radar 
Bogor, 23 May 1999. PBB also abstained from two agreements, which produced vaguely worded 
goals aimed against so-called anti-reformasi forces. Aburrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri and 
Amien Rais were the signatories of one accord. Hamzah Haz, Amien Rais and Nur Mahmudi Ismail 
(PK) signed the second pact. 
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supremacy and to back this up with Qur' anic warnings of Jewish and Christian bad 
intentions. 
Accordingly, doctrinaire notables like Sumargono, Qadir Djaelani and Eggy Sudjana 
wanted an Islamist coalition in the post-election parliament. 146 Campaigning in Aceh, 
Sumargono said that PBB would go into coalition with Islamist parties to fight 
secularism and lead the economy away from dependence on western countries 
toward a closer relationship with Arab nations. In blatant contradiction to Yusril, 
Deputy Chairman Kholil Ridwan wrote in an early edition of the party bulletin, 
referring to a Qur' anic passage: 
In political life, hypocrisy/opportunism [kemunafikan] becomes evident in the stance 
of opportunistic politicians ... or who cannot and do not want to work together with 
genuine [istiqomah] Muslim [mukmin] politicians. How is it possible that a Muslim 
feels more at home in the surroundings of infidels [orang-orang kafir] than among 
his fellow Muslims? Even though, those infidels will not accept him until he follows 
their way of life ... To ally [bersekutu] with the infidels who later will compete with 
Muslims in Islamic parties ... is part of hypocrisy/opportunism. Consciously or 
unconsciously, he is acting in a way hostile to [memusuhi] Islam.147 
Despite assurances that it was an open party, PBB never fully opened the party to 
non-Muslims. 148 It also left unanswered the question why non-Muslims would want 
to join a party in which prominent members promoted an Islamic religious 
supremacy buttressed by a defensive spirit. 
Official statements were contradictory. PBB claimed to be cooperative in dealing 
with the West but its stance on national sovereignty was adamantly self-protective 
and grounded in suspicion against Western governments. Resentment over perceived 
Western and Jewish interference into Indonesian domestic affairs replaced 
146 "PBB Siap Berkoalisi" Media Indonesia, 21 May 1999; "Eggy Sudjana Bogor Punya", Radar 
Bogar, 23 May 1999. 
147 Kholil Ridwan, "Waspadai Kemunafikan" ('Be suspicious of Hypocrisy/Opportunism'), Bulan 
Bintang, No.4, 1-15 Oktober 1998, p. 24. Also Ridwan, "Ikhlas dalam Berjuang", Bulan Bintang, No. 
2, 1-14 September 1998, p. 19. The author referred to the popular verse Al-Baqarah (2:120) which 
warns Muslims that Jews and Christians want Muslims to break with Islam. 
148 In an effort to promote PBB's openness, Farid Prawiranegara claimed that PBB could agree to 
form coalitions with secular parties, including PDIP, provided they were reform-oriented. This would 
comprise, among others, the aim to end TNI's political role. The fact, however, that PBB saw PDIP as 
fulfilling neither precondition underscored the slight substance of such statements. "Partai Islam 
Tanggapi Hati-hati", Kompas, 12 July 1999. 
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Masyumi's generally sympathetic position towards Western nations. In a sense, 
however, anti-Western statements also appeared to have had practical benefit 
because of their appeal to many ordinary Muslims. 
Mirroring the Masyumi legatees' representational claims, PBB depicted external 
threats as targeted against both Islamic and national interests. A PBB Congress in 
February 1999 called on all Indonesians to defend the unitary state and to 'distrust 
the conspiring international interests [kepentingan konspirasi internasional], who 
because of political and economic motives do not want the Unitary Republic of 
Indonesia to persist' .149 The section on 'foreign policy' laid bare the party's 
ambiguity. It called for 'enhanced cooperation with mutual benefit, both 
ideologically, politically, economically, and socio-culturally' whilst insisting that the 
underlying motive of the West in stifling Indonesia's self-determination was to 
prevent Islam from getting strong, for example, by installing a President sympathetic 
to Muslims or open to shari 'ah issues. 150 Yet the party declared to 'highly appreciate 
the principle of brotherhood and the equality in status of all nations on earth' and set 
as goal to 'play an active role to interfere in the emergence of the seeds of 
disintegration' among religious communities. 151 
The principal obstacle for a genume religious pluralism has been the Islamist 
haziness in determining the status of humans before God. In a typical example of 
Islarnist apologetics, PBB declared that Islam would not discriminate against other 
creeds. Referring to the Qur'an verse al-Zalzalah (99:7-8), the party argued that all 
humans 'essentially' (pada hakikatnya) were of the same value and status. What 
would distinguish humans was their 'piety' (ketaqwaan) and their 'closeness to 
God' .152 'Islamic teachings hold [ menegaskan ]', Yusril said, 'that humankind had to 
submit itself to God [Tuhan] ... and [to] perceive humankind as being of the same 
value [ dalam perspektif persamaan derajat]. 153 
149 Hasil Mukernas I, p. 33. 
150 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 99 (quote). 
151 Hasil Muktamar I, pp. 78 & 100. 
152 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 76, also Hasil Mukernas I, p. 7 (one text uses "Allah", the other "Tuhan" for 
the term "God"). 
153 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Nilai Persaudaraan dan Hak Asasi Manusia", Buletin Bulan Bintang, Juni 
2002. Yusril gave this speech as Minister of Law and Human Rights. 
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At the same time, interpreting its Islamic ideological party base, PBB cited the 
Qur'an (al-Baqarah: 2:257), which states that 'Allah is the protector of believers 
guiding them out of the darkness into light [whilst] the leaders of unbelievers [kafir] 
are idolisers [taghut] leading them out of light into darkness' .154 Campaign 
guidelines cited Qur' anic verses with which Islamists commonly feed the prejudice 
that other religious communities were inherently hostile toward Islam and that 
Muslims needed to be suspicious. 155 These verses included al-Ma'idah (5:51) and al-
Nisa (4:144), the latter serving as the basis to proclaim that 'PBB does not make non-
Muslims leaders'. It cited verse al-Anfal (5:60), announcing that 'PBB is ready to 
face the enemies of Allah and our enemies with everything that we have'. Other 
verses were al-Baqarah (2:120), interpreted as 'PBB distrusts [mewaspadai] the 
opponents of Islam' and al-Mumtahinah (60:1), on which the campaign booklet 
commented that 'PBB will not go into coalition with the enemies of Allah [musuh-
musuh Allah] and our enemies'. 156 While the consideration of these passages did not 
necessarily impede cooperation, it certainly nurtured bigotry and prejudice among 
cadres and foiled the inclusion of non-Muslims in the party on equal terms. 157 
In particular, the welcoming rhetoric did not cover the strong antipathies many 
Islamists had against the secular-nationalism represented by PDIP. Islamist parties 
had a general case against PDIP and the combined Military and Police Faction, as 
they could accuse both factions of being anti-reform. The reformasi paradigm of 
154 "Tafsir Asas Partai Bulan Bintang", reprinted inHasil Muktamar I. 
155 These passages were part of a large collection of sayings on general topics. In each instance, the 
verse was illustrated by a party-message for campaigners to deliver to the electorate. Inilah Jalanku, 
DPW PBB Central Java, 1998. 
156 Inilah Jalanku. The al-Ma'idah section warns: 'Take not the Jews and the Christians for your 
protectors. They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them 
(for friendship) is of them'. The al-Nisa verse orders: 'Take not for friends unbelievers than 
Believers', as this would entail God's punishment. The al-Mumtahinah verse warns: ' ... Take not My 
enemies and yours as friends (or protectors)-offering them (your) love ... (they) have ... driven out the 
Messenger ... '. Translations by Yusuf Ali, Meaning. Al-Baqarah (2: 120) quoted earlier. 
157 Eggy Sudjana, a PBB inaugurator, illuminated this difference between tolerance and equality in a 
letter to the editor of the polemical Islamistjoumal Sabili as he wrote: 
'We are friendly [senang] with non-Muslim community leaders and will not question if our 
convictions are contrary. Because it is already clear that our communities are different. We are people 
offaith [beriman] and you are infidels [kafir]. Shari'ah teaches that we have to [follow the principle] 
'for you your religion, for me my religion'. What is important is that there is no conflict between us. If 
we lose [in elections, e.g.], we will gladly accept it as a logical consequence of democracy ... ' Sabili, 6 
September 2000, p. 9. 
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1998 meant that PDIP was often branded as the 'new status quo'. Its most vocal 
opponents were PBB, DDII and KISDI, blaming 'Soekamoists', referring to 
allegedly fanatic defenders of the 1945 Constitution, as the seeming arch-enemies of 
reformasi. 158 At the 2000 session, M.S. Ka'ban notified the MPR that the 
constitutional debates had been deliberately slowed down in order from MPs who 
would 'not want total reform'. 159 The vagueness ofthe 1945 Constitution has tended 
to benefit parties and interest groups in power. As PDIP was widely expected to do 
well in the elections, other parties expected that it would try to retain extensive 
presidential powers. 
Attacks against PDIP from outside parliament had a much stronger ideological tinge. 
Sumargono and Qadir Djaelani, especially, railed against the dangers of secularism 
and non-Muslim domination of government and bureaucracy. Resentment against 
PDIP mounted when, in early 1999, rumours spread that 42 percent of PDIP's 
legislative candidates consisted of non-Muslims. 160 At the core of the bitterness was 
the sense of past injustices which, following the Masyumi legatees' representational 
logic, were directed against the umat Islam. Doctrinaire leaders in PBB, DDII and 
158 "Notulasi Rapat": Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban Rapat Koordinasi Nasional Partai Bulan 
Bintang, Hotel Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 Juli 2000 (sic, correct: 2002), p. 5. 
159 "Pendapat Ak:hir Fraksi Bulan Bintang Pada Sidang Tahunan MPR RI Tahun 2000" reprinted in 
Buletin Bulan Bintang, September 2000. Ka'ban, for example, mentioned PDIP's opposition toward 
direct presidential elections. 
16° For example, among PDIP's leading four candidates in Jakarta, three were non-Muslims: Adian 
Husaini, "Eksperimen PDI Petjuangan", Republika, 15 June 1999. In response, the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia ('Indonesian Ulama Council', MUI) and Muhammadiyah separately issued appeals (seruan) 
to Muslims to vote for a party that would guard Islamic interests, without specifying what this meant. 
In the following, PPP, too, called on Muslims not to vote for non-Muslim candidates. "Tekadku Sudah 
Bulat: Pilih Caleg Islam", Republika, 2 June 1999; "Bola Salju dari Hamzah Haz", Republika, 2 June 
1999. Various reactions came from PBB. Yusril, who attempted to diminish suspicions from non-
Muslims toward PBB, tried to evade the controversy. The doctrinaire leaders, by contrast, insisted that 
Muslims vote for Islamist parties and demanded representational Muslim leadership in the 
government and high bureaucracy. Kholil Ridwan cited in "Wajib Hukum Memilih Partai Islam" ('It 
is an obligation to vote for Islamic parties'), Abadi, May 1999; Ahmad Sumargono "Agama dan 
Negara tak Dapat Dipisahkan", Kompas, 28 May 1999. There was wide consensus among Islamists 
that there was a sensible reason for a proportional Muslim share of candidates. Most Islamist notables, 
among them Deliar Noer (Chairman ofPartai Umat Islam), Didin Hafiddudhin (PK presidential 
candidate) and Abdullah Hehamahua (Chairman ofPPII Masyumi) wanted candidates to make their 
religion public. "Pemilih Harus Kritis: Caleg non-Muslim Jadi Born Waktu" ('Voters have to be 
critical: non-Muslim MP candidates are a time bomb'), Republika, 3 June 1999. MUI's and 
Muhammadiyah' s appeals caused a controversy despite that such calls had already been made in the 
past. Prior to the 1955 elections, an ulama Congress (the Alim-Ulama and Muballigh Islam) issued a 
legal ruling lfatwa) that it was obligatory for Muslims to vote for candidates who endeavour to 
implement Islamic teachings and Islamic law. "Kalau Masjumi Pegang Pemerintahan", Hikmah, 2 
Aprill955, p. 5. 
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KISDI opposed a PDIP-led government, fearing that 'opportunistic minorities', who 
had in the reformasi era switched sides from Golkar to PDIP, could install Megawati 
Soekarnoputri as a puppet President and thereby thwart Islamists from gaining 
positions in the cabinet and high bureaucracy. The 'opportunists' of the New Order, 
Farid Prawiranegara asserted, had now 'taken a new flag, the PDIP' and Hartono 
Mardjono noted the 'red thread' behind the 'actual winners of the New Order' and 
those 'behind the "victory" of PDIP' .161 Megawati, Sumargono wrote in reference to 
PDIP's support for her, 'has been made the horse [kuda tunggangan]' of the 'radical 
minorities' who earlier 'sat on Golkar and now are looking for a new horse' .162 
The doctrinaire leaders feared that PDIP would intend to bloc the amendment of 
crucial parts of the Constitution so that its 'opportunistic group' could protect the 
positions of their military allies in politics and tolerate repressive measures against 
Muslims to sustain secular domination. 163 These qualms were especially common 
among Bulan Bintang notables who had been involved in the 1984 Tanjung Priok 
killings and who had been previously detained. They also stressed that, in the early 
1990s, PDIP (then PDI) had attempted to foil the insertion of Islamic laws into 
nationallaw. 164 Theo Syafei, a Protestant retired officer whom DDII and KISDI had 
branded 'Islam's number one enemy', fuelled these suspicions through a recorded 
speech in early 1999.165 In this speech, Syafei allegedly outlined TNI's strategy to 
infiltrate PDIP and to prevent a district system being adopted for the elections in 
order to disadvantage Islamist parties. 
Apart from being the new vehicle for New Order notables and Christians, Islamists 
in all parties appeared to see PDIP and, to a lesser extent, PKB as a hiding place for 
161 Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999; Hartono Mardjono, "Disartikulasi Politik 
Islam?", Republika, 22 June 1999. 
162 H. A. Sumargono, "Menebak Politik Islam PDIP", Republika, 2 August 1999. 
163 "Hartono Mardjono: 'Apa PDI Perjuangan Masih Berani Voting?'", Forum Keadilan, 17 October 
1999; '"Taufik Bilang Susah Rid. Dalam Politik Orang Oportunis selalu Ada"' (Interview with Farid 
Prawiranegara), Tekad, 19-25 July 1999. 
164 Resolusi Partai Bulan Bintang Kepada MPR-RI untuk Menerbitkan Ketetapan-Ketetapan MPR, 
Jakarta, 1 October 1998. 
165 
"Konspirasi Theo Sjafei", Media Dakwah, February 1999, p. 41. Also "Theo Sjafei Melakukan 
Perlawanan Terbuka Terhadap Umat Islam", speech by Ahmad Sumargono in the Istiqlal Mosque, 
Jakarta, 24 January 1999, reprinted in Media Dakwah, February 1999, pp. 42-3. 
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the politicalleft. 166 The underlying assertion was that, as PBB asserted, 'leftovers of 
communist groups and other radical leftists', 'foreign mission forces', their 
'extended hands in the country' [kakitangannya], and remnants of the New Order 
were the 'fare dodgers' of the reform era. 167 Notably, the view that leftist 
sympathisers had infiltrated PDIP and PKB was also predominant in PAN's Islamist 
camp. 168 Together, these groups would obstruct what Islamists considered rightful 
"Muslim" control over national affairs. Shortly after the election results, which 
established a 34% share for PDIP, had been made public, Hartono Mardjono wrote in 
an intriguing reference to 'real and spurious nationalists': 
The facts show that those who are today in PDIP-both leadership and those who 
will represent them in the DPR and MPR-the majority is the minority group 
[kelompok minoritas] (not real nationalists [nasionalis sejati]) which during the New 
Order succeeded in making the New Order government and all its agencies their 
political vehicle. It is them who during the New Order succeeded in dominating 
ABRI [now TNI], the bureaucracy (especially the field of economy finance industry) 
and Golkar.169 
The doctrinaire Islamists again presupposed broad Muslim assent with their agenda 
and shared concerns against the ideological foe. They also appeared to take for 
granted that non-Muslims could not work politically in the interest of Muslims. 
Again exposing the unwillingness to officially acknowledge the scarcity of doctrinal 
aspirations in a very diverse Muslim community, Hartono wrote shortly before the 
elections: 
The Indonesian people are almost 90% Muslims. How is it possible that if the 
majority of the people's representatives are not Muslim, the aspiration of the Muslim 
community [aspirasi umat Islam] is implemented?170 
To curtail the 'spurious nationalists', Bulan Bintang leaders with strong links to 
KISDI such as Fadli Zon, Eggy Sudjana and Sumargono used their army connections 
to promote an Islam-centred economic nationalism, which identified the Sino-
166 See, for example "Sedang Berkembang Gerakan Marxisme", Media Dakwah, October 1998. 
167 Resolusi Partai Bulan Bintang, 1 October 1998. Official statements of this kind were rare, though. 
168 Interview, A.M. Luthfi, Jakarta, 7 November 2000. According to Luthfi, PKB's support for 
Megawati's presidency gave evidence ofPKB's leftist character. 
169 Hartono Mardjono, "Disartikulasi Politik Islam?", Republika, 22 June 1999. In his "Habibie, 
Akbar, dan Megawati", Abadi, 19-25 August 1999, Hartono distinguished genuine nationalists in 
PDIP from the 'opportunistic minority group' that had captured PDIP as its 'Trojan horse'. 
170 Hartono Mardjono, "'Stembus Accoord' dan Caleg Non-Muslim", Republika, 2 June 1999. 
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Christian business elite as traitors who had deliberately destroyed Indonesia's 
economy. Resuming the dogma of a Muslim nation, it postulated a union between 
Islam and Indonesia's national character. The post-New Order strategies of the 
Islamist parties had differed sharply here. PPP, to boost its anti-New Order 
credentials, took a very critical line on TNI at the 1998 MPR session. PBB made 
ending the army's political role a key policy, but the doctrinaire Islamists candidly 
backed those generals who seemed to be helpful in empowering Islamists. 
It was personal statements, in particular, that stressed the supremacy of Islam and the 
primacy of Muslims in Indonesia. They linked the spirit to defend Indonesia against 
foreign interference to the idea that such interference was undertaken by non-
Muslims against Muslims. Qadir Djaelani wrote: 
The wellbeing and the unity of the ... Indonesian Republic are the wellbeing and the 
unity of the Indonesian Muslim community. Not only is the Muslim community 
[umat Islam] the largest component in Indonesia, but it is also the Muslim 
community which has most sacrificed its wealth and its life and soul to establish the 
Indonesian Republic. The Muslim community is the rightful owner [pemilik sah] of 
this country. Because of this, the Muslim community has the obligation to defend the 
wellbeing and the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic.171 
The economic facet of the Muslim nation-dogma was most clearly found among 
Masyumi devotees. In characteristic rhetoric they described affirmative Muslim 
policies as empowering 'Muslims' or the umat Islam. Yet, the parties they belonged 
to addressed sectarian issues rarely and mostly indirectly. Officially, PBB only gave 
few pointers to constituencies that it was geared up to strive for Muslims to capture 
political power and attain a greater share of wealth. The program cloaked affirmative 
Muslim policies as being to 'enhance the equilibrium [pemerataan] and economic 
justice' and to 'stop giving special treatment or special rights for all business people 
who bring damage to the people and the nation' .172 Amidst an outline of its non-
Islamist reform program, it exhibited the feeling of loss and dependency by calling 
on 'Muslims' (umat Islam) to become more active in politics, demanding that 'no 
more must the Muslim community only pull a stalled car' and remain 'an observer 
171 Persengkongkolan Jahat, reprinted in Djaelani, Anak Rakyat, pp. 314-7. 
172 In the section 'economy' of"Program Umum Perjuangan", Projil Partai Bulan Bintang, p. 11. 
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from outside the arena' and that '[n]o longer must the Muslim community be made 
the object of power, even turned into the victim of mean political manoeuvres ... '. 173 
It was hoped that the army would lend a helping hand. Sumargono wrote with special 
consideration ofPrabowo, the doctrinaire Islamist's key ally in the army: 
... everybody who dares to resist the domination of LB Moerdani [the former 
catholic head of TNI] and CSIS [the influential Catholic-led think tank] 
automatically gets [our] sympathy... Prabowo evidently dares to resist this 
domination ... on various occasions he explained that there are four forces who do not 
want Indonesia to become a thriving country: the international Catholic lobby, Jews, 
Chinese immigrants [Cina Perantauan] and Western countries. In this matter, 
apparently, Prabowo's nationalist sentiment becomes one with his Islamic attitude ... 
Prabowo appears to position Islam as a significant factor to safeguard the unity and 
the union of the nation. For this, Prabowo is also known to belong to those who 
adhere to the understanding of 'proportional democracy', including in religious 
matters ... From the accounts of Prabowo and several groups can be concluded that 
the plan to make the army the enemy of Islam is not only made up ... the accounts of 
Prabowo about the scenario to set Islam against the army are evidently matching 
with the theory of Father Beek, the ... founding leader of the CSIS who says that 
Islam is the "big Satan" who has to be confronted with the "small Satan" who is 
none other than the army. 174 
The results of the 1999 elections showed that such propaganda against the supposed 
schemes of ideological foes had limited impact on the political likings of a majority 
of Muslims. This further illustrated the disconnection of the doctrinaire Bulan 
Bintang Islamists from mainstream Muslims. Frustrated with the public 
unresponsiveness, they bitterly complained about 'illogical and uninformed' support 
many Muslims gave to PDIP and Megawati. Prior to the elections, Sumargono 
lamented: 
With this strategy of infiltration, the Christians later will occupy ['menduduki '] the 
DPR [and] by far outnumber their proportions. They will emerge from PDIP, 
Golkar, [and] PAN ... We don't need to be surprised that non-Muslim legislative 
candidates now dominate PDIP ... Also, we can understand why PDI Megawati 
categorically rejects a district system ... We do not have to be surprised that there are 
Islamic community leaders who act as mouthpieces for the Christians. This is an old 
phenomenon, [it has been happening] since colonial times. [It is] to smooth the path 
for [memuluskan] the Zionist mission of Israel in Indonesia ... Netanyahu or Ehud 
Barak do not need to walk around. Because here there are those who speak on their 
173 Mengapa Memilih Partai Bulan Bintang ('Why to vote for PBB'), KAPPU PBB, Jakarta, 1999. 
174 Ahmad Sumargono, "Memahami Prabowo", Tekad, 6-12 Maret 2000, reprinted in 
http://www.kisdi.com/Maret%202000/memahami%20prabowo.htm, 20 March 2000. 
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behalf. Those who object to the MUI fatwa [ordering Muslims to vote for an Islam-
friendly party] with all force are not only pastor Xaverius and priest Albert but also 
Muslims ... We do not have to insult the right of our Christian friends to undertake 
Christianisation in Indonesia, because it is what their religious teaching orders. What 
we need is to strengthen faith, ethics and our understanding of Ad Dienul Islam and 
to teach our community to be suspicious toward moves of the devils [setan-setan] in 
order to deceive our community. We have to know that Satan never ceases to 
work.I75 
By any objective analysis, these allegations were overstatements and factually 
questionable. These were ideologically motivated attacks whose repetitiveness 
brought to light the distortions in the Islamist's worldview. Though including some 
former leading Golkar cadres, the PDIP board was hardly a bastion of New Order 
figures and it did not warrant being classified as a leftist stronghold. 
The apologetic thrust that liberal political ideas have imposed on Islamists operating 
in plural politics did not shroud the bitter sense of anti-Muslim injustice during the 
New Order. Though promoting Masyumi as tolerant, the thought that Sino-
Indonesians, of whom many were Christians and had represented the model foe in 
previous decades, could be accommodated in PBB was very disconcerting. The 
doctrinaire leaders, therefore, started to become distrustful of Yusril and his inner 
circle. One DDII leader recalled his feelings during an early party summit: 
At the first plenary session of the PBB ... Yusril...in front of 150 party 
administrators ... said that 'to win the elections, we have to take on non-Muslims'. 
Long before the Muktamar; non-Muslims as party members! And the most important 
were Chinese! At that time, I was among those rejecting this because it was not in 
accordance with the statutes [which determine] that this party is based on Islam. At 
that stage, [PBB was still] based on Pancasila and Islamic ethics. But in my heart I 
noted: if it is like this it means that he [Yusril] is quite liberal in ideological matters. 
Only recently I got to know that many of his friends were Chinese, [that he] went to 
school in China and speaks Chinese. He once lived in a Chinese community. 176 
175 Untitled speech by Sumargono as Head ofKISDI at the al-Azhar mosque, Jakarta, 6 June 1999, 
reprinted inAbadi, 10-16 June 1999. 
176 Confidential interview with a former PBB leader, 2001. At the time ofYusril's speech, PBB's 
ideological base was still defined as 'Pancasila and aqidah Islam'. The fact that the doctrinaire camp 
saw non-Muslim membership as contradicting PBB's ideology gave evidence of the shallow 
adherence to the Pancasila party base. It was a mere legal necessity as the ban on the Islamic 
ideological base was still in place. 
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The unresolved contradictions in the position toward non-Muslims created confusion 
among branches, demanding clarification over the party's non-Muslim stance. 177 
Ka'ban's response was issued in the party journal and insisted that Yusril had only 
reiterated the sympathy PBB would receive from Hindus and Christians on the 
grounds that PBB would also struggle for their welfare. It also asserted that many 
non-Muslims would be eager to join. Yet Ka'ban declared he would not 'dare' 
(berani) to decide the matter, which therefore was delegated to PBB's Religious 
Council. 178 The council then decided to permit non-Muslims as 'extraordinary 
members' (anggota luar biasa) on grounds that they would not be able to go through 
the usual inaugaration process, which included an oath toward Allah and the 
Prophet. 179 The decision of the Syuro Council came after most of the doctrinaire 
Islamists had left the party. 
The sense of dependency and loss played a stronger role among the Masyumi 
legatees than in PPP. The latter spoke and acted on an awareness of having stronger 
roots among ordinary Muslims. The origins of its leadership in the large Muslim 
organisations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah had not led to a 
comparable feeling of loss and segregation. Not surprisingly, PPP's discourse was 
less embittered on the perceived historical bond between the army and the "umat 
Islam" and the alleged attempts by "spuriously nationalist" non-Muslims, seculars 
and foreign governments to untie this connection. PPP's attacks against the army 
were more motivated by the desire to appear anti-New Order rather than to thwart an 
ideological foe. The lack of victimisation rhetoric in PPP was echoed by less 
attention toward popular conspiracy theories. 
PK and PBB also gave greater attention to international Islamic issues. In PBB, a 
dispute over proper relations with Israel emerged because of Yusril's ministerial 
177 Yusril, in an obvious contrast to the position of the doctrinaire Islamists, often said the Islamic base 
should not be interpreted as 'exclusive'. See, for example, "Yusril Di Tanah Melayu", Buletin Bulan 
Bintang, 1 October 2001, p. 14. 
178 "Penjelasan atas Statemen Ketua Umum Partai Bulan Bintang Tentang Asas Partai Dan Partai 
Terbuka", reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 October 2001, p. 7. 
179 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. By late 2002, PBB claimed to have both 
non-Muslim members and officials in branches in Sulawesi, Eastern Indonesia, Central Kalimantan 
and Papua. If this was true, these people only held the status of affiliates as they had not been formally 
inaugurated due to their status as non-Muslims. 
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responsibilities. Yusril allegedly told a visiting delegation of Muslim activists that it 
was acceptable to open trade relations with Israel because the Prophet had done so as 
well. 180 The doctrinaire leaders saw this as violation of party policies. The affair 
triggered strong reaction from within PBB, DDII and KISDI. KISDI Secretary Adian 
Husaini publicly condemned the Chairman's reported stance as 'stabbing Muslims 
from behind'. He not only made political arguments against Israeli policies but 
reminded readers that 'hundreds of Qur'anic verses' warned of the consequences if 
Muslims deal with Jews. 181 
Official reactions to the Israel issue attempted to sound undogmatic. They demurred 
Israeli human rights violations and cited constitutional reasons for why colonialism 
needed to be opposed rather than laying bare the anti-Jewish sentiment. 182 Once 
again, Islamist parties appeared to speak on behalf of Indonesians and the umat 
Islam. The brawl over Yusril's stance forced PBB's board to clarify its stance by re-
180 The activists came from the little known Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Islam 
('Communication Forum of the Islamic Youth', FKGMI). Yusril was reported to have argued that 
trade relations would not lead to diplomatic links and pointed Indonesia's relations with Taiwan as an 
example. Bambang Pribadi, "Yusril: Tidak Ada Salahnya Membuka Hubungan Dagang Dengan 
Israel" ('Yusril: There is nothing wrong with opening trade relations with Israel'), Media Dakwah, 
January 2000 (Bambang was leader of the activists who visited Yusril). He defended himself, saying 
the matter fell under the responsibility of Alwi Shihab, Foreign Minister in the Abdurrahman Wahid 
government. When talking to the activists, he only had repeated Alwi's position. This had been 
subsequently distorted in the sense that he would personally support this view. In addition, rumours 
spread that Yusril had hosted an Israeli delegation in the ministerial room complex. One of the visitors 
allegedly was the nephew oflsrael's former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. In response, Yusril explained 
he had been visited by a group of six Indonesians who wanted to inquire into investment regulations. 
They had announced they would bring along two Europeans, who turned out to be Israelis wanting to 
discuss trade relations. ''YIM: 'Saya Tak Pernah Terima Delegasi Dagang Israel"', Risalah, March 
2000. 
181 "Mengapa Yusril Berkawan dengan Israel?" ('Why is Yusril friendly with Israel?'). Letter to the 
editor of Media Dakwah, March 2000. Qur' anic warnings were equally emphasized by PBB Deputy 
Secretary-General Ramlan Mardjoned, "Yahudi: Pembohong dan Penghkianat" ('Jews: Liars and 
Traitors'), Serial Khutbah Jum 'at, January 2000, pp. 5-14. The author specifically referred to a legal 
ruling by Yusuf Qaradhawi, the leading contemporary ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, not to open trade relations with Israel. 
182 See, for example, "Pernyataan Sikap Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Bulan Bintang Terhadap 
Tindakan Biadab Tentara Israel 5 October 2000", reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 November 
2000, p. 14. Other Islamist factions, too, pointed to constitutional issues rather than calling Jews 
enemies of Islam. Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang Pertahanan Negara, 21 March 
2001. PBB, PK and PPP were among many Muslim organisations objecting to the visit of an Israeli 
delegation at the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Jakarta in October 2000. They were joined by 
many notables from religiously neutral parties, including Amien Rais and Golkar Chairman Akbar 
Tanjung. 
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emphasising its ideologically neutral argument, which held that trading with Israel 
would violate the Preamble of the Constitution.183 
Although the dogma of a "Muslim nation" and the imagery of the enemy were just as 
present in PK, it was more successful by not boasting of these misgivings. The 
party's dual agenda came about as an inevitable result of a calculated severance of 
ideology and behaviour. It led to an automatic containment of the party's unbending 
worldview. 
PK: The Automatic Concealment of Dogmatism 
With cooperation as its overall guideline, the postulation of domestic and external 
threats necessarily became an obscured part of PK's discourse. This was unlike the 
openly antagonistic attitude of DDII and KISDI. At the same time, their background 
in tarbiyah and being of a younger age than senior Bulan Bintang leaders meant that 
most PK leaders had fewer emotional fixations regarding domestic Christianisation 
issues. 
In finding a coalition partner, PK followed a calculated strategy to downplay its 
Islamism. On this premise, it formed a good working relationship with the de-
confessionalised PAN. It was the most stable of all major factions with only a minor 
squabble over the position of Secretary in September 2001. 184 PK described the 
collaboration with PAN and other agreements as 'tactical and strategic' steps and as 
a 'political ijtihad', partnerships that 'don't yet amount to an ideological alliance' .185 
183 "Pernyataan Sikap Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang tentang Penolakan Delegasi Israel Dalam Sidang 
Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU)", 10 October 2000, reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 November, 
p. 14; "PBB Tetap Tolak Komunisme di Indonesia", Kamis, 24 February 2000. 
184 The row started when PAN unilaterally appointed the Chinese Catholic Alvin Lie as Secretary of 
the faction. Following this, the PK MPs Syamsul Balda, Mutammimul 'Ula and Mashadi accused 
PAN ofbreaching the earlier agreement that such appointments needed to be discussed between the 
leaderships of the two parties. PAN eventually gave in and annulled Alvin's appointment. "Ribut 
Kursi Sekretaris", Gatra, 22 September 2001. 
185 Bayanat Tentang Fraksi Reformasi, DPP PK, Jakarta, 4 October 1999. Gaining seven 
parliamentary seats in the elections, PK was unable to form a faction on its own. The coalition had 
obvious practical benefits. Together with PAN's 34 seats, the two parties outclassed the TNI/Police 
Faction (38 seats). As a result, PAN and PK were able to defeat TNI's candidate in the competition for 
the DPR vice-chairmanship. Eventually, the DPR elected Islamist PAN Chairman A.M. Fatwa. 
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This was only conceivable among groups with matching ideological views. 186 With 
its cynical view on the Islamic credentials of other parties, PK sought a coalition 
partner with whom it shared non-Islamist short-term goals. 187 PAN met this criteria 
and the subsequent partnership helped to soften PK' s initial doctrinaire image. 
PK officials felt a natural affinity with PAN because the latter's Islamist camp often 
quietly sympathized with their own views. They believed PAN's claim for religious 
openness to be spurious and made a distinction between PAN's 'pluralism' and their 
own party's 'plurality' .188 The difference was that plurality 'conceded' (mengakui) 
humanity to be divided into various ethnicities but theologically they were not on 
'the same level of quality'. Although PK did not confine membership to Muslims, it 
was held 'impossible' for non-Muslims to rise into important party positions. By 
contrast, PAN's promotion of pluralism suggested that all religions were of the same 
value. What differed was the 'understanding'. Yet PK leaders acted on the conviction 
that their fellow Muslims in PAN had chosen pluralism for pragmatic reasons rather 
than because of conviction. Moreover, PAN's application of pluralism, they argued, 
was inconsistent as Muslims would make sure they controlled the party. Applied 
earnestly, PAN needed to give non-Muslims equal status. This gap between claim 
and reality underlined that PAN would not 'deviate too far' from Islam and its strong 
roots in Muhammadiyah. 189 For PK, the difference between the two coalition 
partners had thus more to do with 'Islamic political expression' and was not based on 
substantial disagreements in understanding Islam. 190 The political platform of PAN 
and PK was 'almost the same. For some time, for the next ten years [we stand for] 
186 Bayanat Tentang Terpilihnya M Amien Rais Sebagai Ketua MPR Dan Akbar Tanjung Sebagai 
Ketua DPR ", DPP PK, Jakarta, 6 October 1999; Interview, Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 17 October 2000. 
187 An interesting side-aspect was that the Islamic ideological party base did have little impact on 
coalition strategies. Although at the start PBB's ideological base combined Pancasila with Islamic 
morals, most in the party's leadership appeared only prepared to ally with other Islamist parties. PK, 
by contrast, had taken on Islam while asas tunggal was still in force. Nonetheless, PK's coalition 
partner PAN was based on Pancasila. PBB, Ka'ban held, was 'perhaps more consistent' in its 
perception oflslam. PK's coalition with PAN was an 'ideological contradiction'. Interview, M.S. 
Ka'ban, Jakarta, 12 October 2000. 
188 This section is based on an interview with Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 2000. 
189 Bulan Bintang leaders, too, held PAN to be insincere as the party had quoted Islamic sayings and 
hadith passages in its election campaign in order to appeal to Muslim voters. Sumargono, 
"Sekularisme dan Kejujuran Ideologis" ('Secularism and Ideological Honesty'), Republika, 26 May 
1999. 
190 Regardless of its open platform, the belief that Islam was the superior religion prevailed among 
PAN's Islamist leaders. The view that all religions were of the same value was 'not compatible' with 
Islamic theology. Interview, A.M. Luthfi, Jakarta, 7 November 2000. 
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the same' .191 With both championing democratic legal and political reform, 
identifying corruption as the main target and operating on a religiously delineated 
moral mission, possible long-term ideological differences were secondary. 
The creation of cadres preoccupied with Islam's perceived foes did not hamper PK's 
cooperative approach. With the intention to 'become a binding element (menjadi 
unsur perekat)' among societal groups and the 'national unifier', the combative 
message of ghazwul fikri 'automatically' played a much smaller public role than the 
message of universal justice and reform. 192 It was not targeted at the general public. 
It was absent from official statements, and only indirectly addressed in the party 
tabloid Suara Keadilan ('Voice of Justice'). Toward the press and the public, PK 
members refrained from confrontational rhetoric, and the use of terms like kafir and 
jihad. In the initial stage of its strategy, common goals such as amending the 
Constitution became the noticeable element in the battle againstjahiliyah. 193 
In the interpretation and the training of PK, ghazwul fikri was a combative doctrine, 
though it did not call for a proactive attack and physical confrontation. The material 
emphasised the essential need for wariness and self-protection and, in view of the 
perceived assault against Islam, self-restraint. The instruction therefore taught self-
defence that is non-violent. Ghazwul fikri was essentially an internal canon. Yet PK 
taught ghazwul fikri because its leaders believed it to be true. The intention was to 
create a suspicious and unyielding frame of mind among cadres. It stood neatly 
separated from guidelines for practical behaviour. This was very much unlike the 
contention by militant Islamists that cooperation and compromise with non-Muslims 
was wrong and that the oppression of Muslims in their own lands required that 
physical jihad be declared on the enemy. The success of teaching ghazwul fikri as a 
frame of mind intended to strengthen inner resilience without disturbing moderate 
behaviour. It held great risks, however, as it appeared very much dependent on the 
191 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
192 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. 
193 This became evident in phrases like "Kembali ke UUD 45, Kembali ke Zaman Jahiliyah" ('Back to 
the 1945 Constitution means to return to the times of 'ignorance'), PeKa Online, 5 August 2002, 
http://www.peka.or.id/zoon.php?id=l&cd=l&th=02&bl=08. PeKa Online was one of several 
unofficial PK websites. 
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skills and intention of the cadre-instructor and the mental capabilities of his 
disciples. 194 
PK leaders did not deny the importance of creating cultural suspicion among cadres. 
Writings dealing with the defence of Islam have been few and had very limited 
circulation but they have not been kept behind locked doors. Nevertheless, the party 
has not presented its dogmatic views openly. Its leaders had to be drawn on the 
matter, which is tantamount to deception. In effect, PK deliberately suppressed 
public expression of the doctrinaire facets of its thinking which meant that it was 
aware of and thus vigilant over the controversial aspects of its agenda. 
PK, too, was cautious in demanding affirmative Muslim policies. Similar to the 
reserved official rhetoric of other Islamist parties, the statutes set to aim for an 
'economy that is fair' which would take sides with the 'small people' but without 
'differentiating between race, tribe and religion' .195 During MPR meetings, however, 
PK took on the position of PBB and PPP, calling on the government to especially 
consider the local Muslim community (pribumi) which was most affected by 
economic hardship. In the 2002 MPR session, Irwan Prayitno defended the Fraksi 
Reformasi' s view that saw Muslims as an underprivileged group and indirectly called 
for a disconnection from foreign monetary donors. He said: 
Put plainly, but without intending ... to be discriminating, we ask the President to 
take sides with the pribumi society, which until today has been identical with the 
weak section. We have been free already for 57 years, free in a political sense, but 
we are not yet free economically. We are already free and sovereign; let us regulate 
the economy of this nation with full sovereignty, by taking sides [pemihakan] for the 
weak pribumi, [who is] both weak in a cultural and in a structural sense ... 
"[A]ffirmative policy" is ... normally under way in many countries and this never was 
interpreted as discriminating politics. 196 
194 Reports that local PK militia had been involved in the ethnic violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, 
suggested that it might not be such a great step from combative rhetoric to violent behaviour. 
195 "Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan", reprinted in Sekilas, p. 94. 
196 Irwan Prayitno, Mengkritisi Kebijakan Pemerintah: Tentang Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral, 
Riset dan Teknologi, serta Lingkungan Hidup, Seri Pendidikan Masyarakat, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 
Jakarta, 2003. Though worded carefully, the plea triggered immediate criticism from PAN-based 
Alvin Lie, the only non-Muslim MP in Fraksi Reformasi. Alvin deplored his colleagues' emphasis on 
Muslims and demanded to refrain completely from using the term pribumi as it would create a 
dichotomy and threaten national unity. Also Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 7 (lrwan's 
proposal) and p. 10 (Alvin Lie's protest). The record in the Risalah slightly differs from that of the 
Prayitno book. 
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Aside from general announcements, such as the need to fight economic cartels and 
monopolies and to 'initiate the development of Islamic economic projects and 
industry', PK also made sporadic statements which more directly disregarded its 
claim for equality and tolerance, for example the call 'not [simply] to allow one 
single coin to fall into the hands of non-Muslims' .197 
It automatically was a different matter with non-Muslim communities whose faiths 
the Pancasila did not recognise and who were not present in Indonesia. The Islamist-
endorsed human rights paragraph was characteristically discriminatory as it strove to 
ensure that atheists and communists were unable to 'shield behind' (membentengi) 
human rights to spread their beliefs. 198 In a press release, PK called on everyone 
involved in the drafting to be 'very suspicious' and reject any regulations not in 
accordance with religious teachings because there were indications that certain 
groups felt free to spread communism and 'permissive' views because they felt 
shielded by the human rights label. 199 
Generic animosity against Jews had become widespread among Indonesian Muslims; 
thus any political party was free to take a firm stance against Israel. In some 
instances PK-as PBB and PPP-appeared careful to not to sound anti-Semitic. 
Officially, PK rejected trade relations with Israel 'not because they are Jews' but 
because to trade with a 'colonialist nation' was to act against human rights. The 
statement, however, also depicted Jews as a conspirational people as it briefly 
reminded Indonesians to 'be suspicious' toward Zionists as they had 'tried to 
influence and control the Indonesian economy' .200 The material for the training of 
cadres was more forthright. It depicted 'an eternal conflict between truth [ haq] and 
falsehood [bathil]'. Once again referring to the Qur'an, verse al-Baqarah 120, it 
portrayed Zionism as a 'group which is spread all over the world' and 'which 
197 Komisi C Kebijakan. 
198 Sikap Partai Keadilan terhadap Penegakan Syari'at Islam, in Suara Keadilan, September 2000, 
pp. 4-5. 
199 Siaran Pers No. 05/SP-DPP PK/VIII/2000 Tentang Seruan Partai Keadilan Untuk Suksesnya 
Sidang Tahunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 2000, 6 August 2000. The party listed 
pornography, free sex and 'other deviating behaviour' under the permisivisme-rubric. 
200 Pernyataan Sikap Tentang Pencabutan TAP MPRS NO. XXV/MPRS/1966 dan Hubungan 
Diplomatik dengan Israel, 5 April 2000. 
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everlastingly wages war [melakukan perang] against Islam'. The goal therefore was 
for cadres 'to know that there is a global conspiracy instigated by the enemies of 
Islam', 'to know the Zionist strategy toward Islam', 'to recognise Israel as a Zionist 
state' and 'to know how Islam/the umat Islam is able to prevail over the latter two 
issues' .Z01 But those were hardly controversial ideas, which meant that there 
generally was less need for restraint in the official stance. 
The party's proposed amendment to Paragraph 29 of the Constitution displayed the 
risks of its adaptiveness. PK's promotion of the Plural Clause was in line with its 
rationalisation of the jihadist motive but inevitably it was hypocritical. The Medina 
model on which it was based stood for a plurality consisting of a Muslim-headed 
protectorate with Jews and Christians free to carry out their faiths. 'Liberty', the PK 
statutes asserted, was 'a value implanted' into humans, holding that an 'intact life 
rested on' liberty. To bring about the unity of the Medina society, its Constitution 
guaranteed citizens rights. These liberties comprised 'religious liberty', the 'liberty to 
carry out good adat', 'liberty from poverty', 'liberty from repression', 'liberty from 
fear' and 'liberty of opinion' .Z02 Its advocates, however, either omitted or 
downplayed that the Medina Charter sanctioned religious plurality but ruled out full 
equality between the religious communities. The statement by Hidayat Nur W ahid 
touches on this predicament without spelling it out: 
The Prophet issued the Medina Charter connected to the position of non-Muslim 
Medina citizens, especially the Jews ... [and] non-Muslim groups to obtain the 
guarantee of justice to carry out their religion. This will guard the integration of the 
Medina nation, which consisted of various tribes and religious adherents, even 
though the Muslim people were the majority. And the Prophet was the role model 
[qudwah, Indon. panutan] in all matters ... The Medina Charter is the guarantee of 
national integration and equality (sameness in face of [di depan] a plural society).203 
(Italic in original) 
An exception among a very uniform PK leadership was Daud Rasyid, one of the 
party's more forthright doctrinaire leaders, who urged his colleagues to support the 
Shari' ah Clause. This promised to be more popular and honest because the praise for 
201 Manqjemen, p. 157. 
202 Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 39. 
203 "Sikap PK Tentang Amandemen Pasa129 Ayat 1 UUD 45 Da1am Sidang Tahunan MPR 2002", 
Suara Keadilan, No. 23, 15 May- 15 June 2002. Also reprinted with some changes in Qamaruddin, 
Beginilah, pp. 51-67. 
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the Medina Charter was misguided. More bluntly than other PK leaders, Daud 
spelled out that it was the Muslim community that ruled during the lifetime of the 
Prophet. He thus called on his party to 'take up the lead' in the Reform Faction to 
strive for the Shari'ah Clause: 
Because its [PK's] raison d'etre [asal-usul] is the struggle to implement Allah's 
system on earth.. . [T]he Medina Charter needs to be understood in its context. A 
misunderstanding in this matter could obstruct a struggle that has been pursued for 
decades. First, the ruler at that time was Islam. The head of the state was the 
Prophet. .. Even though Islam was not spelled out, in fact, Islam held power.204 
The Plural Clause thus was a typical case of ideological innovation only taken up 
because of external necessities. Fear of acceptability motivated such modification. 
As such, it had not been an original part ofPK's ideological outlook but came about 
as a result of adapting it to outside circumstances, in which parts of Muslim 
constituencies expected Islamist parties to support the Shari'ah Clause, while secular 
Muslims and non-Muslims regarded such support as polarising, with the latter 
rejecting it categorically. The existence of independent power groups in PPP and 
PBB meant that any modification of ideology threatened to create internal conflicts. 
In PK, though individual leaders had differing opinions, no such independent power 
groups existed, which meant that modifying the ideological stance toward support for 
the Plural Clause did not lead to observable tensions. 
At the same time, Fraksi Reformasi' s stance on the Plural Clause inadvertently 
illustrated that Islamists are unable to take on liberal positions if this means the 
acceptance of secularism. There was little compelling argumentation in Fraksi 
Reformasi about how the state was to become involved in the religious life of non-
Muslims. As a pluralist party, PAN officials promoted a guarded interpretation of the 
legal implications of the term 'obligation' in the Plural Clause. They preferred to say 
that the wording would refer to the individual responsibility of the various 
communities and that 'obligation' would not mean that the state 'issued sanctions' 
204 Daud Rasyid, "Membedah Politik Islam Yang Lumpuh", reprinted in Islam & Reformasi: Telaah 
Kritis Atas Keruntuhan Rezim-rezim Diktator dan Keharusan Kembali Kepada Syari 'ah, Usamah 
Press, Pondok Pesantren Unggulan Al-Makmuriyah, Jakarta, 2001, p. 118. 
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(menjatuhkan hukuman).205 This, of course, was not PK's reading but the purely 
strategic value of the Plural Clause rendered such lack of clarity irrelevant.206 
The Plural Clause suggested a separation of significant sections of national law 
according to the teachings of respective religions and put the state in charge to 
execute these teachings. The first aspect brought it-as the Shari'ah Clause-at odds 
with modem constitutional law. Philosophically and technically, the Plural Clause 
was an inappropriate formula with loose ends. It asserted a vague pan-religious 
agenda on the basis of radical anti-secularism. Illustrating that it was not viable to be 
religiously indifferent, Patrialis Akbar, a PAN MP, proclaimed in the MPR that 'we 
have to settle on [ menyepakati] that there is no place for non-religious people to live 
in Indonesia' .207 In the 2001 session of the MPR, Fraksi Reformasi gave an 
indication of the impasses its proposal contained: 
With this wording we give space/an opportunity [ruang] and an obligation 
[kewajiban] to everybody to carry out the religion he or she adheres to. The Muslim 
community has the obligation to carry out [melaksanakan] Islamic teachings, 
Christians are obliged to carry out the Catholic or Christian teachings; it is the same 
with the adherents of Buddhism and Hinduism. If the Indonesian nation consists of 
more pious human beings, whatever religion they adhere to, the ... quality, 
image ... and prestige of the Indonesian nation will improve.208 
Unlike other religious sources, the Qur'an laid down a number of definite rules of 
conduct and commands. Islam's historical progress has been rather coherent and its 
tradition has been left comparatively intact since its genesis in the ih century. Above 
all, the belief in the interpenetration of religion and state power has remained 
forceful in Islam. This is different with Christian teachings, Buddhism or 
205 A.M. Luthfi quoted in "Piagam Jakarta Diusulkan Masuk dalam Perubahan UUD 1945", Kompas, 
21 June 2000 and Patrialis Akbar quoted in "FPPP dan FPBB Tetap lnginkan Syariat Islam Masuk 
Pasal29", detikcom, 25 July 2002. 
206 Fraksi Reformasi' s lack of clarity over the precise legal implication of the term became particularly 
evident as in some of its proposals a passive wording of the Charter clause is used ('obligated' 
[diwajibkan]), ostensibly to de-emphasise the role of the state. The initial proposal was: 'every 
adherent of religion is 'obligated' [diwajibkan] to carry out [melaksanakan] the teachings [ajaran] of 
his/her religion. It was entirely unclear to whom religious adherents are obligated. The final proposal 
put the clause from Article Three into Article One of Paragraph 29. It also used an active syntax, 
which was closer to the original "seven words". 
207 Risalah Rapat Pleno 21 Maret 2002, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002, p. 368. 
208 PK MP Soenmandjaya quoted in "Risalah Rapat Paripuma Ke-5 (Lanjutan) Sidang Tahunan MPR 
RI Tahun 2001 4 November 2001 ", reprinted in Buku Ketiga Jilid 2, Risalah Rapat Paripurna Ke-4 
s/d Ke-7 Tangga/3 November s/d 8 November 2001 Masa Sidang Tahunan MPR R1 Tahun 2001, 
Sekretariat Jenderal MPR, 2001, p. 159. 
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Hinduism. 209 The Plural Clause etemalised Medinan religious life of the ih century 
as if enlightenment and secularisation never happened to Christianity. The suggestion 
that religious communities other than Muslims could be 'obligated' to carry out their 
creeds, of course, is false. This is despite that various Christian community leaders 
reportedly expressed sympathy for the idea, naturally attracted to the gesture of 
compromise and, perhaps, the stipulation to increase morals in society.210 
Underscoring the--unsurprising-Islamic predisposition in the Plural Clause as in 
other policies has been the unilateral definition of broad values such as 'justice' 
(keadilan). In Islamist thinking, justice only exists where religious obedience has 
been accomplished. Because understanding of the term 'justice' was embedded in the 
Qur'an, by definition, for Islamists justice only existed in the Islamic context. The 
Qur' anic imperative was to 'act justly because this is what is closest to piety 
(taqwa)' ?11 
The aim to bring about 'justice' was a mirror image of the dogma of ghazwul fikri 
which proclaimed that global oppression of Muslims has led to injustice. Though PK 
situated its opposition toward political repression in general terms, ultimately, 
tyranny and the message of ghazwul fikri were two sides of the same coin. PK 
stressed the Islamist liberation rationale in saying that God has expressed approval 
for just rulers and contempt for tyrannical rulers.212 Mankind had to be liberated from 
all forms of tyranny.213 Yet 'actual justice', Hidayat Nur Wahid emphasised, was 'of 
divine origin [ilahiah], [something] that is religious, evolving from religious and 
moral values'. It had to do with the 'fundamental principles', supposed to prevent 
'anything that is tyrannic [zalim]' as Islam prohibited any activity that 'kills the soul 
209 As a set of beliefs, modern Christianity appears to have little in common with early Christianity. 
This is unlike Islam's historical continuity. See, for example, Lewis, Historical Overview. 
210 PK leaders have been fully aware of the separation between church and state in creeds other than 
Islam. Interviews, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 23 October 2000; Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 
December 2002, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 11 October 2003. Acknowledging the profound historical and 
philosophical differences between the religious traditions, the purpose of the Fraksi Reformasi's 
proposal-other than a tactical-becomes inexplicable altogether. 
211 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 29 August 2000. The whole Qur'anic passage states: 'And 
never shall your hate against something make you act unjustly because justice is what is closer to 
piety'. 
212 HR Ahmad (Hadith). Quoted in Manifesto Politik, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 13. 
213 Manifesto Politik, in Sekilas, p. 9. 
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[membunuh jiwa]'.214 Hence, justice 'liberates, whereas tyranny [kezhaliman] 
shackles [membelenggu]'. Justice was 'light', and tyranny was 'darkness'.Z15 Pivotal 
for this view were the Qur'anic warnings that tyranny and injustice inevitably would 
come about as a consequence of secular rule and the resulting disregard of morals. In 
sum, it stipulated that '[t]he infidels [orang-orang kafir] are the tyrants [zhalim]' .Z16 
As such, PK epitomised the archetypal Islamist claim that the only way to bring 
about justice ultimately was through shari 'ah rule. 'Islamic law', Mutammimul 'Ula 
brought this conviction to light, 'has an intimate connection [memiliki kandungan 
yang sarat] with the theme of justice'. Islam was not only a 'value system' but also 
comprised a 'methodology' (minhaj) for the execution of its teachings. Every 
nation's 'value system' had 'the same and universal ideals' such as 'justice, order 
and peace'. Even so, these value systems would fail to provide a 'comprehensive 
accomplishment methodology' ( "metodologi pencapaian" yang memadai) as 'only 
Islam has a comprehensive methodology fitting with the human condition [fitrah]'. 
Islam's big advantage was the lucidity of its principles and clear judgment of right 
and wrong. Other confessions shared similar moral and ethical aspects but only parts 
of their traditions could be translated into laws.217 
Reflecting this conviction, PK's agenda contained a paradox in the promotion of 
non-Islamist values and the application of these values for specific situations and 
directives. Referring to non-Islamist principles such as 'justice' and 'security', the 
party in fact merely promoted the perceived advantages of shari 'ah law. While the 
rhetoric suggested a common acceptability of these values, its elaboration and 
adaptation into real situations very often evolved around explicit Islamist patterns. 
That is, the technical specifics to adapt general values have been pre-formulated in 
the Islamic canon and, as such, were deeply imbedded in the minds of their 
proponents. The starkest example of this duality was the predilection for criminal law 
214 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 12 April2001. In order to understand the meaning of 
'justice', Hidayat argued, it was necessary to understand the origins of the Qur'an's use of the term 
(ibid). 
215 Manifesto Politik, in Sekilas, p. 8. 
216 Jati Diri, in Sekilas, p. 25. 
217 Mutammimul 'Ula, "lntroduksi Hukum Dalam PerspektifPerbaikan Krisis Kenegaraan", 
http://www. mastammim.or.id, 26 September 2000. This argument unintentionally exposed the 
incongruities of the Plural Clause. 
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and the interpretation of punishment directives. In a just world, PK leaders believed, 
the state carried out strict hudud directives as a deterrent to criminals, to achieve its 
goal of an orderly society. Irwan Prayitno argued: 
As for the concepts, they are already standard [baku], for example 'justice'. What 
remains is the medium. Stealing-hand will be cut off. Whoever kills-is killed. If 
in ancient times with a sword, today there is the electric chair. These things can still 
be discussed but the concept is justice... We have thousands of corrupt men in 
Indonesia. Sentence one and the others will be afraid.218 
This view illustrated that, despite the frequent advocacies of independent reasoning, 
PK leaders preserved various mediaeval traditions in the elucidation of Islam. 
Ironically, while Islamists time and again have been lamenting over the West's 
perception of Islamic law as cruel, most often these traditions dealt with shari 'ah 
rules on punishment. Its clear directives made Islam the most efficient weapon 
against corruption and weak law enforcement. Salim Segaf argued: 
Already in effect [in Indonesian law] are marriage, the hajj, zakat and banking. But 
we also want criminal issues [masalah pidana, to be covered by shari'ah] ... Those 
stealing become more and more audacious, those robbing, too, become more and 
more audacious. All become more audacious because there is no legal certainty. And 
it is not possible that we ourselves can bring this about. It must be through laws from 
the state ... If somebody kills, and there is evidence, [he/she] has to be killed. Except 
if the family [of the victim] forgives [him/her]. That is what is needed. If not, things 
may get chaotic. This means all aspects together are linked to the involvement of the 
state.219 
A comprehensive and consistent application of Islamic edicts would evade the social 
costs in Western democracies caused by frequent revisions of laws and lengthy, 
unproductive debates in parliaments. Because of this efficiency, Islamists claim to 
defend an exceptionally rational point of view?20 In the long term, the ideal outlook, 
therefore, was a decreased need for political debate. Mutammimul 'Ula argued: 
When Islam prohibits something that is it; parliament does not have to debate it 
anymore. Hence the low [social] cost. No back and forth. No more political conflict, 
[no more] conflict of ideas [gagasan]. .. Islamic law is simpler [sederhana] and 
218 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. 
219 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001. 
220 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
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more efficient. Morality lives and questions that are already certain don't have to be 
d. d . 221 lSCUSSe agam. 
PK ardently upheld the Islamist ideal of confining political authority to men of 
acknowledged religious values and knowledge. The ideal holds that, eventually, an 
'advisory body' committed to Islam, in Pipes' words a 'within-the-family 
consultation', had to assist the head of state in drafting laws that were of secondary 
importance or which had to be adjusted from time to time.222 An ideal government 
merely consisted of an executive and a judicature; the legislative was not superfluous 
but had strictly limited powers. The only task of the head of state was to implement 
Islam and this made his rule legitimate. As with other Western values, democracy 
was ultimately viewed as a Divine privilege; following this logic it thus cannot be 
based on popular sovereignty. As PK MP Syamsul Balda pointed out, Islam 
demanded leadership by male Muslims most 'capable' of performing independent 
reasoning to establish laws without 'amending' God's law.223 He wrote: 
There is no state without a legislative organ. It is the same with the Islamic state. But 
in the Islamic state, public law and private law are in the power of those who are 
capable of performing ijtihad that is to establish law, which is based on a foundation 
of law [hukum induk] and does not amend these fundamental laws. Every time 
period has its own problems and the legislative body will issue fatwas in accordance 
with legal penalities ... as already determined by the Quran. 
This view leads to the peculiar Islamist logic that democratic processes are laudable 
if people voted for "qualified" candidates, leading to strong Muslim representation in 
parliament, and a democratic government was commendable if it enacted legislation 
based on the Qur'an and Sunnah. Echoeing this, Anis Matta wrote, '[t]he joy [of 
democracy] has a price' .224 As democracies may bring seculars to power, they 
produced undesirable by-products which violated Islamic and, following the Islamist 
appeal to broader religiosity, human ethics.225 It was the state's task to ensure that 
people use their liberties responsibly and measured them. But a responsible dealing 
with liberties only existed where humans perceived themselves as 'moral beings' 
221 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
222 Pipes, Today 's Islamic Movements. 
223 Syamsul Balda, "Antara Islam dan Politik (3-habis): Kedaulatan di Tangan Allah", Peka Online, 14 
March2002. 
224 Anis Matta "Menikmati Demokrasi" ('To Enjoy Democracy'), Saksi, 3 April2001. 
225 Among the most often cited "destructive" liberties was sexual freedom, particularly homosexuality. 
Matta, Menikmati. 
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(makhluk mora[) whose thought was firmly based on the conviction that they would 
have to account for all deeds before God.226 Mutammimul 'Ula pointed to this 
persistent and profound dilemma by arguing that in the Western view 'liberty' 
(kebebasan) was an 'innate human right'. 'But not so in Islam! Liberty in Islam 
essentially is coupled [terikat] to submission toward Allah!' 227 Such avowals once 
again pointed to the Islamist impossibility to recognise the existence of a secular 
morality. Fear of God was an indispensable provision in bringing about a law-
abiding, and thus free and just society.228 
Democracies inevitably caused or prolonged "captivity" in secularism and thus 
injustice because they bear the risk of bringing secular parties to power. The reason 
that states descended into dictatorships or yielded to Western interests was because 
they adopted 'Godless leadership concepts' in which 'Divine revelation [wahyu]' had 
been 'replaced by reason' and the 'Divine law' by 'worldly law' ?29 This thesis of the 
inherent deficiencies of democracies cited the most prominent Islamist ideologues 
such as Mawdudi, Hasan al-Turabi or Rashid Ghannoushi. In almost identical 
fashion, Syamsul Balda argued: 
In ... a condition, in which a leader who successfully roused the emotions of others to 
vote for him/her to become the chief executive of a state, and, because of this is able 
to reach the status of a deity [dewa], the natural consequences are tyranny and 
exploitation, which definitely will happen.230 
Democracies, Syamsul repeated another typical position of these sources, 
implemented the will of the majority of a people. But Muslims were merely 
226 Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 31. 
227 Mutammimul 'Ula, Mencari Akar Sekularisme, Pustaka Tarbiatuna, Jakarta, 2001, p. 38. 
228 See also Ridho, Jihad, pp. 11-23. The author quotes the Qur'an (16: 51) and (al-Ma'idah: 26) 
calling on humans to fear God only. 
229 Syamsul Balda, "Moralitas dan Visi Politik Islam", Serial fikrah, da 'wah dan harakah Waqfah 
Tarbawiyah, No.4, Lembaga Kajian Da'wah Islam, Yayasan Tarbiyatuna, p. 19. 
230 Balda, Moralitas, p. 19. The idea behind this view is that voting would not impose a sense of moral 
obligation on rulers like a religious oath (bay 'ah). The oath would obligate the ruler to implement 
Islam which necessarily meant that he acted justly. Just rule, in turn, ensured the loyalty of the people. 
This is a standard Islamist argumentation. Syamsul Balda, "Bentuk Pemerintahan Masa Kini", PeKa 
Online, 23 October 2001; Interviews, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April200 1; Abu Ridho, Jakarta, 11 
April2001. 
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obligated to implement and carry out the revealed will of God.231 The PK statutes 
gave evidence of the prevalence of this ideal: 
Allah as the holder of all power wishes mankind to be His representative or 
vicegerent [ khalifah] on earth. Therefore, mankind may assert its power as long as 
this is used only to fulfil His will. Thus the status of government in a state is, 
according to Islam, organised on the principle of people's sovereignty [kedaulatan 
rakyat] to realise God's sovereignty [kedaulatan Ilahi].232 
In sum, PK was committed to democracy as the best political system in a Muslim 
society beset by "ignorance" whilst anticipating that elections in a society freed from 
"ignorance" will automatically put virtuous Muslims into power. Democracy as an 
end in itself, without a larger purpose, remained little more than a dictatorship based 
on injustice. Muslims, and indeed human beings, would only be free under Islamic 
command, which in itself epitomised justice. Once in power, Islamists would install 
Islam as prime philosophical reference for national law. The state was only left to 
deal with the clarification of an absolute legal norm for particular situations and 
issuing laws for non-Muslim communities on the basis of their religious teachings 
provided that they broadly harmonize with Islam. The moral and philosophical truth 
of the government's ideological underpinnings is no longer open for discussion 
because a majority of Muslims has been convinced of its truthfulness and superior 
quality.233 
Yet it was central to PK' s political culture that dakwah programs first had to succeed 
in convincing people of the benefits of Islamic ruling so that they vote for a party 
promoting shari 'ah rule. 'The yardstick for the aspiration of the people', Hidayat 
231 PK members reiterated the standard Islamist position that Islam would not recognise an obligation 
to following the will of the majority although it did not explicitly reject the principle of majority rule. 
People's sovereignty would 'not be in opposition against' (tidak bertentangan) the meaning of syura, 
and the existence of a parliament (i.e. the DPR) could be regarded as the complying with the Qur'anic 
consent to consultation as a means to overcome differences. Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas, pp. 35-6. 
Therefore, democracy was not the ideal system but, despite its flaws, it was still the best solution in 
the current circumstances. Syamsul Balda, Prinsip Negara Islam, October 2001. 
http://www.peka.or.id/zoom.php?id=11&cd=1&th=01&bl-10. Another obstacle for Muslims to 
become active in democratic processes was that a hadith prohibits Muslims to draw attention to 
themselves, for example, through self-nomination. Syamsul Balda, Bentuk Pemerintahan Islam Kini, 
23 October 2001, http://www.peka.or.id/zoom.php?id=16&cd=2&th=01&bl=10. The author conceded 
that it is difficult to fulfil this ruling in the process of finding qualified candidates. 
232 Jati Diri, reprinted in Sekilas, p. 34. Mawdudi had earlier coined the term 'popular vicegerency' to 
emphasise that the only legal authority was God. 
233 Interview, Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
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Nur Wahid highlighted his party's democratic commitment, 'is the elections. 
Obviously, more people have voted for PDIP and Golkar. This means people have 
never thought about writing Islam into the Constitution' ?34 Working tore-accustom 
Muslims to a kaffah Islamic life-style also meant to acknowledge more openly than 
Masyumi legatees the gulf between the umat Islam and Muslims who desire the rule 
of shari 'ah law. 
This chapter thus portrayed PK as acting on a clear separation of political strategy 
and ideological commitment; of short-term goals and end objectives and with a 
propensity to disengage controversial aspects of its beliefs from the public discourse. 
The party's unbending worldview has been juxtaposed by moderation and 
conciliation in day-to-day political behaviour. Its gradualist strategy targets on an 
Islamic social transformation through a strong commitment toward dakwah 
activities. It holds that these endeavours need to show substantial progress in the 
larger Muslim community before a profound engagement with Islamic political goals 
can be undertaken. 
The Islamist model of PPP and PBB, by comparison, acted on a narrower missionary 
scale and impetus with little mentioning of guiding all humankind to Islam. PPP and 
PBB comprised dakwah divisions as most Islamic groups of reasonable size do. 
These dakwah divisions had a modest scope and ambition so little attention has been 
given to the reverie that the Islamisation of society might some day advance to a 
degree in which any elections confirm Islamist parties in power-with the unuttered 
next step being that people would then hopefully regard democracy as superfluous. 
Some individuals in these parties might share this quixotic goal but it plays no role in 
party agendas. 
All Islamist parties anticipated that a general reform agenda would be more 
beneficial for the June 1999 elections. They therefore curbed shari 'ah themes and 
other agendas deemed unpopular or endangering them of being branded extremist. 
Initially, PPP sought to gain Islamic credentials through the restoration ofthe Islamic 
234 Hidayat Nur Wahid quoted in "Pemerintah Jangan Jadi Budak Amerika" (Interview), Saksi, No.2, 
16 Oktober 2001, p. 15-9 (quote: p. 18). 
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party base and the party symbol only. The party approached the June 1999 election 
with a non-Islamist reform agenda and a number of issues which had formed a 
significant part of the party's Islamic identity during the New Order. PBB also 
suppressed its shari 'ah agenda because it thought that promoting general political 
reforms will get the party more votes. 
The most important of agendas that brought Islamist parties in danger of being 
labelled extremist was their position toward religious minorities. The Islamist stance 
remained connected to the idea that Indonesia is a 'Muslim country', with the need 
for Muslims to be in control over public affairs. Islamist appreciation of the national 
idea is, to an important extent, subject to this perception. With their domestic 
orientation, PPP, PBB and other Masyumi legatees, however, had a more outright 
protective stance over national unity than PK. The chapter showed that while the 
Muslim nation dogma persisted in all Islamist parties, they went to some lengths to 
portray themselves as tolerant and pro-pluralist. PK made the most systematic 
attempt as the party went into a coalition with a pluralist party and proposed a 
pluralist variant of the "seven words" of the Jakarta Charter which, however, was 




BETWEEN IDEALISM AND POLITICAL ADVANTAGE: 
PRAGMATISM PREVAILS 
Islamist parties faced the challenge of finding a balance between promoting religious 
ideology and making the most of the chances provided by power politics. In 1998, 
reformasi had brought about the long-awaited opportunity to regain political power. 
This chapter will argue that, ultimately, the achievement of political goals was of 
more immediate relevance than ideological ideals. 
Illustrative of this was the Islamists' shifting support behind ideologically diverse 
candidates for presidency. The Islarnist parties' recognition of ideologically opposed 
governments again underlined their strong constitutionalism. Their willingness to 
support contenders for the presidency to whom they were ideologically opposed was 
at the same time coupled to the latter's willingness to give Islamist MPs powerful 
positions in their cabinets. Short-term goals were thus of more urging importance 
than long-term goals; a matter Islamists often explained with the predominance of 
constitutional rulings over ideological principles. This chapter gives particular 
attention to the Islamist parties shifting support from B.J. Habibie to Abdurrahrnan 
Wahid and eventually to Megawati Soekamoputri's presidency and explains the 
motives behind their actions. 
As Islamist parties were strongly opposed to Megawati's Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan ('Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle', PDIP), they wanted to 
diminish that party's chances of winning the election and securing the presidency for 
Megawati Soekamoputri. In the circumstances of 1998 and 1999, Islamist parties 
saw Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia ('Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals', ICMI) Chairman and Soeharto's last Vice-President, Habibie, as their 
best chance in the presidential race. When Habibie's prospects dimmed, however, 
Islarnist parties shifted their support behind Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa ('National 
Awakening Party', PKB) Chairman Abdurrahrnan Wahid to thwart Megawati's bid 
for the presidency. Despite this, these parties later depicted Abdurrahrnan's 
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presidency as a failure and worked to bring about his downfall. In early 2001, 
parliament set up a commission to investigate Abdurrahman's alleged mishandling of 
public funds. 1 Though the cases were widely seen as insufficient basis for 
impeachment, Islamist parties and Fraksi Reformasi pressed ahead and eventually 
called on the MPR to initiate a Special Session to determine the President's fate? 
The MPR removed Abdurrahman in July 2001 and Islamist parties voted to support 
Megawati as his replacement with Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United 
Development Party', PPP) Chairman Hamzah Haz as her deputy. 
For constitutional Islamism the practical imperative often came about as a 
consequence of political participation. It is different in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, where the application of shari 'ah has not been framed by constitutional 
confines. 3 Obtaining less than a fifth of parliamentary seats in the 1999 elections, 
Islamist parties had very little prospect of amending the Constitution to include the 
shari'ah. Accordingly, the last day of the final MPR session on 10 August 2002 
returned Paragraph 29 on 'religion' to its original wording following a decision 
through mutual consultation (musyawarah). The paragraph states in Article One: 'the 
State shall be based upon the belief in the One All-Powerful God'; and Article Two: 
'the State guarantees all persons the freedom of worship, each according to his/her 
own religion and belief.' 
Despite the small chance of success, Islamist parties defended shari 'ah issues and the 
Jakarta Charter during various MPR sessions from 2000 to 2002 while at the same 
time stressing their firm constitutionalism. Hamdan Zoelva said in the MPR: 
I think we have to explain to the public ... that eventually we will accept the 
decision ... made through democratic mechanisms ... whatever the outcome is. This is 
our understanding of democracy. If we early on threaten each other, we do not learn 
1 Popularly known as 'Buloggate' and 'Bruneigate', the conunission investigated the President's use 
of 35 billion rupiah from the Logistic Affairs Agency Bulog and a donation of 2 billion rupiah from 
the Sultan of Brunei. "Buah Kekompakan Politik", Forum Keadilan, 10 June 2001. This led to two so-
called memorandums against the President. The first memorandum accused Abdurrahman of having 
violated the 'presidential oath' (Paragraph Nine of the Constitution) and an MPR decree to fight 
corruption (Resolution XI 1999). Hereafter, Islamist factions became increasingly assertive and allied 
with Golkar to issue a second memorandum in late April2001. "Aksi Koboi Terantuk Megawati", 
Tempo, 1 April2001. 
2 "Jalur Cepat Menuju Suksesi", Forum Keadilan, 11 February 2001. 
3 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. 
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about democracy ... Because of this, we emphasise again that we convey and agree 
with the aspirations of [those sections of] society that want the inclusion of 'the 
seven words' in Paragraph 29, Sub-Paragraph 1. This is our position. I think this 
is ... appropriate, normal, there is nothing to be feared because this is the way we 
enact democracy, this is the way we understand this nation's diversity. Eventually, 
when we take a decision ... whatever the mechanisms, whatever the decision, we 
h . 4 ave to respect 1t. 
When PPP Deputy Chairman Chozin Chumaidy addressed the MPR, he similarly 
said: 
Please believe, the PPP Faction never thought in the slightest way [tidak pemah 
berpikir sedikit pun] about conveying its political struggle outside our democratic 
system. The PPP Faction will always pursue this struggle through the constitutional 
corridor.5 
The internal organisation of Islamist parties has mirrored the practical imperative. 
Religious Councils (Majelis Syuro) are supposed to ensure that Islamic principles are 
paramount. But almost inevitable they give greater priority to political expediency. 
This disparity was starkest in PPP which contained several high-ranking ulama in a 
separate council. In official statements, PPP politicians described the opinion of 
ulama as decisive for political decisions. But when the circumstances demanded the 
adoption of more expedient positions, the same officials downplayed the importance 
of ulama in a political party. They went further by pointing out that PPP ulama had 
never formed an autonomous religious body with an authority equal to that of 
N ahdlatul Ulama. 
PPP debated religious issues in the Majelis Pertimbangan Partai ('Party Advisory 
Council', MPP), which comprised both ulama and other senior officials.6 Even 
though the MPP was officially on the same hierarchical level as the Central Board, 
its role remained largely symbolic.7 PPP ulama held that the "secular" name of the 
council was chosen in order to stress the difference from the Syuro Councils in non-
4 Risalah Rapat Plena 21 Maret 2002, reprinted inBuku Kedua Jilid 2 Tahun 2002, p. 337. 
5 Risalah Sementara 10 Agustus 2002, p. 28. The dedication to democratic custom was also apparent 
in the attitude of Islamist MPs pleading for shari 'ah in the DPR and MPR, which was persistently 
calm and composed. "Soal Piagam Jakarta, Masyarakat Tidak Perlu Khawatir", Tempo Interaktif, 8 
August 2000. 
6 Of the MPP's 14 Vice-Chairmen in the 1998-2003 period, five had ulama status. Previously, from 
1974 to 1979, PPP ran a Syuro Council that had more political clout. 
7 Tellingly, there was not a single case in which the MPP and the Central Board differed. Interview, 
K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
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political organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah and thus to emphasize a 
political party's need to adopt positions flexibly. This argument was questionable. 
PPP's flexibility was based on the political considerations of party strategists. In the 
words ofMPP Chairman K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin: 
The consideration .. .is that [in a political party] there is the possibility that political 
developments have to be taken into account. By contrast, in the socio-religious 
organisation, it is purely religion ... If the religious fatwa says red, then it is red. In 
politics, to say three times two is six can also be four plus two. As for the Syuro 
Council, two times three is six. As for the MPP, which performs in politics, it is how 
much? Four plus two? Or five plus one? This is what makes the difference: the 
flexibility.8 
Such statements reflected how, in practice, the verdict of the ulama tended to adapt 
to the circumstances and legitimise the course of the party executive. The ulama 
issuedfatwa but adherence to them was not binding on the party leadership.9 
Likewise, Masyumi never clearly defined the political authority of its religious elite. 
The Syuro Council, the 1945 statutes announced vaguely, would provide input and 
issue fatwas 'any time this was seen as necessary'. 10 As in post-1949 Masyumi, the 
Central Board of Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB) had much more 
political clout than the Religious Council. This division of power reflected Yusril's 
perception of what a modernist party should be. 11 The statutes defined the task of the 
Syuro Council as to 'give.input, both requested and not' and to provide religious 
rulings 'on issues which are fundamental and strategic' .12 This cautious description 
suggested that real power would rest with the Central Board and that the role of the 
Syuro Council would be to monitor in a broad sense the party's policies. 
8 Interview, K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. The Lajnah Syuro 'Ulama 'il 
Ka'bah ('Consultation Committee ofKa'bah Ulama') was formally subordinated to the Central Board. 
9 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
10 Anggaran Dasar dan Program Perjuangan Masjoemi, p. 5. The Syuro had real clout between 1945 
and 1949; after 1949 its influence waned. 
11 See Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, p. 306, for a similar view on the role of 
Religious Councils in what the author defined as 'modernist Islam'. 
12 Hasil Muktamar I, p. 42. The role of the Religious Council was to 'give its assessment' 
(memberikan pertimbangan) to the Central Board and the DPR Faction. Interview, Sahar L. Hassan, 
Jakarta, 30 November 2001. It was common that the Chairman and the Secretary of the Syuro Council 
took part in leadership meetings. On explicit shari' ah related and controversial matters such as 
whether non-Muslims may become party members, the whole council met. Yet there had never been a 
case in which the council objected to a decision of the Central Board. Also, the Chairman of the Syuro 
Council, DDII-based Mohammad Soleiman, had no particular expertise in jurisprudential matters. 
Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
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In Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK), there was tighter relationship between its 
various internal bodies than was the case with other Islamist parties. The highest 
authority was the Religious Council. 13 Unlike in PPP and PBB, however, the Syuro 
Council consisted of members of all the other party bodies: the executive, the MPP 
('Party Advisory Council') and the Shari'ah Board.14 Politicians and religious 
leadership thus were directly interrelated which 'makes it easier for us to interact and 
establish control' and thus to guarantee obedience to party guidelinesY Overall, 
allegiance to policy decisions was seen as 'very fundamental' and the Syuro Council 
imposed tough sanctions if codes of conduct were breached. 16 
Opposing Secularism and Megawati 
The chances of the Islamist parties to win widespread acceptance of their religious 
ideology in the reformasi era were slight. It was of more important to them to 
prevent the secular-nationalist camp from dominating post-New Order politics. This 
was also a more realistic goal. In the period between May 1998 and the Special 
Session of the MPR in October 1999 that was to elect the successor to interim 
President Habibie, Islamist parties went to great lengths to thwart PDIP and prevent 
Golkar and elements of the former military elite from obtaining key positions in 
government. When PDIP emerged from the elections with 34%, it became the 
leading party, but it was not enough to ensure Megawati the presidency. Between the 
elections and the October 1999 MPR session, Islamist parties and Partai Amanah 
Nasional ('National Mandate Party', PAN) made a joint effort to prevent PDIP from 
turning its lead into a presidential election victory. 
13 The 55-person Syuro Council was set up once every five years and met once every three months. Its 
main task was to discuss the elaboration of the general directives established by the party Congress, 
first held in May 2000. The Central Board only carried out the decisions of the Syuro Council, which 
were described as final. Although the President represented the party in public, he had much less real 
power than the executive Chairmen of other parties. 
14 PK was the only party with a separate Shari'ah Board. 
15 Interview, Anis Matta, Jakarta, 4 October 2000. 
16 Interviews, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 29 November 2001; Mutammimul 'Ula, Jakarta, 4 September 
2000. 
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The political circumstances, of course, were profoundly unlike those that prevailed 
during the New Order. A major difference was that political fragmentation, the lack 
of a single dominating faction and a shared set of goals dictated by the reformasi 
mandate persuaded all parties of the necessity for broader cooperation and the 
overlooking of ideological differences. This was both the case in the lead-up to the 
1999 elections and in its aftermath, particularly because its results led to a complex 
composition of parliament with 19 parties represented. Another factor was rooted in 
political culture. When the political circumstances allowed it, Indonesian cabinets 
traditionally embraced all major streams and allocated posts roughly in accordance 
with electoral shares. This inclination to share power has been one reason for the lack 
of a formal opposition. 17 
The practical motive for power-sharing arrangements was that most parties were 
extremely wary about the dangers of being excluded from lucrative cabinet positions, 
which gave access to much needed patronage funds. Moreover, they did not want to 
be seen as "oppositional". There was wide acceptance that gaining prestigious 
positions in the bureaucracy or in parliament was the most pressing goal. Cadres 
traditionally expected party elites to be benefactors, using their powerful positions to 
collect funds and distribute them. 18 As a justification to meet this demand, Islamist 
politicians invented the concept of oposisi positif('positive opposition'). Underlying 
the persistent wish to justify any policy with the Islamic tradition, they often related 
oposisi positif to the Qur' anic stipulation of amar maruf nahi munkar ('to enjoin 
good and prohibit evil'). By doing so, they succumbed to the desire to play a part in 
power-sharing pacts while claiming to uphold a critical or ideologically pure stance. 
A major challenge for the Islamist camp was the lack of a strong presidential 
candidate who represented their interests. Neither Hamzah Haz nor Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra enjoyed the public support of Abdurrahman W ahid or Megawati. Ami en 
Rais was unwilling to stand for an Islamist party. Islamist parties thus were forced to 
support Habibie, the best candidate on hand in 1998 and 1999. The tendency for 
Islamist parties to snatch short-term goals in the bid to place Islamists in strategic 
17 This 'consultation' paradigm has been widely critiqued as reformasi also should have led to a clear 
distinction between government and opposition. 
18 Confidential remarks by a PPP MP, October 2003. 
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positions had earlier been evident in the response to ICMI (established in 1990). Not 
Islamist ambition, but personal career advancement was the chief motivating factor 
for most ICMI cadres. 19 A particular motive for Islamists to cultivate relations with 
ICMI had been that Chairman Habibie emerged as a potential future President. The 
arrangement between Habibie and modernist Islam, in which the Islamist camp was 
only a small component, was thus grounded in mutual pragmatic interest.20 
Habibie was an enthusiast for high technology and, though coming from a devout 
Muslim background, with little determination to foster Islamic ideology. Like the 
other main aspirants for the presidency, he was very unlikely to champion shari 'ah 
goals. Recognising this, Islamist parties focussed on promoting a candidate who 
could provide cabinet and senior bureaucratic positions as well as give some 
commitment to a number of umat interests. Habibie and ICMI were likely allies to 
enhance the number of committed Muslims in government institutions and the public 
domain and to introduce affirmative Muslim economic policies. Masyumi legatees in 
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia ('Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council', 
DDII) or Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam ('Indonesian Committee 
for Solidarity of the Islamic World', KISDI), therefore, had earlier backed his rise up 
the ranks and bolstered his Islamic credentials?1 As ICMI Chairman, they asserted, 
Habibie 'has already become an Islamic symbol' and thus, as discussed in chapter 
three, supposedly a nuisance for the West. Claiming rewards for their support, 
Islamists often reminded their candidate that 'part of the honour and the "image" 
[ wajah] of Islam have been entrusted [ dipertaruhkan] to the shoulders of Habibie'. 22 
Again, realist short-term goals took precedence over idealist long-term objectives. 
When Habibie eventually took over as interim President on 18 May 1998, Islamist 
19 Ramage, Ideological Discourse, p. 224. 
20 Marcus Mietzner, "From Soeharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political 
Islam during the Transition", in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos?, 
Singapore, 1999, pp. 65-104 (esp. p. 86), Ramage, Ideological Discourse, p. 202, Aspinall, 
Opposition, p. 321. 
21 Aspinall, Opposition, p. 91. Habibie lacked a mass following and, previously, was not affiliated 
with Muslim organisations. In 1993, Habibie said that he did not know Masyumi and what it stood 
for. Despite his indifference toward Islamist ideology, Habibie had a preference for ascetic practices 
and work ethics. Hefner, Civil Islam, pp. 134-5; Porter, Managing Politics, p. 93. 
22 "Lima Harapan dan Saran Buat Prof. DR. BJ Habibie" reprinted in KISDI Menggugat, (no 
publisher), Jakarta, 1999, pp. 21-2. 
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organisations stood firmly behind him, emphasising the constitutionality of the 
succession process and mobilising Muslim groups and militia for pro-Habibie 
demonstrations.23 They also argued that the law required Habibie's term to last a full 
five years until 2003.24 During his tenure, Islamists, mainly from PPP, regained 
access to cabinet and the upper reaches of the bureaucracy. The party obtained two 
portfolios in Habibie's 'Reform Development Cabinet': Hamzah Haz became 
Minister of Investment and A.M. Saefuddin, the Parmusi politician and DDII Deputy 
Chairman became Minister of Agrarian Affairs.25 These ministries enhanced PPP's 
access to funding sources and promised a huge benefit in the form of contracts for 
party-aligned businesses. 
But unequivocal support for Habibie' s presidential candidature at the 1999 MPR 
session soon proved electorally unattractive. The camp mostly affected by this was 
Bulan Bintang. PBB's initial pro-Habibie stance was used by opponents to argue that 
it was 'pro status quo'. It was claimed that, in its early days, the party had received 
funds from Soeharto. A particular negative factor was that Yusril had worked as a 
speech writer for Soeharto in his final years in office. 26 Overall, it was the Masyumi 
legatees rather than PK that were branded as sectarian and a potential threat to 
democratic life. 27 These allegations in the Indonesian press were indiscriminate but 
they seriously undermined PBB's efforts to gain wider support. 
23 These comprised DDII, KlSDI, BKSPPI, GPI and also factions ofHMI, Ikatan Mahasiswa 
Muhammadiyah ('Union ofMuhammadiyah Students', IMM) and PII. On 21 July 1998, together with 
an umbrella group named Komite Umat Islam untuk Reformasi Konstitutional ('Committee of the 
Muslim Community for Constitutional Reform'), these groups demonstrated in favour ofthe 
constitutionality ofHabibie's interim presidency. 
24 "Di Mata Kami Habibie Konstitutional" (interview with Qadir Djaelani), Forum Keadilan, 30 
November 1998; "Mereka Bicara Kepentingan, Bukan Kebenaran" (interview with Yusril), Panji 
Masyarakat, 17 June 1998. 
25 PPPs JusufSyakir was elected Vice-Chairman of the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung ('Supreme 
Advisory Council', DPA). 
26 To save the credibility of the Chairman, the Bulan Bintang tabloid pointed out to party cadres that 
Yusril had neither been an active Golkar member nor was he involved in repressions against Muslims 
such as the Pancasila education programs of the 1980s. Moreover, the journal asserted that Masyumi 
leaders had agreed to all of the Chairman's activities. For example, before joining the State Secretariat 
he had consulted with the old Masyumi leadership through Anwar Harjono who gave his approval. 
"Benih Fitnah Mulai Titabur'', Bulan Bintang, No. 1, August 1998, pp. 8-10. 
27 Electorates were told that the party would represent rigid W ahabite Islamism and, in case of 
electoral victory, prohibit local religious customs. 
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Soon after the election returned a disappointing result for Islamist parties, the PPP 
politicians Zarkasih Noer and Faisal Baasir urged Amien Rais to lead a loose alliance 
of Islamist parties in nominating an alternative presidential contender.Z8 Once again 
underscoring the dearth of broadly popular Islamist leaders, they preferred Amien as 
alternative contender instead of Hamzah Haz, because the former was more 
'marketable' and 'more making news' .29 This led to the formation of the Poros 
Tengah ('Middle Axis'), comprising PK, PPP, PBB and PAN, which together made 
up about 20% of electoral votes and held 140 of the 500 MPR seats.3° Cooperation 
between Middle Axis members did not go beyond a mutual dislike of Megawati and 
PDIP.31 Associates wavered between sentiments of Islamic brotherhood while 
aiming to secure personal and party interests. Underscoring the Middle Axis' limited 
nature, Islamist leaders tried to give the impression that it was solely Amien Rais' 
project. The alliance was however a success in preventing Megawati from becoming 
President, regardless of its pragmatic origins. 
Whereas Amien Rais and several PPP leaders increasingly identified themselves with 
the Middle Axis, PK and PBB remained cautious.32 PK leaders, in particular, had 
sober views about the motives of their colleagues. They saw the plain, power-related 
28 Initiators of the Middle Axis preferred to explain the initiative to find a third presidential candidate 
besides Megawati and Habibie as an effort to prevent a conflict between their respective supporters. 
29 Ami en refused, arguing that PAN's meagre 7.12% share in the elections would rule out his 
candidature. Husnie Thamrin, "Dia Politikus Profesional", in Lukman Hakiem, Sultan Mufit and 
Miftahudin (eds.), Faisal Baasir: Politik Jalan Lurus, Jakarta, Dharmapena Nusantara, 2001, pp. 381-
88 (quote p. 383, italics in original). After the elections, PBB and PK withdrew their initial candidates 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra and Didin Hafidhuddin. "PPP ingin berkoalisi dengan 4 parpol besar'', Suara 
Pembaruan, 7 July 1999. 
30 The alliance was temporarily renamed under the neutral 'Fraksi Reformasi' to facilitate affiliation 
with PAN and parts ofPKB. It also was another attempt to identify Islam as reformist in opposition to 
Golkar and PDIP, which were branded as status quo parties. Both PAN and PKB had refused to join 
the alliance under the name 'Islamic faction'. PKB officials feared a fall-out with PDIP and many 
PAN officials believed a formal Islamic affiliation would contradict the pluralist platform of their 
party. "Menakutkan Minoritas" (interview with PKB Chairwoman Khofifah Indar Parawansa) and 
"Kemunduran, jika Membentuk Fraksi Islam" (interview with PAN Chairman Abdillah Toha), Siar, 
26 July- 1 August 1999. PPP appeared most eager to uphold the Islamic credentials of the alliance by 
defending an Islamic label instead of the neutral 'Middle Axis'. "Masih Diwamai Banyak Friksi", 
Media Indonesia, 3 August 1999. 
31 Some Islamist leaders claimed to have taken up earlier efforts to bring about a federation oflslamic 
parties, such as the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah ('Islamic Brotherhood Forum', FUI). Hartono 
Mardjono, "'Fraksi Islam' dan 'Poros Tengah"', Republika, 28 July 1999. In fact, whereas earlier 
examples such as FUI were based on a more heartfelt idealism to save the "Masyumi spirit", in the 
case of the Middle Axis, the sense of brotherhood seemed spurious as it was entirely triggered by 
external causes and practical motives. 
32 "Jangan Terburu Dikerucutkan" and "Belum ke Amien Rais", Tekad, 12-18 July 1999; Mardjono 
Fraksi Islam. 
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objective as damaging their claim to fight for virtuous politics. In a revealing 
statement, PK declared that the Middle Axis consisted of parties with 'different 
visions and goals' and suspected 'hidden agendas' among its affiliates. There was no 
faith that the pact would last beyond any short-term goals. But seen from a 'practical-
pragmatic' perspective, PK acknowledged its benefits.33 
Furthermore, prior to the June 1999 elections and then again when parties began 
negotiating possible alliances to secure a majority in the presidential election in 
October, opponents ofPDIP raised the question of whether Islam permitted a woman 
to become President. Ironically, though PK appeared most doctrinaire on the issue, 
the staunchest advocate of a male President became PPP. At several stages, non-
Islamist contenders of Megawati such as Abdurrahman W ahid were fuelling the 
dispute. 34 It first surfaced in late 1998 and, ultimately, re-emerged under different 
circumstances when Megawati appeared as successor to the presidency of 
Abdurrahman W ahid in August 2001. 
Eventually, however, both the doctrinaire Islamists and the pragmatists in PPP 
proved open to compromise. Earlier, in late 1998, the Kongres Umat Islam ('Muslim 
Community Congress', KUI) had asserted that most Muslims would oppose a female 
President. 35 This stance was forgotten when Islamist parties backed Megawati' s bid 
for presidency in August 2001.36 Moreover, with the high possibility of PDIP doing 
well in the elections, it early on appeared damaging for party-affiliated ulama to 
declare allegiance to the rejection of a female President. As this would have put 
Islamist parties in danger of appearing inconsistent, each religious advisory board of 
Islamist parties issued a separate ruling. Yet only PPP made its stance public; PK, 
33 Bayanat Tentang Poros Tengah dalam Sorotan, 17 September 1999. 
34 In a bid to foster his own growing ambitions to become President, Abdurrahman claimed that the 
Muslim community could not accept a female Head of State. By doing so, he conveniently discarded 
his previous "liberal" stance on the issue. 
35 The Congress, however, did not issue afatwa (religious ruling) prohibiting women from becoming 
President. Instead, KUI declared that a new edict was unnecessary as the respective Qur' anic verses 
had a general trait. There was, therefore, no confirmation or 'emphasis' (penegasan) in the Islamic 
sources that women may not lead politically. Interview, K.H. Ali Yafte, Jakarta, 22 July 1999. 
36 Mostfatwa rulings have limited influence and in the case of the KUI recommendation, there was no 
tangible impact. Muslim organisations have often issued separate rulings, often strongly influenced by 
political interests. A NU ruling from 1997, for example, decided that women were allowed to become 
President. The verdict was necessitated by Abdurrahman Wahid's backing ofSoeharto's eldest 
daughter "Tutut", who was a presidential aspirant at the time. 
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PBB and the Middle Axis never divulged their position.37 Thus, the objection all 
Islamist parties had against Megawati based on her gender was apparently spurious. 
Much more important were power-related motives to oppose her presidency while 
most of those referring to a specific theological reason had anticipated backing down 
if the political developments required it. 38 
The separation of ideological conviction and behaviour was also predominant in the 
attitude of PK. Weighing benefits and risks of gender-related polemics, PK 
understood that it would undermine its efforts to appear open and temperate. 
Moreover, as a new party likely to gain few seats in parliament, the insistence on 
dogmatic standpoints was likely to have little impact on parliament or national 
politics. Official PK listings of leadership criteria did not specifically rule out a 
female President. Instead, the party referred to non-Islamist values such as an ability 
to value different opinions; strong commitment to build a 'civilised society' 
(masyarakat madani) and a commitment to human rights.39 Internally, however, PK 
leaders believed that only men could become President.40 A legal ruling of the 
Shari'ah Council declared that it was 'illegal [tidak sah] and forbidden [haram] to 
make women head of state'. Referring to the standard hadith on this matter (HR 
Bukhari), it pointed out that 'if this law was breached, it will become one cause of 
the destruction of the nation [bangs a] and the country'. Pointing to the intrusion of 
Western lifestyle into Muslim lands, the council held that western feminism 
attempted to shatter this decree by 'deliberately destroying Islam and the Muslim 
community, especially female Muslims [kalangan Muslimah]' .41 Salim Segaf, 
Chairman of the Shari' ah Board, commented on this apparent friction between 
Islamic ideal and political advantage by highlighting the matter-of-factness in PK's 
constitutionalism: 
37 Interviews, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 13 June 1999; "Farid 
Prawiranegara: 'Mega Perlu Memberi Jaminan'", Forum Keadilan, 27 June 1999. 
38 Bulan Bintang leaders claimed that PDIP members had deliberately exaggerated the Islamist 
parties' nit-picking in order to undermine their credibility. Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 
July 1999. 
39 Bayanat Tentang Pencalonan Presiden Republik Indonesia Dari Partai Keadilan, DPP PK, 13 
March 1999. 
40 Interviews, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 20 October 2001; Anis Matta, Jakarta, 13 June 1999. 
41 Fatwa ofPK's Shari'ah Council on "Presiden Wanita" ('Female President'), Fatwa Dewan Syariah, 
pp. 104-6. Unlike several leading ulama and intellectuals in NU and MUI, the Shari'ah Council 
argued that female leadership was not a matter of different legal opinion but had already been rejected 
by what it called 'Sunni ulama' (ulama ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah). 
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A fatwa [from PK] based on Islam exists. But not a rejection from the party ... 
According to Islam, leadership has to be by men. But we live in a country that has 
not [fully] implemented [tidak menerapkan] shariah. This is something we have to 
understand. We have to agree to the Constitution because we are a political party. 
[If] Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] resigns, says the Constitution, Mega follows ... 
If we keep rejecting this, rejecting that, people will laugh about us. They will think 
we have very narrow thinking ... We are aware of the Constitution. We are also 
aware of the condition of society. Change surely will take place; it only needs time.42 
This realist approach again underlined the party's commitment to democratic 
principles and processes despite clinging to a different ideological ideal.43 
Despite the openly antagonistic attitude of the doctrinaire Islamists in the Bulan 
Bintang camp to PDIP, PBB was similarly careful not to appear hostile. There were 
different views in the party whether a Megawati presidency had to be assessed from 
a theological perspective or not. Press and public often connected PBB' s stance to 
doctrinaire Islamists such as Sumargono. Yet the doctrinaire leaders, too, early on 
conceded that ideological conviction could not claim superiority over constitutional 
regulations. In July 1999, Sumargono anticipated that falling in line with the 
circumstances was the only option. He said: 
As a Muslim, I have the conviction ... that I am not allowed to change because it is 
definitive [qal)l] that women cannot become imam [head of state]. A qal)l issue only 
can be seen through the point ofview of faith [iman]; [it] cannot be assessed through 
relative rational considerations. Hence, I am consistent not to support Mega [to 
become President]. [A]lso [because] of her skills and [her] very dangerous 
environment... It may well be that Mega becomes a puppet. I fear that a Mega 
government won't be better than the New Order. [But] as a democrat, if later 
Megawati will be elected, what is there left to do ... I will accept the situation. I will 
not make any threats; I will not revolt or anything. But the principle that she is not 
my leader will prevail. In case I will be offered to join her cabinet, I will definitely 
refuse.44 
42 Interview, Salim Segaf, Jakarta, 20 October 2001. 
43 Other Islamist leaders close to PK supported this stance. Shortly after PDIP was established as the 
winner of the elections, PK's presidential candidate Didin Hafiddhudin argued that it was 
inappropriate to use gender argumentation to reject the candidate who had gained most of the votes. 
Didin quoted in "Cal on Altematif, Siapa Butuh", Merdeka, 29 June 1999. 
44 Sumargono quoted in "Umat Islam PDI-P Jangan Mau Diadu Domba", Abadi, 22-28 July 1999. 
Around the same time, he pointed out that at the 1999 MPR session, Muslims may have to accept a 
leader who is 'less than ideal' and that 'we probably still will be forced' to vote for somebody whom 
'we don't really want'. Ahmad Sumargono, "Masalah Kepemimpinan Nasional", reprinted in Saya 
Seorang Fundamentalis, Global Cita Press, Bogor, 1999, p. 123. 
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Aware of the futility of the issue, most Keluarga Bulan Bin tang organisations evaded 
public comment. They pointed out that Masyumi never clarified its position on 
female leadership and used this as an example for the party's hands-off attitude.45 
Realists in PBB also used the glib argument that other Muslim countries had female 
leaders, too.46 
It was only PPP that openly rejected female leadership, apparently in the hope of 
further emphasising its Islamic credentials. It was clear, however, that for both 
modernists and traditionalists, the gender of the President was a religious matter of 
secondary relevance.47 Ironically, it was the pragmatic NU-based politicians such as 
Hamzah Haz and Secretary-General Tosari Widjaya who openly rejected Megawati's 
nomination. This was quite astonishing as neither had in the past raised theological 
impediments to female leadership. Hamzah, in particular was later ridiculed when, in 
mid-2001, he accepted the vice-presidency under Megawati. PPP's ruling that 
banned women from the presidency was made public at a party meeting in March 
1999, shortly prior to the elections.48 It proclaimed: 
PPP holds that the national leadership to be entrusted [ dipercayakan] to the best 
Muslim son of the nation fputera terbaik bangs a yang Muslim]... PPP will 
nominate a presidential and or a vice-presidential candidate from the best party 
cadres after having heard the ulama's fatwa.49 (Bold in original) 
45 Interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. The only Masyumi legatee rejecting a woman as 
President was the PPII Masyumi. This was striking given the umesponsiveness of the original 
Masyumi toward the matter. Contradictions of this kind have also puzzled fellow Muslim leaders. 
Interview, Deliar Noer, Jakarta, 28 November 2001; "Tidak Masalah Presidennya Wanita", Suara 
Merdeka, 14 October 1999. 
46 Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999. 
47 For the modernists' indifference: Interviews, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001; Rusdy 
Hamka, Jakarta, I December 2002; Jusuf Syakir, "Arsitek Utama Poros Tengah", Lukman Hakiem, 
Sultan Mufit and Miftahudin (eds.), Faisal Baasir: Politik Jalan Lurus, Jakarta, Dharmapena 
Nusantara, 2001, pp. 389-400. 
48 This was the first National Leadership Meeting (Rapimnas) from 31 March to 1 April1999. 
Another of those meetings shortly after the elections re-confirmed this decision while determining that 
PPP would now be willing to support a presidential candidate from outside the party. "Capres PPP 
Putra Terbaik Beragama Islam" ('PPP's Presidential Candidate is the Best Male Muslim'), Suara 
Pembaruan, 16 June 1999. 
49 Pernyataan Politik Pertai (sic) Persatuan Pembangunan: Hasil Rapat Pimpinan Nasional I di 
Jakarta, 31 March-I April 1999. The meeting itself did not come to a formal decision but followed 
Hamzah's information that ulama had decided to support a male candidate. Once more, PPP's 
explanations of the ruling appeared sophistical. Officially, the fatwa was described as only being a 
'recommendation' from the MPP, which, nonetheless, had the 'authority' (bobot) of afatwa. In this 
form, the ruling was presented to the Central Board. Interview, K.H. Endang Zainul Abidin, Jakarta, 
14 January 2003. These hair-splitting explanations showed the awareness that the ulamas' ruling 
would become practically irrelevant if political circumstances demanded it. 
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It is clear that the ulama verdict was well timed in order to provide PPP's campaign 
managers with the right ammunition to explain to Muslim constituencies why it was 
wrong to vote for PDIP. The Parmusi-based Chairman Rusdy Hamka recalled with a 
smile, "Megawati was rejected; then we campaigned on this. Indeed it [the fatwa] 
was merely for the sake of the campaign [Memang untuk kepentingannya kampanye 
saja ]'.50 Subsequent criticism of PPP, however, suggested that the party had 
promised to uphold its initial rejection as a matter of principle. But as Tosari Widjaya 
anticipated shortly after the June 1999 elections: 'if later a woman is voted by the 
MPR, we [PPP] won't run into the woods [lari ke hutan] but accept the realities' .51 
The ulama verdict was thus a temporarily helpful device. 
While PDIP and Megawati were the unequivocal foes, up to the start of the October 
1999 MPR session that established Abdurrahman Wahid as President, Islamist 
parties had yet to commit themselves to a candidate.52 The pragmatic Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra wanted the Middle Axis merely to facilitate negotiations with either the 
Habibie or Megawati camp for future power arrangements. Abdurrahman only 
appeared as an alternative contender after both Islamist parties and Amien Rais had 
become irritated with the complacency of Megawati, and her failure to negotiate with 
other parties over future power sharing.53 In contrast to PDIP and Megawati's 
aloofness, Habibie's associates were willing interlocutors. 54 
50 Interview, Rusdy Hamka, Jakarta, 1 December 2002. 
51 Interview, Tosari Widjaya, Jakarta, 30 June 1999. Expediency and the symbolic role of ulama were 
just as much at hand in the position ofPPP's main competitor PKB. Up to the 1999 MPR session, 
PKB anticipated an alliance or a coalition with PDIP. As such, PKB politicians necessarily declared 
that there were no religious reasons against a female President, even though a significant number of 
NU ulama opposed Megawati on theological grounds. Compare with Ulil Abshar Abdalla, "Megawati 
dan Islam", Tempo, 26 October 1998. 
52 "Ketidakpastian Gus Dur Bersama Poros Tengah", Forum Keadilan, 10 October 1999. 
53 At this stage, Hamzah upheld PPP's position prior to the elections, insisting that the goal was not to 
prevent Megawati's presidency, but because a woman may not become President. Leaders of other 
parties did not mention this. "Fraksi Islam takkan singkirkan Mega", Terbit, 15 July 1999. 
54 "Yusril Ihza Mahendra: 'Poros Tengah lbarat Cewek'", Forum Keadilan, 15 August 1999; "Habibie 
Beri Jatah PDIP Enam Menteri", Pelita, 11 August 1999. Amien Rais, too, initially had prepared 
himself for a Megawati presidency and waited for PDIP to approach him. Marcus Mietzner, "The 
1999 General Session: Wahid, Megawati and the Fight for the Presidency", in Chris Manning and 
Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects ofReformasi and Crisis, ISEAS, 
Singapore, 2000, pp. 39-58 (esp. p. 51). Habibie suggested a cabinet of28 members, 20 of which were 
to be filled with party leaders. He offered four ministerial posts to PPP and two to PBB. "Said Agil, 
Yusril Ihza dan Dimyati Sorot Poros Tengah", Suara Karya, 11 August 1999. 
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Yet between May 1998 and mid-1999, Islamist support for Habibie had steadily 
declined. Promoting morals in politics and the necessity to be on the 'anti-status quo' 
side made backing Habibie highly problematic. 55 During his term in office, Habibie 
was strongly criticised for failing to bring New Order cronies to trial.56 This was 
despite the fact that under his leadership, the government liberalised party politics, 
drafted new election laws and began to revise the composition and status of the MPR 
and DPR. It also initiated a number of shari 'ah regulations. In fact, Islamist 
disenchantment with the interim President often was based on practical political 
considerations rather than on dissatisfaction with his reformasi accomplishments. 
The irritation was strongest among the doctrinaire Islamists among the Masyumi 
legatees and those with close links to "Islamic" sections of the army, most notably 
the PBB politicians Fadli Zon and Farid Prawiranegara. Little more than a month 
into his presidency, Sumargono complained that it was as if Habibie 'had lost his 
image as a Muslim leader'. 57 Habibie, Farid held in July 1999, had 'disappointed us 
so many times', so 'we are not going to give a blank check to Habibie' .58 Of 
particular concern was the belief that Habibie had not prevented the dismissal of 
several "Islamic" officers and their replacement by what were considered 
Islamophobic officers. For the doctrinaire Islamists, this reshuffle was a plot against 
55 The deterioration of the relationship between Habibie and Islamist parties became particularly 
apparent through a declaration in May 1999 in which PK, PPP and PAN together declared that they 
would abstain from supporting another Habibie presidency. 
56 PK, for example, attacked the Habibie administration for its 'conservative spirit' and for being 
'hesitant' in exposing corrupt cliques of the old regime. Pidato Politik Presiden Partai Keadilan Pada 
Peresmian DPW Daerah Istimewa Aceh, 11 October 1998; Bayanat Tentang Komunike Bersama 
Antata PPP, PAN Dan PK, DPP PK, Jakarta, 21 May 1999. Adding to this, Habibie affiliates were 
linked to the Bank Bali corruption case. Later, PK demanded from PPP to unanimously withdraw 
support for Habibie as to do so would be 'non-reformist'. Underscoring the battle for reformasi 
credentials, the party held that any cooperation would cease if one of the signatories 'disobeys the 
principles of the reform agenda'. Pidato Politik Presiden Partai Keadilan pada Peresmian DPW DKI 
Jakarta, 27 September 1998. 
57 This was because Habibie had not initiated an investigation into the high-profile killing of Muslims 
in Tanjung Priok, he had hesitated to free Muslim prisoners, he had not immediately allowed the 
formation oflslam-based parties, he acted against KISDI and PBB associates in the military, he was 
'too lenient' with separatist (non-Muslim) movements in Irian Jaya and East Timor, and he did too 
little to contain pornography and alcohol. Speech by Ahmad Sumargono at the al-Azhar mosque, 
Jakarta, 6 June 1998 reprinted as "Evaluasi 47 Hari Kepemimpinan BJ Habibie", in KISDI 
Menggugat, (no publisher), Jakarta, 1999, pp. 53-7 
58 Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 12 July 1999. PBB thus tried to discard the public view it 
would nominate Habibie for a second term. The first National Working Congress (Mukemas) in 
February 1999, therefore, announced to appoint a party cadre as candidate. "Calon Presiden Harus 
Kader Partai" Kompas, 28 February 1999. PBB, however, did not pursue a clear position. At times the 
party defmitely ruled out support for Habibie. At other times, it claimed to be neutral. "Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra: PBB tak Calonkan Habibie", Kompas, 10 March 1999; "Yusril Ihza Mahendra: PBB Juga 
Nggak Kurang Difitnah", Ummat, 26 April1999. 
278 
their yearning to strengthen the number of allies in the army. 59 The sacking of 
Prabowo Sub ian to as head of the army's strategic command, Kostrad, was critical. 60 
There also was pressure to officially recognise the merits of Natsir and other 
Masyumi leaders: 
... Habibie ... did not give any response to the proposal that the state acknowledges 
the merits of ... Islamic national fighters such as ... Natsir and ... Sjafrudin and 
honours them as National Heroes. Habibie also had not done anything with regard to 
the demand to rehabilitate the good name ofMasyumi ... 61 
While this aroused fierce commentary from Media Dakwah and KISDI, the 
pragmatic Islamists were more cautious in their response. Yusril, in particular, had 
been more lenient with Habibie and was anxious for PBB to stay out of military 
politics. This heightened frictions with those Bulan Bintang leaders who, 
disappointed with Habibie, accused Yusril of 'having deserted Prabowo' .62 
In PK, greater restraint over political strategy facilitated a more even-handed and 
unemotional stance. One prerequisite for PK's presidential candidate was not having 
played any negative role in either the Old or New Order.63 To boost the party's claim 
to foster virtuous politics, PK nominated Dr. Didin Hafidhuddin, a lecturer from the 
Agricultural Institute in Bogor and a board member of DDII. Didin had written 
widely on matters of exegesis and was considered an expert on alms tax. A familiar 
name in Islamic study circles, Didin was never likely to draw a big public following. 
He rarely appeared on TV and had a very serious, dour demenour. But winning the 
59 "Farid Prawiranegara: Ada Gejala Realiansi Soeharto-Benny", Ummat, 5 April1999; "Yang 
Penting Ia Memihak Islam" (interview with Fadli Zon), Suara Hidayatullah, 1999; Fadli Zon, 
"Skenario Pemilu 1999", Abadi, 25-31 March 1999. 
60 "Habibie Menyerang Prabowo, Sumitro Prihatin", Tempo, 1 March 1999. In February 1999, 
President Habibie gave his version of the events leading to Soeharto's fall, asserting that Prabowo had 
planned a coup against the government. Fadli Zon and Farid, however, repeatedly insisted that 
Prabowo was among Habibie' s most loyal supporters. Both men had initially hoped that Habibie 
would become President and Prabowo Head of the Armed Forces. 
61 Evaluasi 47 Hari. Also Interview, Farid Prawiranegara, Jakarta, 13 July 1999 (the President shortly 
later complied with this wish, see chapter three). Moreover, PBB claimed to have only received 1 
billion rupiah from the government for campaigning whereas another party comprising several 
Habibie associates such as Adi Sasono, allegedly had more than 500 billion rupiah at its disposal. 
62 Cited by Mohammad Soleiman. Interview, Jakarta, 29 September 2000. 
63 Pemimpin Yang Membawa Cahaya: KH. Drs. Didin Hajidhuddin, MS. Caton Presiden RI dari 
Partai Keadilan, DPP PK, (no date, probably 1999), p. 8. 
279 
presidency was not the purpose of his candidature.64 To nominate a non-party 
member was to illustrate the party's claim for political virtues and was a statement of 
principle 'aiming to develop an image of national leadership'. 65 
PPP was openly split on its presidential contender. For most of the time until the 
1999 MPR session, its position remained unclear.66 Officially, PPP was reluctant to 
support the Habibie presidency. 67 This hesitation was because Habibie endangered 
PPP's strategy of presenting itself as a major advocate of reformasi. MPP Chair 
Jusuf Syakir wrote: 
B.J. Habibie wanted to proceed but we knew Habibie's weakness, [he] could not get 
away from Suharto. This was hard [berat] ... To support Habibie was not logical, 
because he clearly was New Order, [there were] many who could not accept [him].68 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of alternatives, Habibie always remained the candidate 
promising the most benefit for Islamist parties. At the 1999 MPR session, PPP and 
the Reform Faction admonished him in their formal responses to his accountability 
64 Didin had appeared reluctant to accept the nomination but eventually approved in February 1999. 
He never took on party membership, though. Unlike other parties, PK painstakingly gave insight into 
the process that led to the nomination of Didin and published a booklet for this purpose titled 
Pemimpin Yang Membawa Cahaya ('A Leader who conveys Brightness'). Other nominees were listed 
as: Deliar Noer, PPP's A.M. Saefuddin and-a blatant indication of the party's flexibility-Nurcholish 
Madjid. The decision to halt Didin's candidature was made in October 1999 after it had failed to 
receive any substantial response and because of the substandard election result. PK then urged Amien 
Rais to run as candidate. Bayanat Tentang Partisipasi Partai Keadilan Dalam Kabinet Persatuan 
Nasional, DPP PK, Jakarta, 29 October 1999. 
65 Laporan Pertanggung Jawaban DPP PK Masa Bakti Augustus 1998- Mei 2000; Anis Matta, 
"Cal on Presiden Kita", Suara Keadilan, 30 March - 12 April 1999, p. 1. 
66 Through characteristically ambiguous and cautious statements, Hamzah Haz said PPP would not 
support Megawati, but this would not mean backing Habibie. "AM Saefuddin: PPP mendukung 
Habibie sebagai Capres", Kompas, 24 June 1999. At the same time, Hamzah appeared unwilling to 
support Amien as the Middle Axis' candidate. Other PPP leaders chastised his indecisiveness. "Fraksi 
Islam lirik Amien Rais", Tekad, 12-18 July 1999, p. 15. "Fraksi Reformasi Calonkan Gus Dur", 
Kompas, 7 October 1999. Moreover, some PPP leaders insisted on nominating a party cadre, Hamzah 
did not rule out a candidate from outside the party. '"The Real King Maker Baru", Adil, 21-27 July 
1999. At the same time, PPP Chairman A.M. Saefuddin, a long-time Habibie associate from ICMI, 
and PPP' s youth organisation Pemuda Ka'bah ('Ka'bah Youth') openly supported Habibie and urged 
all Islamic parties to do so as well. In mid-June 1999, Saefuddin announced that the party would only 
wait for the right moment to declare its nomination ofHabibie. Pemuda Ka'bah urged PPP's MPR 
faction to reject a candidature ofMegawati as there remained doubts about her Islamic credentials. 
"GP Ka'bah dukung capres Habibie", Pelita, 19 June 1999. 
67 "Terserah Amien dan Gus Dur" (interview with Zarkasih Noer)", Siar, 26 July-1 August 1999. 
68 Syakir, Arsitek Utama, p. 390. 
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speech. Nonetheless, Islamist leaders urged Habibie to maintain his candidacy.69 
When this failed, they tried to convince Amien to proceed-something he steadfastly 
refused. 70 It was, however, only Abdurrahman Wahid who could draw votes from the 
PKB Faction away from Megawati.71 Despite this, all Islamist parties waited until the 
last moments to steer their support toward Abdurrahman, which revealed their deep 
mistrust ofhim.72 Internally, PBB was divided over whether Yusril should withdraw 
his own nomination. The party faced the dilemma of whether to accept Megawati, as 
her election may have allowed Yusril to get the vice-presidency. This was the 
preferred option of the pragmatic Islamists.73 Such considerations were intriguing 
given the previous determination to thwart a Megawati presidency. It showed how 
short-lived ideological principles could be if lucrative political opportunities came 
within reach. 
To a larger extent than Habibie, support for Abdurrahman Wahid could not have 
been based on the hope that his government would accommodate an Islamist agenda. 
Although Abdurrahman had played to Islamist sentiment in the run up to the 
presidential elections and the natural affiliation arising from Abdurrahman's 
credentials as an Islamic scholar and leader, Islamists sanctioned his nomination 
because of his solid popular mandate and his reputation as a democrat.74 
It was at the same time apparent that practical considerations had overruled previous 
key policies. Backing Abdurrahman sat uneasily with the Islamist claim to be 
69 Interviews, Mashadi, Jakarta, 9 November 2000; Mohammad Soleiman, Jakarta, 29 September 
2000. Many Islamist leaders of all parties continued to have a high opinion ofHabibie. PPP, according 
to Mietzner, had already set up Habibie's formal nomination. General Session, p. 46. 
70 The shift toward Abdurrahman only happened after Amien Rais and Hamzah Haz refused to be 
nominated. 
71 Greg Fealy, "Islamic Politics: A Rising or Declining Force?", in AriefBudiman and Damien 
Kingsbury (eds.), Indonesia: The Uncertain Transition, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2001, pp. 119-36. 
72 The unabated suspicion was nicely illustrated by the last-minute presidential nomination ofYusril. 
Islamist leaders feared Abdurrahman could at the last moment play foul and withdraw, thereby giving 
the presidency to Megawati unopposed. At the same time, the rivalry and apparent lack of trust 
between Middle Axis members caused PBB to conceal Yusril's nomination, fearing it could be 
misunderstood as treachery. Rather than explaining to suspicious allies the tactical benefit ofYusril's 
candidature, PBB stepped ahead unilaterally. "Hartono Mardjono: 'Gus Dur Saya Sumpah"', Forum 
Keadilan, 31 Oktober 1999. 
73 They thus urged Yusril to uphold his candidature. Soleiman, Bukan Politikus, pp. 373-9; Interview, 
Mohammad Soleiman, Jakarta, 29 September 2000. Hartono Mardjono was decisive in convincing 
Yusril to withdraw and to make way for Abdurrahrnan. 
74 He, for example, suddenly said that the push for shari'ah or an Islamic state was understandable. I 
am grateful to Dr. Greg Fealy for this point. 
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building up a healthy political system by rejecting popular but inexpert community 
leaders.75 An additional factor was the President's bad health, arguably breaching a 
Qur'anic requirement for leadership. Notably, in an article from April 1999, the PK 
leader Anis Matta had mentioned physical health, in particular good eyesight and 
hearing as one of four prerequisites for a leader according to Islamic teachings. 76 
Physical criteria, however, were not listed in the requirements for the presidency 
stated in the party's statutes. This suggested that in the more public political 
statements, Islamist parties were more selective and pragmatic in chosing their 
demands. For example, they downplayed theological provisos anticipating an 
Abdurrahman presidency. Moreover, though all Islamist parties had promised to 
oppose military participation in politics, they all pragmatically accepted the presence 
of retired officers in key cabinet and senior bureaucratic positions. 77 
During Abdurrahman's term there was very scant criticism, especially officially, 
about the low priority his government gave to implementing shari' ah. 78 Islamist 
critiques against the President dealt with an alleged breach of reformasi issues and a 
number of ideological issues that guaranteed wide support from ordinary Muslims. 
The shari 'ah-related critique was mainly restricted to within the parties. At the centre 
of the openly stated criticism were typical reformasi issues such as the failure to 
overcome the economic crisis, the administration's unclear strategy to halt regional 
conflicts and failure to undertake resolute measures against corruption. 79 
Underscoring the alleged breach of non-Islamist reformasi issues, Islamist leaders 
proclaimed that the President 'similar to Soeharto' positioned his associates in the 
financial and economic cabinet posts and the bureaucracy in order to advance and 
financially back his political power. 80 
75 Abdurrahman was the very opposite of the desired team-player and technocrat. He has regularly 
displayed indifference for policy details and disinterest in fields such as economics. 
76 Anis Matta, "Sang Pemimpin", Sabili, 7 April 1999. 
77 Altogether, six ministries went to former officers. For example, the former Head of the Armed 
Forces Wiranto became Coordinating Minister for Police and Security, Surjadi Sudirja Minister of 
Internal Affairs and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Minister for Mining and Energy. 
78 His government only issued two decrees, one on the coordination of zakat administration and one 
regulating the financial management of the government's pilgrimage services. 
79 The official critique oflslamist parties thus corresponded with that of most neutral observers. 
80 Mashadi, "Gus Dur dan TNI", Suara Keadilan, November- October 2000. Reflecting these 
allegations and characteristic Islamist concerns, PK called for a disclosure of private assets of all 
members of Abdurrahman's new cabinet including the President and his deputy. Siaran Pers 
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Masyumi legatees most clearly linked the supposed failures of the government to 
issues of national unity while underlining their own reformist credentials and 
representational claims. PBB stressed its bond with the 1998 student movement and 
the reformasi mandate by holding that Abdurrahman 'disappointed us all, 
disappointed all children of the nation'. He had failed to comply with reformasi 
goals, the party stressed, 'which were fought for by our comrades the students and all 
reformist groups'. 81 The President's claim that several provinces would break away 
if he was dismissed exploited the issue of national unity and showed that he was 
'mesmerised' (terpukau) by the 'mirage of power' .82 His dismissal was a 'bitter pill' 
that had to be accepted in order to continue reformasi, to protect national unity and 
the Constitution, which were threatened 'as a consequence of the actions and 
undertakings of the President' .83 Similarly, PK leaders held that Abdurrahman's 
actions suggested a deep gulf between his reputation as an advocate of Indonesian 
democracy and his actions as President. 84 Later, in a dramatic yet ideologically 
neutral statement, PBB called on parliament, the MPR and the army and police to 
'save the people from the dictatorship of the power-holder', asserting that if this were 
not immediately anticipated, it may cause 'the destruction of the Indonesian state and 
its people' .85 
This sort of critique was misleading. In previous years, the doctrinaire Islamists, in 
particular from DDII, had vehemently campaigned against Abdurrahman as an ally 
of Christians and socialists and their perceived proteges in the military and 
No.06/SP-DPP-PKIVIII/2000 Tentang Tanggapan Partai Keadilan Terhadap Beberapa Momentum 
Penting Bulan Agustus 2000 Pasca Sidang Tahunan MPR, DPP PK, Jakarta, 22 August 2000. 
81 Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang DPR-RI Atas Laporan Panitia Khusus Hak 
Mengadakan Penyelidikan Terhadap Kasus Penyalahgunaan Dana Milik Yayasan Dana 
Kesajahteraan Karyawan Bulog Dan Dana Bantuan Sultan Brunei Darussalam, FPBB DPR, 1 
Februari 2001. 
82 "Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Atas Respons Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid 
Terhadap Memorandum Kedua DPR RI", 30 Mei 2001 reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, June 2001, 
pp. 11-4. 
83 Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang MPR-RI Mengenai Sidang Istimewa MPR-RI 
Dalam Rapat Plena Badan Pekerja Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat-RI, 7 Juni 2001; Pendapat 
Akhir Fraksi Bulan Bintang Atas Respons Presiden, 30 Mei 2001. 
84 Untung Wahono, "Selamat Jalan, Gus!" ('Good Bye, Gus!') Suara Keadilan, 5-31 August 2001; 
Anis Matta, "Kita Dukung Semua Proses Konstitusi di DPR ('We support all constitutional practices 
in the DPR')", Suara Keadilan, 25 May- 25 June 2001. 
85 Pernyataan Sikap Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Bulan Bintang tentang Kondisi Nasional 
Sekarang, 4 June 2001. 
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intelligence. Not surprisingly, the doctrinaire leaders pre-emptively nurtured a 
negative attitude toward Abdurrahman's presidency.86 'We already knew exactly 
who Gus Dur was', PBB Deputy Chairman Kholil Ridwan remarked, 'we only 
feared that Megawati would become President. ' 87 Highly suspicious of 
Abrurrahman's wide relations outside the Muslim community, the doctrinaire 
Islamists were openly dismissive that PBB had joined the Middle Axis and supported 
Abdurrahman.88 Qadir Djaelani said soon into his presidency in February 2000: 
... I tell my colleagues in PBB that the general MPR session was not the victory of 
the Middle Axis but the victory of the Axis Ciganjur ... the Ciganjur group cannot be 
separated from Benny Moerdani and Benny cannot be separated from Jews and the 
US. This is a mathematical calculation.89 
PBB's affiliated organisations DDII and KISDI strongly echoed these suspiciOns. 
Hussein Umar, for example, argued in Mediah Dakwah: 
Rarely the Muslim community and the Zionists cheer together. But when A W 
[ Abdurrahman] was elected President ... this really happened. The Indonesian 
Muslim community was happy, so were the Zionist leaders of Israel. This is not 
strange, because A W has been long known as a close friend of Zionist community 
leaders.90 
With these firm suspicions, it is not surprising that Islamist parties suspected the 
President and his inner circle to have a secret agenda, for example in its bid to drop 
the ban on leftist ideologies. Again Qadir Djaelani: 
The election of Abdurrahman Wahid .. .is the starting point [titik cerah] to open a 
large chance for the Marxist movement. .. (H)e is a Marxist. .. As President [he] took 
great action for the Marxist-Leninist/Communist movement to rise ... again in 
Indonesia. Starting with the apology to Xaxana Gusmao (President of East 
Timor/[and the] Marxist Fretilin), [the] apology to remants of...[the] PKI for the 
killings ofNU people in 1965 to 1967; the order to ... Yusril Ihza Mahendra to meet 
expatriates of. .. [the] PKI overseas, efforts to abolish TAP MPRS 
86 The chief concern was to keep all options open, reflected in statements such as that PBB would 'not 
support and not reject' Abdurrahman's candidacy. Hartono Mardjono quoted in "'Ping-Pong' Poros 
Tengah", Tekad, 16-22 August 1999. 
87 Interview Kholil Ridwan, Jakarta, 8 November 2001. 
88 "Abdul Qadir Djaelani: Saya Tetap Bercita-cita Mendirikan Negara Islam", Panji Masyarakat, 16 
February 2000. 
89 Qadir quoted in Negara Islam. The term 'Axis Ciganjur' (Poros Ciganjur) referred to 
Abdurrahman's home address south of Jakarta and implied his suspicious relations with a large 
number ofnon-Muslims. 
90 Hussein Umar, "Pelajaran Dari Kasus Abdurrahman Wahid", Media Dakwah, August 2001, pp. 6-7. 
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No.XXV/1966 ... [the] nomination of Marxist cadres for high office [elite kekuasaan] 
both civil and military ... the import of rice from Chinese merchants [ cukong] which 
eliminates rice farmers ... Those actions are useful and in line with class conflict 
theory in Marxism, to instigate a social revolution as prerequisite to 
bring ... Communism to power.91 
Such blunt allegations, however, were rare in official statements, arguably in order 
not to obstruct the daily work in parliament. Yet in one-less explicitly worded-
example, PBB also formally alleged a systematic attempt by the government to 
trigger social unrest and indirectly called it a communist-sympathisant. The party 
stated: 
There is a chain of statements and deeds of the President that definitely will lead to 
wider and deeper social divergence [kesenjangan] and which can be interpreted as 
attempt to provide scope [lahan] to pull off class conflict between societal sections, 
which indeed is the main art in the method [ sendi metode utama] of the communist 
struggle.92 
PK leaders shared these reservations but, typically, did not say so publicly.93 The 
party was similarly circumspect in stating ideological reasons for its attacks against 
PDIP and Abdurrahman. It held that to abolish the legal ban on leftist ideologies 
would endorse the spread of communism which was 'anti-democratic', 'uncaring of 
human rights' and irreconcilable with the Indonesian principle of monotheism.94 
Nonetheless, echoing the Bulan Bintang camp, PK officials also asserted that 
dropping the ban on communism was 'a strategic step to draw the support from 
91 Abdul Qadir Djaelani, Kapitalisme & Komunisme Anak Kandung Sekularisme, Yayasan Pengkajian 
Islam Madinah Munawwarah, Jakarta, 2001, pp. 29-30. 
92 "Pemyataan Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Sehubungan dengan Usul Presiden Abdurrahman Wahid 
untuk Mencabut Tap MPRS No. XXV/MPRS/1966", 14 April2000, reprinted in Tabloid Jumat, No. 
423, 28 April2000. The 'deeds' stated in this document repeated those listed by Qadir. The board also 
called on the government to ban books promoting leftist thought, again by referring to constitutional 
reasons rather than ideological ones. "PBB Tetap Tolak Komunisme di Indonesia", Kamis, 24 
February 2000. Unlike PBB, DDII and KISDI exposed their suspicions in a much more candid way. 
See, for example, "Gerakan Komunis di Belakang Gus Dur" ('The Communist Movement behind Gus 
Dur') and "Jurus Terakhir Presiden Wahid: Merangkul Erat Komunis, Kristen Radikal dan Zionis" 
('President Wahid's last option: Tightly Embracing Communists, Radical Christians and Zionists'), 
Media Dakwah, March 2001, pp. 41 and 47. 
93 In April 2000, this difference in attitude led to a disagreement between the Media Dakwah and PK. 
The tabloid had reported that PK would actively back the President and organise mass demonstrations 
to support him; a claim that prompted a plainly worded reply from PK: "PK Tetap dukung Gus Dur" 
('PK still supports Gus Dur'), Media Dakwah, March 2000 and "Tanggapan DPP Partai Keadilan", 
Media Dakwah, April 2000. 
94 PK argued on non-ideological terms, holding that to abolish the ban would require changing the 
Preamble of the Constitution. This was also the argument ofPPP and PBB. Pernyataan Sikap Tentang 
Pencabutan TAP MPRS No. XXV/MPRS/1966 Dan Hubungan Diplomatik dengan Israel, DPP PK, 5 
April2000. 
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former PKI cadre and ... Javanese syncretic Muslims which until now were in PDIP' 
to join PKB.95 
At the MPR session, PK had only backed Abdurrahman's candidature as a very last 
resort.96 Although officially the whole Reform Faction nominated Abdurrahman, 
only PAN leaders signed the formal declaration. PK MPs approved tacitly. 
Eventually, in the 1999 MPR session, they voted for Abdurrahman only after an 
instruction by the party's board.97 At the same time, the party appeared to have 
anticipated that the ideological divergences would inevitably become evident. An 
official statement shortly before the presidential election pointed to Abdurrahman's 
'unique character' and almost apologetically added that he often insulted the feelings 
of the Muslim community.98 Whereas official statements were cautiously worded, 
personally PK leaders distrusted Abdurrahman because they believed his government 
would strongly resist the strengthening of Islam in state institutions and the 
Constitution and play in the hands of Islamic foes. This reservation included his 
... extraordinary network among socialists. Among the socialist-seculars and the 
Christians there are huge fears regarding the rise of Islam. These groups need Gus 
Dur as a guarantee to prevent this. Because from the outset Gus Dur did not benefit 
[ menguntungkan] Islam. 99 
Roqib Abdul Kadir, a PK MP with a NU background said, in a rare case of open 
shari 'ah-related critique: 
To imagine the government of Gus Dur will carry out shariah is impossible because 
Gus Dur himself is a supporter of secularism who separates religious issues from 
government. .. there has not been a single instruction released in accordance with the 
95 Mashadi, Gus Dur. 
96 Abdurrahman's closest ally in PK was the party's first President Nur Mahmudi Ismail. Nur 
Mahmudi came from a traditionalist background and he had studied at the pesantren Salafiyah al-Islah 
in Bandar Kidul, which is managed by NU. He mediated between the Middle Axis and those ulama in 
East Java who initially had rejected Abdurrahman's candidature. Taking up Mahmudi's family 
affiliation with NU, he was able to reduce misgivings with regard to the motives of the Middle Axis 
and initial suspicions that PK promoted a "heretical", anti-Sunni, theology. Bayanat Tentang 
Kunjungan Presiden Partai Keadilan Ke Pesantren Langitan Bersama Gus Dur, DPP PK, Jakarta, 2 
September 1999. Abdurrahman later even offered Mahmudi a senior position in PKB. 
97 Confidential interview with a PK MP, Jakarta, October 2000. 
98 Bayanat Tentang Poros Tengah Dalam Sorotan, DPP PK, Jakarta, 17 September 1999. 
99 Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 8 February 2001. Among the President's most distrusted advisors were 
Marsilam Simanjuntak, Hendardi and other leaders of secular NGOs. 
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hope of the Islamic community ... Gus Duris written down as the President who has 
most often disappointed the Muslim community.100 
Given the misgivings PBB and PK had toward Abdurrahman prior to the presidential 
election, it is clear that they had neither expected nor prioritised the implementation 
of shari 'ah issues. In supporting him, they subordinated their ambition to realise 
shari 'ah to the pursuit of political power and non-Islamist goals. They proved to be 
dogmatic about short-term objectives such as stabilising the economy, battling 
corruption or inner security issues and flexible about their long-term ideological 
agenda. This priority was likely to have prevailed if the Abdurrahman government 
had been more successful in achieving non-Islamist goals. 
Illustrating this, none of the commentary in PK's journal linked critique of the 
government to a failure to implement' shari'ah. Tellingly, it was the party's 
ideologue Abu Ridho who assessed that 'not a single reformist mandate had been 
observed conscientiously' by Abdurrahman. 101 A highly eclectic thinker and 
idiosyncratic leader, Abdurrahman was anathema to PK's leadership ideal, which 
demanded cogent and transparent management. On several cases, the frictions 
between the President and Islamist parties revealed opposing attitudes toward the 
rule of law with Abdurrahman willing to bend and, at times, breech regulations if it 
suited his interests. 102 Fahri Hamzah's critique encapsulated PK's political culture: 
[Gus Dur] is called a kiai by his adherents. But if we look at him-how can we be 
loyal to somebody like him?! He lies every day, he changes his mind every day; he 
confuses everyone. Let him be a kiai, let him be a wali [local Islamic saint]. [We] 
campus people are critical people! 103 
100 Rokib Abdul Kadir and Budi Setiadi, "Antara "Bughot" dan "Thoghut"", PeKa Online, 26 March 
2001. 
101 Abu Ridho, "Pemimpin Bangkrut" ('A Bankrupt Leadership'), Suara Keadilan, 16 January- 15 
February 2000. Also Untung Wahono, "Waktu Anda Sudah Habis, Gus!" ('Your time has run out 
Gus!'), Suara Keadilan, 10 March- 10 April2001; Fahri Hamzah, "Kita Diambang Petaka", Suara 
Keadilan, 11 April- 10 May 2001 and Mutamimmul 'Ula "Gus Dur Memprete1i Legitimasinya ('Gus 
Dur gambles away his legitimacy')", http://www.mastammim.or.id/artikel.p?id=5&no=O, 8 October 
2000. 
102 Untung Wahono "Wibawa Hukum Dihadapan Presiden", Suara Keadilan, September 2000. 
103 Interview, Fahri Hamzah, Jakarta, 2 April2001. Another illustration of this culture was that the PK 
leadership prohibited party cadres from exploiting Abdurrahman's alleged outer-marital affair. "PK 
Larang Kademya Sebarkan Isu Perselingkuhan Gus Dur", Suara Merdeka, 3 September 2000. 
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A precondition to back Abdurrahman, of course, had been that he would supply 
Middle Axis parties with positions in cabinet. 104 However, whereas PBB and PPP 
endeavoured to place their leaders into all post-Soeharto administrations, PK, despite 
also clinging to the principle of oposisi positif, declined to be considered for cabinet 
positions. 105 This was another illustration of the party's political culture and, in the 
case of Abdurrahman's presidency, an expression of early scepticism. This stance, 
however, appeared to have been abandoned when former PK President Dr. Nur 
Mahmudi Ismail accepted the offer to become minister without consulting the party 
leadership, thereby putting his party in an awkward position. 106 PK explained the 
change of heart by arguing that the 'recommendation' to continue to abstain had 
included the qualification that 'if the government resulting from the SU MPR 1999 
does not have (sufficient) legitimacy; is weak and unstable because of pressure from 
various sides'. The Abdurrahman government, it then insisted, was 'legitimate and 
strong' because it was a 'reconciliatory government' that included all political 
camps. 107 This qualification, however, was not mentioned in the earlier statement 
from September 1999 that had ruled out participation. Moreover, such a positive 
assessment contradicted the qualms held by PK leaders about Abdurrahman and his 
inner circle of advisors. 
In particular, Middle Axis parties disliked the fact that Abdurrahman had offered 
Megawati the vice-presidency and thus foiled PPP's hopes for Hamzah to take that 
position. This was interpreted as an early sign that the President planned to disregard 
deals. 108 Having thwarted PPP from getting the vice-presidency, a compromise was 
found in which Islamist parties settled for Megawati by ensuring several cabinet 
positions.109 Islamist parties and Fraksi Reformasi ended up with eight ministries. 110 
104 Both PPP, PAN, PBB, PK, PDIP, PKB, Golkar and the military received ministries. This 
arrangement between ideological camps, the Middle East expert Bromberg noted, was without parallel 
in the Muslim world with the possible exception of Lebanon. Daniel Bromberg, "Dissonant Politics in 
Iran and Indonesia", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No.3, Fall2001, pp. 381-411. 
105 Poros Tengah, 17 September 1999. 
106 Nur Mahmudi remained PK's only minister in all cabinets between 1998 and 2002. 
107 Bayanat Tentang Partisipasi Partai Keadilan Dalam Kabinet Persatuan Nasional, DPP PK, 
Jakarta, 29 October 1999. 
108 Hamzah was particularly interested in the vice-presidency because Abdurrahman's poor health 
could have meant that he had to resign prematurely, in which case the deputy would have replaced 
him. 
109 "Kabinet Buah Kompromi", Panji Masyarakat, 3 November 1999. There was fierce competition 
over ministries in order to ensure access to funds. See Marcus Mietzner, "Abdurrahman's Indonesia: 
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The curious alliance, however, got offto a bad start. In November 1999, Hamzah and 
Yusril were unexpectedly accused ofhaving received 14 billion rupiah from accounts 
of the bankrupt Bank Bali for election campaigns. 1ll Whereas Yusril was cleared, 
Hamzah resigned in mid-November. 112 
Aside from this, it was not without irony that the government's policies substantiated 
several Islamist suspicions. The President's personal choices for senior bureaucratic 
appointments were seen by many Middle Axis members as strategic steps to 
strengthen the 'socialist-leftist' or the 'Sino-Christian' camp. Often, these choices 
had precedents in the New Order, a matter that Islamists, especially in PK, 
highlighted rather than revealing ideological suspicions. 113 Furthermore, there was 
indignation about the perceived display of apathy toward regional conflicts and 
social woes, in particular if Muslims were the victims. 114 Islamist parties were 
especially unforgiving toward the President's claim that there had been merely five 
Muslim casualties in the Maluku conflict. 115 He also appeared to display a carefree 
attitude toward the archetypal Islamist foes of communists and Jews. This validated 
initial worries that with Abdurrahman's presidency 'the conditions have become 
Political Conflict and Constitutional Crisis", in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon L. Smith, Indonesia 
Today: Challenges of History, ISEAS, Singapore, 2001, pp. 29-44. 
110 Yusril Ihza Mahendra became Minister of Law and Legislation, Hamzah Haz Coordinating 
Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty Eradication, Zarkasih Nur (PPP) State Minister for 
Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises, Bambang Sudibjo (PAN) Finance Minister, Al-Hilal 
Hamdi (PAN), State Minister of Transmigration and Population, Yahya Muhaimin (PAN) Minister for 
National Education, Hasballah M. Saad (PAN) State Minister for Human Rights Affairs and Nur 
Mahmudi Ismail (PK) Minister ofF ores try and Plantation. PPP had demanded three ministries (one 
for Faisal Baasir) but only obtained two. "Dr. Hamzah Haz: 'Saya Kecawa"', Forum Keadilan, 19 
September 1999. 
111 "Yang Kegerahan di Kabinet Persatuan", Forum Keadilan, 19 December 1999. 
112 The misgivings worsened when the President declined to replace Hamzah with a PPP cadre, 
preferably Secretary-General Tosari Widjaya. "PPP minta jatah", Suara Merdeka, 26 April2000; "Dr. 
Hamzah Haz: "Saya Kecewa"", F arum Keadilan, 19 September 1999. 
113 Abdurrahman's Islamist critics asserted that he had protected conglomerates which 'clearly had 
been cronies of the New Order' and that he had placed New Order figures such as Sofyan Wanandi 
and Emil Salim within his team of economic experts. In late 1999, the President appointed Sofyan, a 
Sino-Indonesian, and businessman and PDIP leader Arifin Panigoro as heads of a new economic 
board and, curiously, named the former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew, a prominent opponent of 
Islamism, as national economic advisor. In January 2000, Marsilam Simantanjuk and Bondan 
Gunawan, two leaders of the secular think tank Forum Demokrasi ('Democratic Forum') became 
presidential secretaries. Fahri Hamzah (ed.), Inilah ... Satu Dekade Kontroversi: Tabel-Tabel 
Kontroversi Abdurrahman Wahid Periode 1991-2000, CYFIS Press, 2000. 
114 This critique was linked to Abdurrahman's unreasonably large number of overseas trips. Islamists, 
at the same time, suspected that the President aimed to foster ties with left-leaning governments such 
as the Brasilian. Interview, Mashadi, Jakarta, 8 February 2001. 
115 Ula, Mempreteli. 
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more conducive for Zionists' and that he had 'embraced' Marxists, Christians and 
Jews overseas while 'alienating pious and consistent Muslims'. 116 Islamists felt 
particularly embarrassed by widespread negative reporting in Arab newspapers about 
Abdurrahman' s policies. 117 These issues, apart from rising internal tensions in PBB 
(chapter two) further reduced Islamist support for the government. 
The government's lenient approach toward separatist movements enhanced Islamist 
sensitivities on issues of national integrity, particularly because it matched their 
theories of infiltration by Western nations and their domestic allies endeavouring to 
weaken or even break up Indonesia. This had, for example, become evident in the 
President's approval for Irian Jaya to change its name into Papua and financing a 
Congress that discussed a scenario for independence. Suspecting a global dimension 
to domestic issues, some Islamists alleged that the government was attempting to 
extend the influence of the Jewish gold industry in the region. 118 Much of the 
Islamist parties' critique, however, appeared to be self-serving. Rarely did they 
provide sound alternative concepts to overcome these challenges. For example, they 
appeared reluctant to comment on the resumption of military operations in Aceh in 
2001 and the numbers of Muslim casualties. 
Despite the growing dissatisfaction with Abdurrahman's presidency, Islamist parties 
for a long time maintained their reservations about Megawati and PDIP. At the 2000 
Annual Session of the MPR, PDIP and the TNI faction had continued to oppose 
crucial amendments to the Constitution and to introduce direct presidential elections. 
116 Aus Hidayat Nur, "Dunia Islam dan Hagemoni (sic) AS", Suara Keadilan, Nov.-Des 2001 (first 
quote). Daud Rasyid, "'Kata Pengantar", Islam & Reformasi: Telaah Kritis Alas Keruntuhan 
Rezim-rezim Diktator dan Keharusan Kembali Kepada Syari'ah, Usamah Press, Pondok Pesantren 
Unggulan Al-Makmuriyah, Jakarta, 2001, p. 5 (second quote). Aus Hidayat was Chairman of one of 
two dakwah divisions in PK. 
117 The President's suggestion to make Jerusalem an international city under UN protection was seen 
as pro-Israel and, predictably, caused outrage. "Presiden Partai Keadilan Hidayat Nur Wahid: 'Gus 
Dur Untungkan Israel ('Gus Dur benefits Israel'), 
http://www.keadilan.or.id/templates/News.cfm?ID=150, 23 August 2000; "Siaran Pers No. 09/SP-
DPP PK/X/2000 Tentang Penolakan Terhadap Kedatangan Anggota Parlamen Dari Israel", 10 
October 2000 reprinted in Suara Keadilan, October-November 2000. 
liS Nur, Dunia Islam; Mutammimul 'Ula, "Prasyarat Rekonsiliasi", Suara Keadilan, September 2000. 
In addition, Abdurrahman appointed Henry Kissinger as one of his personal advisors and accepted 
membership of the Shimon Peres Foundation. Islamists like to point out that Kissinger was of Jewish 
descent and allege connections to the Freeport McMoran Corporation, which operates in Papua, 
purportedly pursuing an anti-Islamic agenda. 
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To find a loophole that allowed the dismissal of Abdurrahman while preventing 
Megawati succeeding him, Islamist parties began to consider ways to amend the 
constitutional provision that power must be handed from the President to the deputy 
in the case of former's incapacity. 119 
The Imperative to Secure Political Goals 
From February 2001 onwards, Islamist parties began to exhibit a sympathetic attitude 
towards Megawati. They started pointing out that Muslims needed to understand that 
the Constitution determined Megawati to be the rightful successor to 
Abdurrahman. 120 Realising that Islamists were willing to seek new power 
arrangements in a post-Abdurrahman era, PDIP started to court Islamist parties and 
PAN. Megawati went on a much-publicised hajj, embarked on the umroh (a less 
formal pilgrimage) and, in an important gesture, invited Ahmad Sumargono to 
accompany her. Islamist leaders interpreted this as an effort on PDIP' s part to 
increase Megawati' s Islamic credentials and to accommodate Middle Axis parties for 
future power-sharing arrangements. 121 PDIP and Megawati appeared determined not 
to repeat their unreceptive attitude of the 1999 MPR General Session. 
The calamities of the Abdurrahman administration made it easy for Islamist parties 
to point out the relative strengths of Megawati. In a sudden change of rhetoric, she 
now was praised for her willingness to listen to others and seek consensus. Her 
119 Paragraph Eight of the Constitution states: 'If the President passes away, resigns, or is not able to 
fulfill his/her obligations during his term in office, he/she will be replaced by the Vice-President until 
the end of his/her term'. Endeavouring to prevent a Megawati presidency in the case of 
Abdurrahman's downfall, some Islamist leaders favoured to temporarily allocate power to the MPR 
presidium, which should take over the President's role while preparing the election of a new 
President. "Yusril Ihza Mahendra: Paling Krusial Amandemen Pasal 8 UUD 1945", Kompas, 13 
March 2000; Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
120 On 23 February 2001, Megawati's husband Tauflk Kiemas met with Middle Axis leaders at DDII's 
Jakarta headquarters. Participants included Amien Rais, Yusril, M.S. Ka'ban, Hidayat Nur Wahid and 
Fuad Bawazier (PAN). "Silaturahmi Mencari Jaminan", Tempo, 11 March 2001. On 2 March 2001, a 
second meeting again with the purpose to smoothen relations between PDIP and Middle Axis 
parties-including the Axis' central Islamist faction-took place at Jakarta's al-Azhar mosque. 
121 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 9 March 2001 (together with Elly Burhaini Faisal, 
journalist of the magazine Panji Masyarakat and Anas Urbaningrum). Underscoring the change in 
attitude, Sumargono and Alimarwan Haman courted Megawati by welcoming her at Jakarta's airport 
after a leave of absence. 
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notorious reticence and passivity, previously held against her, now were portrayed as 
assets. Her intellectual abilities were no longer scoffed at. PK's President Hidayat 
Nur Wahid, for example, declared that a taciturn President was preferable to one who 
constantly uttered controversial statements. 122 Overall, PK continued to trade long-
term ideological goals for short-term political goals. Declaring its support for a 
Megawati presidency, the party demanded adherence to the constitutional process 
and a devotion to ongoing non-Islamist reforms as conditions for its support. 123 The 
support for Megawati did not include the prerequisite to give shari 'ah laws more 
priority. 
Likewise, M.S. Ka'ban held that Megawati's team and advisors indicated the new 
government would be more effective than the chaotic team of Abdurrahman. Most 
significantly, fears that Megawati and her backers might discriminate against 
Muslims were now depicted as exaggerated. 124 This change in rhetoric was stunning 
given that, by early 2001, the PDIP leadership had not significantly changed since 
1999. Opting for political advantage, those doctrinaire leaders who had remained in 
PBB after the 2000 split proved their fortitude in opposing the nationalist-seculars to 
be of secondary relevance if political advantages were attainable. Yet at the same 
time, the Islamist camp made it clear that support for Megawati was limited to until 
the 2004 elections. They also warned her not to forget that the Middle Axis and, in 
typical rhetoric, the "Muslim community" would help her to get the presidency.125 
This was, once again, hardly a compelling argument, given that Islamist parties 
together had received less than 20% of the Muslim vote in the elections. 
PPP, in particular, tried to cloak support for Megawati as having strong Islamic 
sanction. To argue its case and, particularly, its readiness to approve Hamzah Haz's 
vice-presidency in a Megawati administration, the party followed the casuistical 
reasoning that has become a trademark of traditionalist pragmatism. 'A law', PPP 
122 Interview, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Jakarta, 9 March 2001. 
123 "Partai Keadilan Dukung Megawati Menjadi Presiden" ('The Justice Party supports Megawati to 
become President'), Kompas, 3 February 2000. 
124 "H. MS Kahan, SE., M.Si: Tak Ada Jalan Lain, Memorandum II", Buletin Bulan Bitang, 1 April 
2001, p. 11. 
125 Sumargono quoted in "Jika Mega Jadi Presiden Adil-lah Terhadap Umat Islam!" ('If Mega 
becomes President, she has to treat the Muslim community fairly!'), Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April 
2001, p. 12. 
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ulama argued, 'is determined by its cause' (hukum ditentukan oleh sebab)' and 
further pointed out: 
We were looking for a ground for whether the ideological basis [Islam] approves it 
[Megawati's presidency] in an emergency situation. We asked this as a reversal of 
the problem. The ideological basis [Islam] determines that 'there is a qualification in 
a situation like this: the terminology is crisis'. Because the law says so. Hence, in an 
emergency situation, the ideological basis affirms that Mega succeeds ... Religion 
says that in every stance we take, the first consideration has to be which [position] 
brings about the bigger crisis. To seize the vice-presidency or not. Therefore, 
according to religious consideration, if the predicament is larger if we reject the 
vice-presidency, it means that we have to take it. These are the teachings of fiqh 
[ kaidah fiq hi yah]. 126 
Having previously de-legitimised a Megawati presidency because she is a woman, 
ulama now fell into line with the pragmatism of the Central Board and even 'to the 
contrary held that the vice-presidency is a position that has to be seized because it is 
of great strategic value' .127 This time, they therefore legitimised the executive's 
decision to go all out to promote Hamzah as Vice-President. Ulama also had the task 
of explaining the party line to PPP cadres and electorates in the regions. But it was 
held that once ulama had accepted the board's position, it was easy to persuade 
traditionalist constituencies that the decision was well founded. 128 The Parmusi camp 
in PPP had been less zealous in jurisprudential matters and was not affected by 
possible resentment of constituencies. It thus had more promptly geared up for 
Abdurrahman's dismissal. 129 
Of course, PPP officials made it clear that their support for Megawati and the 
readiness to join her cabinet depended on PDIP's willingess to accept Hamzah as her 
deputy in the session of the MPR in August 2001. 130 As the combined votes by 
Islamist parties in the MPR were not enough to guarantee Hamzah's victory, PPP 
relied on PDIP's support. Hamzah directly reminded her not to repeat 
126 Interview, K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
127 Interview, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
128 Interview, K.H. Endang Zainal Abidin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
129 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 19 October 2001. 
130 Interview, Rusdy Hamka, Jakarta, 1 December 2002; '"'Bahtiar Chamsyah: "Apa Tahan Megawati 
Menggandeng Orang Orde Baru?'"', Forum Keadilan, 29 July 2001. 
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Abdurrahman's mistake of alienating those who helped him into power. 131 Once the 
position of Vice-President had been filled, Islamist parties, the Reform Faction and 
PDIP could work on a compromise to share the ministerial posts. 132 
Unlike Yusril and Amien, who continued to be on quite good terms with Megawati, 
Hamzah's relationship with her had always remained cool. In 1999, unlike PBB or 
PK leaders, Hamzah had boasted ofPPP's rejection ofMegawati. To mend relations, 
PPP MPs had lobbied PDIP since late 2000. 133 Prior to the 2001 MPR session, 
negotiations further intensified. 134 To put further pressure on PDIP, PPP claimed that 
NU' s constituency, infuriated over the actions against Abdurrahman, could be 
compensated with Hamzah's vice-presidency as he also came from NU. In fact, NU-
based PPP leaders feared a negative reaction from within the organisation against the 
party and, therefore, had been more careful in openly attacking the former President. 
Hamzah Haz, particularly, was chastised by colleagues for being meek. One of his 
critics recalled: 
I said to Hamzah: no more ofthis! Even if Gus Dur makes five PPP cadres ministers, 
he cannot be trusted. It is a lie... It is indeed typical for Hamzah not to be 
confrontational. He is [always] inclined toward compromise. Hence, during the New 
Order he was always safe. 135 
131 "Jalan Lempang untuk Mega", Forum Keadilan, 11 March 2001.The vice-presidency had become 
more important after a presidential resolution in 2000 enhanced its authority. PDIP had initially hoped 
for a possibility to leave the vice-presidency vacant. "Arifm Panigoro: "Kalkulasi Saya dan Taufik 
Kiemas Berbeda"", Tempo, 18 March 2001. 
132 "Mau Apa Yusril Puji-puji Mega" ('What does Yusril want from flattering Mega?'), Rakyat 
Merdeka, 7 March 2001. 
133 "Calon Wapres dan Kabinet yang Gemuk", Tempo, 29 July 2001. PPP nominated Hamzah in a 
meeting one day before the MPR's Special Session. Directly afterwards, Hamzah met Megawati one 
to one in order to overcome personal differences. Eventually, the PDIP vote split mainly between 
Hamzah and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. "Hamzah Haz, Merdeka!", Tempo, 5 August 2001. The 
voting process needed three rounds to come to a decision. 
134 Lobbying became especially important after Akbar Tanjung insisted on proceeding with his 
candidature. PPP MPs claimed that Akbar had previously agreed to support Hamzah and asserted that 
PPP had a natural right to get the vice-presidency, arguing that the party had previously not been 
considered appropriately according to its 1999 election results. "Alimarwan Hanan, S.H.: Politisi 
Kabah dari Bumi Sriwijaya", Forum Keadilan, 12 August 2001. 
135 Confidential remarks by a PPP leader, Jakarta, 2001. Other officials expressed similar views. 
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Thus, in the final weeks leading up to the special session of the MPR in July 2001, 
PPP appeared wary and hesitant to finalise the impeachment process. 136 Ultimately, 
however, the yearning to get the vice-presidency for the party was stronger. 
In the session, the PPP and the Reform Faction nominated Hamzah whereas PBB 
abstained. Almost half of PDIP MPs voted for Hamzah. This was a sign that the 
secular-nationalists opted for reconciliation rather than alienating Islamist parties as 
this could have set the government off to a bad start. PDIP needed a clear 
parliamentary majority and was anxious to minimise any antagonism resulting from 
Abdurrahman' s dismissal. 137 It used Hamzah to win over any reluctant Islamists. 138 
The nature of the preceding arrangements became evident in the first Megawati 
cabinet, which was comprised of many members of the previous national unity 
cabinet and six members from Middle Axis parties. 139 
As Chairman of the largest Islamist party, Hamzah had been the Islamist candidate 
for the vice-presidency with the best chance of success. This calculation also resulted 
in the support of Parmusi leaders. The reason for the unity among the PPP elite was 
the financial and patronage opportunities, which the vice-presidency opened, and the 
prestige to push through a PPP-based Vice-President for the first time. It was 
anticipated that constituencies would be thrilled about their Chairman becoming 
Vice-President and thus would be more likely to vote again for the party. It therefore 
seemed beneficial to prolong Hamzah's chairmanship beyond his original term. 
When he was elected Vice-President in July 2001, his supporters pressed for 
guarantees that he would remain party Chairman, considering that it would enhance 
136 Soon after his election, Hamzah went to East Java to court NU leaders and to promote 
reconciliation. The aim was to minimalise the damage the resignation of Abdurrahman had cost 
Hamzah and to win over NU constituencies to vote for PPP in the 2004 elections. In 1999, PPP's 
share in East Java had dropped from 27 to 5 seats. "Menggiring NUke Kandang PPP", Forum 
Keadilan, 23 September 2001. 
137 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Indonesia's Change Of President And 
Prospects For Constitutional Reform: A Report on the July 2001 Special Session of the People's 
Consultative Assembly and the Presidential Impeachment Process, October 2001. 
138 The danger that PPP will try to capture the presidency was rather small as Hamzah' s popular 
appeal was very limited apart from PPP's NU constituencies. It appeared also likely that Amien Rais 
would not support such as step as he planned to get the presidency himself in the long run. Harold 
Crouch, "Drifting Along: Megawati's Indonesia", Australian Financial Review, 10 May 2002. 
139 Among those was PPP Chairman Bahtiar Chamsyah, former head of the Bulog committee, and 
PAN Chairman Hatta Radjasa, a main negotiator among the MPR factions. PKB refused to be 
considered for the cabinet. 
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PPP votes at the 2004 elections. 140 As a result, a PPP Working Congress in October 
2001 annulled the 1998 National Congress decision to hold the next of those 
Congresses (Muktarnar) in 2003 and postponed it until2004, after the elections. 
The elite's pragmatism at that stage worsened tensions in PPP. Critics claimed the 
board of the 2001 Working Congress had been stage-managed to approve the 
postponement ofHamzah's chairmanship. Previously, Harnzah had made conflicting 
statements about whether he was willing to be considered for another term. 141 In 
addition, critics held that Hamzah had no scruples in becoming Megawati's deputy 
while the party's earlier promotion of a female President as prohibited by Islam 
appeared conveniently forgotten. 142 A local PPP leader summed up the contentious 
aspects ofHamzah's pragmatic leadership: 
[I]n Islam, a leader has to stick to his word. Hamzah Haz, however, has until now 
been demonstrating his inconsistency as General Chairman... Prior to the elections 
in 1999, he exposed to the press that he would resign as Chairman if the outcome of 
the votes was below 20%. After ... the votes ... dropped dramatically ... he remained 
unconcerned, as if nothing had happened. The Muslim community and Allah ... will 
note that he perceived his [earlier] statements as nil. Hamzah's incoherent fplintat-
plantut] stance did not stop here. After. .. Habibie resigned and the presidency was 
fought over by Megawati...and Abdurrahman Wahid, Hamzah clearly stated '[it is] 
prohibited for a woman to be President in a nation such as Indonesia, where a 
majority of citizens are Muslim'. But when a slight chance opened [to gain] a power 
position for him after Abdurrahman ... resigned and Megawati became President, 
Hamzah did not hesitate at all. Giving various grounds, Hamzah was ready to be 
elected and to accept the position as Vice-President, [the] substitute of the female 
President he formerly confronted vehemently ... He [also] said [that he] was no 
longer available to be elected again if there was another cadre willing to become 
General Chairman ... Hence, is this the kind of Islamic party leader which we have to 
fight for as leaders of the nation ... ?143 
140 "Tekanan Baru buat Hamzah", Tempo, 12 May 2002. 
141 In mid-2000 news had spread that Hamzah would not be available for a second term as Chairman. 
As usual, modernists and traditionalists each named their own candidates for succession. "PPP: Tidak 
Perlu Cari Kambing Hitam", Kompas, 23 January 2002. 
142 See the two interviews with Zainuddin MZ "Saya Akan Mengomandani PPP Refomasi", Tempo, 
18 November 2001, and "Inilah Saat Terberat Dalam Hidup Saya", Forum Keadilan, 20 January 2002. 
143 H. Fauzi, Gugatan Menuju Muktamar Luar Biasa Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP, 2003, pp. 
7-8. The author was Chairman ofPPP's Yogyakarta branch and dismissed from the party because of 
this publication. 
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PBB's shift of support to Megawati had some similarities with PPP. 144 In March 
2001, PBB sent a maklumat ('announcement') to regional boards emphasising its 
devotion to the succession arrangements set out in the Constitution. At the same 
time, the party recognised that there were still different views in the Muslim 
community on female leadership 'which are all based on compelling arguments and 
explanations'. By conceding that there remained differing viewpoints, PBB 
attempted to cushion possible disenchantment among more doctrinaire sympathisers. 
The maklumat concluded that PBB saw a leadership change from Abdurrahrnan to 
Megawati who 'coincidentally is a woman' (yang kebetulan adalah seorang 
perempuan) as 'a matter of no choice' (bukan merupakan pilihan) and conformity 
as a 'constitutional necessity' (keharusan konstitutional). 145 At the time of the 
succession, party leaders again stressed that any application of doctrine had to take 
place in a 'national context' (konteks nasional). 146 But in highlighting the temporary 
character of such arrangements, the Central Board expressed hope that it would only 
have to live with this compromise until the next general elections. 147 
To further prepare its supporters for the policy shift, the central theme of PBB's 
bulletin of 1 April 2001 was reconciliation between 'Islam' and 'nationalists', 
supported by several short articles and interviews. The contributors, however, were 
careful not to overstate the significance of the pact, stressing that adhering to the 
Constitution was not the same as to collaborate with the ideological foe. Once again, 
Yusril's view was crucial for the party's stance. One article pointed out that: 
144 In February 2001, Abdurrahman had purged relations with PBB when he dismissed Yusril from 
cabinet. Official reasons were alleged ineptitude of the judiciary and problems in the Immigration 
Department. A more important cause for the dismissal was that Yusril had verified that the 
investigative committee that geared up to sack the President could continue to work on legal grounds. 
Moreover, Yusril had argued that a special MPR session to finalise the dismissal could be held 
without issuing a memorandum. Saldi Isra "Sekitar Pemberhentian Yusril Ihza", Republika, 14 
February 2001. 
145 "Maklumat Nomor: A-478/DPP-Sek/12/21" reprinted in Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April2001, p. 5 
(bold in original). Also interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. The document was sent to 
all regional and local party branches, party factions in the MPR, the national, regional and local 
parliaments and the boards ofPBB-close keluarga organisations. 
146 Interview, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
147 Maklumat Nomor: A. The Syuro Council immediately approved the board's decision. Its Chairman, 
Mohammad Soleiman, declared that if the Central Board had clarified its position and issued a 
maklumat, the Syuro Council would follow. It would refrain from discussing problems related to 
gender, as the current constitutional ruling would reflect a stance to which Indonesians had agreed on 
earlier. Soleiman quoted in "Maklumat Tawarkan Solusi", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April2001, p. 4. 
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... [as] Yusril explains, PBB does not elect the President; Megawati automatically 
becomes president. So we DO NOT SUPPORT THE SECULAR NATIONALISTS 
but support the Constitution, which automatically installs Megawati as President. 148 
(Capital in original) 
With initiatives such as the maklumat, the PBB board hoped to head off internal 
debate and thus possible frictions among regional branches and affiliated 
organisations. But the party had few troubles to gain acceptance for its policy, 
pointing to the example of Masyumi' s constitutionality and building on the deep 
dissatisfaction with the Abdurrahman govemment. 149 
Yusril had earlier appeared as another possible candidate for the vice-presidency. 
However, by then PBB leaders had become more circumspect over the battle for 
positions, aware that the ongoing power struggles had irritated the public. Moreover, 
not all PBB branches supported Yusril's candidature. Whereas Megawati's 
presidency was accepted as an emergency solution, parts of PBB did not want to see 
the Chairman as her deputy, as this was not a matter of constitutional necessity but 
could be freely decided. 150 
Islamist parties had begun to voice their support for shar 'iah in the MPR session in 
2000 (chapter five). In order to promote Hamzah as Vice-President, PPP now had to 
drop the debate on female leadership and to make concessions in its struggle for 
shari 'ah. In the months leading to the Annual MPR session, scheduled for November 
2001, rumours held that PPP would back down on the Jakarta Charter as part of a 
previous arrangement to smooth the relationship with PDIP and President Megawati. 
Henceforth, media and PDIP legislators took--or pretended to take-PPP's dropping 
of the Jakarta Charter as abandoning the struggle to insert the Charter clause into 
Paragraph 29 of the Constitution. 151 
148 "Islam Dukung Nasionalis Sekular?" ('Does Islam support the secular-nationalists?'), Buletin 
Bulan Bintang, 1 April2001, p. 7. 
149 "Maklumat Tawarkan Solusi", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 April2001, pp. 4-5. 
150 Other cadres were sticklers for procedures, arguing that there was no previous party decision-in 
this case during the previous National Working Congress (Mukernas)-to approve a candidature. 
Interview, Jurhum Lantong, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. Another reason was that had Yusril directly 
challenged Hamzah, the "Muslim" vote would have split. 
151 "PPP dituduh ingkarijanji" ('PPP accused ofbreaching promise'), Suara Merdeka, 6 September 
2001. 
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Curiously, PBB, too, appeared to believe it had been left as the sole proponent of the 
Charter. 152 As a competitor for the shari 'ah-minded Muslim vote since the 2000 
Congress, PBB took up the rumours that PPP had dumped its central Islamist agenda. 
The party bulletin notified its readers that PBB now was alone in its fight for 
shari 'ah and presented the party as the last bastion upholding the historic pledge and 
the 2000 Congress mandate to implement the Jakarta Charter clause. 153 Nur Syamsi 
Nurlan proclaimed in the journal: 
For Partai Bulan Bintang, which is based on Islam, the constitutional struggle to 
return the seven words [of the] Jakarta Charter into the UUD 1945 is the instruction 
[amanah] of the first National Congress of the party, which has to be carried out by 
all sectors and cadres of the party. Even though later Partai Bulan Bintang will be 
left alone fighting in the MPR, it is prohibited to betray this instruction.154 
It appears, however, that when Hamzah became Vice-President, PPP once again 
pursued a double agenda. Whatever the political developments, which now had led 
Hamzah to be the deputy of Megawati; at every stage the party had to safeguard its 
Islamic profile. Since 2000, its Islamic credentials had rested solidly on the Jakarta 
Charter formula. PPP could not afford to create the impression of a political sell-out 
and had to secure its image as a defender of Islam in the eyes of its constituency. 
Hence, prompted by rumours the party had given up shari 'ah issues, PPP leaders 
emphasised their earlier concession to exclude the Jakarta Charter of the Preamble 
from the debates, further sanctioning the supposedly profound differences to the 
Charter clause of Paragraph 29 of the Constitution on 'religion'. 
This attempt was underscored by a softening of Islamist rhetoric. 155 PPP MPs now 
depicted amending Paragraph 29 as strictly fighting for 'Islamic values' (nilai-nilai 
Islam) and as a purely legislative matter. Whereas this rhetorical emphasis was new, 
overall the party's shari 'ah policy had remained the same as before. Above all, it 
152 This became clear in PBB's depiction of the significance of its second National Working Congress 
shortly before the November 2001 MPR session. "F-PBB tetap pe:tjuangkan Piagam Jakarta ('The 
PBB Faction still fights for the Jakarta Charter')", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 September 2001, p. 9. 
153 Interview, Sahar L. Hassan, Jakarta, 30 November 2001. 
154 "Syariat Islam is a Solution", Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 May 2002, p. 15. The author was one of 
four Deputy Secretary-Generals inaugurated in 2000. 
155 At the 2000 MPR session, however, PPP MPs still often spoke of the 'Piagam Jakarta' when 
referring to an amendment of Paragraph 29. PPP also did not streamline the interpretation of 
individual PPP leaders about what exactly distinguished the "seven words" of the constitution from 
those of the Preamble. 
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continued to fail to communicate the meaning of key policies to the public. PPP MPs 
held: 
[F]or the PPP faction, to reject the Jakarta Charter is the same as to reject the 
Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Those who emphatically reject the Jakarta 
Charter do not or do not sufficiently understand this. Once again, we insist that there 
is not one faction in the MPR that attempts to return those seven lost words into the 
Preamble of the Constitution. What exists is the desire to rectify Paragraph 29, 
section 1 through a democratic mechanism on which we agreed together. 156 
As such, PPP MPs propped up the promotion of inserting the Shari'ah Clause into 
Paragraph 29 as an ordinary legal amendment, open to change if proven unsuccessful 
or dismissed by popular vote. 157 According to Lukman: 
This is to clarify because by inserting the 'seven words' PPP is perceived as reviving 
the Jakarta Charter. We want to set that straight because the purpose of the Jakarta 
Charter is very different from PPP's current proposal. The Jakarta Charter refers to 
the whole Preamble, what remains today are the 'seven words' ... The Jakarta 
Charter is not only ... those seven words inserted in the Preamble but, in those 
paragraphs, there are also things such as the President has to be Muslim and so on. 
Hence, the Jakarta Charter is associated with an Islamic state ... what PPP strives for 
is not the Jakarta Charter in the context of wishing to establish an Islamic state. 
But ... including the 'seven words' in the paragraph is strongly connected to the 
legislative process. This is a profound difference in our view. People must not 
misperceive that PPP will bring back the past; [the] struggle of the past to establish 
an Islamic state ... 158 
Stepping up these arguments, from September 2001 on, PPP officials explained to 
constituencies that they would carry on striving for shari 'ah at the MPR sessions. 159 
Yet, illustrative of the factionalism in PPP's elite, many party notables did not know 
whether a bargain with PDIP had been made. Parmusi leaders, in particular, 
suspected that Hamzah and Secretary-General Alimarwan Hanan had indicated to 
PDIP MPs to ease pressure to amend Paragraph 29 while sustaining Islamist rhetoric. 
One PPP leader recalled: 
156 Pendapat Umum 4 November 2001, p. 5. 
157 Alimarwan Haman, "Kontroversi Piagam Jakarta", Media Persatuan, October 2001, p. 3; "Pasal 
29 Tidak Terkait Piagam Jakarta" ('Paragraph 29 is not connected to the Jakarta Charter') (Interview 
with Tosari Widjaya, same issue). The time of these assurances shortly before the 2001 MPR session 
is noteworthy. 
158 Interview, Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin, Jakarta, 14 January 2003. 
159 The press appeared confused by the change ofPPP's rhetoric, evident in heading such as "PPP tak 
lagi permasalahkan Piagam Jakarta dan Gender" ('PPP no longer makes the Jakarta Charter and 
Gender an issue'), Tempo Interaktif, 27 July 2001. 
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A part of the Muslim community wants that [we] continue the struggle for the 
Jakarta Charter. But when Hamzah became Vice-President, PPP had eased up on the 
issue because as we heard, once again as we heard ... there was a political deal 
between several individuals of the board, probably Hamzah and the Secretary-
General [Alimarwan] with PDIP: Okay, PDIP supports Hamzah if [PPP] ceases to 
struggle for the Jakarta Charter; stops making an issue of a 'female President'. This 
is what we heard.160 
The affair again revealed the cynical view of several PPP leaders on their colleagues' 
motives for promoting shari 'ah goals. The critique was particularly directed toward 
Hamzah's apparent commitment for shari'ah issues, which many in the party saw as 
insincere. Hamzah was an 'old product' with a 'thin' (tipis) knowledge of Islam. The 
party's support for the "seven words" had 'more political nuances', with the 
objective to 'please the hearts of the Muslim community and PPP supporters' 
(menyenangkan hati umat, hati pendukung PPP). A PPP leader held this about his 
party's support for the Charter: 
[This is] above all to please these groups, [it is] more inclined to make them happy 
[menghibur] ... Maybe it [the Jakarta Charter] will be fought for but when being 
defeated ... well then we have already fought for it.. .. Not more than that. Not more 
than the intention [ucapan] will be forwarded. 161 
Officially, however, PPP's support for the Shari'ah Clause remained strong and the 
MPR Faction continually defended it in the 2001 and 2002 sessions. 162 The 
continuing commitment was echoed by a party-Congress in October 2001, one 
month before the MPR session. 163 In this, PPP proclaimed it would 'never cease' the 
struggle for the clause. 164 In the 2002 MPR session, the debate got increasingly 
tangled as several parties introduced new variations of their earlier proposals, 
ostensibly to find a compromise but presumably more in order to appear cooperative. 
160 Interviews, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 25 October 2001 (quote); Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 17 October 
2001. Those assuming a deal did so without having full evidence but pointed out that MPs from PDIP 
insisted that an agreement had been made. NU-based leaders such as Zein Badjeber and Lukman 
Saifuddin denied this. The PPP leadership later consulted Hamzah Haz for clarification. Hamzah 
denied having made any concessions to PDIP. 
161 Interview, Djafar Badjeber, Jakarta, 25 October 2001. 
162 It is not clear whether PDIP was informed that PPP would continue the struggle for the Charter 
clause on the basis that it ultimately would give in to compromise. It is likely that, individually, PPP 
leaders ensured PDIP of their willingness to slow down support for the Charter. However, neither was 
this official PPP policy nor is it likely that they specified what this meant precisely. 
163 It was the second National Working Consultation (Mukemas). 
164 Lampiran: Keputusan Mukernas II PPP Nomor 01/Mukernas/PPP/X/2001 tangga/14 October 
2001. 
301 
Intriguingly, the PPP Faction appeared least willing to make concessions. PPP MPs 
scarcely responded to the suggestions made during previous sessions and appeared to 
drag out the negotiations. 165 In mid-July 2002, PPP once again stepped up its 
shari 'ah rhetoric. On the title page of the July 2002 edition of its journal Media 
Persatuan, the party announced: 'Defending [Pertahankan] Syariat Islam' .166 
Another Congress underlined that the 'struggle to implement shariah' was 'essential' 
(amat prinsipil) and 'must not be compromised by less profound issues' .167 
The moment for such assurances was certainly significant. Through statements such 
as these, PPP gave the impression to supporters that it would not easily back down in 
the final round of the constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, with the provisions 
that Hamzah's new position as Vice-President had created, the shari 'ah agenda 
increasingly became perfunctory and was only retained as a rhetorical device. After 
all, 'we also have to see how we can show to the masses that we already fought for it 
[the Shari' ah Clause]'. 168 
Paradoxically, PPP's NU camp, despite supporting shari'ah issues, continued to 
claim doctrinal affinity with NU. In a conference in July 2002, NU ulama again 
rejected the Shari'ah Clause. 169 After this, Hamzah took on a more moderate 
position. He stressed that PPP would accept the will of the majority in the MPR who 
wanted to retain Paragraph 29 and refrain from walking out. Hamzah also asserted 
that, as a NU member, he would do what he could to follow the call of the NU 
ulama. 170 This, of course, appeared illogical, given the latter's rejection of the 
Shari'ah Clause. Nonetheless, NU-based PPP leaders asserted that there were more 
similarities between their party and NU than their support for shari 'ah issues might 
165 The PPP representatives Ali Hardi Kiaidemak (Parmusi) and Lukman Hakim Saifuddin (NU) were 
among the most steadfast supporters of the Shari' ah Clause. Both appeared very unwilling to drop 
proposed changes to Article One. As a NU politician, Lukman previously had not shown a particular 
interest in the matter. I am grateful to Dr. Greg Fealy for pointing this out to me. 
166 Media Persatuan, No. 85, Juli 2002. By then, Islamist parties more often used the term 'shari'ah' 
than the 'Jakarta Charter' or the "seven words" because it appeared to be more popular. 
167 This was the third National Working Congress (Mukernas). The result suggested steadfastness in 
the fight for shariah and pledged to fight 'maximally and optimally' for the "seven words". Lampiran 
Keputusan Musyawarah Kelja Nasional (Mukernas) III Nomor: 04/Kep/Mukernas III/PPP/VII/2002, 
29 July 2002. 
168 Interview, Faisal Baasir, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
169 This was the Musyawarah Nasional Alim Ulama NU. 
170 "PPP tidak akan "ngotot"", Suara Pembaruan, 29 July 2002. 
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suggest. They claimed that, substantially, PPP would not deviate from the legal 
opinion ofNU ulama rejecting the insertion of the charter. Zein Badjeber suggested a 
purely political motive behind the disparity: 
... PPP are basically NU and Muhammadiyah people. Therefore, their positions will 
not deviate from [tidak lari] what has been said in NU as well as Muhammadiyah ... 
Thefatwa [legal opinion] ofPPP's MPP will not differ from NU or Muhammadiyah 
because its ulama are ulama from NU and Muhammadiyah. Perhaps, in making a 
political decision, we are different. For example, PPP supports the insertion of this 
[the Shari'ah Clause].171 
Such efforts to advocate ongoing consent with NU were echoed in the prevailing 
assurances of PPP politicians that the clause would refer to the individual 
responsibility to perform shari 'ah laws. 172 Hence, despite formally opposite 
ideological policies, this position complied with NU' s stance that state authorities 
should not take up an active role in enforcing Islam. Such assurances again 
underlined that PPP, in this case particularly its NU members, were sophistical about 
the shari 'ah policy. In particular, Hamzah's reconciliation efforts with NU showed 
PPP's underlying pragmatism and wariness to insist on controversial positions. They 
strongly suggested that, in the MPR sessions of November 2001 and 2002, PPP's 
displayed determination to implement shari 'ah was tactically motivated. 
By mid- to late 2001, it became more important for PPP to ensure a good working 
relationship with PDIP and President Megawati. It therefore became necessary to 
back down on contentious issues despite maintaining a firm Islamist rhetoric. In 
October 2001, Faisal Baasir, head ofPPP's faction in the MPR, predicted: 
I think that Hamzah will ask the MPR Faction to no longer force [memaksakan] the 
insertion of the seven words. Eventually, this will happen. Because, be that as it 
may, there is a political-pragmatic interest in that Hamzah wishes to build up the 
alliance with PDIP. We still have to develop this not only for the elections but more 
in the sense that later for PPP the chance might arise to get the presidency ... This is 
the chance for PPP to have even bigger chances. [It might be] again different later 
when PPP is in power. A matter of tactics. This is called politics. One could say 'to 
step back in order to later step ahead' [mundur untuk nantinya lebih maju].173 
171 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
172 Interviews, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Jakarta, 14 September 2003; Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 
December 2002. 
173 Interview, Faisa1 Baasir, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
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Hence, by the time of the 2002 session, PPP already had been settling for a give-and-
take solution. In particular, ongoing firm shari 'ah rhetoric aimed to facilitate a 
compromise to include an Islamist phrase into the constitutional directives on 
'education' (pendidikan). 174 PPP, together with other Islamist parties and Fraksi 
Reformasi, proposed to insert the phrase 'to increase belief [iman] and devoutness 
[taqwa] [and] noble character [akqhlaq mulia]'. 175 It had signalled it would follow a 
softer line in its shari 'ah bid and not "walk out" if this clause could pass. PDIP and 
Golkar, which had previously blocked the supplement, yielded. Hence, PPP shifted 
toward a more practicable goal rather than going all out on Paragraph 29 for which 
there was no consensus even among Islamic parties. 176 
Fraksi Reformasi, on the other hand, insisted on the alternative wording and was 
quite inflexible in the negotiations. 177 PK's decision to back calls to amend 
Paragraph 29 had mostly been to silence criticism within the party that it was not 
supporting shari'ah issues. Moreover, PAN could not possibly propose the Shari'ah 
Clause as this would have destroyed its pluralist commitment. The small Perserikatan 
Daulatul Ummah Faction ('United Faction of Muslim Sovereignty', FPDU) 
frequently changed position on Paragraph 29. 178 
While PPP anticipated a win-win solution, PBB had no comparable opportunity to 
gain political advantage and thus turned into the staunchest backer of the Shari'ah 
174 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. 
175 Education had been a major field ofPPP opposition toward the New Order regime. PPP and PBB 
held the same position about Paragraph 31 on 'education'. They pointed to the discrepancy between 
educational laws-already including a phrase on iman and taqwa-and the constitution that had 
lacked this until now. See, for example, Notulasi Rapat, p. 6. 
176 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002. The crucial article of Paragraph 31 was the 
third. It now reads: 'The government shall manage and organise one system of national education, 
which shall increase the level of spiritual belief, devoutness and moral character in the context 
developing the life of the nation and shall be regulated by law.' Translation from NDI, 1945 
Constitution. 
177 PBB held that negotiations with PKB were more successful than with Fraksi Reformasi. Notulasi 
Rapat. In the 2002 session, PKB suggested to replace the term 'obligation' (kewajiban) in the "seven 
words" with the term 'determination' (kesungguhan) as the faction would 'fear the legal implications 
of the term kewajiban'. See Risalah Rapat Plena 13 June 2002, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 3 Tahun 
2002, p. 402. 
178 During the 2000 MPR session, the PDU Faction appeared to support maintaining a shari'ah-free 
paragraph but in 2001, it called for the Shari'ah Clause. Eventually, PDU agreed to maintain Article 
One but shifting the "seven words" or the alternative wording of the Fraksi Reformasi to the Second 
Article. It was, however, left open as to what difference this shift meant. 
"8 Fraksi Setuju Pasal29 Tidak Diubah", Suara Pembaruan, 20 July 2002. 
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Clause. 179 The party remained opposed to the Plural Clause proposed by Fraksi 
Reformasi and PKB. It appeared to have had no popularity among shari 'ah-minded 
constituencies. Bulan Bintang leaders also held that other religious communities did 
not want the state to meddle in religious affairs, something, they argued, the Plural 
Clause demanded. 180 Both PBB and PPP argued that it was the Shari'ah Clause that 
would guarantee the freedom of other religious communities. Yet PBB appeared 
willing to discuss other formulations in order to accommodate the interests of other 
religions and lessen the fears of intimidation in the case of an inclusion of the "seven 
words". To this end, it suggested a separate article to further emphasise the state's 
responsibility to protect the freedom of religions other than Islam. 181 
Islamist parties refused to vote on the 'religion' paragraph. Though a democratic 
mechanism, they asserted that voting on shari 'ah issues was provocative and futile. 
They argued that shari 'ah was not an issue they were allowed to vote on. It was a 
'duty' (keharusan) based on God's wi11. 182 Many, therefore, insisted that decisions 
on religious issues had to be made through consultation. Nonetheless, only PBB took 
this as reason for its faction to refuse to vote in the MPR or even to remain seated 
while such a voting took place. At several occasions PBB politicians, including 
Yusril, stressed that 'syari'at Allah which is already qath'y [unyielding] is not for 
humans to vote on'. 183 Hamzah Haz, in comparison, also declared that shari 'ah and 
Paragraph 29 were not open for voting, but, at times, he also appealed to Islamist 
colleagues to accept that there was strong resistance to their proposal. 184 
Yet Islamist parties also had strong practical reasons to prevent a vote on shari 'ah. If 
decided by a ballot, the debate on the Charter was likely to be perceived as closed. 
Islamists thus feared they then would no longer be able to maintain the Charter 
179 In contrast to PPP's rhetoric from late 2001 on, PBB did not link the term 'Jakarta Charter' to the 
Preamble. The party, however, somewhat adjusted its rhetoric after PPP had begun to strictly 
distinguish between the Charter of the Preamble and the "seven words" of the Constitution. 
180 Notulasi Rapat, p. 17. 
181 Risalah Rapat Plena 13 Juni 2002, reprinted in Buku Kedua Jilid 3 Tahun 2002. 
182 See, for example, "Syari'at Kembali Diganjal", Buletin Bulan Bintang, August 2002, pp. 12-3. 
183 Stated at PBB's second National Congress in September 2001. Quoted in "Sendiri Mengusung 
Syari'at" Buletin Bulan Bintang, 1 November 2001, p. 14; Interviews, M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 12 
October 2000; Sahar L. Hassan, Jakarta, 30 November 2001. 
184 "Fraksi Partai Islam Konsolidasi", Media Indonesia, 16 July 2002; "Factions agree on presidential 
vote, differ on sharia", Jakarta Post, 7 August 2002. 
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clause as a party policy and to defend it during future MPR sessions. PPP, too, strove 
to secure the clause. Bringing the debate to a closure would have caused potential 
damage to PPP's future political interests and deprived the party of a key trademark, 
in particular against its main competitor PKB. Therefore, the party, in the words of 
Zein Badjeber, 'looked for a political manoeuvre which will not obstruct ways to 
resume the struggle sometime in the future' .185 Because of this, PPP leaders insisted 
that the only difference to PBB's seemingly more steadfast position was that they 
had 'taken advantage of the momentum' to insert a religious phrase in the law on 
education. Though staying in the MPR, PPP did not use their right to participate but 
left the decision to other factions 'to agree to maintain Paragraph 29 for the time 
being' .186 The PDU Faction took the same stance. PPP MP Ali Hardi Kiai Demak 
recalled: 
Ami en Rais [President of the MPR] said: This session does not decide to amend 
Paragraph 29 [stressing 'this session' and imitating falling hammer]. This means, the 
alternatives are still hoarded for the future ... The chance [to amend Paragraph 29] 
has to be kept alive! If we chose the first option, this would mean to reject the others. 
Then it would be over. [But] saying that we do not make changes at this session, it 
means we are still able to at future sessions.187 
PBB pulled out from the session in dramatic fashion. The party belatedly exposed its 
shari 'ah commitment only from 2000 on but then displayed unfaltering 
determination. Paradoxically, this happened after most doctrinaire Islamists had left 
the party, suggesting that the fortitude with which it defended shari 'ah issues had 
turned into a key issue to consolidate the party internally. On the last day of the MPR 
session, the PBB Faction startled other camps, including Fraksi Reformasi and PPP, 
as it walked out of parliament. 188 In a press release on 10 August 2002, the last day 
of the MPR session, PBB announced it would not follow the MPR decision to 
maintain Paragraph 29 in its original form. Signed by the whole MPR Faction, the 
document was circumspectly worded yet defiant: 
185 Interview, Zein Badjeber, Jakarta, 5 December 2002 (quote). Also interview, Rusdy Hamka, 
Jakarta, 1 December 2002. 
186 Earlier, PPP had also announced it might "walk out". "Pasal29 UUD 1945 ke Naskah Asli", Suara 
Merdeka, 11 August 2002. 
187 Interview, Ali Hardi Kiai Demak, Jakarta, 7 October 2003. 
188 The idea to "walk out" was originally proposed by Ahmad Sumargono, one of the few doctrinaire 
leaders who had remained in the party after the split in the first Congress in May 2000 (see chapter 
two). Notulasi Rapat, p. 17. 
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Today, [we] feel a heavy burden [beban berat], because we have to take a position 
that possibly displeases some members of the MPR. We take a position very 
congruent [lekat] with our conviction. Basically, we still maintain [berketetapan] 
choosing the second option for Paragraph 29.. . We have no intention to step back 
whatsoever [sedikitpun] from this position. If now some factions have decided to 
reject, as an analogy this is like a man who fights his way along a road full 
of. .. thorns. Although we don't have the power to jump over this wall, we only wait 
until the time has come [when] we can continue our way. There is nothing that is not 
possible if Allah wishes it. If you still reject our proposal. .. please note that we, the 
complete PBB Faction won't take part in making this decision [tidak ikut mengambil 
keputusan itu]. 189 
Earlier, in a PBB summit preparing the party's strategy for the upcoming 2002 MPR 
session, regional boards had backed the defiant display of shari 'ah determination. 190 
It dismissed the possibility of voting, as this would have brought the struggle for the 
Charter to a symbolic end. To the contrary, a steadfast position was to 'lay the 
foundations for the future struggle' and further distinguish PBB from PPP, whose 
yielding PBB leaders indirectly described as puny. The party once again beefed up 
its rhetoric. It depicted the view that the state had to take up a central role in 
implementing shariah as a matter of the heart and rationally undebatable, insisting 
that 'what we proposed was not wrong' .191 More than once PBB used a dramatic 
allegory which again underlined the self-perception of the ideologically determined 
keluarga leaders as being fighters for a just cause: 
We wanted to fight but the wall was high. We do not have the power to jump over; 
we also do not have the power to tear it down. But we will not yield. We do not step 
back. We stay at the same place [berhenti di tempat]. Waiting until the time has 
come ... Unlike the others. 192 
In 2001, PBB already had underlined the perceived Divine authorisation of this 
struggle, telling the MPR: 
189 Pernyataan Sikap: Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia, F-PBB MPR, 10 August 2002. 
190 Notulasi Rapat, p. 15. PBB expected to win 12% of party support and not more than an additional 
10% from sympathetic individuals if a secret ballot was held. In an open vote, supporters from other 
camps were expected to stick to the anti-shari'ah line of their parties. Ibid, pp. 3/6. 
191 Interview, Hamdan Zoelva, Jakarta, 4 December 2002. 
192 Interview, Zubair Bakri, Jakarta, 1 October 2003. The 'wall allegory' appeared in several writings 
and statements of Bulan Bintang leaders in 2002. Indeed, some Islamists claimed that the outcome of 
the effort to implement shari' ah was second to the feeling of fulfilling a religious obligation. 
According to Ka'ban, striving to insert shari 'ah into the constitution necessarily 'was less connected 
to the final outcome [of the decision]; what counts is the effort we put behind our ideals.' Interview, 
M.S. Ka'ban, Jakarta, 17 October 2001. 
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The Bulan Bintang Faction will never stop fighting for the implementation of 
shariah Islam. People may think that we are wrong. This is no problem for us, if only 
we are not wrong in the view of Allah. 193 
Another concern was to lose face. Casting a vote on the "seven words", PBB held, 
would be internationally interpreted as if 'Indonesian Muslims rejected shari 'ah 
Islam' .194 Hence, for PBB the outcome of the 2002 MPR session only meant that 
Paragraph 29 will not be altered 'for the time being'. Earlier, in the final statement at 
the 2000 MPR session, PBB had already promised to the Indonesian Muslim 
community that 'your aspiration to insert the Jakarta Charter' will be the agenda of 
the party 'for all time to come' (sepanjang masa). 195 
Other factions reprimanded PBB for allegedly breaching an earlier agreement to 
consult. Perplexed PK MPs in the MPR responded by phoning members of its 
Religious Council to request instructions. On their advise, the whole PK camp of the 
Reform Faction took up PBB's protest and walked out. 196 This change of heart was 
due to concerns that Bulan Bintang leaders could consider reaping political gain from 
their demonstration of resolute behaviour, particularly in the next election campaign. 
PK MPs, displaying a considerable sense for practicalities, feared that had they 
stayed in the MPR, 'later, people will meet us with hostility' .197 
This chapter thus described Islamist pragmatism as explained by their approval of the 
nation state and its institutions as being the authoritative source for legislation. 
Accommodation and compromise were central Islamist characteristics during 1998 to 
193 Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Terhadap Rancangan Putusan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Hasil Sidang Tahunan 2001, FPBB MPR, (no date). 
194 Notulasi Rapat. Debating the party's strategy in the upcoming MPR session, regional boards 
insisted that Muslims made the biggest sacrifices for the nation, whereas the minorities-specifically 
referring to the Hindu population in Bali--contributed nothing. Several board members, for example 
Anwar Shaleh, suggested shifting support to Fraksi Reformasi's proposal for strategic reasons. Others, 
like Ahmad Sumargono, rejected this. 
195 Pendapat Akhir Partai Bulan Bintang 2000. PK MPs have expressed amazement over this 
statement, as it seemed to suggest that to struggle for Islam necessarily had to mean to struggle for the 
Charter. Interview, Irwan PrayitrJo, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. 
196 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. These MPs were Mutammimul 'Ula, 
Irwan Prayitno, Syamsul Balda, Mashadi, Rokhib Abdullah, Sumandjaya and Zivli Rosa, the only 
female PK MP. One PAN MP, Nurdiati Akma, joined PK. "Pasal29 UUD 1945 ke Naskah Asli", 
Suara Merdeka, 11 August 2002. Other PAN members were equally startled by PK' s reaction. 
197 Interview, Irwan Prayitno, Jakarta, 4 and 5 December 2002. 
308 
2002 despite the large amount of internal ideological rhetoric in PK and the 
doctrinaire sections of PBB and the keluarga. This pragmatic imperative has 
prevailed regardless of the inner resistance individual Islamists might preserve 
toward parts of the state's legislation. 
Islamist parties took a pragmatic and flexible stance on a number of high-profile 
issues such as the presidency, shari 'ah and the Jakarta Charter. This was particularly 
evident in the ultimate subordination of the Islamist goal to prevent the secular-
nationalists from dominating post-New Order politics, especially by gaining the 
presidency. The Islamist flexibility was due to a priority given to constitutionalism. 
This notwithstanding, PPP and PBB also acted on a strong desire to position their 
people in post-New Order governments; they thus were inclined to suppress previous 
principles if this desire was met. 
A good example for the pragmatic imperative was when PPP conveniently 
disregarded its previous opposition against Megawati's presidency on doctrinal 
grounds once the chance for its Chairman Hamzah Haz emerged to join her cabinet 
as Vice-President. PPP's emphasis of the argument that Islam disapproved female 
leadership felt in the same context as its support for the Jakarta Charter; both were 
largely motivated by the desire to boost its Islamic record. More pressing than 
doctrinal grounds had been power-related reasons to oppose Megawati from getting 
the presidency. PPP's eventual soft-peddling over shari 'ah issues in the 2002 MPR 
session, however, did not mean that the party discarded shari 'ah goals altogether. 
PPP eased its backing of the Charter but, at the same time, the party ensured that it 
would be able to sustain shari 'ah as party policy in the future. In comparison, PBB, 
with its devotion to the example of Masyumi, unswervingly advocated the Jakarta 
Charter until the last MPR session in 2002. 
While PPP's inconsistency on the presidential issue and shari'ah once again gave an 
indication of the party's internal factionalism, PK sustained its priority toward short-
term reformist goals and carried on with its trademark matter-of-factness toward 
issues the party considered to be out of its reach. Indication of this gave PK' s instant 
subordination of sharia 'h issues when consenting to Abdurrahman Wahid's 
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presidency, a leader the party saw as detrimental to a greater public role of Islam; 
and its neat separation of internal and external reasoning when assessing Megawati' s 
bid for presidency. Convinced that Islam does not permit women to lead a 
government, PK only gave 'undogmatic' reasons for opposing her, in the awareness 
that this was in greater correspondence with the outlook and public concern of the 
early reformasi years. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis is a study into the nature of Indonesian Islamism. It argued in favour of a 
nuanced examination of the beliefs and behaviour of Islamist parties in the four years 
after the end of the New Order (1998-2002). Many scholars of Indonesian Islam have 
characterised Islamist politics as monolithic and contrary to the 'essence' of Islamic 
teachings. They, in effect, portrayed Islamism as an undesirable element in a transitional 
democracy such as Indonesia's. The thesis has critiqued this anti-Islamist discourse as 
biased in its depiction and promotion of Islam as a pluralist-friendly religion and 
questioned the binary conceptions which it uses to analyse Islamist agendas. It argued 
that Indonesian Islamism' s faithfulness to the Constitution and reformist goals have been 
greater than this scholarship suggested. It also argued that rather than being clear-cut and 
unwavering, as many of their critics claim, many other aspects of Islamist politics have 
rather been contradictory (such as the stance on religious pluralism) and formalist-
symbolic or desultory (such as the shari 'ah agenda of several parties). Pragmatism, 
however, has, in most cases, prevailed following the need to appear pluralist and pro-
reform. 
A central theme of the thesis was the Islamist view that Islam should provide the major 
cultural and legal framework for Indonesian society. This conviction, to some extent, 
explains the Islamists' aim to control the government in order to achieve Muslim 
supremacy. The thesis further pointed out that Islamist motives originate in a sense of 
loss of Muslim identity. For Islamists, gaining control of government meant shifting 
political power away from secular and non-Muslim forces, both of which they see as 
having accumulated a disproportionately large share of power since colonial times. The 
objective in controlling government thus meant to counter the long-term effects of 
colonialism, estranging Muslims from Islam and preventing devout Muslims from 
having a prominent political role in independent Indonesia. Because of this belief, 
Islamists are able to explain the electoral success of national and secular parties-such 
as in the June 1999 elections-as the consequence of a larger transformation of Muslims 
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along western-secular parameters together with the West's negative propaganda against 
shari'ah. 
This fixation toward perceived past injustices was greatest in Partai Bulan Bintang 
('Crescent Star Party', PBB) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia ('Indonesian 
Islamic Propagation Council', DDII) with their emotional and ideological ties to the 
legacy of Masyumi. With their obsession about domestic schemes to marginalise 
Muslims, PBB and DDII have shown a distinctive commitment to the national idea and 
to defending the place of Muslims in it. The view that Western interference has 
prevented Indonesia from becoming a great Muslim nation is critical to understanding 
their assertion that a broadly defined Islam was the vital element in Indonesian cultures 
and society. 
At the same time, many Indonesian Muslims see themselves and Islam now as victims of 
a global plot to subjugate Muslim-majority countries. They perceive US policy as 
continuing Dutch interferences into domestic issues with the overall goal to hinder 
Indonesian Muslims from gaining political and economic power. Islamists take this for 
granted and have responded by taking on an unreflective essentialism. Moreover, they 
have remained attached to the assertion that only submission to shari'ah defines a 
Muslim. 
The thesis also showed that Islam's perceived superiority toward other religions has had 
a deep and pervasive impact on Islamists' dealings with other religious communities. 
Islamists usually declare a desire to return Muslims to a full Islamic identity but the 
Islamist ideal has always rather been to make Islam the broader philosophical basis of 
legislation and public affairs. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development 
Party', PPP) and PBB, however, have abandoned this aim due to the controversies over 
the state ideology and the Jakarta Charter since independence. Both parties have since 
then taken on non-interference in minority religious affairs as their guiding rhetorical 
principle by adamantly asserting that non-Muslims would not be affected by the 
constitutional recognition of shari 'ah. 
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The Reformasi Fraction in parliament-the non-Islamist Partai Amanah Nasional 
('National Mandate Party', PAN) and Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK)-claimed to 
overcome the controversy of the original wording of the Jakarta Charter by proposing an 
alternative wording of the Charter clause that omitted shari'ah terms. This option 
showed that the organisation of society in the medieval city of Medina has remained an 
important model for Islamist perceptions of how a Muslim-led society should function. 
It gave a clearer illustration of Islamism's concern for broader piety in society with 
Islam being the overriding factor for creating laws. PK explained its initiative as an 
attempt to overcome the controversy of the Jakarta Charter. In reality, it was a rather 
blatant attempt to appear pluralist-friendly. Party leaders were aware of the 
impracticability of their proposal; their prime concern remained to bring about shari 'ah 
rule. 
The thesis, at the same time, emphasised that there was a gulf between the Islamist 
desire to mould Indonesian society and the awareness of how little support they can 
expect from most Indonesian Muslims. This desire is strongly based on a pre-1955 
election premise for which there was no empiric proof at that time. The electoral share 
oflslamist parties in 1955 (44%) and 1999 (16%) strongly suggested that the majority of 
Indonesian Muslims do not identify themselves with the Islamist agenda, most 
importantly the aim to Islamise the state and the Constitution. Many Islamist notables 
reflected this awareness by refusing to join an Islamist party to face the 1999 elections. 
The thesis portrayed Amien Rais as the most prominent example of a pluralist stance 
that was based in pragmatic considerations. 
Above all, Islamist parties were doubtful about the electoral appeal of shari 'ah issues. 
They, therefore, downplayed their shari'ah agenda by promoting issues likely to have a 
broader electoral appeal. They considered non-Islamist reformasi goals such as 
modifying the Constitution to strengthen parliamentary powers, restoring economic 
growth, battling corruption and ending the army's political role as in step with people's 
hopes in the early reformasi years and as more helpful for increasing their vote. 
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Moreover, all Islamist parties repeatedly changed their positions according to political 
expediency. This became particularly evident in the effort to find a pro-Islamist 
President. In 1998 and 1999, Islamist parties backed President Soeharto's successor B. J. 
Habibie in the belief that he was most likely to secure their position in government and 
prevent the electoral success of the secular nationalist Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-
Peljuangan's ('Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle', PDIP) candidate Megawati 
Soekarnoputri. When Habibie withdrew from the competition in October 1999, Islamist 
parties eventually backed Abdurrahman Wahid. By doing so, they put aside their strong 
misgivings about him, especially relating to his long opposition to an Islamic state and 
his closeness to religious minorities. In 2001, Islamist parties then declared support for 
Megawati. Islamist parties' support for Megawati was contingent on their gaining a 
share of power in her government. The rapprochement with Megawati was particularly 
beneficial for PPP, as it allowed its Chairman Hamzah Haz to become Vice-President. 
The constitutionalism of Islamist parties explained this course of action. At the same 
time, the Islamists' flexibility contrasted with the strong aversions many of them held 
against the secular-nationalism represented by PDIP. 
PPP, PBB and PK pursued similar strategies in presenting themselves to the electorate 
but they followed different political approaches. The political behaviour of PPP and 
PBB was participationist. Both parties sought representation in all post-New Order 
cabinets. The focus on immediate political goals characterised their party culture. The 
ideological thought of both parties has been stagnant and neither had a long-term 
programmatic strategy. They were aware that any call for shari'ah and the Jakarta 
Charter would be defeated in parliament. 
Of all Islamist parties, the thesis argued, PPP' s behaviour was the most blatant mixture 
of Islamism and pragmatism. The party's shari 'ah agenda has mostly been politically 
motivated and its quality was superficial. As there is little ideological depth and 
consensus over ideological propositions, PPP hardly qualifies as a full Islamist party. In 
1998, PPP vigorously promoted central reform issues such as constitutional reform and 
314 
ending the political role of the military. But PPP has always endeavoured to appeal to 
ideologically aware Muslims and pluralist Muslims at once. In the pre-election period, it 
sought to appeal to the umat by restoring Islam as its ideological base and the kab 'ah 
(Holy Shrine) as party symbol. These had been the party's key programmatic issues 
during the New Order. 
In mid-2000, PPP took on the Shari' ah Clause of the Jakarta Charter as one of its prime 
policies. Despite this, its preference for accommodation prevailed. This was apparent in 
PPP' s defence of its shari 'ah policy. Most PPP leaders did not argue that the "seven 
words" of the Shari'ah Clause would put obligation onto the state to enforce Islamic law 
on Muslims, because to do so appeared much less threatening to non-Muslims. To 
portray itself as a champion of shari'ah while downplaying the consequences of its 
constitutional recognition, at the same time, rendered PPP's shari 'ah agenda desultory. 
Such a rationale was in accordance with the party's long-held political culture defined 
by pragmatism and patronage. When PPP split into two parties in early 2002, it was due 
to squabbles over leadership positions both between traditionalists and modernists and 
between the old elite and younger leaders. It was not because of dissimilarity in 
ideology. 
While more unswervingly pro-shari 'ah than PPP, PBB appeared comfortable with a 
symbolic dedication to Masyumi and shari'ah. The party together with other Masyumi 
legatees such as DDII, KISDI and Persis carried on a central part ofMasyumi's tradition 
and program that is the state's responsibility to establish shari'ah among Muslims. This 
group relies heavily upon the legacy of the thought of Mohamad Natsir. Unlike PPP, 
PBB insisted that the Shari'ah Clause would oblige the state to implement Islam, thereby 
taking up Masyumi's position. Today's Masyumi legatees however, have shown little 
interest in examining how Masyumi's ideology could be readapted for today's politics. 
PBB addressed the public on the supposed superiority of shari 'ah rule and lamented 
what it sees as shari'ah's tarnished repute among large sections of the Muslim public 
due to the ongoing impact of imperialism and westemisation. The disinclination of PBB 
to award its avowal for a constitutional acknowledgment of shari 'ah any significant 
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intellectual value gives its commitment an overall formalistic-symbolic quality. Beneath 
the admiration for Masyumi there is bewilderment over the precise content of its 
ideology and what political behaviour it dictated. The conflict and eventual split of PBB 
in 2000 brought this to light. Similar to PPP, PBB seemed not explicitly concerned about 
realising the rule of shari 'ah in contemporary Indonesia and both parties were hesitant in 
making shari 'ah issues immediately public. But ultimately PBB displayed a greater 
eagerness to appear adamant in pursuing ideological goals. 
PK most clearly disconnected the external from the internal discourse. The party 
followed a calculated separation of ideology and behaviour. Internally, PK instructed 
cadres to guard against a global conspiracy to destroy Islam. Externally, the party was 
strongly realist and accommodative toward non-Islamist parties. PK's claim to represent 
virtuous politics made its political behaviour less determined by power concerns. Yet the 
party's outlook entirely fitted the consciously acquiescent approach many Islamist 
parties and organisations had taken on since the 1990s in other parts of the Muslim 
world. Above all, PK' s devotion to reformist ideals and its compliant rhetoric cloaked 
the party's motive to brace Muslims against Western cultural and economic influence 
and ideologies other than Islam. PK committed itself to 'universal' values, above all 
'justice' (keadilan), yet its understanding of the term was fundamentally Islamist. It was 
convinced that justice could only be achieved through comprehensive implementation of 
shari 'ah. Though promoting broader religious values, the party's understanding of a just 
society often centred on the execution of strict legal punishments stipulated in the 
Qur'an. 
Indonesian Islamist parties thus pursued different forms of political pragmatism. The 
argument could be made that PK warrants acceptance as both a party of committed 
democrats and disciples of deeply dogmatic motivations. The paradox is that PK 
members often contributed substantively to policy issues related to democratisation 
whilst the party's ideal perception of society makes democratic processes redundant. 
PK's focus on dakwah (proselytisation) is central to understanding its democratic 
credentials. The party acted on the belief that society needed to be guided back toward a 
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complete Islamic life. Thus, religious enlightenment had to precede the recapture of state 
and government. Once dakwah succeeds, the position of devoted Muslims will 
automatically be strong. 
PK, designed purposely for the fledgling democracy in the post-Soeharto era, thus most 
comprehensively adjusted its agenda to the circumstances while sustaining their vision 
of a post-democratic order in which society is organised along the lines of the medieval 
Medina society with Muslims as the leading community. They, recapping Martin 
Kramer's verdict (page 59), premeditatedly and effectively "repackaged" Islamist 
ideology for a democracy. 
There was no such "repackaging" among PPP and the Masyumi legatees (i.e. PBB). The 
Masyumi legatees adapted their ideology from Masyumi which-like PK-had 
acknowledged democracy and the rule of law as overriding principles for the ideological 
struggle. However, not only had the struggle for shari 'ah to be framed by these 
principles, the Masyumi tradition also perceived and endorsed democracy as the final 
political system. At the same time, PBB-again following Masyumi-maintained that 
for Muslims the judiciary, even in a multi-party system, had to be circumscribed in 
various aspects by the principles of shari 'ah. The party like other Masyumi legatees, 
however, never provided a sound concept of how such a judicial system could be 
practicable. 
Furthermore, the thesis showed that Islamists of all parties displayed a frequent 
disconnection between the practical imperative and personal conviction. This was 
evident in the adjustment of rhetoric to particular circumstances and whether Islamists 
addressed Islamist or plural audiences. Islamists have perceived Indonesia as a country 
that is being "owned" by the Muslim community with non-Muslims being tolerated 
"guests". They have insisted on "Muslim" cultural superiority and that Muslims should 
constitute the leading community in Indonesia. The restricted pluralism of Islamists is 
displayed in their stance on minority rights. Islamists, and again many Muslims in 
pluralist parties, have been tolerant toward the expression of monotheist religions but 
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have repeatedly attempted to discriminate against kepercayaan (syncretic beliefs) and 
polytheist creeds such as Hinduism. Not only Islamists but many politicians in pluralist 
Muslim parties as well see the Islamic canon as endorsing Muslim supremacism. 
Together they view tolerance between the religious communities as vital, although most 
believe that Muslims must also have a bigger share of political power, backed by their 
status as the largest populace in Indonesia. This perception is based in classical Sunni 
doctrine; it has been stirred up by the memories of colonisation and westemisation, and 
it has more recently been fuelled by international politics commonly seen as anti-Islam. 
There were differences among the Islamist parties, however. In both PK and PBB, the 
anti-Semitic and anti-Christian sentiment was largely kept quiet because the parties' 
leadership sought to appear pluralist. PK, however, was more consistent in curbing its 
anti-pluralist side. PPP, in comparison, acted in awareness of having maintained stronger 
links with mainstream Muslims and the large socio-religious organisations Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah. PPP customarily endorsed religious pluralism in its 
endeavours to prove to the public that its self-proclaimed nationalist devotion continued 
despite a shari 'ah agenda and pro-Muslim economic policies. 
In summary, Indonesian Islamism's firm constitutionalism, its affirmation of free vote 
and a free choice of electoral candidates and the acknowledgment that the endorsement 
of ideological goals had to take place within these parameters, renders it compatible with 
democratic politics. The restricted pluralism, however, which is based on tolerance 
toward non-Muslims but bars full equality, has remained a persistent anti-democratic 
facet in Islamist agendas. 
This study has provided some fresh data on the nature of Indonesian Islamism. First of 
all, there is a liberal bias in the scholarship on Indonesian Islam manifest in the 
endorsement of Islamic scripture as pro-pluralist and its dismissal of Islamist ambitions 
as contrary to Islamic theology and history. This scholarship, therefore, fails to see that 
Indonesian Islamism is largely pragmatic and ends-oriented. Islamist parties constantly 
turned to more immediately relevant political goals while putting second ideological 
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purity. Secondly, the Islamist call for shari 'ah often works as a symbol for restoring a 
presumably Muslim national character against a global environment typecast as anti-
Islam. The significance of shari 'ah lies above all in its power as a symbol for this quest. 
Aside from this, Islamist parties tend to have little ideological profundity. PPP and PBB, 
in particular, seemed to care little about a thoughtful discussion of shari 'ah issues. 
Thirdly, constitutional Islamism in Indonesia shows most of the contradictions of 
Islamism operating in multi-party systems elsewhere. This is explained by Islam's claim 
for being the final and true revelation given to mankind on the one hand and Islamism's 
constitutionalism and the demands for compromise and flexibility in power politics on 
the other hand. 
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APPENDIX I 
RESULTS OF THE JUNE 1999 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
Vote in% Number of Seats (in total 462) 
PDIP 33.76 153 
Golkar 22.46 120 
ppp 10.72 58 
PKB 12.62 51 
PAN 7.12 34 
PBB 1.94 13 
PK 1.36 7 
PNU 0.64 5 
PPII Masyumi 0.43 1 
PSII 0.36 1 
PKU 0.28 1 
PUI 0.25 
PSII 1905 0.14 
Masyumi Barn 0.04 
Source Vote in %: Kompas, 27 July 1999 
Source Parliamentary Seats: Komisi Pemilihan Umum ('Electoral Commission', KPU) 
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APPENDIX II: 
KELUARGA BULAN BINTANG NOTABLES 
Name Organisational.Background Political 
Affiliation 
post-1998 
Mohamad Natsir Chairman Masyumi (1945-58) -
(died 1993) Founder DDII (General Chairman 1967-93), 
prominent member of Petition 50, FUI, Persis 
KH Masjkur Co-founder DDII (though mmor role), NV -
(1993) (Chairman 1952-54, Chair NV Konstituante 
Faction, Rois II 1967-71), FUI, Vice-Chairman 
DPR (until1982) 
Prof. Co-Founder DDII (Natsir's deputy 1967-97), first -
Mohammad Minister of Religious Affairs 
Rasjidi (200 1) 
Yunan Nasution DDII (Chair), Masyumi (Secretary-General, 1959), -
(1996) PNI, KNIP 
KH Much tar FUI, Persis (Chair) -
Latief ( 1997) 
Nurulhulda DDII, FUI, Perti 
(2001) 
KH Nur Ali DDII (Chair), Hizbullah/Sabilillah, Komando Jihad, -
(1992) FUI 
KH Misbach DDII (Chair East Java), NV, Hizbullah/Sabilillah, PBB (honorary 
(1999) PII, MUI member) 
KH Sholeh DDII (Chair), Hizbullah/Sabilillah, Komando Jihad, -
Iskandar (1992) FUI 
Buchari Tamam DDII (co-founder & Secretary-General) -
(1994) 
Dr. Anwar DDII (Chair 1993-99), Masyumi (executive PBB (honorary 
Harjono (1999) member, 1959), FUI, GPII, ICMI (board member), member, Vice 
ICDR Secretary-General) 
Hasan Basri DDII (co-founder, treasurer), Masyumi (executive PBB splinter group 
(2001) board member, 1959), GPII, MUI, ICMI (board (2000) 
member) 
Prof. Osman DDII (co-founder), Masyumi (Chair, 1959), scholar -
Raliby (2000?) 
Prof. De liar HMI (Chair, 1953-55) PUI 
Noer 
Afandi Rhidwan DDII (Chairman since 1999), Persis, PUI, GPII, PBB (signatory, 
Batalyon Hizbullah non-active) 
Hussein Umar DDII, KAPPI, PII (Chairman 1969), GPII, ICMI ppp 
(Board), KISDI, KOMP AK 
KH Rusyad DDII (Chair), NV PBB (honorary 
Nurdin (2002) member) 
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Dr. Rifyal DDII (Chair) PBB (unti12001) 
Ka'bah 
Mohammad Masyumi (Secretary MPR Faction) Chairman DDII, PBB 
Soleiman ICMI, FUI PPP (Deputy Chairman MPP, 1989-
1994) 
Cholil Badawi Masyumi, DDII (Chair), PII, PPP -
A.M. Luthfi DDII (Chair), Salman (co-founder), FUI, PII, ICMI PAN 
Hartono DDII (Chair), PII, MI, PPP PBB 
Mardjono (2003) 
Prof. AM DDII (Chair), PPP, ICMI ppp 
Saefuddin 
Dr. Didin DDII (board member), ppp (Secretary MPR -, PK presidential 
Hafidhuddin Faction) candidate 
Prof. Ami en Muhammadiyah, ICMI, DDII (board member) PAN 
Rais 
Ramlan DDII, BAKOMOBIN, GPII, Editor 'Khutbah PBB (Vice 
Mardjoned Jumat' Uoumal) Secretary-General) 
F aisal Baasir Al-Irsyad, PII, KAHMI, DDII (board member) ppp 
Farid HMI, DDII (board member) PBB (until2000) 
Prawiranegara 
KH Kholil DDII (board member), BKSPPI, KISDI PBB (until2000) 
Rid wan 
Yahya Muhammadiyah, DDII (board member) PAN 
Muhaimin 
Prof. Yusril Ihza Muhammadiyah, ICMI, HMI, DDII board Member PBB 
Mahendra (since 1997), Chief Editor Media Dakwah 
Prof. Yusuf HMI, ICMI, DDII (board member) PBB 
Amir Feisal 
Dr. Imaduddin ICMI, DDII (board member), HMI, Salman (ITB, -
Abdulahim founder) 
GeysAmmar DDII (board member), Al-Irsyad (Chairman 1998- PBB (signatory, 
2000) non-active) 
Tamsil Linrung DDII, HMI MPO (Chair 1988-90), GPII, ICMI, PAN 
Centre of International Islamic Education 
Foundation 
Mohammad DDII PAN 
Siddiq 
Abdullah DDII, KAMI, KAPI, HMI (Chair 1979-81), HMI PPII Masyumi 
Hehamahua MPO 
Mawardi Noer Masyumi, GPII, PII, Korps Muballigh Indonesia PPII Masyumi 
(KMI) 






Hamzah Haz General NU, PMII (Chairman BA, Tanjungpura University 
Chairman 1962-65), KAMI (economics) 
Former lecturer and journalist, 
DPR member since 1971, expert in 
budgetary matters 
Alimarwan Secretary MI, PII, HMI Sriwijaya University (law), 
Hanan General Former teacher 
Bahtiar Vice MI, HMI, Parmusi (II) University Medan Area (economics) 
Chams yah Secretary Former teacher, public servant 
General, (Medan, 1974-81), co-publisher (local 
Chair newspaper) 
Faisal Baasir Chair, MI, al-Irsyad (Chair Gadjah Mada University (law), 
Chair MPR Youth Branch 1964-70), Badan Pimpinan Umum Perusahaan 
Faction PII, HMI, Parmusi (II) Bangunan Negara (BPUPBN) 
Zain Badjeber Chair NU (Deputy secretary- Islamic University of Jakarta (law), 
general 1967-71), ppp Former journalist and editor (Pelita, 
DPP since 1973, Chair Harian Duta, Risalah), former 
education department lecturer (law) 
(1984-89) 
Zarkasih Nur Chair NU, PMII, Ansor lAIN Hidayatullah {Islam), 
subsequently economics 
Prof. AM Chair HMI, KAHMI, KAMI, IPB, PhD, (Germany, Food 
Saefuddin KASI, MI, ICMI (Expert Engineering) 
Council), DDII, BKSPPI Former lecturer, consultant (World 
Bank, UNDP, IFAD), Director UIKA 
(Bogor), State Minister of Agrarian 
Affairs 
Rusjdi Hamka Chair MI, Muhammadiyah, Academy of Journalism, 
Parmusi Former chief editor (Panji 
Masyarakat), A1-Azhar educational 
foundation 
Tosari Secretary- NU, IPNU, PMII, SPSI lAIN Malang 
Widjaya General, 
Chair 
Lukman MP NU Pondok Pesantren Modern Gontor, 
Hakiem University Islam As-Syafi'iyah 
Saifuddin (Dakwah Faculty), 
Active in the Pesantren Al-Hamidiyah 
and the Saifuddin Zuhri Foundation 
Husnie Chair, Vice MI, KAPPI lAIN Y ogyakarta 
Thamrin Chairman 
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(d. 2003) MPR 
Faction 
KH Zainuddin Chair, NU (self-proclaimed), lAIN Hidayatullah, 
MZ (= Head Golkar Prominent preacher (TV) 
Muhammad Lajnah 
Zein) Syuro* 
Ismail Hasan Chairman MI, PII, HMI, ICMI -
Metareum MPP 
KH En dang Vice HMI, PMII, PUI, MUI, University Padjadjaran (Socio-
Zainal Abidin Chairman Perti politics), STHI Sukabumi, 
MPP Former teacher (pesantren) 
KH Munzir Chairman NU,MUI University Nahdlatul Ulama (Solo), 
Tamam MPP University of Baghdad, 
Former teacher (Institute of Qur'anic 
Science, As-Syafiyah etc.) 
Ali Hardi Vice Muhammadiyah, KNPI, University Sam Ratulangi (law), 
Kiaidemak Chairman, MI, Parmusi Former lawyer 
MPP 
Jusuf Syakir Vice MI,HMI Chair of Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan 
Chairman Penyelenggara Negara (KPKPN), 
MPP DPA Chairman 
Chozin Vice PMII, GP Ansor, NU, lAIN Sunun Gunung (Shari'ah), 






Name Position & Professional 
Prof. Yusril General YISC al-Azhar, HMI, Madrasah Islam 'al-Jihad', Perguruan 
Ihza Mahendra Chairman DDII, ICMI, Islam (Belitung, MA), Law and 
Muhammadiyah, Literature (Universitas Indonesia), 
.. 
actiVIst at ARH Science University of Malaysia (PhD), 
mosque (Salemba) Former university professor (law), staff 
in State Secretary and Soeharto's 
speech writer (1994-99), assistant of 
Secretary of State, Director of law firm 
"YIM and Partners" 
MS Ka'ban Secretary- HMI, HMI MPO, al- Economics, (University Jayabaya), 
General Irsyad, FUI, KISDI Former student activist, lecturer at 
pesantren and several universities 
Sahar L. Deputy Al-Irsyad, HMI Director ofGAMI Press (until2002) 
Hassan Secretary- MPO, DDII 
General, Deputy (LIPPM), PPP 
Chairman (since 
2000) 
Mohammad Chair Syuro Masyumi, DDII, 
Soleiman Council ICMI, ppp (Vice 
Chairman MPP) 
Dr. Rifyal Chair (until DDII University of Cairo (Law, PhD), 
Ka'bah 2001) Supreme Court Judge (since 2001) 
KH Kholil Deputy Chairman DDII, KISDI, Head of pesantren (Cibubur, South 
Rid wan (until2000) BKSPPI (Head), PII Jakarta) 
Abdul Qadir Chair (until KAPPI, PII, GPII Islamic University of Indonesia, 
Djaelani 2001) (Chair), Komando Director (formerly lecturer) Perguruan 
Jihad, Indonesian Tinggi Dakwah Islam, ('College of 
Islamic Preachers' Islamic Propagation', PTDI), lecturer at 
Corps (Korps Institut Pertanian Bogor ('Bogor 
Muballigh Indonesia) Agricultural Institute', IPB) 
Hartono Deputy Chairman Parmusi, ppp (MI), University of Indonesia (Law), 
Marjdono (d. (until2001) HMI, PII, HMI, DDII Lawyer and lecturer (Law, University 
2003) (Deputy Chairman), Muhammadiyah Jakarta, lAIN 
ICMI, Hizbul Hidayatullah Jakarta), Vice Chairman 
Wathan, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung ('Supreme 
Muhammadiyah Advisory Council', DPA) 
Ahmad Deputy Chairman KISDI, Darul Islam, Economics (University of Indonesia) 
Sumargono (2000-2004), Jakarta Preachers' 
Head of MPR Corps (Korps 
Faction (since Muballigh Jakarta) 
2000) 
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Zubair Bakri Deputy Chairman PII, Hizbul Wathan, University of Zaitun (Tunisia), 
(since 2000) ppp (MI) Hasanuddin University (Literature) 
Hamdan Vice Secretary- HMI, PPMI, API Law (Makassar University), 
Zoelva General, Former law consultant (1988-90), 
Chairman (since attorney 
2000) 
Eggy Sudjana Chair (until HMI MPO (Chair), Chairman Perserikatan Petani Muslim 
2000) PPP, PPMI, ICMI Indonesia ('Indonesian Muslim 
(Cides), Parmusi Workers Brotherhood', PPMI) 
Fadli Zon Chair (until GPI, KNPI, CPDS University of Indonesia (Russian 
2000) Literature), former editor (Horison), 
director of 'Institute for Policy Studies' 
(IPS) 
Abdurrahman Chair ICMI Former attorney, supreme court judge; 
Saleh now Attorney General 
Adian Husaini Deputy PWI, HMI (Bogor), IPB (veterinary studies), several 
Secretary- 'Spiritual Islamic pesantren, lastly Ulil Albab (Bogor), 
General (until Body' IPB (Chair), prolific writer, former journalist (Berita 
2000) KISDI Buana, Republika, Media Dakwah), 
Member of 'Commision for Harmony 
between Religious Constituencies' 
(affiliated with MUI) 
Prof. Yusuf Chair West Java PPI, HMI, ICMI PhD, IKIP Ban dung (Teaching and 
Amir Feisal Education), 
Former university professor 
Anwar Sanusi Deputy Chairman ppp TV preacher 
(until 2000) 
Anwar Saleh Chairman (since DDII, PII, GPI -
2000) (Chairman) 
Farid Chair (until HMI Economist, President Director of Energi 
Prawiranegara 2001) Nusantara Group, involved in 'Institute 
for Policy Studies' (IPS) 
Suaib Didu Deputy GPI (Chair) Coordinator mission of Indonesian 





Ellucational& Professional Background 
Dr. Nur President (1998 Al-Ghifari (at IPB) IPB, PhD (University of Texas), (food 
Mahmudi to May2000) technology), Scientist at BPPT (Institute for 
Ismail the Study and Application of Technology) 
Dr. MPP Chair, PII, HMI, PPI (Saudi Pesantren Walisongo, lAIN Yogyakarta 
Hidayat President Arabia), tarbiyah (Shari'ah Faculty), PhD, Islamic University of 
NurWahid (2000-2005) activist Medinah (Faculty Dakwah & Ushuluddin) 
Director al-Haramain Foundation, Jakarta, 
Head of Forum Dakwah Indonesia 
('Indonesian Dakwah Forum' FDI), former 
lecturer at lAIN Jakarta, Co-founder Forum 
Indonesia Damai ('Forum for a Peaceful 
Indonesia') 
KH Chair MPP, Tarbiyah activist Asy-Syafi'iyah (university), 
Rahmat Chair Syuro Preacher, Sabili co-founder (with Zainal 
Abdullah Council (2000- Muttaqin), Director Islamic Centre lqro' 
5) 
Dr. Salim Chair Shar'iah Tarbiyah activist PhD (1986), University of Medina, Saudi 
Segaf-Al Council (2000- Arabia, (shari 'ah) 
Jufri 5) Preacher, Lecturer LIPIA (Shariah Faculty), 
lAIN Syahid, Head Shari'ah Council PT. 
AR VA, Director of 'Shari' ah Consultation 
Centre', Head of the 'Indonesian Committee 
for Solidarity with Afghanistan' (KISA), 
Head of al-Haraih Foundation 
Anis Matta Secretary- Ikatan Pelajar Pesantren Muhammadiyah, LIPIA (Shari'ah 
general (1998- Muhammadiyah, faculty), 
2002) Tarbiyah Director al-Manar Foundation, Jakarta, 
Khairu Ummah 
Dr. lrwan Chair Public HMI, ICMI University Putra Malaysia (training 
Prayitno Relations/D PR management, PhD), training (dakwah) 
member, PK (Padang, UI), 
Malaysia Economist, University Lecturer (Unand), 
Director of ADZKIA Foundation, business 
consultant 
Dr. Daud Vice Chairman PUI, DDII, University of Medinah (shar'iah Faculty, 
Rasyid Shari'ah PhD), 
Council Lecturer (lAIN Hidayatullah, Jakarta) and 
preacher, prolific writer, member of shari 'ah 
'Team of Advisors' for the Ministry of Justice 
Mahfudz Head of Dakwah activist at UI University of Indonesia, 
Siddieq Cadreisation (Socio-political Active at SIDIK (sometimes: 'Siddieq') 
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faculty) Foundation, Jakarta, Director Islamic Centre 
Iqro' 
Mutammi DPR, Head OSIS al-Islam PII SMA al-Islam (Solo), International Law 
mul 'Ula Politics & Law (Chair 1983-86), (Diponegoro University), 
Department DDII and tarbiyah prolific writer, editorial board Gema Insani 
DPP (98-00) activist Press, former lecturer at Asy-Syafi'yah 
Head, Law & University, Ibnu Khaldun University (Bogor) 
Human Rights and Djuanda University (Bogor) 
Department 
Abdul MPP, Chair Tarbiyah activist University of Indonesia (Arab Literature) 
Habib Cadreisation Founder of al-Hikmah Foundation 
Hasan Department 
Abdi Deputy LMD (Salman), PII lAIN Sunan Kalijaga (Yogyakarta), 
Sumaithi Chairman MPP (West-Java), HMI, University Ibn Suud (Riyad, journalism), 
(Abu (2000-05) PPI (Saudi Arabia), Leading Dakwah activist, SIDIK (Siddieq) 
Ridho) DDII (affiliated), FUI Foundation (Chair), co-founder al-Ishlahy 
Press, prolific writer 
Fahri Head, KAMMI (Founding Economics (University oflndonesia), 
Hamzah Department of Chair), Tarbiyah, PPP Former leading student activist, religious 
Communication (MPR Faction) instructor (UI), al-Manar Foundation, CYFIS 
& Networking 
KH Yusuf Deputy Active at the Shari 'ah Consultation Centre, 
Supendi Chairman Jakarta 
Shari'ah 
Council 
Mashadi MP PII (East Java), Former journalist (Kiblat, Saksi, Media 
KISDI, DDII, GPI Dakwah), researcher at Siddieq Foundation, 
Jakarta 
Syamsul MP Economics 
Balda 





MINISTERS OF ISLAMIST PARTIES AND FRAKSI REFORMASI 
Prof. Dr. Burhanuddin Jusuf Habibie Cabinet (22 May 1998- 26 October 1999) 
Hamzah Haz (PPP), State Minister* oflnvestment 
Prof. A.M. Saefuddin (PPP), State Minister of Agrarian Affairs 
First Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet (26 October 1999-23 August 2000) 
Prof. Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Minister of Law and Legislation 
Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail (PK), Minister of Forestry and Plantation 
Y ahya Muhaimin (PAN), Minister of National Education 
Bambang Sudibjo (PAN), Finance Minister 
Hamzah Haz (PPP), Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty 
Eradication** 
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Hazballah M. Saad (PAN), State Minister ofHuman Rights Affairs 
Al-Hilal Hamdi (PAN), State Minister ofTransmigration and Population 
Second Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet (23 August 2000-1 June 2001) 
Prof. Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Minister of Law and Human Rights*** 
Dr. Nur Mahmudi Ismail (PK), Minister of Forestry and Plantation**** 
Yahya Muhaimin, Minister ofNational Education 
Al-Hilal Hamdi, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration 
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Third Abdurrahman Wahid Cabinet (1 June 2001-9 August 2001) 
Yahya Muhaimin, Minister ofNational Education 
Al-Hilal Hamdi, Minister of Manpower and Transmigration 
Zarkasih Nur (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Megawati Soekarnoputri Cabinet (9 August 2001) 
Hamzah Haz (PPP), Vice-President 
Bahtiar Chamsyah (PPP), Minister of Social Affairs 
Prof. Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Minister of Justice and Human Rights 
Hatta Radjasa (PAN): State Minister Research and Technology 
Aliwarman Hanan (PPP), State Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
* State ministerial positions have no portfolios 
**Dismissed in November 1999 
***Dismissed in February 2001 
****Dismissed in March 2001 
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Abdillah Toha (24 August 2000): PAN chairman (nationalist section) 
Abdul Habib Hasan (19 September 2000): activist in PK's cadreisation department 
Abdullah Hehamahua (15 & 21 September 2000, 6 February 2001): PPII Masyumi 
chairman, former HMI chairman 
Abdurrahman Saleh (September 2000): PBB chairman 
Abu Ridho (17 October, 15 November 2000 and 11 April2001): leading PK 
Ideologue and activist, prolific writer on international Islamic issues 
Adian Husaini (30 October 2001): doctrinaire Islamist PBB deputy secretary general 
(until 2000), KISDI secretary, prolific writer 
Agus Dwiwarsono (11 April 2001 and 6 October 2003): deputy-secretary general 
PBB, head of cadreisation section 
Ahmad Sumargono (10 November 2000): doctrinaire Islamist chairman and head of 
DPR faction ofPBB, formerly chairman ofKISDI 
Ali Hardi Kiai Demak (7 October 2003): PPP chairman and MP, Parmusi chairman 
Ali Yafie, KH, Prof. (22 July 1999): NU-based chairman ofMajelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI) until early 2000 
Anas Urbaningrum (16 March 2001): HMI chairman (1998-2000) and leading 
younger Muslim intellectual 
Andi Rahmat (22 January & 6 March 2001): Chairman KAMMI (1999-2001) 
Anis Matta (13 June 1999, 4 & 5 October 2000, 23 January 2001, 11 October 2003): 
PK secretary-general 
Anwar Saleh (29 September 2000): PBB chair and former GPI chairman 
Daud Rasyid, Dr. (5 November 2001): deputy chairman PK Shari'ah Council and 
DDII-affiliated tarbiyah activist 
Deliar Noer, Prof., (9 October 2000 & 28 November 2001): chairman PUI and 
leading academic on politics and Islam 
Djafar Badjeber (24 October 2001): Chair PPP DKI Jakarta (until2002) 
Djayadi (23 January & 6 February 2001): PII chairman (2000-2) 
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Fahri Hamzah (November 2000 and 2 April2001): chairman KAMMI (until1999), 
chairman PK, leading Islamic student activist 
Fahruddin (24 August 2000): HMI chairman (2000-2002) 
Faisal Baasir (31 October 2000 & 19 October 2001): PPP chair, head ofMPR 
faction, Parmusi chairman 
Farid Prawiranegara (12 July 1999): PBB chairman, son ofMasyumi chief 
economist Syafruddin Prawiranegara 
Hakam Nadja (20 November 2001): PAN chairman (Islamist section), former PII 
chairman (1998-2000) 
Hamdan Zoelva (6 September 2000,4 December 2002): PBB politician and MP 
Hartono A. Jaiz (16 November 2001): DDII-basedjoumalist and writer 
Hartono Mardjono (5 & 13 September 2000, 25 January 2001): veteran 
politician: PBB (to 2001), formerly PPP, died in 2003 
Hatta Radjasa (29 August & 6 November 2000): PAN secretary-general 
Hidayat Nur Wahid, Dr., (29 August & 23 October 2000, 9 March 2001 [together 
with Elly Burhaini Faisal, journalist of the magazine Panji Masyarakat and 
Anas Urbaningrum], 12 April2001): president Partai Keadilan (since 2000) 
Husein Umar (September & 3 October 2000,24 November 2001): DDII general 
secretary, PPP chairman and MP 
Imam Muchrozi (22 January 2001): chairman PK West Java 
Imam Rulyawan (5 April2001): Islamic activist at the Dental Faculty of the 
University of Indonesia (UI), Jakarta 
lrwan Prayitno, Dr., (4 & 5 December 2002): PK ideologue and the party's chief-
economist 
Ismail Hasan Metareum (18 September 2000): former PPP General Chairman (1993 
-1998), chairman ofPPP's 'Advisory Council" (MPP) 
Jurhum Lantong (17 October & 6 November 2001): Deputy Chairman ofPBB's 
Jakarta branch 
Ka'ban, M.S., (4 August, 19 September & 12 October 2000, 17 October 2001): PBB 
secretary general, head of MPR faction 
Kholil Ridwan, KH, (8 November 2001): doctrinaire Islamist deputy chairman PBB 
(until 2000), DDII member 
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Lukman Hakiem Saifuddin (24 October & 2 November 2000, 14 January 2001): NU 
- based PPP MP 
Lukman Hakiem (27 November 2001): DDII-based PPP activist, prolific writer and 
editor 
Luthfi, A. M., (7 and 21 November 2000): PAN chairman (Islamist section), DDII 
chairman 
Mohammad Hafiz (16 April2001): leading DDII-affiliated tarbiyah activist 
Mahfudz Siddiq (5 April & 17 October 2001): Head ofPK's cadresation section 
Mashadi (9 November 2000 & 8 February 2001): PK-based MP ofFraksi Reformasi 
Miqdad Hussein (26 July 2000 & 1 November 2001): PPP activist 
Mohammad Soleiman (29 September 2000): DDII chair, chairman ofPBB's Syuro 
Council 
Patrialis Akbar (29 August & 6 November 2000): PAN chairman (Islamist section) 
and MP of Fraksi Reformasi 
Ridwan Saidi (11 & 18 September 2000): Masyumi Baru founder, former PPP MP 
and HMI chairman 
Rifyal Ka'bah, Dr., (27 July & 22 September 2000, 5 February 2001): PBB 
DDII chairman, academic 
Ramlan Mardjoned (12 November 2001): Deputy secretary general PBB, formerly 
N atsir' s secretary 
Mutammimul 'Ula (4 September and 10 October 2000, 14 January 2003): PK 
ideologue, Head of Department of Law and Human Rights, MP for Fraksi 
Reformasi 
Rusdy Hamka (1 December 2002): MI-based, senior PPP politician 
Sahar L. Hassan (15 March & 30 November 2001,6 October 2003): deputy chairman 
PBB (since 2000), formerly deputy-secretary general 
Salim Segaf, Dr., (20 October & 29 November 2001): Chairman ofPK's Shari'ah 
Council 
Suaib Didu (16 & 19 November 2001): doctrinaire Islamist PBB deputy secretary 
general, chairman GPI 
Tosari Widjaya (30 June 1999): NU- based, veteran PPP politician 
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Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Prof., (22 November 2001): pragmatic PBB general chairman, 
minister in various cabinets and leading authority on legal issues 
Zeinal Endang Abidin, K.H., (14 January 2003): NU-based chairman ofthe PPP 
'Advisory Council' (MPP) 
Zein Badjeber (5 December 2002): veteran PPP politician 
Group Interviews: 
Fahri Hamzah, Andi Rahmat and several KAMMI activists: 16 January 2001 




I. Primary Sources 
1. Official Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Publications 
i.) Books and Pamphlets 
Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Khittah Perjuangan dan 
Pernyataan Politik Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Jakarta, 1984 
Buang, Muhammad, A.S Darussamin, Alihardi Kiai Demak, Lukman Hakiem, 
Endin A. J. Soefihara and Rasyid R. Sulaiman (compilers), Menuju 
Reformasi Politik, Ekonomi, dan Hukum: Perjuangan Fraksi Persatuan 
Pembangunan dalam Sidang Umum MPR 1998, FPP MPR-RI, Jakarta, 1998 
Darmawan, Alfian M., Ismail Hasan Metareum, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Endin A. 
J. Soefihara, and M. Kaoy Syah (compilers), Perubahan Demi Keadilan 
Untuk Kepentingan Rakyat, DPP PPP, Jakarta, 1998 
Hakiem, Lukman (compiler), Api Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam - Membangun 
Indonesia Yang Adil dan Beradab: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan 
Pembangunan Pada Sidang Istimewa MPR RJ10-13 Nopember 1998, FPP 
MPR RI, Jakarta, 1999 
__ (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi 
Persatuan Pembangunan dalam Badan Pekelja Sidang Istimewa MPR Rl 15-
30 September 1998, Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI, Jakarta, 1998 
__ (compiler), Politik A mar Ma 'ruf Nahi Munkar- Peljuangan dan Sikap Politik 
Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan pada Sidang Tahunan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tahun 2000, FPP MPR- RI, 
Jakarta, 2000 
Haz, Hamzah, Rapatkan Shaf- Tegakkan A mar Ma 'ruf Nahi Munkar, DPP PPP, 
Jakarta, (no date) 
"Jangan Mencurigai Rakyat (Tambahan Penjelesan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia terhadap Rancangan 
Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Pencabutan TAP MPR No. IV/MPR/1983 tentang 
Referendum Disampaikan pada Sidang Komisi B Sidang Istimewa Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tanggal12 November 1998)", 
reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam 
- Membangun Indonesia Yang Adil dan Beradab: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi 
Persatuan Pembangunan Pada Sidang Istimewa MP R Rl 10-13 Nopember 
1998, FPP MPR RI, Jakarta, 1999, pp. 91-94. 
"J ati Diri Partai Persatuan Pembangunan", reprinted in Muhammad Buang, 
A. S. Darussamin, Alihardi Kiai Demak, Lukman Hakiem, Endin A. J. 
Soefihara and Rasyid R. Sulaiman (compilers), Menuju Reformasi Politik, 
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Ekonomi, dan Hukum: Perjuangan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan dalam 
Sidang Umum MPR 1998, FPP MPR- RI, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 19-28 
"Kata Pengantar Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api 
Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam- Membangun Indonesia Yang Adil dan 
Beradab: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Pada Sidang 
Istimewa MPR RI 10-13 Nopember 1998, FPP MPR RI, Jakarta, 1999, pp. 
xxi-xxvii 
Keputusan Muktamar III Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, DPP PPP, 1994 
Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(Nomor: 01/Mukernas/PPP/VIII/2000) tentang Pemantapan Visi, 
Misi/Khidmat, dan Paradigma Baru Serta Reposisi Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, 2 August 2000 
Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(Nomor: 03/Mukernas/PPP/VIII/2000) tentang Pernyataan Politik dan 
Rekomendasi Mukernas Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 2 August 2000 
Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) III Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, 16-18 Juli 2002 
Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar IV Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, DPP PPP, 
Jakarta, 1999 
"Koreksi Total dan Kelanjutan Perjuangan (Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan 
Pembangunan MPR-RI Pada Rapat Paripuma Badan Peketja MPR-RI 
Tanggal 15 September 1998)" reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), 
Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan 
Pembangunan dalam Badan Pekerja Sidang Istimewa MPR RI 15-30 
September 1998, Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 
29-59 
Lampiran: Keputusan Mukernas II PPP Nomor: 02/Mukernas/PPP/X/2001 tanggal 
14 Oktober 2001: Rekomendasi Internal Musyawarah Kerja Nasional II 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, 13-14 Oktober 2001 
Lampiran II: Keputusan Mukernas II PPP Nomor 01/Mukernas/PPP/X/2001 tanggal 
14 Oktober 2001 
Lampiran Keputusan Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (Mukernas) III Nomor: 
04/Kep/Mukernas III/PPP/VII/2002, 29 July 2002 
"Menangkal Gagasan Federalisme Dengan Menegakkan Keadilan (Tambahan 
Penjelasan atas Pengantar Musyawarah Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia terhadap 1. Rancangan 
Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Penyelanggaraan Otonomi Daerah, Pengaturan 
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Pembagian dan Pemanfaatan Keuangan Pusat dan Daerah dalam Kerangka 
Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia 2. Rancangan Ketetapan MPR RI 
tentang Politik Ekonomi Disampaikan dalam Rapat Komisi D Sidang 
Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tanggal 12 
November 1998)", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi 
Tidak Boleh Padam: Senerai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Pada 
Sidang Istimewa MPR RI 10-13 November 1998, FPP MPR, Jakarta, 1999, 
pp. 150-165 
"Meniti Zaman Bersama Partai Persatuan Pembangunan", in Muhammad Buang, 
A. S. Darussamin, Alihardi Kiai Demak, Lukman Hakiem, Endin A. J. 
Soefihara and Rasyid R. Sulaiman (compilers), Menuju Reformasi Politik, 
Ekonomi, dan Hukum: Perjuangan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan dalam 
Sidang Umum MP R 1998, FPP MPR -RI, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 8-9 
Metareum, Ismail Hasan, Menuju Praktik Politik Yang Bermoral, DPP PPP, 1996 
__ , "Perubahan Demi Keadilan Untuk Kepentingan Rakyat", in Alfian M. 
Darmawan, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Endin A. J. 
Soefihara and M. Kaoy Syah (compilers), Perubahan Demi Keadilan Untuk 
Kepentingan Rakyat, DPP PPP, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 18-25 
__ , "Reformasi Tidak Bisa Ditunda Lagi", in Alfian M. Darmawan, Ismail 
Hasan Metareum, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, Endin A. J. Soefihara and M. 
Kaoy Syah (compilers), Perubahan Demi Keadilan Untuk Kepentingan 
Rakyat, DPP PPP, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 26-38 
"P-4 Harus Dicabut (Penjelasan Tambahan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI 
terhadap Rancangan Ketetapan tentang Pencabutan Ketetapan MPR-RI 
No.II/MPR/1978 tentang Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila 
(Eka Prasetnya Pancakarsa) Tanggal18 September 1998", reprinted in 
Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Senarai 
Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan dalam Badan Pekerja Sidang 
Istimewa MPR RI 15-30 September 1998, Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan 
MPR RI, Jakarta, 1998, pp. 119-22 
Pandangan Dan Pendapat Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Tentang Memorandum II 
Sebagai Kelanjutan Memorandum I DPR RI Tangga/1 Pebruari 2001 
Disampaikan Dalam Rapat Paripurna Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia Hari Senin Tangga/30 Apri/2001 
"Paradigma Baru Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)", reprinted in Media 
Persatuan, November 2000, p. 3 
Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Tentang 
Pertahanan Negara, 21 March 2001 
Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis 
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Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Atas Hasil Kerja Badan 
Pekerja MPR RI Disampaikan pada Rapat Paripurna Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 4 November 2001 
Pemandangan Umum Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia terhadap Hasil-hasil Badan 
Pekerja MPR-RI tentang Perubahan Kedua Undang-Undang Dasar Negara 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 dan Rancangan-rancangan Ketetapan 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Lainnya disampaikan 
pada Rapat Paripurna Sidang Paripurna Sidang Tahunan MPR-RI tanggal 
10 Agustus 2000, also reprinted in Lukman Hak:iem (compiler), Politik Amar 
Ma 'ruf Nahi Munkar- Perjuangan dan Sikap Politik Fraksi Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan pada Sidang Tahunan Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tahun 2000, FPP MPR- RI, Jakarta, 2000 
Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia terhadap Rancangan Ketetapan Hasil Komisi-komisi 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, 8 November 2001 
Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Terhadap Rancangan Undang 
-Undang Tentang Pengadilan HakAsasi Manusia Dalam Rapat Paripurna 
DPR-RI Tanggal 06 Nopember 2000 
"Pengantar Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Persatuan Pembangunan" in Lukman 
Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan Rakyat: Senarai Gagasan 
Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan dalam Badan Pekerja Sidang Istimewa MPR 
RI 15-30 September 1998, Frak:si Persatuan Pembangunan MPR RI, Jakarta, 
1998, pp. 11-22 
Peraturan Tata Tertib Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Republik Indonesia, FPP, DPR- RI, Jakarta, 1998 
"Pemyataan Politik Muktamar IV Partai Persatuan Pembangunan", reprinted in 
Ketetapan-Ketetapan Muktamar IV Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, DPP 
PPP,Jak:arta,pp. 183-4 
Pernyataan Politik Pertai (sic) Persatuan Pembangunan: Hasil Rapat Pimpinan 
Nasional I di Jakarta, 31 Maret-1 April 1999 
Pernyataan Politik Rapat Pimpinan Nasional-11 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
Jakarta, 14-15 Juni 1999 
Pidato Ketua Umum Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Dr. H 
Hamzah Haz Pada Peringatan Hari Lahir KE-26 Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, Jakarta, 5 Januari 1999, DPP PPP, 1999 
Program Perjuangan (Khittah) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan -Mas a Bakti 1998 
-2002 (Ketetapan Muktamar IV PPP Nomor: VI!Muktamar IV/PPP/XII/1998) 
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"Siaran Pers", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Menegakkan Kedaulatan 
Rakyat: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan dalam Badan 
Pekerja Sidang Istimewa MPR RI 15-30 September 1998, Fraksi Persatuan 
Pembangunan MPR RI, 1998, Jakarta, pp. 240-46 
"Sikap Politik Kita: Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia terhadap Hasil-hasil Komisi 
Majelis Sidang Tahunan MPR RII disampaikan dalam Rapat Paripuma 
Sidang Tahunan MPR RI pada tanggal15 Agustus 2000", reprinted in 
Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Politik Amar Maruf Nahi Munkar: Perjuangan 
dan Sikap Politik FPPP pada ST MPR RI Tahun 2000, FPPP MPR, Jakarta, 
2000,pp.95-116 
Sistem Pelatihan Kader Partai Persatuan Pembangunan Buku Satu, DPP PPP 
Pusat Pendidikan dan Pelatihan, (no place, no date, probably 1995) 
"Suara Hati Nurani Rakyat Telah Kami Suarakan Di Majelis (Pendapat Akhir Mini 
Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Republik Indonesia 
terhadap Rancangan Ketetapan MPR RI tentang Politik Ekonomi dalam 
Rangka Demokrasi Ekonomi Disampaikan dalam Rapat Komisi D Sidang 
Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tanggal12 
November 1998)", reprinted in Lukman Hakiem (compiler), Api Demokrasi 
Tidak Boleh Padam- Membangun Indonesia Yang Adil dan Beradab: 
Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan Pada Sidang Istimewa 
MPR RI 10-13 Nopember 1998, FPP MPR RI, Jakarta, 1999, pp. 166-68 
"Tinggalkan Kepentingan-Kepentingan Sesaat (Pemandangan Umum Fraksi 
Persatuan Pembangunan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia terhadap Rancangan-Rancangan Ketetapan Hasil Badan Pekerja 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Disampaikan dalam 
Rapat Paripuma Sidang Istimewa Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia Tanggal 11 November 1998)" reprinted in Lukman Hakiem 
(compiler), Api Demokrasi Tidak Boleh Padam- Membangun Indonesia 
Yang Adil dan Beradab: Senarai Gagasan Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan 
Pada Sidang Istimewa MPR RI 10-13 Nopember 1998, FPP MPR RI, Jakarta, 
1999, pp 1-45. 
ii.) Periodicals 
Media Persatuan, DPP PPP, No. 72 (November 2000), No. 76 (Juli 2001), No. 77 
(Agustus 2001), No. 78 (September 2001), No. 79 (Oktober 2001), and No. 
85 (Juli 2002) 
2. Official Partai Bulan Bintang Publications 
i.) Books and Pamphlets 
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A Brief Profile of Partai Bulan Bintang, (no place, no date, probably 1998) 
Draft Pernyataan Silwp Partai Bulan Bintang: Selamat Tinggal 1998, Selamat 
Datang 1999, Jakarta, 30 December 1998 
Harjono, Anwar, address at the official declaration ofPBB, reprinted under 
"Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang" in Ramlan Mardjoned, Sejarah Partai 
Bulan Bintang- Dari MIA! sampai Deklarasi Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP 
PBB, Jakarta, 2001, pp. 73-80 
Hasil Mukernas (Musyawarah Kerja Nasional)-I Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP Partai 
Bulan Bintang, (no place), 1999 
Hasil Mukernas Partai Bulan Bintang Yogyakarta 15-17 September 2000, DPP 
Partai Bulan Bintang, (no place), 2000 
Hasil Muktamar I Partai Bulan Bintang, DPP PBB, Jakarta, 2000 
"Inilah Jalanku ":Bahan Kampanye Untuk Jurkam Partai Bulan Bintang, DPW 
Partai Bulan Bintang Jawa Tengah, (no date, probably 1999) 
"Kata Pengatar", in Haril M. Andersen, Hamdani, Husni Jum'at, Nasruddin Muharor 
and Zauri Fathin (eds.), Memperjuangkan Syariat Islam: Kumpulan Pidato 
Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Pada Sidang Tahunan Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia Tahun 2000-2002, Fraksi PBB 
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